U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 2023

United States v. Tyquell Alexander

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Decided August 11, 2023

78 F.4th 346 (Federal Reporter, Fourth Series)

Opinion

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 22-2802 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TYQUELL ALEXANDER, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 21 CR 190 — John J. Tharp, Jr., Judge. ____________________ ARGUED JULY 12, 2023 — DECIDED AUGUST 11, 2023 ____________________ Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. ȱĜȱĴȱ¢ȱ¡Ȭ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ scene, apprehended and frisked him, and found the gun ȱȱȱ ǯȱ¡ǰȱ ȱ ȱcharged with ȱȱęȱȱȱǰȱŗŞȱǯǯǯȱȗ 922(g)(1), moved ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ cause. The district court denied the motion. Because the 2 No. 22-2802 Ĝȱ ȱ¡ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ suspiciousl¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱĜǯȱ Late one night in October 2020, ShotSpotter devices 1 alerted the Chicago Police Department to possible gunshots ȱȱŚŚŖŖȱȱȱȱȱ ¢, on Chicago’s west side. Police officers began ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ Ȭ mote-controlled surveillance cameras called Police Observa- tion Devices. These camerasǰȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȬ sitioned in high-crime locations, enabled police to watch a large group congregating on that block. The monitoring offic- ers saw ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ǯȱ¡ȱȱthe gun ¢ȱȱ¡¢ȱȱȱȱȱ it in his front waistband. The officers who saw the hand-off ȱȱȱǯȱȱ¢ȱǰȱ¡ȱȱȱ opposite direction. He then stepped behind a man standing alongside him and moved toward a metal fence that blocked ȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱ. He pushed against the fence but ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ he officers, who hand- cuffed and frisked him. One officer felt an L-shaped object in ¡Ȃȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȬ ȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ the police station. ¡ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȬ ȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱŗŞȱǯǯǯȱȗ 922(g)(1). He moved to ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ noises suggestive of gunshots. “The Chicago Police Department’s Use of ȱ ¢ǰȄȱ THE CITY OF CHICAGO OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, at 4 (Aug. 24, 2021), https://igchicago.org/wp-content/up- loads/2021/08/Chicago-Police-Departments-Use-of-ShotSpotter-Technol- ¢ǯ (archived at https://perma.cc/XG4C-WMKC).

No. 22-2802 3 arguing that the officers’ knowledge that he possessed a gun before their arrival did not establish probable cause that he committed or was committing a crime. The government re- ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ stop was reasonable suspicion—a standard that justified stop- ping and frisking ¡ȱȱȱ ShotSpotter alert, his open possession of a gun, and his evasive actions when the officers arrived. ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡Ȃȱ ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¡Ȃȱ£—whether ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ—and settled upon ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ¡Ȭ ander that he possessed a gun. The judge then determined ȱȱȱ¡ǰȱȱbecause ȱ¡Ȃȱe possession of a gun, but for two other reasons. First, the offic- ers saw that ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ ȱ¢ȱǰȱŝŘŖȱILCS 5/24-1(a)(10)(iv), when he carried an unconcealed ȱȱȱȱ ǯȱǰȱ¡Ȭ ander tried to ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ scene after a suspicious handoff just minutes earlier. ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱsee FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2), preserving his right to appeal the rul- ing on his motion to suppress. The judge sentenced him to ȱ¢ȱȱǯ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ press. As a ¢ȱmatter, it is not obvious at which point ¡ȱ ȱ ǻǯǯǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ ǰȱȱǰȱ ȱ¢ȱransported him to the police station) andǰȱ¢ǰ whether the officers’ conduct should ȱ¢£ under a probable cause or reasonable suspicion 4 No. 22-2802 standard. But the government contends that the standard is immaterial because the officers “possessed both probable cause (as the district judge concluded) and reasonable suspi- ȱȱǰȱǰȱȱȄȱ¡ǯȱ the parties and district judge all evaluated whether there was probable ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ frisked him, and probable cause is the more demanding ǰȱ ȱȱ¢£ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ cause.

A warrantless arrest is valid under the Fourth Amend- ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǯȱDistrict of Co- lumbia v. Wesby, 138 ǯȱǯȱśŝŝǰȱśŞŜȱǻŘŖŗŞǼǯ Probable cause ¡Ȭ ists, in turn, when ȱ¢ȱȱ—with the same information ȱ¢ȱȱȱ—would be- lieve there ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ¢. Id. When reviewing the denial of a motion to sup- press, we review the judge’s legal determination of probable cause de novo and the judge’s factual findings for clear error.

Ornelas v. United StatesǰȱśŗŝȱǯǯȱŜşŖǰȱŜşşȱǻŗşşŜǼǲȱUnited States v. Key, 889 ǯřȱşŗŖǰȱşŗŘȱǻŝȱǯȱŘŖŗŞǼǯ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱt ȱȱȱȱ ¢ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ more important, broader point. Even if—ȱ ¡ȱ Ȭ gues—the officers did not know that he ȱȱ¢ȱȬ tion or lacked a concealed-¢ȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ cause to believe that he broke Illinois law, that is, the Illinois ȱȱ¢ȱ. That Act allows a person with ȱȱȱ¢ȱa ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱit is “com- ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ǰȄȱŚřŖȱILCS ŜŜȦśǰȱŜŜȦŗŖǲȱ No. 22-2802 5 see ŝŘŖȱ ȱśȦŘŚ-1(a)(1ŖǼǻǼǰȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱ¡Ȭ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱǯ In a related challenge to the judge’s probable-cause ruling, ¡ȱȱȱȱȃȱȱȱȄȱȱ the face of the officers’ approach—when he ¢ȱȃȱ ȱ¢ȄȱȱȃȱȱȱȄ—did not give the of- ficers reason to believe that his gun possession was unlawful.

True, such behavior alone seems unremarkable for purposes of probable cause. See United States v. Williamsǰȱŝřŗ ǯřȱŜŝŞ, ŜŞŝȱǻŝȱǯȱŘŖŗřǼȱǻ“Mȱǰȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȬ ȱǰȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱǰȱȱ ¢ȱǰȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱ area … .Ȅ). ȱ¡Ȃȱȱȱagain too narrow—his be- havior ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ point among the ¢ȱȱȱthat could establish probable cause. In United States v. RichmondǰȱşŘŚȱǯřȱŚŖŚȱǻŝȱ Cir. 2019)ǰȱȱ¢ȱȱǰ we concluded that offic- ers had reasonable suspicion that the defendant committed a crime based on ȱȃȱȄȱȱȱ shirt pocket, his ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃǳȄȱ ȱ their approach, and his placement of an unidentifiable object on the threshold of his front door. Id. at 408-09. A similar set of circumstances was present here: ¢ȱȱof- ficers could infer ȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱ he possessed a gun (which is undisputed), and his furtive movements upon their approach. See also United States v. Adair, 925 F.3d 931, 934, 938 ǻŝȱǯȱŘŖŗşǼ (officers had rea- sonable suspicion in part because defendant tried to evade of- ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ Ǽǯ For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district judge’s denial of Al¡Ȃȱȱȱȱǯ

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.