In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 21-2326 RYAN KLAASSEN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

TRUSTEES OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division. No. 1:21-CV-238 DRL — Damon R. Leichty, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 11, 2022 — DECIDED JANUARY 25, 2022 ____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, SCUDDER, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. Indiana University requires students and fac- ulty to be vaccinated against SARS-CoV-2, which causes COVID-19. After the district court denied plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, we denied a motion for an in- junction pending appeal. 7 F.4th 592 (7th Cir. 2021). Our opin- ion observed that, because seven of the eight plaintiffs qualify for the University’s exemption for students who represent that vaccination conflicts with their religious beliefs, standing 2 No. 21-2326

depends on the eighth plaintiff, who does not assert that vac- cination is religiously unacceptable. Id. at 593. Before the parties filed their appellate briefs on the merits, the University asked us to dismiss the litigation as moot. The University told us that Natalie Sperazza, the sole plaintiff in- eligible for a religious exemption, has withdrawn from the University. Plaintiffs replied that Sperazza has deferred her enrollment, not withdrawn, and that she plans to aaend if she can do so without being vaccinated. We accepted that repre- sentation and denied the University’s motion. The parties then filed their briefs, which do not shake our confidence in the correctness of our earlier decision. But be- fore reaching the merits we must revisit mootness. Because plans can change, and because the briefs do not discuss the plaintiffs’ current status, we asked at oral argument whether Sperazza still intends to aaend Indiana University if she can do so without vaccination. She promptly gave a negative an- swer. Her declaration says: “I have no plans to return as a stu- dent at Indiana University.” At the pre-briefing stage, plaintiffs told us that the suit is justiciable for two reasons: Sperazza’s status (now altered) and the fact that all plaintiffs contest the requirement that un- vaccinated students wear masks and be tested regularly for COVID-19. Their appellate brief ignores the mask-and-test re- quirement, however, so that aspect of the suit has been aban- doned. Plaintiffs’ aaempt to revive this subject in a post-argu- ment memorandum comes too late. Plaintiffs nonetheless ask us to treat this litigation as justi- ciable because the subject is capable of repetition but evading review. That contention is mistaken, for two reasons. No. 21-2326 3

First, the capable-of-repetition doctrine applies only if the dispute can recur between the same parties. See, e.g., Los An- geles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975). Given the religious exemption enjoyed by seven plaintiffs, and the withdrawal of the eighth, these plaintiffs will not be aggrieved by the University’s vaccination require- ment in the future. Second, only short-lived disputes evade review. See, e.g., Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 481–82 (1990); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399–400 (1975). This vaccination policy is not in that category. Indiana University requires many vaccinations, and none of the litigants suggests that SARS-CoV-2 is just a temporary addition to the list. College enrollment usually lasts four years, and some students go on to graduate education (one of the plaintiffs was a law student when the suit began). Challenges to other vaccination require- ments have been resolved by the Supreme Court, see Biden v. Missouri, No. 21A240 (Jan. 13, 2022); National Federation of In- dependent Business v. Department of Labor, No. 21A244 (Jan. 13, 2022), even though those requirements were adopted after In- diana University’s. The problem in obtaining judicial review does not stem from an evanescent policy, whose application will be complete before a court can act. The obstacle to reso- lution of this suit is that the only plaintiff with standing with- drew from the University. The judgment of the district court is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot.