(after stating the facts as above). [1] The Bliss patent in suit, No. 707,754, is for “brush mechanism for dynamos,” disclosing an obvious improvement of the patentee’s earlier invention, shown in patent No. 525,836, issued in 1894; and it may well be assumed for the present consideration, as contended by counsel in support thereof, tliat “the structure of the second patent constitutes an ingenious reorganization of the structure of the first patent.” Its specifications set forth 12 claims, while the charge of infringement in controversy is predicated alone on the sixth claim, which reads:

“Brush mechanism for dynamos comprising a rotary ring, a stationary ring, a raceway intermediate of the two rings, bearing-balls located in said raceway and serving to hold the rings in rotatable relation with each other, brush-holders carried by the rotary ring and means for limiting the rotatory movement of the said rotary ring, substantially as set forth.”

The defense of invalidity, for alleged anticipations of the means thus claimed, is directed solely to the broad terms of the sixth claim, and raises no question affecting the other claims of invention in the structure as described in the specifications. Thus the issue of validity • — elaborately discussed in the arguments of counsel — is narrowed to the inquiry whether invention appears to authorize monopoly over any “brush mechanism for dynamos comprising” the eleriients described in this claim.

The invention of the patent and ‘its application are thus stated at the outset of the specifications:

“My invention relates to brush mechanism for dynamos, with the object in view of providing automatically for the constant polarity of a dynamo in whichever direction it may rotate and notwithstanding changes or reversal of the direction of the rotation.

“The invention may be applied to all dynamos' the direction of the rotation of which is required to be or liable to be reversed, but the polarity .of which is required to be constant; but it is especially applicable to dynamos deriving motion from running-gear of railway vehicles for the purpose of *920charging' storage batteries or furnishing a direct electrical current for the illumination of such vehicles.”

. These general definitions of the subject-matter are-applicable to the earlier Bliss patent, without reference to other prior patents in evidence, and the novelty of the structure thereafter described must reside in the improved means and results produced in the above-mentioned “reorganization” of the prior structure. For analysis of such means as specified, we are content to refer to the description contained in the opinion filed by Judge Kohlsaat, as appended to the foregoing statement; and we concur in his conclusion that patentable invention may appear in the provision and arrangement of elements in the device of the patent, although not of the broad nature and scope contended on behalf of the appellant.

We do not understand, however, the invention thus assumed to be applicable for support of the sixth claim in suit. The stress of the contention therefor rests on the provisions of the device for access to the parts and removability (bodily), for correction or repair, as thus pointed out in the specifications:

“Among the prominent advantages of the structure hereinabove set forth special attention is called to the simple manner in which the brush-carrying ring, with brush-holders attached thereto, may be bodily removed from the front of the casing by simply removing the cover 6 and releasing the outer ring m from the casing, the conductors y and y' having been previously disengaged from their binding-posts by the operator working through the opening in the bottom of the casing covered by the plate i. The opening h in the bottom of the easing furthermore admits of the operator inserting a support under the armature c to block it in position to permit the cover 5, with its bearing-hub e, to be slid off the shaft without permitting the latter to be displaced or strained by the removal of the bearing-hub e. The removable plate i also furnishes ready access to the brushes without removing any part of the structure except the stop-pin u and the release of the conductors y y', since the removal of the stop « permits the disk j to be turned completely around, bringing each of the brushes into position to be manipulated through the opening h in the bottom of the casing. This is of very great importance where the casing is secured beneath the floor of a car or close to a ceiling where access at frequent intervals can. only conveniently be had from beneath.” *

In respect of these provisions and features of the device, neither of them is fairly defined in any element or elements of claim 6, while each and every thereof is aptly embraced in other of the patent claims; and it,is obvious that the claim in question is framed to exclude the use of the several elements thus named, or their equivalents, in any brush mechanism for dynamos, as patentable subject-matter, independent of the above-mentioned provisions.

We are impressed with the view that the elements of the claim .constituting the brush-holder mechanism are anticipated by the earlier Bliss patent, within the broad sense on which the claim must rest, leaving only the provision and use of the well-known anti-friction means of ball-bearings for its differentiation therefrom in such sense. But, whatever may be deemed the force of that patent, for the purposes of the inquiry, we believe the Wheeler patent in evidence (No. 575,918, issued in 1897, for a “brush carrier for dynamo-electric ma*921chines”), in like sense, discloses every element of claim 6. Its specification states:

“My invention relates to a means of mounting the brushes of a dynamo.: electric machine so that the lines of contact are visible, the brushes easily, removable, and that the connecting-cables may be dispensed with and the brushes can be simultaneously thrown off from or onto the commutator. In order to effect this, I mount’the brushes on two rings insulated from each other and mounted on the frame of the machine at the inner end of the commutator, and carriers on the rings extending over the commutator, on which the brushes are mounted. I also provide means for moving the rings around to set the brushes and a system of connecting rods to lift all the brushes at once. The two ends of each of these connecting-rods are separate pieces of metal adjustably united by a turnbuckle of insulating material.”

As shown by specifications and drawings (Fig. 1), the brushholder consists of two rings, one stationary and the other rotary. Its inner rotary ring k carries the brushes. The outer ring b is stationary, and with its guides n and grooved rollers m interposed in the rotary ring permits the rotation, while preventing lateral movement; and its shifting screw o limits the movement of the rotary ring. Thus every element mentioned broadly in claim 6 is met by this patent, inclusive of the anti-friction means of grooved rollers, as the well-known equivalent of “bearing-balls,” located and used alike. As may well be observed, the important features of the casing and mountings (for access and removability) are not mentioned therein, but are expressly included as subject-matter in various other claims of the patent.

We are of opinion, therefore, that other patents and exhibits cited by way of defense do not require discussion; th'at the foregoing reference is sufficient for anticipation of the broad claim in suit; and that such claim cannot be upheld for support of the charge of infringement, so that the issue raised of infringement thereof in fact by the appellee’s brush mechanism does not require consideration.

The decree of the Circuit Court, dismissing the bill for want of equity, conforms to the foregoing conclusion of law; and it is affirmed.'

On Petition for Rehearing.

The appellant, having petitioned for a rehearing of the above-entitled appeal, wherein the opinion of the court, filed at the present term, directs af-firmance of the decree below, further petitions for relief in the cause, predicated on an alleged disclaimer filed by the appellant in the Patent Office subsequent to the filing of the above-mentioned opinion herein. A certified copy of the instrument referred to is produced, which describes the patent in suit, and thereupon purports to disclaim as follows:

“Your petitioner therefore hereby enters its disclaimer to so much of claim 6 of said patent as may describe a brush mechanism in which the stationary ring is not separable from the armature with its commutator and from the body of the field magnet casing, so that the brush mechanism may be bodily removed without dismembering the rotary and stationary rings and the bearing-balls which lock or tie them together, and in which the means for limiting the rotary movement of the rotary ring is not such as to permit movement sufficient to change the respective positions of the brushes with relation to the commutator to cause the polarity of the brushes to remain constant, regardless of the direction of rotation of the armature of the dynamo. Thereby limiting said claim 6 to a brush mechanism in which the stationary ring is separable from the armature with its commutator and from the body of the fields magnet casing, so that the brush mechanism may be bodily removed *922without dismembering the rotary and stationary rings and the bearing-balls which lock or tie them together, and in which the means for limiting the rotary movement of the rotary ring is such as to permit movement sufficient to change the respective positions of the brushes with relation to the commutator to cause the polarity of the brushes to remain constant, regardless of the direction of rotation of the armature of the dynamo.”

(after stating the facts as above). [2] Relief is sought by the appellant’s petition to escape the ruling of this court for affirmance of the decree below by reopening the cause for hearing upon the effect of a disclaimer filed by the appellant 'in the Patent Office pending the mandate upon .the appeal. An objection is urged that this court is without jurisdiction to authorize such relief, because it is founded on new matter “appearing in the case for the first time,” and that it “is an original matter which should be determined by the District Court prior to any consideration thereof” herein. But we believe such contention to be untenable. If the disclaimer set up in the petition affords ground for relief in the present cause, it can be granted only through action (by leave or otherwise) of the appellate court, as the authority of the District Court after appeal becomes limited to execution of the mandate (In re Potts, 166 U. S. 263, 17 Sup. Ct. 520, 41 L. Ed. 994); and no doubt is enter-tainable that relief may be authorized by this court to enforce any equities arising under a disclaimer so presented. See American Soda Fountain Co. v. Sample, 136 Fed. 857, 70 C. C. A. 415.

The- question, therefore, whether the disclaimer set up in the petition presents equitable ground for reopening the cause plainly arises for determination before issuance of the mandate. On behalf of the appellee it is contended that the instrument filed as a disclaimer is not authorized, within the meaning of the statute (sections 4917, 4922, Rev. St. [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 3393, 3396]), “since it does not disclaim any distinct part of the specification or claim of the patent in suit, but disclaims merely the interpretation of the claim which this court has held to be necessary.” Without specifying any distinct claim or part thereof as surrendered, the disclaimer, so called, is plainly framed and directed to incorporate in thé claim the appellant’s interpretation of various elements of the “brush mechanism” there mentioned, so that the claim shall be read in conformity with the meaning-for which its counsel contended throughout the argument on the appeal for reversal of the decree. For answer to the crucial inquiry above stated, however, we believe it to be unnecessary to determine either the sufficiency or effect of this instrument by way of ascertaining the meaning or force of the claim in. controversy. So no discussion is required of the various contentions of counsel, either as to the effect thereof, or whether the ruling in our opinion, as heretofore filed, against the validity of such claim is consistent with the present disclaimer, or could rightly be affected thereby.

Faying aside all of these questions as to the force of the disclaimer to require interpretation of the claim, for relief under the petition, we may assume, for the purpose alone of the present inquiry, that it is not only effective to that end, but affixes a definition of the terms of the claim which furnishes support for its validity, notwithstanding *923the prior patents referred to in our opinion. The benefit of this assumption, however, cannot relieve the claim of the limitations imposed by the prior art evidence, and that evidence in the record we believe to be conclusive for the narrow scope of any invention which may thus be found in the claim, as the opinion below (upholding its validity) clearly points out, with references to the prior patents. With the claim so'limited in the monopoly which may thus be predicated thereon, the appellee’s “brush mechanism” in evidence is plainly distinguished from the patent device, departing therefrom in several means and functions, so* that, under the above hypothesis, these departures, as sufficiently referred to in the opinion filed below, furnish ample support for dismissal of the bill.

Irrespective, therefore, of our conclusion against the validity of the claim in suit, the petition to reopen the cause is denied; and the petition for a rehearing is likewise overruled.