ORDER

Rafael Barragan-Flores, a Mexican citizen, was convicted of being in the United States without permission after his removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He appeals his 37-month sentence and argues that the lack of a “fast-track” program in the Western District of Wisconsin, see Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub.L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 675; U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1, creates a disparity with § 1326(a) sentences imposed in districts that have such a program. We have already rejected the argument that any resulting disparity could render a sentence unreasonable, see United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 442 F.3d 539, 542-43 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Galicia-Cardenas, 443 F.3d 553, 555 (7th Cir. 2006) (per curiam), but Barragan-Flores contends that the differing treatment violates his right to due process and equal protection under the United States Constitution. We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.

*577 We review Barragan-Flores’s argument only for plain error because he did not raise it in the district court. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 62-63, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002); United States v. Castillo, 406 F.3d 806, 822 (7th Cir. 2005). Barragan-Flores attempts to frame his argument principally as a “geographically based equal protection” claim that warrants strict-scrutiny analysis. But only convicted felons are affected by the presence or absence of a fast-track program, and convicted felons are not a suspect class. See United States v. Wicks, 132 F.3d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Carroll, 110 F.3d 457, 461-62 (7th Cir. 1997). All that matters, then, is whether the legislative judgment to give the Attorney General the discretion to decide where to implement fast-track programs is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 464-65, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991); Carroll, 110 F.3d at 461-62. As our sister circuits have recognized, fast-track programs are rationally related to the government’s legitimate interest in conserving prosecutorial and judicial resources. See, e.g., United States v. Marcial-Santiago, 447 F.3d 715, 716 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Melendez-Torres, 420 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 2005). Thus the implementation of fast-track programs in some but not all districts does not violate Barragan-Flores’s equal protection rights. Moreover, it does no good for Barragan-Flores to cloak his same argument in due process terminology; in this context the analysis, and the result, is the same. See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 465, 111 S.Ct. 1919; Marcial-Santiago, 447 F.3d 715, 716.

AFFIRMED.