NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted August 17, 2011* Decided August 17, 2011

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 11‐2029

MICHAEL A. BLACKMON, Appeal from the United States District Plaintiff‐Appellant, Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

v. No. 10‐C‐978

GARY H. HAMBLIN and Rudolph T. Randa, RICK RAEMISCH, Judge. Defendants‐Appellees.

O R D E R

In this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Wisconsin prisoner Michael Blackmon challenges as unconstitutional the conditions of his parole, which has since been revoked. Blackmon was ordered back to prison because he refused to obtain a psychological evaluation. Blackmon concedes this fact but insists that he is “of sound mind” and that forcing him to seek a psychological evaluation amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. He demands

* The defendants‐appellees were not served with process in the district court and are not participating in this appeal. After examining the plaintiff‐appellant’s brief and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the plaintiff‐appellant’s brief and the record. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). No. 11‐2029 Page 2

unspecified injunctive relief plus $6 million in damages. The district court dismissed his suit at screening. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

We agree with the district court that Blackmon has selected the wrong vehicle to pursue his grievances. A person convicted of a crime may not use § 1983 to attack the fact of his confinement or the conditions of his parole. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973); Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006); Williams v. Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576, 579‐80 (7th Cir. 2003); Drollinger v. Milligan, 552 F.2d 1220, 1224‐25 (7th Cir. 1977). Nor may a prisoner use § 1983 to obtain damages if success on the merits necessarily would imply the invalidity of the revocation of his parole. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994); Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006); Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216, 219 n.2 (5th Cir. 2004); Knowlin v. Thompson, 207 F.3d 907, 909 (7th Cir. 2000). If Blackmon wanted to challenge the constitutionality of Wisconsin’s requiring him to obtain a psychological evaluation, then he should have filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

AFFIRMED.