Community Bank of Trenton v. Schnuck Markets, Incorporated
Opinion
*807 In late 2012, hackers infiltrated the computer networks at Schnuck Markets, a large Midwestern grocery store chain based in Missouri and known as "Schnucks." The hackers stole the data of about 2.4 million credit and debit cards. By the time the intrusion was detected and the data breach was announced in March 2013, the financial losses from unauthorized purchases and cash withdrawals had reached into the millions. Litigation ensued.
Like many other recent cases around the country, this case involves a massive consumer data breach. See, e.g.,
Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc.
,
The principal issues in this case present fairly new variations on the economic loss rule in tort law. The central issue is whether Illinois or Missouri tort law offers a remedy to card-holders' banks against a retail merchant who suffered a data breach, above and beyond the remedies provided by the network of contracts that link merchants, card-processors, banks, and card brands to enable electronic card payments. The plaintiff banks assert claims under the common law as well as Illinois consumer protection statutes. Our role as a federal court applying state law is to predict how the states' supreme courts would likely resolve these issues. We predict that both states would reject the plaintiff banks' search for a remedy beyond those established under the applicable networks of contracts. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the banks' complaint.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
A. Today's Electronic Payment Card System
When a customer uses a credit or debit card at a retail store, the merchant collects *808 the customer's information. This includes the card-holder's name and account number, the card's expiration date and security code, and, in the case of a debit card, the personal identification number. Collectively, this payment card information is known as "track data." At the time of purchase, the track data and the amount of the intended purchase are forwarded electronically to the merchant's bank (the "acquiring bank"), usually through a payment processing company. The acquiring bank then requests payment from the customer's bank (the "issuing bank") through the relevant card network-in this case, Visa or MasterCard. If the issuing bank approves the purchase, the transaction goes through within seconds. The customer's issuing bank then pays the merchant's acquiring bank the amount of the customer's purchase, which is credited to the merchant's account, minus processing fees. Contracts govern all of these relationships, although typically no contracts directly link the merchant (e.g., Schnucks) with the issuing banks (our four plaintiffs here). Here is a simplified diagram of this series of relationships:
The Card Payment System
In this case, Schnucks routed customer track data through a payment processor, First Data Merchant Services, to its acquiring bank, Citicorp. Citicorp then routed customer track data through the card networks to the issuing banks (plaintiffs here), who approved purchases and later collected payments from their customers, the card-holders. This web of contractual relationships facilitates the dotted line above: the familiar retail purchase by a customer from a merchant. Because Schnucks was the weak security link in this regime, the plaintiff banks seek to recover directly from Schnucks itself, a proposed line of liability represented by the dashed line above. This new form of liability would be in addition to the remedies already provided by the contracts governing the card payment systems.
B. The Contracts that Enable the Card Payment System
All parties in the card payment system agree to take on certain responsibilities and to subject themselves to specified contractual remedies. In joining the card payment system, issuing banks-including our plaintiffs here-agree to indemnify their customers in the event that a data breach anywhere in the network results in unauthorized
*809
transactions.
1
Visa requires issuers to "limit the Cardholder's liability to zero" when a customer timely notifies them of unauthorized transactions. Appellee App. at 99-100 (§ 4.1.13.3). MasterCard has the same requirement.
For their parts, acquiring banks and their agents must abide by data security requirements.
When a retailer or other party in the card payment system suffers a data breach, issuing banks must bear the cost, at least initially, of indemnifying their customers for unauthorized transactions and issuing new cards. The contracts that govern both the Visa and MasterCard networks then provide a cost recovery process that allows issuing banks to seek reimbursement for at least some of these losses. See Appellee App. at 102 (Visa), 110 (MasterCard). Schnucks agreed to follow card network "compliance requirements" for data security and to pay "fines" for noncompliance.
Id.
at 70. Our colleagues in the Eighth Circuit later read Schnucks' contract with its data processor and acquiring bank to include significant limits on Schnucks' share of the liability for losses of issuing banks. See
First Data
,
*810 C. The Schnucks Data Breach and Response
In early December 2012, hackers gained access to Schnucks' computer network in Missouri and installed malicious software (known as "malware") on its system. This malware harvested track data from the Schnucks system while payment transactions were being processed. As soon as payment cards were swiped at a Schnucks store and the unencrypted payment card information went from the card reader into the Schnucks system for payment, customer information was available for harvesting. The breach affected 79 of Schnucks' 100 stores in the Midwest, many of which are located in Missouri and Illinois, the states whose laws we consider here.
For the next four months, hackers harvested and sold customer track data, which were used to create counterfeit cards and to make unauthorized cash withdrawals, including from the plaintiff banks. Schnucks says it did not learn of the breach until March 14, 2013, when it heard from its card payment processor. A few days later, an outside consultant quickly identified the source of the problem. On March 30, Schnucks issued a press release announcing the data breach.
The plaintiff banks estimate that for every day the data breach continued, approximately 20,000 cards may have been compromised. This means around 2.4 million cards in total were at risk from the Schnucks breach. Given this rate, plaintiffs estimate that more than 300,000 cards may have been compromised between March 14 and March 30, after Schnucks knew that security had been breached but before it announced that fact publicly. The plaintiff banks allege that numerous security steps could have prevented the breach and that those steps are required by the card network rules.
3
In fact, under the networks' contractual provisions, the card networks later assessed over $1.5 million in reimbursement charges and fees against Schnucks, which eventually split that liability with its card processor and acquiring bank. Brief for Appellants at 4,
First Data
,
D. The Banks' Lawsuit
The plaintiff banks, which may or may not have received some of those reimbursement funds, filed a lawsuit in 2014 seeking to be made whole directly by Schnucks. The banks dismissed their first complaint voluntarily and then filed this action in the Southern District of Illinois in October 2015. They amended their complaint in October 2016. The banks contend that despite the existence of the contractual remedies, issuing banks "cannot always recoup the reimbursed fraudulent charges" and must pay other fees and bear card reissuing costs, which these banks seek to recover from Schnucks. Appellants' Br. at 11. 4
*811 In effect, the banks seek reimbursement for their losses above and beyond the remedies provided under the card network contracts. They say their losses include employee time to investigate and resolve fraud claims, payments to indemnify customers for fraudulent charges, and lost interest and transaction fees on account of changes in customer card usage. Plaintiffs estimate their damages in the tens of millions of dollars, placing this lawsuit in the same league as some others between financial institutions and breached retail merchants. See David L. Silverman, Developments in Data Security Breach Liability , 72 Bus. Law. 185, 185 (Winter 2016-17) (discussing three recent data breach cases settled by retail merchants for more than $15 million, including attorney fees).
In a thorough order, the district court dismissed all of the plaintiff banks' claims against Schnucks. No. 15-cv-01125-MJR,
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
We review
de novo
the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), accepting plaintiffs' factual allegations as true and drawing all permissible inferences in the plaintiffs' favor.
West Bend Mut. Insurance Co. v. Schumacher
,
B. Common Law Claims
1. Framing the Analysis
The plaintiff banks' substantive claims all arise under state law, but the relevant state courts have not addressed the specific questions we face. Under
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
,
To frame the issues, we begin by examining the economic loss doctrine in commercial litigation. For more than fifty years, state courts have generally refused to recognize tort liabilities for purely economic losses inflicted by one business on another where those businesses have already ordered their duties, rights, and remedies by contract. The reason for this rule is that "liability for purely economic loss ... is more appropriately determined by commercial rather than tort law," i.e., by the system of rights and remedies created by the parties themselves.
Indianapolis-Marion County Public Library v. Charlier Clark & Linard, P.C.
,
Courts invoking the economic loss rule trust the commercial parties interested in a particular activity to work out an efficient allocation of risks among themselves in their contracts. Courts "see no reason to intrude into the parties' allocation of the risk" when bargaining should be sufficient to protect the parties' interests, and where additional tort law remedies would act as something of a wild card to upset their expectations.
East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.
,
The doctrinal explanation is relatively simple: tort law often applies where there is "a sudden, calamitous accident as distinct from a mere failure to perform up to commercial expectations."
Rardin
,
*813
This principle has also been applied in other contexts. For example, when physical or personal injuries occur because of defective products, "[s]ociety has a great interest in spreading the cost of such injuries," but when a product causes economic loss by simply failing to perform as expected, tort liability is unwarranted; the Uniform Commercial Code already provides "a finely tuned mechanism for dealing with the rights of parties to a sales transaction with respect to economic losses."
Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.
,
Some form of the economic loss rule is the rule in most jurisdictions in the United States,
Rardin
,
The parties offer numerous doctrinal arguments about the economic loss rule and common law duties. Before we dig into those arguments, we pause to explain the broader choice between paradigms in this case. In deciding whether economic losses are recoverable in tort law, courts face a choice between what scholars have called the "stranger paradigm" and the "contracting parties paradigm." Catherine M. Sharkey,
Can Data Breach Claims Survive the Economic Loss Rule?
,
*814 The stranger paradigm fits "when an actor's negligence causes financial losses to a party with whom the actor has no pre-existing relationship." Sharkey, 66 DePaul L. Rev. at 344. The stranger paradigm seeks to set the "parameters of the duty of reasonable care ... at physical injuries and property damage" and, traditionally, does not allow recovery for simple economic losses. Id. But some courts taking this approach in data breach cases have decided to allow tort recovery anyway, both for consumers and for sophisticated financial institutions. These courts, one scholar argues, "are doing so not only in an ad hoc manner, but also by stretching and misapplying the stranger paradigm" instead of taking a "broader regulatory perspective." Id. at 383.
The contracting parties paradigm approaches the problem differently. Under this paradigm, "the question is whether a duty should be imposed by [tort] law ... over and above ... any voluntary allocation of risks and responsibilities already made between the contracting parties." Id. at 344-45. In this approach, the presence of contract remedies sets a boundary for tort law. If "contract law purports to decide the case, the negligence paradigm ... should stay in the background." Id. at 345 n.16, quoting Powers, 72 Tex. L. Rev. at 1229 (alteration in original).
Courts using the contracting parties paradigm first take into account the mechanisms the parties have chosen to allocate the risks they face. Courts then consider whether these mechanisms have sufficiently reduced the externalities visited upon third parties, or whether the breached entities need additional financial incentives to pursue better data security. Id. at 382-83. The ultimate question is whether these arrangements already place costs on "the cheapest cost avoider" or whether additional tort liability is necessary because the existing contracts "externalize significant risk onto hapless third parties." Id. at 383.
The plaintiff banks emphasize here that they have no direct contractual relationship with Schnucks. That's true, but it does not undermine use of the contracting parties paradigm. The plaintiff banks and Schnucks all participate in a network of contracts that tie together all the participants in the card payment system. That network of contracts imposes the duties plaintiffs rely upon and provides contractual remedies for breaches of those duties. See
Annett Holdings, Inc. v. Kum & Go, L.C.
,
As described above, in deciding to join the card payment system, Schnucks agreed to abide by the data security standards of the industry, the PCI DSS. Schnucks also agreed to be subject to assessments and fines from the card networks in the event that it was responsible for data breaches and unauthorized card activity. On their end, the plaintiff banks agreed to exceed federal requirements for indemnifying their card-holders and also consented to the remedial assessment and reimbursement process provisions and related risks.
*815 Even if these issuing banks had heard of this particular merchant before its data breach was announced, parties to the card payment system are not ships passing (or colliding) in the night. All parties involved in the complicated network of contracts that establish the card payment system have voluntarily decided to participate and to accept responsibility for the risks inherent in their participation. This includes at least some risk of not being fully reimbursed for the costs of another party's mistake.
The details of these reimbursement remedies are not fully apparent from the contract excerpts presented in this case. But what matters is not the details of the remedies but their existence . Merchants and acquiring banks face the financial cost of data breaches through the card networks' reimbursement regime. That means the cheapest cost avoiders (the data handlers) already bear the cost of data security protocols and breaches. The plaintiff banks in this case make no effort to explain how this system is inadequate in providing reimbursement. They ask us, though, to predict the recognition of new theories of state tort liability through simplistic application of sweeping black-letter tort law principles, leaving the card network reimbursement systems to be considered as mere damage issues on remand.
Given this network of contracts and contractual remedies, we decline plaintiffs' invitation to apply a version of the stranger paradigm. We doubt the wisdom of recognizing new, supplemental liabilities without a clear sense of why they are necessary. It's not as if the banks have no rights or remedies at all. This is also not a situation where sensitive data is collected and then disclosed by private, third-party actors who are not involved in the customers' or banks' direct transactions. See, e.g.,
In re Equifax, Inc., Customer Security Data Breach Litigation
,
The legal issues raised by the plaintiff banks are similar to the issues that arise in large construction projects with layers of contractors, subcontractors, sub-subcontractors, and so on. There may be no direct contractual relationship between a negligent subcontractor and other businesses that suffer from delays and expenses it caused. Yet all participants are tied into a network of contracts that allocate the risks of sub-standard or slow work. In such cases, as the Indiana Supreme Court has explained, claims of purely economic loss are better treated under contract law, without supplementary remedies from tort law. See
Indianapolis-Marion County Public Library
,
*816 As we explain in more detail below, we do not see either a paradigmatic or doctrinal reason why either Illinois or Missouri would recognize a tort claim by the issuing banks in this case, where the claimed conduct and losses are subject to these networks of contracts. We now turn to plaintiffs' more specific doctrinal arguments.
2. Negligence Claims
a. Illinois Law
Plaintiffs allege that Schnucks, a retail merchant, had a common law duty to safeguard customers' track data and that the duty extends to its customers' banks. We first consider this question under Illinois tort law, which asks whether the defendant had "an obligation of reasonable conduct for the benefit of the plaintiff" using a four-factor analysis.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp.
,
The Illinois Appellate Court addressed this topic in
Cooney v. Chicago Public Schools
, where Social Security numbers and other personal information of more than 1,700 former school employees were disclosed in a mailing.
Cooney
then rejected " 'a new common law duty' to safeguard information," writing that "we do not believe that the creation of a new legal duty beyond legislative requirements,"-i.e., beyond notice-"is part of our role on appellate review."
*817
Even if
Cooney
had not come to this conclusion, Illinois would probably apply the economic loss rule to bar recovery anyway. As mentioned above, Illinois'
Moorman
doctrine has three exceptions,
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.
,
The plaintiff banks respond to these points by claiming that Illinois' economic loss rule does not apply when the duty is "extra-contractual." The banks claim that a duty attaches because there is no direct contract between these parties. The problem is that all parties in the card networks (including card-holding customers) expect everyone to comply with industry-standard data security policies
as a matter of contractual obligation
. See above at 808-09.
Cooney
shows that Illinois has not recognized an independent common law duty to safeguard personal information. The banks' argument also fails to account for the scope of the
Moorman
doctrine. Schnucks assumed contractual data security responsibilities in joining the card networks. Even if the plaintiff banks were not direct parties to agreements with Schnucks, they seek additional recovery for the breach of those contractual duties. "Even in the absence of an alternative remedy in contract," Illinois does not permit tort recovery for businesses who seek to correct the purely economic "defeated expectations of a commercial bargain."
2314 Lincoln Park West Condo. Ass'n v. Mann, Gin, Ebel & Frazier, Ltd.
,
b. Missouri Law
The Missouri appellate courts have said less than Illinois appellate courts on this question of duty. All the same elements
*818
important to the
Cooney
court, though, are also present in Missouri law. The Missouri courts use the same four-factor common law duty test. Compare
Hoffman v. Union Elec. Co.
,
Other state legislatures have acted to impose the kind of reimbursement or damages liability the plaintiff banks call for here. Minnesota, Nevada, and Washington stand out as examples. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 325E.64, subd. 3 (2017) (requiring reimbursement and imposing liability); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 603A.215(1), (3) (2017) (requiring PCI DSS compliance, but holding harmless compliant data collectors who are less than grossly negligent);
Even if Missouri courts were not convinced by these comparisons and recognized a common law duty to safeguard customer data, the economic loss doctrine would still thwart the plaintiff banks' claims. Missouri does not permit "recovery in tort for pure economic damages" without personal injuries or property damage.
Autry Morlan Chevrolet Cadillac, Inc. v. RJF Agencies, Inc.
,
3. Negligence Per Se
The plaintiff banks' negligence
per se
claims fail because of the same statutory inferences. Neither Illinois nor Missouri has legislatively imposed liability for personal data breaches, opting instead to limit their statutory intervention to notice requirements.
Cooney
,
*819
Amburgy
, 671 F.Supp.2d at 1055. This is critical. Both states require a plaintiff to show, as the first element of a negligence
per se
action, that a statute or ordinance has been violated. Departures from industry custom are not sufficient, since industry custom would be a source of common law duties to be litigated in a negligence action. See
Bier v. Leanna Lakeside Property Ass'n
,
To bolster their negligence and negligence
per se
arguments, the plaintiff banks cite two district court cases declining to dismiss similar claims by banks against retail merchants. These cases are not persuasive regarding the common law of Illinois or Missouri. One case consciously sought to further statutory data security breach policies not present here.
In re Target Corp. Customer Data Security Breach Litig.
,
4. Other Common Law Claims
The plaintiff banks assert three other claims sounding in the common law of contracts: unjust enrichment, implied contract, and third-party beneficiary. The district court correctly dismissed them as well. All three fail because of basic contract law principles.
Illinois law and Missouri law on these common law contract theories are similar. Both refuse to recognize unjust enrichment claims where contracts already establish rights and remedies.
Guinn v. Hoskins Chevrolet
,
Illinois and Missouri also do not recognize implied contracts where written agreements define the business relationship.
*820
Industrial Lift Truck Service Corp. v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp.
,
Neither state recognizes third-party beneficiary claims unless the beneficiary is identified or the third-party benefit is clearly intended by the contracting parties. Construction law is again helpful here. Illinois and Missouri have required a subcontractor to show that the contract in question between the principal parties clearly extends the rights of a third-party beneficiary. See
L.K. Comstock & Co. v. Morse/UBM Joint Venture
,
As the district court found, Schnucks was not unjustly enriched. Its card-paying customers paid the same amount as those paying in cash; thus there is no unjust enrichment left uncovered outside of the card payment system contracts. As for an implied contract, the First Circuit has recognized an implied contract between a grocery store's
customers
and the store over the safeguarding of personal data. See
Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co.
,
Similarly, we have no reason to think Illinois or Missouri would conclude that a retail merchant and its customer specifically intended the customer's bank to be a third-party beneficiary of their retail transaction. Illinois has rejected this theory where a construction subcontractor (not unlike the plaintiff banks here) sought damages for a breach of the contract between a construction manager and a construction client (like the retail merchant and customer here, respectively), where provisions of the contract were inconsistent with the idea that it envisioned the subcontractor as a third-party beneficiary.
L.K. Comstock & Co.
,
The plaintiff banks have not argued on appeal that the card payment system contracts specifically envision them as a third-party beneficiary regarding the data security provisions, nor did they argue this point in the district court beyond vague references to the interchange fees the issuing banks receive simply for being part of the card payment system. See Dkt. 65 at 17; Am. Compl. ¶ 24. This is not enough to overcome the "strong presumption" in Illinois law "that parties intend a contract to apply solely to themselves" for enforcement purposes.
Bank of America, N.A. v. Bassman FBT, L.L.C.
,
No express contract exists between Schnucks and its customers (beyond the basic exchange of products for payment), let alone one that specifically intends to include the plaintiff banks as third-party beneficiaries. As with construction contracts, the direct rights and reimbursement possibilities provided by the web of contracts, either for the construction job or the card payment system, define the limits of recovery. See, e.g.,
Indianapolis-Marion County Public Library v. Charlier Clark & Linard, P.C.,
5. Decisions in Other Circuits
One other federal circuit court has reached a different prediction of state law on facts similar to these. Our colleagues in the Fifth Circuit predicted that New Jersey would recognize a negligence claim brought by an issuing bank against a payment processor, though not retail merchants. See
Lone Star Nat'l Bank, N.A. v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc.
,
Our predictions here are closer to the analysis in two cases from the Third and First Circuits. The Third Circuit applied the economic loss rule to bar negligence claims and rejected most of the other theories invoked by issuing banks against a breached retail merchant.
Sovereign Bank v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc.
,
Similarly, the First Circuit has rejected a negligence theory because of the economic loss rule and also rejected a third-party beneficiary theory under the card payment system contracts.
In re TJX Companies Retail Security Breach Litig.
,
C. Illinois Statutory Claims-The ICFA
1. The Plaintiff Banks' Claims
We turn next to plaintiffs' claims under Illinois statutes. (As noted, Missouri provides no statutory cause of action for financial institutions in retail data breaches.) The plaintiff banks allege that Schnucks violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (ICFA)
*822 by engaging in an unfair practice of having poor data security procedures. See 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/2, 505/10a. The banks also allege that Schnucks violated the Illinois Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA), 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 530/10, and point out that PIPA violations are identified by statute as per se unlawful practices actionable under the ICFA, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 530/20. We affirm the district court's rejection of both theories in this case.
2. Basic Elements of an ICFA Claim
We first explain the relevant features of the ICFA before explaining why this claim fails as a matter of law. A plaintiff bringing a private claim under the ICFA must show five elements, the first of which is "a deceptive act or practice by the defendant."
Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
,
ICFA plaintiffs must identify "some stand-alone ... fraudulent act or practice,"
*823
As mentioned above, the "any person" language in the ICFA means that businesses can sometimes sue one another under the statute, but a business plaintiff under the ICFA must show a "nexus between the complained of conduct and consumer protection concerns," which we refer to here as the "consumer nexus test."
Athey Products Corp. v. Harris Bank Roselle
,
But we need not decide here whether the plaintiff banks could ever establish a consumer nexus in an ICFA data breach claim. As a more preliminary matter, they fail to allege any ICFA violation in this lawsuit that would make that secondary consumer nexus determination necessary.
3. Unfair Practice Claim
The plaintiff banks fail to allege an unfair practice under the ICFA because their theory is essentially a "market theory of causation" argument that Illinois courts have rejected. The complaint alleges that "Schnucks engaged in unfair business practices in violation of [the] ICFA by failing to implement and maintain reasonable payment card data security measures." Am. Compl. ¶ 116. The complaint goes on to allege: "While Schnucks cut corners and minimized costs, its competitors spent the time and money necessary to ensure" the security of "sensitive payment card information."
This argument does not support an ICFA claim. It is very similar to the argument the Illinois Supreme Court rejected in
Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co.
, where the plaintiff alleged that he paid an " 'artificially inflated' price for ... gasoline" due to the "defendant's allegedly deceptive advertising scheme."
The plaintiff banks allege that Schnucks effectively manipulated both its prices and sales volume by deliberately concealing the data breach. This manipulation would not have been possible, say the banks, if Schnucks had told the truth about its data security. Dkt. 65 at 4. The banks admit that they did not "plead specific misrepresentations." They argue instead that they do not need to-that alleging an unfair practice directed at the market in general is enough. By simply continuing business as usual as its consultant investigated the data breach, plaintiffs argue, Schnucks violated public policy and by extension the ICFA. 11
This theory is not consistent with
Oliveira
, which likened its plaintiff's theory to "the fraud on the market theory found in federal securities case law" and rejected it for ICFA claims.
4. Illinois Personal Information Protection Act
It might be possible for the plaintiff banks to state a different kind of claim under the ICFA by alleging that Schnucks violated the Illinois Personal Information Protection Act by failing to disclose the breach for two weeks after learning of it. A violation of the PIPA can be sufficient to obtain ICFA relief. See 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 530/20. The data breach occurred in this case, and PIPA requires notice to Illinois residents affected by data breaches. § 530/10. But the plaintiffs failed to explain to the district court whether and *825 how Schnucks' conduct fell under one of the operative subsections of the notice statute and not any of its exceptions. See id . Such an explanation was needed to preserve the PIPA-ICFA claim for appellate review, especially for a counseled class of sophisticated plaintiffs advocating a novel theory.
The problem here is not the adequacy of pleadings but the adequacy of the legal argument in the district court. In responding to a motion to dismiss, "the non-moving party must proffer some legal basis to support his cause of action."
Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A.
,
This is especially true when a party advances a novel legal theory. See
The plaintiff banks argue that they asserted this claim properly in the district court. Their support is meager. Plaintiffs point to a footnote in the complaint that refers to a PIPA code section, see Am. Compl. ¶35 n.23, and a page and a half devoted to their ICFA claims in the brief opposing the motion to dismiss, Dkt. 65 at 18-19. These were not sufficient to alert the district court that plaintiffs were even relying on the theory they argue on appeal, let alone to explain the theory to the district court. Though plaintiffs summarized the connections between the federal FTCA and the ICFA, see Am. Compl. ¶ 115, they simply did not address the potential application of PIPA to this case in either filing.
One district court case cited in the plaintiff banks' response mentions PIPA. Even if that were enough to alert the district judge to the issue-and it is certainly not-plaintiffs tried to distinguish that case, not to draw parallels to it. See Dkt. 65 at 18, distinguishing
In re Michaels Stores Pin Pad Litig.
,
We will not revive this potential claim here. "Even if the argument was not waived ... the [plaintiffs-appellants] failed to support it in this court with anything more than abstract generalities," which is a sufficient reason not to wade into the
*826
issue.
Hassebrock v. Bernhoft
,
Conclusion
We agree with the district court that neither Illinois nor Missouri would recognize any of the plaintiff banks' theories to supplement their contractual remedies for losses they suffered as a result of the Schnucks data breach. The judgment dismissing the action is
AFFIRMED.
This contractual duty goes beyond the federal law requirement to limit customer liability in the event of a data breach. See
We can properly consider the remedies provided in the card brand rules and Schnucks' contractual agreements. A court deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) may consider documents that are attached to a complaint or that are central to the complaint, even if not physically attached to it.
Tierney v. Vahle
,
These steps include installing appropriate antivirus software, complying with network segmentation and firewall standards, encrypting sensitive payment data, tracking and monitoring all access to payment information, and implementing two-factor authentication for remote access.
The most important set of facts alleged by the plaintiffs involves the March 14-30 period, when Schnucks knew of the data breach but had not yet alerted banks and consumers. Because Schnucks "derives the majority of its revenue from electronic payment card transactions," plaintiffs believe Schnucks intentionally dragged its feet in announcing the data breach. See Am. Compl. ¶ 59. By having substandard security and by delaying disclosure of the breach, plaintiffs allege, Schnucks "saved the cost of implementing the proper payment card security policies, procedures, protocols, and hardware and software systems, and ... wrongfully shifted the risk and expense of the Data Breach" to the banks. Am. Compl. ¶ 84.
The plaintiff banks attempt to distinguish Cooney by pointing out that track data, as opposed to Social Security numbers, can be used more easily to cause lasting financial harm. From the card-holding consumer's perspective, given federally-mandated and card network-promised indemnification, this may or may not be true. And the plaintiffs point to no Illinois authority that explains why this difference, or the fact that financial institutions seek to impose this duty here, should change the result.
So far, only one court has examined this statute in a data breach case in a reported opinion. It predicted that no such negligence cause of action exists under Missouri law.
Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc.
,
Plaintiffs allege a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
The Court of Appeals of Georgia later disagreed with the
Home Depot
prediction of state law.
McConnell v. Dep't of Labor
,
In addition, plaintiffs in Illinois state court must plead fraud under the ICFA with the same level of specificity as under the common law.
Connick
,
In 2006, which was after
Oliveira
but before
De Bouse
, the Illinois Appellate Court found that a consumer could state an ICFA claim where a manufacturer of aluminum-clad wooden windows failed to disclose physical defects in its product.
Pappas v. Pella Corp.
,
To characterize their claim as an "unfair practice" rather than a misrepresentation, the plaintiff banks cite a district court decision that in turn quoted
Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp.
,
Reference
- Full Case Name
- COMMUNITY BANK OF TRENTON, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SCHNUCK MARKETS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
- Cited By
- 130 cases
- Status
- Published