NONPRECEDENTIALȱDISPOSITION Toȱbeȱcitedȱonlyȱinȱaccordanceȱwith ȱFed.ȱR.ȱApp.ȱP.ȱ32.1

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

SubmittedȱNovemberȱ23,ȱ2010* DecidedȱDecemberȱ2,ȱ2010

Before

MICHAELȱS.ȱKANNE,ȱCircuitȱJudge

TERENCEȱT.ȱEVANS,ȱCircuitȱJudge

DAVIDȱF.ȱHAMILTON,ȱCircuitȱJudge ȱȱȱ No.ȱ09Ȭ1365

DAVIDȱM.ȱJONES, AppealȱfromȱtheȱUnitedȱStatesȱDistrict PlaintiffȬAppellant, CourtȱforȱtheȱNorthernȱDistrictȱofȱIndiana, FortȱWayneȱDivision. v. No.ȱ3:08cv545 HOWARDȱMORTON,ȱetȱal.,ȱ DefendantsȬAppellees.ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ TheresaȱL.ȱSpringmann, Judge.

OȱRȱDȱEȱR

DavidȱJonesȱfiledȱsuitȱunderȱ42ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ1983ȱclaimingȱthatȱprisonȱofficialsȱhaveȱbeen deliberatelyȱindifferentȱtoȱthreatsȱagainstȱhimȱfromȱgangȱmembersȱatȱtheȱIndianaȱState Prison.ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱcourtȱdirectedȱJonesȱtoȱprepayȱtheȱentireȱfilingȱfeeȱafterȱconcludingȱthat heȱpreviouslyȱincurredȱthreeȱstrikesȱforȱfilingȱfrivolousȱlitigationȱandȱwasȱnotȱinȱimminent

* ȱ Theȱ defendantsȱ wereȱ notȱ servedȱ withȱ processȱ inȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ andȱ areȱ not participatingȱinȱthisȱappeal.ȱȱAfterȱexaminingȱtheȱappellant’sȱbriefȱandȱtheȱrecord,ȱweȱhave concludedȱthatȱoralȱargumentȱisȱunnecessary.ȱȱThus,ȱtheȱappealȱisȱsubmittedȱonȱtheȱbriefȱand theȱrecord.ȱȱSeeȱFED.ȱR.ȱAPP.ȱP.ȱ34(a)(2)(c). No.ȱ09Ȭ1365 Pageȱ2

danger.ȱȱSeeȱ28ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ1915(g).ȱȱWhenȱJonesȱdidȱnotȱpay,ȱtheȱcourtȱdismissedȱtheȱaction, andȱJonesȱnowȱappeals.ȱȱInȱlightȱofȱourȱrecentȱdecisionȱinȱTurleyȱv.ȱGaetz,ȱNo.ȱ09Ȭ3847,ȱ2010 WLȱ4286368ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱNov.ȱ2,ȱ2010),ȱweȱvacateȱtheȱjudgmentȱandȱremandȱforȱfurther proceedings.ȱ

Accordingȱtoȱtheȱallegationsȱinȱhisȱcomplaint,ȱwhichȱatȱthisȱstageȱweȱmustȱpresume areȱtrue,ȱseeȱSantiagoȱv.ȱWalls,ȱ599ȱF.3dȱ749,ȱ756ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2010),ȱJonesȱexperiencedȱaȱpatternȱof forewarnedȱassaultsȱbyȱgangȱmembersȱthatȱtheȱdefendantsȱignoredȱandȱevenȱinstigated.ȱ GangȱmembersȱhadȱfirstȱthreatenedȱJonesȱaroundȱJuneȱ2007,ȱbutȱhisȱrequestȱforȱprotective custodyȱwasȱdenied.ȱȱTheȱdefendantsȱmovedȱhimȱintoȱaȱdormȱwithȱanȱinmateȱheȱpreviously “hadȱtroubleȱwith.”ȱȱThatȱinmateȱlaterȱrestrainedȱJonesȱatȱknifepointȱwhileȱanotherȱinmate attackedȱhim.ȱȱForȱreasonsȱnotȱexplainedȱbyȱJones,ȱheȱwasȱlaterȱplacedȱinȱsegregationȱand toldȱheȱwouldȱremainȱthereȱforȱtwoȱyears,ȱbutȱevenȱinȱsegregationȱtheȱthreatsȱcontinued.ȱ Jonesȱdoesȱnotȱsayȱexplicitlyȱthatȱtheȱtwoȱassailantsȱandȱtheȱothersȱwhoȱthreatenedȱhimȱwere gangȱmembers,ȱbutȱheȱdoesȱallegeȱthatȱwhileȱheȱwasȱinȱsegregationȱguardsȱallowedȱa numberȱofȱgangȱmembersȱintoȱtheȱrecreationȱyardȱsoȱtheyȱcouldȱassaultȱhim.ȱȱTheseȱinmates stabbedȱhimȱinȱtheȱstomachȱandȱslicedȱhisȱfaceȱwithȱaȱrazor,ȱsendingȱhimȱtoȱtheȱhospitalȱand causingȱpermanentȱscarring.ȱȱJonesȱonceȱmoreȱrequestedȱprotectiveȱcustodyȱandȱagainȱwas refused.ȱȱAfterȱhisȱreleaseȱfromȱtheȱhospital,ȱhowever,ȱJonesȱwasȱtransferredȱtoȱWestville CorrectionalȱFacilityȱforȱtheȱremainderȱofȱhisȱsegregationȱtime.ȱȱWhileȱatȱWestville,ȱJones suedȱandȱrequestedȱmonetaryȱdamagesȱandȱanȱinjunctionȱtoȱpreventȱhisȱreturnȱtoȱthe IndianaȱStateȱPrison,ȱwhereȱtheȱgangȱmembersȱwhoȱattackedȱhimȱstillȱwereȱhoused.

Jonesȱalsoȱmovedȱtoȱproceedȱinȱformaȱpauperis.ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱcourtȱdeniedȱthis requestȱonȱtheȱunderstandingȱthatȱJonesȱhadȱalreadyȱaccumulatedȱthreeȱstrikesȱandȱwasȱnot inȱ“imminentȱdanger”ȱsoȱasȱtoȱexcuseȱprepaymentȱofȱtheȱfullȱfilingȱfee.ȱȱJonesȱmovedȱfor reconsideration.ȱȱHeȱarguedȱthatȱheȱwasȱinȱimminentȱdangerȱbecauseȱheȱwasȱscheduledȱto beȱreturnedȱtoȱtheȱIndianaȱStateȱPrisonȱinȱsevenȱmonthsȱwhenȱhisȱsegregationȱtimeȱended, andȱthusȱhisȱseparationȱfromȱtheȱgangȱmembersȱwhoȱattackedȱhimȱwasȱonlyȱtemporary.ȱ TheȱcourtȱreasonedȱthatȱtheȱharmȱJonesȱfearedȱwasȱspeculativeȱratherȱthanȱimminentȱand deniedȱhisȱmotion.ȱȱIfȱheȱfacedȱaȱrealȱthreatȱinȱtheȱfuture,ȱtheȱcourtȱinformedȱJones,ȱheȱcould moveȱforȱinjunctiveȱrelief,ȱbutȱinȱtheȱmeantimeȱheȱwasȱobligatedȱtoȱpayȱtheȱentireȱfilingȱfee inȱadvance.ȱȱTheȱcourtȱlaterȱdismissedȱJones’sȱlawsuitȱwhenȱheȱfailedȱtoȱpay.

Afterȱheȱfiledȱthisȱappeal,ȱJonesȱwasȱmoved—asȱheȱsaidȱwouldȱhappen—backȱtoȱthe IndianaȱStateȱPrison.ȱȱOnȱthatȱbasisȱweȱgrantedȱhimȱleaveȱtoȱproceedȱinȱformaȱpauperis.ȱ Jonesȱv.ȱBates,ȱNo.ȱ09Ȭ1365ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱApr.ȱ20,ȱ2010)ȱ(grantingȱJones’sȱmotionȱtoȱreconsider).ȱ Thisȱappeal,ȱweȱobserved,ȱpresentsȱaȱquestionȱofȱfirstȱimpression:ȱwhetherȱanȱallegationȱthat anȱinmateȱisȱguaranteedȱtoȱbeȱreturnedȱtoȱsurroundingsȱthatȱwillȱplaceȱhimȱinȱharm’sȱwayȱis sufficientȱtoȱmeetȱtheȱexceptionȱinȱ§ȱ1915(g)ȱforȱimminentȱdanger.ȱȱId.ȱȱJonesȱmaintainsȱthat, No.ȱ09Ȭ1365 Pageȱ3

atȱtheȱtimeȱheȱfiledȱhisȱcomplaint,ȱheȱknewȱwithȱreasonableȱcertaintyȱthatȱheȱwouldȱbeȱsent backȱtoȱtheȱIndianaȱStateȱPrison.ȱȱHeȱalsoȱarguesȱthatȱtheȱstringȱofȱthreatsȱandȱtheȱassaults forecastȱbyȱthoseȱthreatsȱestablishedȱwithȱsufficientȱprobabilityȱthatȱimminentȱdanger awaitedȱhimȱthere.ȱȱ

Weȱareȱinclinedȱtoȱagree.ȱȱTheȱtimingȱofȱimminentȱdangerȱisȱrelative,ȱparticularly givenȱtheȱpaceȱofȱlitigation.ȱȱWeȱhaveȱcautionedȱagainstȱaȱ“chimerical”ȱinterpretationȱof imminentȱdanger;ȱtheȱrelevantȱtimeȱframeȱisȱnotȱlimitedȱtoȱtheȱexactȱmomentȱanȱinmate facesȱassault.ȱȱLewisȱv.ȱSullivan,ȱ279ȱF.3dȱ526,ȱ531ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2002).ȱȱButȱeventsȱhaveȱovertaken thisȱappeal.ȱȱSectionȱ1915(g)ȱprovidesȱthatȱaȱprisonerȱincursȱaȱstrikeȱforȱbringingȱ“anȱaction orȱappealȱ.ȱ.ȱ.ȱthatȱwasȱdismissedȱonȱtheȱgroundsȱthatȱitȱisȱfrivolous,ȱmalicious,ȱorȱfailsȱto stateȱaȱclaimȱuponȱwhichȱreliefȱmayȱbeȱgranted.”ȱȱWhenȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱconcludedȱthat Jonesȱhadȱalreadyȱaccumulatedȱthreeȱstrikes,ȱtheȱcourtȱcitedȱthreeȱofȱhisȱpriorȱlawsuits:ȱJones v.ȱClark,ȱIP98ȬCȬ157ȱ(S.D.ȱInd.ȱMarchȱ4,ȱ1998);ȱJonesȱv.ȱMaxey,ȱIP98ȬCȬ910ȱ(S.D.ȱInd.ȱOct.ȱ2, 1998);ȱandȱJonesȱv.ȱRichwine,ȱ1:06ȬCVȬ162ȱ(S.D.ȱInd.ȱApr.ȱ25,ȱ2006).ȱȱCountingȱtheȱfirstȱtwo casesȱasȱstrikesȱdoesȱnotȱseemȱproblematicȱbecauseȱbothȱwereȱdismissedȱinȱtheirȱentiretyȱat screening.ȱȱYetȱtheȱthirdȱcase,ȱweȱnowȱknow,ȱdidȱnotȱincurȱaȱstrike.

TheȱdistrictȱcourtȱinȱRichwineȱdismissedȱseveralȱclaimsȱandȱdefendantsȱfromȱthe complaintȱatȱscreeningȱandȱlaterȱgrantedȱsummaryȱjudgmentȱforȱtheȱremainingȱdefendants.ȱ InȱcountingȱthisȱlawsuitȱasȱJones’sȱthirdȱstrike,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱreadȱGeorgeȱv.ȱSmith,ȱ507 F.3dȱ605,ȱ607Ȭ08ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2007),ȱtoȱholdȱthatȱaȱprisoner’sȱlawsuitȱincursȱaȱstrikeȱifȱevenȱone claimȱisȱdismissedȱonȱaȱgroundȱlistedȱinȱ§ȱ1915(g),ȱnoȱmatterȱhowȱmanyȱclaimsȱareȱincluded inȱtheȱcomplaint.ȱȱEarlierȱthisȱmonth,ȱhowever,ȱweȱclarifiedȱthatȱGeorgeȱdoesȱnotȱsupportȱthis contention.ȱȱRather,ȱprisonersȱincurȱaȱstrikeȱonlyȱwhenȱaȱ“caseȱisȱdismissedȱinȱitsȱentirety basedȱonȱtheȱgroundsȱlistedȱinȱ§ȱ1915(g).”ȱȱTurley,ȱ2010ȱWLȱ4286368,ȱatȱ*7.ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱcourt, withoutȱtheȱbenefitȱofȱTurley,ȱunderstandablyȱinterpretedȱGeorgeȱasȱitȱdid.ȱȱButȱonlyȱpartȱof Jones’sȱcaseȱinȱRichwineȱwasȱdismissedȱatȱscreening,ȱandȱgivenȱourȱholdingȱinȱTurley,ȱheȱdid notȱincurȱaȱthirdȱstrikeȱforȱthatȱsuit.ȱȱOurȱownȱsearch,ȱmoreover,ȱhasȱnotȱuncoveredȱany otherȱlawsuitȱinȱwhichȱJonesȱincurredȱaȱstrike,ȱandȱthusȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱerredȱin concludingȱthatȱtheȱ“threeȱstrikes”ȱprovisionȱappliedȱtoȱhim.ȱȱAndȱsinceȱJonesȱdoesȱnotȱhave threeȱstrikes,ȱtheȱquestionȱofȱimminentȱdangerȱisȱmoot.ȱ

TheȱjudgmentȱisȱVACATED,ȱandȱtheȱcaseȱisȱREMANDEDȱforȱfurtherȱproceedings.