Order

In 2006 we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Daniel Andreola interlocutory relief on his claim that state prison officials failed to provide him with a diet that met his specifications of Kosher preparation. No. 05-1931 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 2006) (unpublished order). We also held that further proceedings were required to resolve plaintiffs claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.

The district court then conducted a jury trial. The first question in the special-verdict form was whether Andreola holds a sincere religious belief in Judaism. The jury’s negative answer ended the case. On appeal, Andreola insists that the evidence on this issue favors him, but, unless no reasonable person could have taken the jury’s view, the verdict must stand. The district court observed that Andreola conceded that, before his imprisonment, “he had regularly eaten at fast food restaurants and other nonkosher establishments”. Moreover, “Andreola did not testify and personally affirm his religious faith”. Although Andreola asserts that the jury instruction on this point was deficient, he does not identify any error (and at all events did not object before the instruction was given).

Although Andreola contends that the district judge was biased against him, his only basis is the judge’s remark—after the jury had returned its verdict—that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act “isn’t intended as a get rich scheme for prisoners who feel them rights are being violated”. That statement is a correct proposition of law and does not demonstrate any form of prejudgment. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994).

*936 Andreola’s other arguments are beside the point, given the jury’s verdict, and need not be discussed.

Affirmed.