Appellant Daniel G. Carr appeals his conviction for violating the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SOR-NA), 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq., by failing to register with the State of Tennessee as a sex offender. His appeal raises three challenges to his conviction. First, he argues that SORNA should be construed to require registration only after a state fully implements SORNA, which Tennessee had not done at the time of his offense. In support, he contends that the Commerce Clause compels accepting his proposed construction. Second, he argues that since he did not receive notice that SORNA required him to register with Tennessee as a sex offender, applying SORNA to him violates his due process rights. Third, he argues that SORNA violates the Tenth Amendment by forcing state officials to operate the state’s sex offender registry in compliance with SORNA before the state has chosen to adopt SORNA’s registration requirements. After briefing had been concluded in Carr’s appeal, this Court published our opinions in United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599, No. 11-5237, 2012 WL 762977 (6th Cir. March 12, 2012), and United States v. Coleman, 675 F.3d 615, No. 10-5283, 2012 WL 1034016 (6th Cir. March 29, 2012). Together, these opinions conclusively address all three of Carr’s legal challenges. Felts is particularly dis-positive, rejecting legal challenges that are the same as Carr’s on facts that are very similar to Carr’s. Indeed, the similarity is so strong that Carr described that case *729 and the arguments it presented on appeal as essentially “identical” to his, and conceded that most of his arguments were directly foreclosed by Felts’s holding. And Coleman’s holding bolts the door that Felts had effectively already closed on Carr’s sub-argument that the Commerce Clause requires this Court to accept his construction of SORNA.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM.