In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 22-1639
NATIONAL POLICE ASSOCIATION, INC.,
                                                 Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                 v.

GANNETT CO., INC., ET AL.,
                                              Defendants-Appellees.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
         Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
      No. 1:21-cv-01116-RLM-DLP — Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.
                     ____________________

  ARGUED NOVEMBER 30, 2022 — DECIDED AUGUST 31, 2023
               ____________________

   Before WOOD, JACKSON-AKIWUMI, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
    JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge. The National Police As-
sociation (“NPA”) is a non-profit organization that describes
its purpose as “educat[ing] supporters of law enforcement in
how to help police departments accomplish their goals.” In
2018 and 2019, a handful of police departments around the
country took issue with fundraising mailers the NPA sent res-
idents; the departments characterized the solicitations as de-
ceptive. The Indianapolis Star and the Associated Press
2                                                 No. 22-1639

reported on the alerts issued by these police departments. In
response, the NPA sued the publishers, alleging their reports
were libelous. The organization lost when the district court
dismissed its case, but it presses its theory on appeal—one
based on a novel interpretation of the Restatement (Second)
Torts § 577(2). In short, the NPA suggests the Restatement cre-
ates a requirement that internet publishers remove previously
published libelous information. The NPA even asks that we
certify questions to the Indiana Supreme Court to confirm
that such a duty exists in Indiana. But because this alleged
duty lacks doctrinal support, we decline to certify the ques-
tions and affirm the district court’s dismissal of this case.
                              II

   The NPA is a non-profit formed in 2017. It makes public
service announcements, publishes various media, and pre-
pares legal filings on behalf of police officers and police de-
partments to help law enforcement agencies.
   In May 2018, the Police Department of Germantown, Wis-
consin, posted a “scam alert” on its Facebook page flagging
NPA solicitations. The Police Department of Trenton, Michi-
gan, did the same in February 2019.
    The Indianapolis Star, owned by defendant-appellee Gan-
nett Company, Inc, reported on the police department alerts
a month later. The article ran on March 17, 2019, and was ti-
tled “This Indianapolis charity says it helps police. Police
chiefs say it’s a scam.” Referencing alerts issued by several
police departments, the article focused on whether the money
NPA raised truly went to police departments in the munici-
palities where it mailed solicitations. The article highlighted
statements in NPA mailers sent to residents of two towns that
No. 22-1639                                                   3

falsely characterized the towns as sanctuary cities. The article
quoted nonprofit experts who expressed measured skepti-
cism of the NPA based on publicly available tax filings, and it
noted that various Indianapolis police organizations and the
national Fraternal Order of Police were generally unaware of
the NPA. The Star also sought rebuttal comment from the
president of the NPA; spoke to an attorney listed as the NPA’s
treasurer; and quoted a sheriff the NPA provided to the news-
paper as a positive reference, who detailed assistance the or-
ganization provided to his department.
    The next day—March 18, 2019—the AP published a wire
story on the same allegations covered by the Star, titled “Po-
lice question authenticity of nonprofit’s fundraising.” The
NPA characterizes the reporting in the AP and the Star stories
as defamatory given they insinuate the NPA is a fraudulent
or dubious organization.
    In the year and a half after the two stories were published,
the NPA began a campaign of extracting apparent retractions
of the “scam” alerts the Star and the AP reported on. In May
2019, a few months after the articles ran, the Trenton Police
Department updated its Facebook post. The revised post
acknowledged the NPA “is an official organization”. But the
revised post also declared that the police department does not
receive money from the NPA, and it cryptically advised,
“Please do your own homework when donating to any chari-
table cause or organization.” The NPA viewed the revised
post as a retraction of the police department’s original alert,
noting that the reference to a “scam” was removed.
   On June 21, 2019, the NPA sued the City of Trenton and
two of its officers based on their statements included in the
Star’s March 17 story. After these lawsuits were filed, the Star
4                                                           No. 22-1639

returned to the story, writing a follow-up on July 15 titled, “A
pro-police Indianapolis nonprofit is suing 2 police officers.”
In this subsequent article, the paper recapped its reporting on
the initial scam allegations.
    As a part of its retraction campaign, the NPA also sued the
Germantown Police Department, and extracted from Steven
R. Kreklow, Village Administrator of Germantown, a state-
ment noting that although Germantown proper was not a
sanctuary city, it was a part of the Milwaukee metro area—
where other municipalities had sanctuary policies.1 The NPA
also presents this statement as a retraction of the Germantown
police chief’s original statement that the mailers were mis-
leading.
    With statements in hand from Trenton, Germantown, and
the City of Belle Isle, Florida (which also described the NPA
mailers as misleading in the original Star story), counsel for
the NPA sent a letter to Gannett, the publisher of The Indian-
apolis Star, and to the AP’s Indiana office and general counsel,
providing notice under Indiana Code § 34-15-4-2 that the
NPA considered the three articles defamatory and intended
to sue. The letter sought a retraction and removal of public
access to online copies of the stories. Both letters pointed to
the legal theory that would drive the suit: “Under the modern
rule of continuing publication, a defamatory statement is
deemed to be republished if, after becoming aware of its false
and defamatory nature, the publisher leaves the publication


    1 The NPA’s defense of these letters relies on the nuance of the De-
partment of Homeland Security describing Germantown and Belle Isle as
“sanctuary area[s]”, even though those designations refer to different gov-
ernmental units than the municipalities alone.
No. 22-1639                                                                5

on the publisher’s website subject to continuing access by
third parties.” In-house counsel for Gannett and the AP re-
sponded to the near-identical letters on February 23 and
March 1, 2021, respectively. They disagreed with NPA’s claim
of defamation and stated they were prepared to defend the
stories in potential litigation. The NPA filed its complaint on
May 3, 2021.
       The district court granted the publishers’ motion to
dismiss for three reasons. First, it held that the NPA’s suit
would fail under traditional defamation doctrines, given the
organization never alleged “actual malice”—that the publish-
ers were aware of an inaccuracy or had serious doubts about
the accuracy of the material—when the stories were first pub-
lished. Nat'l Police Ass'n, Inc. v. Gannett Co., No. 1:21-CV-1116
RLM-DLP, 

, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 28, 2022).
    Second, the district court was skeptical of the reasoning
underlying the libel claim. The NPA predicated its suit on a
novel application of the Restatement (Second) of Torts §
577(2),2 which imposes liability for landowners who do not
remove defamatory content on their property. NPA sought to
apply this to the context of internet publications, backed by
this court’s decision in Tacket v. General Motors Corporation,


    2 The Restatement is a recapitulation of established legal norms across
states that is not mandatory and does not have the force of statute, espe-
cially since “different jurisdictions may, and often do, go their separate
ways.” Next Techs. Inc. v. Beyond the Off. Door, LLC, 

 (7th
Cir. 2021). Even so, when a state has not explicitly taken a contrary posi-
tion on an area of law, it is usually safe to assume that it would follow the
Restatement. 

 (citing Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Doe, 

(7th Cir. 2014)). The parties here have adopted that approach, so we will
do the same.
6                                                     No. 22-1639

which predicted (incorrectly, at least to date) that Indiana
would adopt § 577(2). 

 (7th Cir. 1987). The
district court held that neither authority applied in this case,
as the NPA’s proposed “continued publication” rule was an
attempt to conflate doctrine relating to a party’s adoption of
another’s statement (the Restatement and Tacket) with a
party’s failure to retract one’s own statement (the scenario
here, the district court said). Nat'l Police Ass'n, Inc. v. Gannett
Co., 

, at *4.
     Third, the district court determined that absent a basis for
liability under § 577(2), the single publication rule, which lim-
its libel liability to the first publication of a work, foreclosed
the NPA’s claim. Id. The court noted that the NPA failed to
provide a limiting principle to its reading of § 577(2): if “fail-
ure to retract” created a claim, the court noted, liability could
be created at any point after publication, thus undermining
the single publication principle. Id.
                                III

    On appeal, the NPA reiterates its claim that the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 577(2) provides a basis for its claims
against Gannett and the AP. Before addressing this theory, it
is useful to recap the basics of a libel claim under Indiana law.
A plaintiff in such a suit must plead “(1) a communication
with a defamatory imputation; (2) malice; (3) publication; and
(4) damages.” Haegert v. McMullan, 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2011). For matters of public or general concern
(as in this case, the NPA agrees), the claimant must prove the
entity acted with actual malice in publishing the material. J.-
Gazette Co. v. Bandido's, Inc., 

, 451–52 (Ind.
1999). Actual malice refers to the publisher’s “knowledge that
No. 22-1639                                                      7

[the statement] was false” or “reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not.” 

 at 451 (quoting New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 

, 279–80 (1964)).
    The NPA challenges not the original publication of the ar-
ticles, but the “continued publication of them online after
Publishers were notified that they were defamatory.” In other
words, the NPA argues that a claim of defamation predicated
exclusively on events that happen after the article is published
can be valid. For this claim, the NPA relies on a purported
blank space in libel doctrine: how to deal with libelous con-
tent published online. Into this alleged blank space, the NPA
inserts its reading of the Restatement (Second) of Torts §
577(2) and Tacket. However, this “blank” space is illusory; the
single publication rule, which limits libel liability to the first
publication of a work, has been applied to online material
across the country, including in this circuit. See, e.g., Pippen v.
NBCUniversal Media, LLC, 

 (7th Cir. 2013)
(“Every state court that has considered the question applies
the single-publication rule to information online.”) These au-
thorities control here as well.
    The NPA cites the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577(2),
which states, “One who intentionally and unreasonably fails
to remove defamatory matter that he knows to be exhibited
on land or chattels in his possession or under his control is
subject to liability for its continued publication.” NPA claims
that the language of § 577(2) creates a duty to remove defam-
atory material from one’s chattels “regardless of author.”
NPA argues the phrasing of § 577(2) should be inclusive of
one’s own defamatory matter because the provision lacks lan-
guage explicitly stating that the duty to remove defamatory
material only applies to third party statements. The problem
8                                                     No. 22-1639

with this interpretation is that the context surrounding §
577(2)—from the comment to the illustration to the lack of
precedent adopting the NPA’s argument—points in the op-
posite direction.
    The true meaning of § 577(2)—despite the textual artifacts
NPA fixates on—is revealed by its accompanying commen-
tary. Comment p of the Restatement states that the basis of
liability under § 577(2) is “[the landowner’s] duty not to per-
mit the use of his land or chattels for a purpose damaging to
others outside of the land.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 577 cmt. p (1977). The comment goes on to analogize the pro-
vision to the duty in § 362(c) “to use reasonable care to rem-
edy a condition upon the defendant’s land created by an-
other, which involves unreasonable danger to those outside
of the land.” Id. (emphasis added). The illustration for § 577(2)
is more explicit: it discusses a bar owner’s liability for failing
to remove bathroom graffiti impugning the chastity of a
woman. Id. at cmt. p, illus. 15; see also Hellar v. Bianco, 

 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (the basis for the illustration).
NPA’s view that § 577(2) can apply to a property owner’s own
writings is supported by nothing other than a claim that com-
ment p of the Restatement cannot “trump” the text of the Re-
statement.
    The NPA’s reference to our decision in Tacket v. General
Motors Corporation suffers from the same problems as its invo-
cation of § 577(2): a failure to acknowledge the authority ap-
plies only to third-party statements. At the time Tacket was
decided, no Indiana court had ruled on the § 577(2) approach,
so this court had to make a prediction. We guessed that Indi-
ana would follow § 577(2), as “[a]doption of another’s publi-
cation is an old basis of liability.” 

. The
No. 22-1639                                                                    9

plaintiff in Tacket, a GM plant manager, had alleged that the
company “adopted” a sign that accused him of corruption by
failing to take it down for at least seven months. 

.
Whether GM had “published” the sign by its failure to re-
move it turned on an application of the Restatement. We ruled
that there was enough evidence for a jury upon remand to de-
cide that GM had adopted the sign by failing to remove it after
being informed of its existence in an area under GM’s control.

. In that decision, however, we made no reference
to § 577(2) applying to a property owner’s own words or ma-
terial, as opposed to those of a third party, like the person who
created the offending sign at the GM plant.
    Indiana has not adopted the rule of § 577(2) in the 36 years
since Tacket. Furthermore, even though that case is too old to
have contemplated online publication liability, many other
cases have come before courts across the country—including
this one—attempting to argue that online articles are subject
to defamation liability based on a post-publication notifica-
tion of falsity. Most of these arguments have been unsuccess-
ful.3 Two cases before this court merit specific mention.


    3 Courts across the country have rejected some version of the argu-
ment. See, e.g., Roberts v. McAfee, Inc., 

 (9th Cir. 2011)
(rejecting a former general counsel’s claim that his former employer de-
famed him by leaving online a press release implicating him in a stock
backdating scandal after related criminal and civil prosecutions were un-
successful, because allowing any past mass communication to create def-
amation liability “undermines the single-publication rule” by); Firth v.
State, 

 (N.Y. 2002) (“The policies impelling the original
adoption of the single publication rule support its application to the post-
ing of . . . [a] report regarding claimant on the State’s Web site.”); N. Atlanta
Golf Operations, LLC v. Ward, 

, 821 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022) (“In
Georgia, the single publication rule governs actions for libel. This includes
10                                                            No. 22-1639

     In the first case, NBA legend Scottie Pippen sued a group
of media organizations arguing that, in covering his lawsuits
against a series of former advisers, the organizations falsely
reported he filed for bankruptcy. Pippen, 

. Pip-
pen premised his libel claim on a notification he sent to the
publications after their reports were published. 

. Ap-
plying Illinois law, we ruled that ex-post notification does not
provide a basis to infer actual malice, and Illinois’ codification
of the single publication rule meant a defamation claim was
complete the moment a story was published. This meant that
Pippen was unable to establish actual malice and continue his
libel claim. 

 at 614–15. Pippen is important, but it applied
Illinois law. However, Indiana courts have also applied the
single publication rule. See, e.g., Pack v. Truth Publ'g Co., 

 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“The act at issue is the
Newspaper’s initial publication of the article and whether
that initial publication was in good faith. After-the-fact infor-
mation that could not have played any part in the Newspa-
per’s initial publication decision does not matter to that anal-
ysis.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A (3)

actions for libel based on statements made on the Internet.” (cleaned));
Trexler v. The Ass'n Press, No. 2010CP401249, 

, at *3 (S.C.
Com. Pl. Apr. 30, 2013) (“[W]hen presented with the question of the appli-
cation of the single publication rule with respect to publications posted on
the Internet, South Carolina will follow the single publication rule.”), aff’d
on other grounds, No. 2015-UP-201, 

 (S.C. Ct. App. Apr.
15, 2015); Abate v. Maine Antique Dig., No. 03-3759, 

, at *1
(Mass. Super. Jan. 26, 2004) (“[C]ourts in other states have applied this
single publication rule to generally accessible internet publications. To
hold otherwise and treat internet publications differently would result in
the endless retriggering of the statute of limitations, thus exposing those
who ‘publish’ information on the internet to a multiplicity of lawsuits and
thereby inhibiting the open dissemination of information and ideas.”).
No. 22-1639                                                  11

(1977) (showing the broad application of the rule to a wide
array of media types).
    In the second case, contrary to the NPA’s claim that the
single publication rule does not conflict with the NPA’s for-
mulation of the “continuing publication rule,” we predicted
that Indiana would apply the single publication rule in situa-
tions analogous to this case—namely, where the continued
online presence of purportedly defamatory material is at is-
sue. In Pack v. Middlebury Community Schools, a teacher who
believed he was wrongfully fired reached a settlement with
his school district including a forward-looking non-dispar-
agement clause. 

 (7th Cir. 2021). The
teacher later sued again, arguing this clause compelled the
school to disable public online access to a pre-settlement press
release describing his firing. 

 We ruled the school was not
required to do so—not just because of the contractual lan-
guage, but also because each additional time someone saw the
old press release did not constitute a “new” breach of the
agreement. 

. In other words, we ruled that Indiana
courts would apply the single publication rule to a situation
analogous to NPA’s “continuing publication” argument. See

 (“We conclude that the Indiana Supreme Court
would conclude that the press release is not a new statement
each time someone accesses it on the School’s website . . . .”).
    For these reasons, there is no basis for the NPA’s theory of
liability.
                              IV

   The NPA asks us to certify several questions to the Indiana
Supreme Court under Circuit Rule 52(a), chief among them,
“Whether Indiana recognizes the continued-publication rule
12                                                            No. 22-1639

for defamation as set out in § 577(2) and as Tacket predicted it
would.”4 However, we certify questions under this rule only
if we are “genuinely uncertain about a question of state law
that is key to a correct disposition of the case.” In re Hernandez,

 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc.
v. Ill. Paper & Copier Co., 

 (7th Cir. 2013)). The
NPA’s questions are simply recitations of its arguments about
the “continued publication rule,” which we addressed above.
There is not enough uncertainty about Indiana law to justify
certification of these questions since, as we have already
noted, the state follows the single publication rule. For this
reason, we decline to certify these questions.




     4 The questions the NPA seeks to certify are, in full:

             1.   Whether Indiana recognizes the continued-publication
                  rule for defamation as set out in § 577(2) and as Tacket
                  predicted it would.
             2.   If so, whether that continued-publication rule includes a
                  duty not to keep distributing one’s own libels after one
                  learns online hosted information is defamatory.
             3.   If so, in situations where (a) one is accused of a crime
                  and false statements, (b) that event is reported in online
                  news, (c) a later event exculpates the accused, and (d)
                  the accused provides notice to the news entity of the ex-
                  culpatory information and requests retraction, whether
                  the statute of limitations runs from the time of that no-
                  tice.
             4.   Whether, in addition to damages, available remedies in
                  such a case include ordered removal, retraction, and/or
                  prominent posting of exculpatory information with the
                  online story if it remains online.
No. 22-1639                                                  13

                               V

    The NPA asks this court to reverse the district court’s dis-
missal of its libel suit based on an untested, bespoke theory of
liability based on an interpretation of the single publication
rule that courts have consistently rejected. We decline this in-
vitation. The district court’s ruling is AFFIRMED.