United States v. Bruce Johnson

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Per Curiam

United States v. Bruce Johnson

Opinion

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 11, 2008* Decided December 29, 2008

Before

JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 08‐1822

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District Court Plaintiff‐Appellee, for the Southern District of Illinois.

v. No. 04 CR 40013

BRUCE JOHNSON, J. Phil Gilbert, Defendant‐Appellant. Judge.

O R D E R

Bruce Johnson pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 100 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846. After the United States

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2). No. 08‐1822 Page 2

Sentencing Guidelines were amended to reduce the penalties for crack cocaine offenses, see U.S.S.G. App. C, Supp. 2007, amend. 706, Johnson asked the district court to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(C), and the court appointed counsel. His attorney moved for a reduced sentence, and the district court reduced his sentence to 84 months’ imprisonment.

Johnson does not challenge the district court’s reasoning in imposing this sentence. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(9)(A); Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545‐46 (7th Cir. 2001). Instead, he argues that his counsel was ineffective for seeking a reduced sentence instead of a full resentencing. We have previously held that a prisoner seeking a sentence reduction does not have a right to appointed counsel. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 657 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Tidwell, 178 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1999). But even if Johnson had a right to effective assistance of counsel in his § 3582(C) proceeding, an attack on counsel’s effectiveness is more properly brought on collateral attack than on direct appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003); United States v. Jackson, Nos. 07‐1449 & 07‐1577, 2008 WL 4553061, at *9 (7th Cir. Oct. 14, 2008). If Johnson wishes to raise that argument he may do so on collateral attack. The appeal is therefore

DISMISSED.

Reference

Status
Unpublished