RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0091P (6th Cir.) File Name: 00a0091p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

;  LATANA SLAYTON,  Plaintiff-Appellee,   No. 98-4528 v.  > OHIO DEPARTMENT OF   Defendant-Appellant.  YOUTH SERVICES,

 1 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Akron. No. 97-01742—David D. Dowd, Jr., District Judge. Argued: January 28, 1900 Decided and Filed: March 14, 2000 Before: JONES, NORRIS, and SILER, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Noelle T. Tsevdos, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL EMPLOYMENT LAW SECTION, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Edward L. Gilbert, Akron, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Noelle T. Tsevdos, Joseph D. Rubino, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

1 2 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. No. 98-4528 No. 98-4528 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. 15

EMPLOYMENT LAW SECTION, Columbus, Ohio, for York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989) Appellant. Edward L. Gilbert, Akron, Ohio, for Appellee. (holding that a hostile environment deprived victim of “a fair and equal opportunity . . . to succeed at her position”). _________________ Indeed, given Slayton’s work environment, the district court found that she was “programmed for failure.” J.A. at 110. OPINION Without evidence that Slayton’s reinstatement would unduly _________________ displace an innocent third party or result in unnecessary hostility, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellee discretion in ordering reinstatement. Latana Slayton sued Defendant-Appellant Ohio Department of Youth Services (“DYS”), asserting that it violated her right III. to be free from gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (West 1999). Because we do not find error in any of the district court’s Slayton claimed inter alia that DYS maintained a sexually holdings, we AFFIRM its judgment. hostile work environment and that it terminated her because of her gender. After trial, the jury returned a $125,000 judgment for Slayton on the hostile environment claim, but ruled in DYS’ favor on the gender discrimination claim. DYS then moved for a new trial, or, in the alternative, remittitur. The district court denied these motions, and DYS now appeals. We agree with the district court’s judgment and AFFIRM it in all respects. I. On December 26, 1995, DYS hired Slayton to work as a juvenile corrections officer at the Indian River School (“IRS”), a maximum security institution for young, male lawbreakers. IRS housed young people who had committed a wide range of serious felony offenses, including homicide. Slayton was aware of the environment in which she would be working, and accepted the job with full knowledge that it entailed continuous interaction with criminal offenders. Slayton’s position required that she complete a probationary period before graduating to regular status. In early January 1996, Slayton began a several week training period in which she learned various IRS procedures, including its directives on the limited use of physical force against inmates. After this training period, Slayton was assigned to the “E-Unit.” Because of Slayton’s limited seniority, 14 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. No. 98-4528 No. 98-4528 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. 3

adduced evidence), DYS has not demonstrated that the award however, she was often re-assigned to other units. When on and underlying facts are so incongruous to shock the E-unit, Slayton worked alongside Corry Appline, a male conscience, fall outside the bounds supportable by proof, or fellow corrections officer. Initially, Slayton had a “working suggest mistake. Accordingly, we hold that the district court relationship” with Appline. However, in late February and did not abuse its discretion in denying DYS’ remittitur early March, Slayton’s professional relationship with Appline motion. degenerated. Slayton contended that Appline began “horse playing” and “wrestling around” with the inmates. Appline E. supplied the inmates with snacks, magazines, and sexually- explicit CDs. Slayton further testified that Appline began Finally, DYS challenges the district court’s grant of playing, often for the duration of an entire shift, lewd music Slayton’s reinstatement motion. We review the reinstatement that featured lyrics including “f**k the bi**h” and “me and grant for an abuse of discretion. See Hudson v. Reno, 130 my bi**h.” F.3d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1997). It is well-established that reinstatement is an appropriate equitable remedy for Title VII Additionally, Appline played music videotapes for the violations. Id. Indeed, reinstatement is “the presumptively inmates. In Slayton’s view, these videos depicted an array of favored equitable remedy.” Roush v. KFC Nat’l. sexually provocative conduct, including risque “grinding” and Management Co., 10 F.3d 392, 398 (6th Cir. 1993). simulated erotic acts. Moreover, Appline often led the However, this presumption may be negated where inmates in performing dances to the videos. During these reinstatement requires the displacement of an uninvolved dances, performed in front of both Slayton and the inmates, third party, where hostility would result, or where the plaintiff Appline touched his “private parts,” his head, his chest, and has found other work. See id.; see also Hudson, 130 F.3d at “in between his leg[s].” J.A. at 229. Slayton testified that she 1202. Additionally, reinstatement may be inappropriate when approached Appline more than twenty times about his an employer is genuinely dissatisfied with a plaintiff’s actual behavior, and that he merely replied “too bad.” Slayton job performance. See Hudson, 130 F.3d at 1202; McKnight further asserted that, sometime in March 1996, she reported v. General Motors Corp., 973 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. this behavior to her immediate supervisor, Rose Davidson. 1992). Slayton also alleged that Appline’s inappropriate conduct DYS argues that because the jury ruled against Slayton on extended to other areas as well. She asserted that he her gender discrimination claim – thereby finding that she encouraged the youth to drop their towels when she was on was not terminated because of gender – the district court shower duty. While she does not contend that he directly improperly granted reinstatement. However, the jury instigated such activity, she does state that Appline joked with explicitly found in an interrogatory that the hostile the kids about this behavior. According to Slayton, Appline environment adversely affected Slayton’s job performance. laughed even more boisterously when inmates dropped their Additionally, a hostile environment finding necessarily towels while their penises were erect. Along these same recognizes that “sufficiently abusive harassment adversely lines, Slayton also alleged that, on one occasion, Appline affects a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of employment.” intentionally sent her to check on an inmate who he knew was Yeary v. Goodwill Industries-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, masturbating. Slayton believes that Appline intentionally sent 445 (6th Cir. 1997). Thus, reinstatement is an appropriate her to find the inmate in that activity because Appline was remedy when a hostile environment prevented an employee already laughing in her direction by the time she exited the from adequately performing her job. See Carrero v. New inmate’s cell. Finally, on another occasion, Slayton contends 4 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. No. 98-4528 No. 98-4528 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. 13

that in response to an inmate’s question as to why Slayton court should reduce a jury’s verdict only when the judgment was so mean, Appline responded, “maybe she’s on her “clearly exceeds” the maximum amount of compensatory period[;] I don’t know what her problem is.” J.A. at 249. damages a jury could reasonably award. Id. at 156 (citation omitted). Thus, we may reduce a jury award only if it is 1) In Slayton’s eyes, the inmates became increasingly hostile beyond the range supportable by proof, (2) so excessive as to towards her because of Appline’s conduct. The inmates shock the conscience, or 3) the result of a mistake. Id. began referring to Slayton in a variety of derogatory terms, Moreover, the excessiveness of a verdict is primarily a including “ho ass b**ch” and “skinny[] chicken head.” “matter . . . for the trial court which has had the benefit of Indeed, Slayton contended that Appline directly undermined hearing the testimony and of observing the demeanor of the her ability to perform her job by informing the inmates: witnesses.” Wilmington v. J.I. Case Co., 793 F.2d 909, 922 “[D]on’t worry about that b**ch; she’s not going to be here (8th Cir. 1986). that much longer; she’s going to be fired.” J.A. at 243. DYS relies heavily on this court’s recent unpublished After her futile attempts to seek redress from supervisor opinion in Barna v. City of Cleveland, No. 96-3971, 1998 WL Davidson, Slayton contends that she spoke with a number of 939884 (6th Cir. Dec. 22, 1998) (unpublished opinion). In other INS supervisors, including Kirk Braithwaite, the unit Barna, the jury awarded the plaintiff $125,000 after she was administrator, and Linda Bess, the contemporaneous subjected to behavior by a supervisor who asked her to superintendent of IRS. Slayton testified that she began perform oral sex, bragged about his sexual prowess, made informing Braithwaite of this behavior in March 1996, and lewd gestures, called her a “white b**ch,” and stated that the that he stated that he would “check into” Appline’s behavior. plaintiff did not “know what it’s like unless [she had] a black While Braithwaite could not recall meeting with Slayton in man.” Id. at *1-*2. This Court found the award excessive, March, his notes indicated that by May 1996, he was aware of noting that “[w]ithout persuasive proof that the plaintiff Slayton’s concerns with Appline’s behavior. Despite suffered from serious and long lasting symptoms, an award of Slayton’s direct entreaties, Braithwaite did not promptly $125,000 is disproportionate to the harm actually suffered by report Appline’s conduct to anyone or further investigate the plaintiff during her three weeks of employment.” Id. at Slayton’s claims. Slayton’s contacts with Bess met a similar *5. fate, as Bess merely stated that she would “look into” the situation. Barna, however, is inapposite because the Court expressly premised its holding on the short, three-week duration of the On March 15, 1996, around the same time that Appline’s harassment. The record here shows Slayton experienced conduct intensified, Slayton allegedly slapped an inmate who continuous harassment from Appline for almost fourth shouted profanities at her. The DYS inspector’s office months. These aforementioned incidents, occurring on an conducted an investigation and issued a report on May 17, almost daily basis, included incessant references to Slayton as 1996. The report found that Slayton had unnecessarily used a “bi*ch,” continuous playing of sexually explicit music and physical force, that she had altered her description of the videos, and intentionally sending Slayton to observe a incident several times, and that she acted negligently in failing masturbating inmate. Even if one might consider the award to adequately subdue the inmate. The report recommended generous, see Koster v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 24, 34 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that remittitur is not appropriate because the award is “extremely generous,” but is only allowed when the award is “grossly disproportionate” to 12 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. No. 98-4528 No. 98-4528 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. 5

Robinson, nobly turning the other cheek and remaining that DYS take “appropriate administrative action” in response unaffected in the face of constant degradation.” See Torres v. to this incident.1 Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1997). With these principles in mind, we look to the following factors to guide On June 20, 1996, DYS terminated Slayton on the this determination: the frequency of the discriminatory purported basis that she inappropriately used physical force conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening, during the March 15 incident. Slayton responded by filing an humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it administrative complaint with DYS, alleging that she had unreasonably interferes with an employee's work been sexually harassed throughout her employment. When performance. Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, No. those efforts failed to bear fruit, Slayton filed her Title VII 98-6117, 2000 WL 38449, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 20, 2000). complaint in federal court. Slayton alleged inter alia that DYS fired her because of her gender and that it maintained a We cannot conclude that the district court erred in denying hostile work environment. The district court granted DYS DYS’ directed verdict motions. Slayton testified, and the jury partial summary judgment on a claim not raised on appeal, may have believed, that Appline continuously called her a but denied summary judgment on Slayton’s discrimination “b**ch,” continuously played sexually explicit rap music and and hostile environment claims. During trial, DYS moved for videos, intentionally sent her to check on an inmate who was directed verdicts at the close of each side’s case, asserting that masturbating, contended that her menstrual cycle was the Slayton’s allegations supported neither a discrimination nor cause of her problems, and consistently told inmates that they hostile environment finding. The district court denied these did not need to worry about her as she was a “bi**h” who motions, and the jury returned a $125,000 verdict for Slayton would be fired soon. Slayton further testified that this on her hostile work environment claim, but ruled in DYS’ conduct began in early March 1996 and continued for four favor on her gender discrimination claim. months until her June 20 termination. Moreover, DYS personnel were well aware of Appline’s conduct, but DYS then moved for a new trial, or remittitur in the nevertheless failed to take any action. Because of the severity alternative, contending principally that the district court and duration of this activity, we conclude that the jury could improperly allowed lay opinion testimony, and that it should have reasonably found that Slayton experienced a work not be liable under Title VII when a hostile work environment environment that a reasonable woman would find hostile. See is created by inmate conduct. Slayton simultaneously moved Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636-37 (6th Cir. 1987); for reinstatement to her position at IRS. The district court see also Pisano, 116 F.3d at 631-32 (holding that plaintiff’s denied a new trial and remittitur, and granted Slayton’s claims that supervisor continuously referred to her in sexually motion for reinstatement. In granting reinstatement, the derogatory terms raised jury issue on hostile environment district court noted that although the jury found that DYS had claim). Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying not terminated Slayton on the basis of gender, it nevertheless the directed verdict motions. found – in an interrogatory – that the sexually hostile environment adversely affected her performance. On appeal, D. DYS challenges the district court’s denial of its directed verdict motions, the denial of its new trial motion, and the DYS additionally asserts that the district court erred in denying its motion for remittitur. We review the denial of remittitur for an abuse of discretion. See Bickel v. Korean Air 1 The district court noted that it “listened carefully to the testimony of Lines Co., 96 F.3d 151, 156 (6th Cir. 1996). The district the investigating officer and was unimpressed with the conduct and fairness of that investigation.” J.A. at 110. 6 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. No. 98-4528 No. 98-4528 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. 11

denial of remittitur. DYS also appeals the grant of Slayton’s inmates”). Indeed, where, as here, prison personnel reinstatement motion intentionally manipulate non-agents in ways that create a discriminatory environment, and prison supervisors fail to II. take steps to remedy known discrimination, the resulting discrimination is properly attributable to the prison. A. C. The denial of a new trial motion “should be reversed only on the showing of an abuse of discretion.” Cathey v. Johns- DYS also appeals the denials of its directed verdict Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1573 (6th Cir. 1985); motions, contending that Slayton’s allegations fail to establish see also United States v. Fullerton, 187 F.3d 587, 592 (6th an objective hostile working environment under Title VII. Cir. 1999). DYS contends that the district court improperly We review de novo the district court’s denial of a directed allowed Braithwaite and Bess to offer lay opinion testimony verdict. See Snyder v. Ag Trucking, Inc., 57 F.3d 484, 490 on whether Appline’s conduct violated its internal sexual (6th Cir. 1995). A directed verdict should be granted only if harassment policy. DYS cites a portion of Braithwaite’s “there is either a complete absence of proof on the issues or testimony where he was questioned on a letter he wrote no controverted issues of fact upon which reasonable persons concerning “possible sexual harassment” against Slayton. could differ.” Aparicio v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 84 F.3d 803, Additionally, DYS contends that the district court itself 806-07 (6th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). elicited improper lay testimony from Bess. Slayton’s counsel asked Bess, “if indeed Mr. Appline had brought in CDs that A plaintiff establishes a hostile work environment “[w]hen refer to women as bi**hes and f*ck the bit**es, words to that the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, effect, did you feel or do you feel that’s a violation of the ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to sexual harassment policy?” J.A. at 366. Bess stated that alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an such conduct is “a violation of rules” and “offensive.” abusive working environment.” Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 560 (6th Cir. 1999). A complainant Bess then stated that DYS would employ a third party to must establish that the working environment is both investigate the claims. At that point, the district court asked subjectively and objectively hostile to satisfy this Bess to presume that the allegations had been established, and requirement. Id. at 560-61. to consider whether an investigator would be necessary. After Bess twice reiterated the presumption that the court wanted To establish an objectively hostile environment, one must her to draw, the court emphasized: establish that a “reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all the circumstances” would find the Well, it’s been determined now. Hypothesize that the environment hostile. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, plaintiff’s testimony is true. In your view does that Inc., 118 S.Ct. 998, 1003 (1998) (citation and internal constitute under the terms of your policy, the state’s quotation omitted). Accordingly, “‘simple teasing,’ offhand policy, does that constitute sexual harassment in the comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) workplace? will not amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’” Faragher, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 2283 J.A. at 368. Bess replied, “[a]ccording to our policy, yes; it (1998) (internal citation omitted). While a plaintiff must would be.” Id. After the district court’s exchange with Bess, make a substantial showing to establish a hostile it instructed the jury that its “instructions [were] coming,” that environment, “[h]arassed employees do not have to be Jackie 10 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. No. 98-4528 No. 98-4528 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. 7

inmates – people who have been deemed unsuited to live in it should not prematurely evaluate the evidence, and that even normal society.”). if the jury concluded that “an action constitutes quote sexual harassment [, it] does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff However, this general rule against prison liability for wins.” J.A. at 368-369. DYS contends that the above inmate conduct does not apply when the institution fails to exchange, including the Braithwaite testimony, “irreparably take appropriate steps to remedy or prevent illegal inmate damaged” its ability to defend itself against Slayton’s suit. behavior. See Waymire v. Harris County, Tex., 86 F.3d 424, Specifically, DYS avers that this purported lay opinion 428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that because prison took testimony embraced a primary issue to be decided by the jury, prompt remedial action, jailer did not establish a hostile and that the court’s questioning of Bess constituted environment where a fellow jailer circulated a sexually impermissible vouching for the credibility of Slayton’s offensive inmate drawing); Powell, 37 F.Supp.2d at 1017 claims. (holding that prisons may be liable for sexual harassment where they fail to take “proper preventive and remedial steps We are not convinced by DYS’ claims. First, the district with regard to inmate behavior”); Hicks v. Alabama, 45 court clearly did not vouch for the credibility of Slayton’s F.Supp.2d 921, 933 (S.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that a prison claims. The court merely, and explicitly, asked Bess to was not liable under Title VII for hostile work environment “hypothesize” that Slayton’s allegations were true and to offer when inmates engaged in sexually-explicit behavior, no her conclusion on whether that conduct constituted “sexual prison employees engaged in harassment, and no other harassment” under department policy. By stating “what if it’s remedial avenues were available). Similarly, no authority established . . .” and “hypothesize,” the district court patently suggests that there is an absolute bar to Title VII liability asked Bess to respond to a hypothetical, and certainly was not when prison personnel encourage or instigate illegal inmate vouching for the verity of Slayton’s claims. Further, the behavior. Cf. L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 122 (9th Cir. district court’s instruction re-emphasized that the jury should 1992) (holding that where prison “independently created the not draw any premature inferences. opportunity for and facilitated” an inmate’s assault of a prison employee, it was subject to § 1983 liability). DYS’ evidentiary claim on the admission of Bess’ and Braithwaite’s testimony on “sexual harassment” under In this case, we initially note that Slayton did not merely department policy presents a closer question. Courts should allege that inmate conduct created a hostile environment. The generally exclude inquiries that ask non-expert witnesses to record principally supports a finding that Appline himself, pontificate upon legal questions. Torres v. County of with the tacit approval of the prison, engaged in conduct that Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1985); see Mitroff v. created a hostile environment. The record shows that Appline Xomox Corp., 797 F.2d 271, 276 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding, in continuously played misogynistic rap music, referred ADEA action, that lay testimony was improper when witness derogatorily to Slayton’s menstrual cycle, repeatedly called testified that defendants were engaged in a “pattern of [age] her a “bi**h,” displayed sexually-explicit music videos, and discrimination”). Indeed the Mitroff court noted that while performed erotic dances in plain view. Moreover, while lay opinion testimony embracing an ultimate issue is inmate conduct is involved in a number of Slayton’s other specifically allowed by Fed.R.Evid. 704, it “seldom will be allegations of harassment, it is clear that Appline encouraged, the case when a lay opinion on an ultimate issue will meet the endorsed, and even instigated the inmates’ harassing conduct. test of being helpful to the trier of fact since the jury’s opinion Cf. Hicks, 45 F.Supp.2d at 932 (in holding for prison, noting is as good as the witness’ and the witness turns into little that “[t]he offensive behavior is alleged only to be that of the more than an ‘oath helper.’” Mitroff, 797 F.2d at 276. 8 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. No. 98-4528 No. 98-4528 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. 9

This case is distinct from the Torres/Mitroff line of cases before assessing the credibility of Slayton’s claims. Thus, to because, here, the internal policy clearly formed the predicate the extent this testimony might have improperly confused the of both Bess’ and Braithwaite’s testimony. The pertinent jury, the district court’s instructions cured any potential portions of Bess’ testimony deal exclusively with her opinions prejudice. on the applicability of internal policy to Appline’s conduct. At no point did the district court or counsel refer to Title VII Moreover, Bess’ and Braithwaite’s brief testimony on this liability or standards during this questioning. Braithwaite’s issue was not so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. A letter clearly and expressly addressed internal DYS policy, “[r]eversal based on improper admission of evidence is and even when Bess assented to the district court’s query on appropriate only when the admission interfere[s] with whether Appline’s conduct, if true, would have violated DYS substantial justice.” Morganroth & Morganroth v. DeLorean, policy, she replied: “[a]ccording to our policy. . . it would 123 F.3d 374, 382 (6th Cir. 1997). See Fed.R.Evid. 103(a). be.” J.A. at 368 (emphasis added). Thus, the testimony did Both Bess’ testimony and Braithwaite’s letter were extremely not, in fact, embrace an ultimate issue. brief evidentiary elements in the three-day trial, and Slayton introduced wide-ranging evidence that DYS allowed Appline There remains, however, a question on the extent to which to create a hostile work environment. Even if arguendo the the jury might have been confused concerning the interplay of district court improperly admitted lay opinion testimony, DYS liability under internal policy and Title VII. Even when lay has not shown that it was prejudiced. opinion testimony does not technically implicate ultimate legal issues, a district court may properly exclude testimony B. if “terms used by the witness have a separate, distinct and specialized meaning in the law different from that present in DYS also argues that it cannot be held liable for a hostile the vernacular.” United States v. Sheffey, 57 F.3d 1419, 1426 work environment created by prison inmates. Although there (6th Cir. 1995). In this regard, we have concluded that a is scant appellate case law on this question, it is beyond doubt district court abuses its discretion when it “allows a witness that inmate conduct, without more, is an insufficient predicate to define legal terms, especially terms that carry a for a hostile environment claim. See, e.g., Maine v. considerable amount of legal baggage.” Woods v. Lecureux, Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections, No. 97-6027, 1997 WL 110 F.3d 1215, 1220 (6th Cir. 1997). 602688, at *2 (10th Cir. 1997) (unpublished opinion) (holding that inmate conduct per se is not attributable to a prison); Therefore, a district court should not presume that a jury of Powell v. Morris, 37 F.Supp.2d 1011, 1017 (S.D. Ohio 1999) laypersons is well-versed on the distinct legal meanings of (noting that correctional employees assume attendant risks, “sexual harassment” under an agency’s policy and “sexual including lewd, sexual behavior by inmates). Prisoners, by harassment” under Title VII. Without a specific instruction definition, have breached prevailing societal norms in that policy liability does not equal statutory liability, juries fundamentally corrosive ways. By choosing to work in a might improperly and prematurely presume guilt. While the prison, corrections personnel have acknowledged and district court here did not provide a specific instruction on the accepted the probability that they will face inappropriate and distinctions between policy and statutory liability, the district socially deviant behavior. See Powell, 37 F.Supp.2d at 1017 court did immediately instruct the jury to refrain from (“[A]nyone who works at a prison . . . must expect some off- prematurely evaluating the evidence, or presuming guilt if it color interactions. . . . It is absurd to expect that a prison can found that Slayton established “harassment.” It further actually stop all obscene comments and conduct from its ordered the jury to await its precise liability instructions