In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 22-2182 SAMUEL HOGSETT, Petitioner-Appellant, v.

THOMAS LILLARD, Respondent-Appellee. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. No. 21-cv-1085 — Stephen P. McGlynn, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 6, 2022 — DECIDED JULY 7, 2023 ____________________

Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. In 2007, a jury convicted Samuel Hogsett of three federal crimes, including being a felon in pos- session of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The sentencing court found that Hogsett was an armed career criminal be- cause he had three prior convictions for violent felonies. As a result, he faced a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on his § 922(g) conviction instead of the then-applicable 10-year maximum. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), (e)(1) (2006). The court 2 No. 22-2182

sentenced him to 295 months’ imprisonment on that count. In 2021, long after Hogsett’s convictions became final, the Su- preme Court interpreted “violent felony” in § 924(e) to ex- clude crimes that can be committed with a mens rea of reck- lessness. Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1834 (2021) (plurality opinion). Hogsett thinks one of the convictions sup- porting his sentencing enhancement could have been commit- ted recklessly, so he asserts that Borden establishes that his § 922(g) sentence is above the statutory maximum. Hogsett wants to bring a collateral challenge to that sentence. To collaterally attack a conviction or sentence, a federal prisoner files a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Mangine v. Withers, 39 F.4th 443, 447 (7th Cir. 2022). The problem for Hogsett is that he filed a § 2255 motion in 2010, and a prisoner can only file another § 2255 motion in one of two specific circumstances: A second or successive motion must be certified … by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain— (1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroac- tive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. § 2255(h). Thus, “[i]ntervening Supreme Court statutory in- terpretation decisions … are outside the ambit of § 2255(h).” Mangine, 39 F.4th at 447. Because he did not satisfy the No. 22-2182 3

requirements to file a successive § 2255 motion, Hogsett filed a § 2241 habeas petition instead. Hogsett argued that he was eligible to file a § 2241 habeas petition under § 2255(e), the “saving clause.” Under § 2255(e), “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a [federal] prisoner” who previously filed a § 2255 motion “shall not be entertained … unless it … appears that the rem- edy by [§ 2255] motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” Since In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998), we have interpreted § 2255(e) to allow a pris- oner to seek habeas relief under § 2241 if: (1) [his] claim relies on a statutory interpretation case, not a constitutional case and thus could not have been invoked by a successive § 2255 motion; (2) [he] could not have invoked the decision in his first § 2255 motion and the decision applies retroactively; and (3) the error is grave enough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice. Mangine, 39 F.4th at 447 (quoting Beason v. Marske, 926 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2019)). The district court denied Hogsett’s § 2241 petition, holding that even if Hogsett’s sentence on his § 922(g) conviction was above the statutory maximum, there could be no miscarriage of justice because his total sentence was within the advisory Guidelines range. Hogsett appealed.* While Hogsett’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Jones v. Hendrix, holding that § 2255(e) “does not per- mit a prisoner asserting an intervening change in statutory

* We thank Alison Guernsey and the Federal Criminal Defense Clinic at the University of Iowa College of Law for representing Hogsett and then-law-student Paige Roff for ably arguing the appeal on his behalf. 4 No. 22-2182

interpretation to circumvent [the] restrictions on second or successive § 2255 motions by filing a § 2241 petition.” 599 U.S. ----, 2023 WL 4110233, at *5 (June 22, 2023). Instead, the saving clause is designed to “cover[] unusual circumstances in which it is impossible or impracticable for a prisoner to seek relief from the sentencing court” in a § 2255 motion. Id. at *6 (giving examples including the dissolution of the sentencing court). The Court abrogated Davenport and its counterparts in other circuits because they were an improper end-run around § 2255(h)’s limitations on filing second or successive motions. Id. at *7–8. “The inability of a prisoner with a statutory claim to satisfy” § 2255(h)’s requirements, the Court explained, “does not mean that he can bring his claim in a habeas petition under the saving clause. It means that he cannot bring it at all.” Id. at *9. The parties agree that Jones abrogates Davenport and con- trols this case. Hogsett previously filed a § 2255 motion, and he now wishes to invoke Borden to mount a new collateral at- tack on his sentence. Because Borden is a statutory interpreta- tion decision, § 2255(h) does not permit Hogsett to file a suc- cessive § 2255 motion, and Jones forecloses the possibility of filing a § 2241 habeas petition via § 2255(e). 2023 WL 4110233, at *9. The district court applied Davenport and denied Hogsett’s § 2241 petition on the merits, but Jones holds that federal courts lack jurisdiction to consider habeas petitions filed by federal prisoners in Hogsett’s position. Id. We there- fore vacate the district court’s judgment and remand with in- structions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.