ORDER

George Darden received a career offender enhancement under United States Sentencing Guideline § 4B1.1. At issue is whether one of Darden’s previous convictions qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2). *546 See Appellee’s Br. 7. In Johnson v. United States, No. 13-7120, — U.S.-, 135 S.Ct. 2551, - L.Ed.2d -, 2015 WL 2473450 (U.S. June 26, 2015) (slip op. at 10, 15), the Supreme Court held that the identically worded residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act is void for vagueness. Compare U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). We have previously interpreted both residual clauses identically, see United States v. Ford, 560 F.3d 420, 421 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Houston, 187 F.3d 593, 594-95 (6th Cir. 1999), and Darden deserves the same relief as Johnson: the vacating of his sentence. Indeed, after Johnson, the Supreme Court vacated the sentences of offenders who were sentenced under the Guidelines’ residual clause. United States v. Maldonado, 581 F. App’x 19, 22-23 (2d Cir. 2014), vacated, 576 U.S.-, — S.Ct.-, — L.Ed.2d - (2015); Beckles v. United States, 579 Fed.Appx. 833, 833-34 (11th Cir. 2014), vacated, 576 U.S.-, — S.Ct. -, — L.Ed.2d-(2015). The same relief is appropriate here.

For these reasons, we vacate the judgment and remand for reconsideration in light of Johnson v. United States.