Order

Last year, we held that plaintiff Atrella Reynolds had succeeded in serving process on AAA Texas, LLC, and on “AAA Auto Club Enterprises.” Since neither had answered the complaint, we remanded with instructions to “decide whether to author *560 ize another round of attempted service [on the proper defendant], or to declare AAA Texas in default and leave the three AAA entities to work out among themselves where the responsibility lies.” Reynolds v. AAA Auto Club Enterprises, 525 Fed.Appx. 488 (7th Cir. 2018) (nonprecedential disposition).

On remand, the district court concluded that Automobile Club of Missouri is the only proper defendant, because the letter declining to hire Reynolds shows that it made the contested decision. The judge reformed the caption to remove AAA Texas and “AAA Auto Club Enterprises” as parties. (AAA Auto Club Enterprises appears to be a trade name rather than an organization; it is therefore not subject to suit. See Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 106 S.Ct. 2379, 91 L.Ed.2d 18 (1986).) The district judge concluded that Automobile Club of Missouri is not in default. Reynolds never attempted to serve it directly, and it filed an answer after recognizing that Reynolds had presented a claim against it. The judge then entered summary judgment against Reynolds, ruling her suit untimely. Reynolds v. Automobile Club of Missouri, 2014 WL 642421, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21560 (S.D.Ill. Feb. 19, 2014).

Reynolds does not contest the ruling on timeliness. Instead she maintains that our 2013 decision required the district court to enter a default judgment against Automobile Club of Missouri. That assertion is incorrect. As the language we have quoted shows, we told the district court to decide whether to declare AAA Texas in default. The judge explained why he did not do this and has complied fully with our mandate. And even if the judge had declared AAA Texas in default, that would not have provided Reynolds with what she seeks now — a judgment against Automobile Club of Missouri.

Affirmed.