In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-2847 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

JERRY PEOPLES, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:19-cr-00418-4 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2024 — DECIDED OCTOBER 24, 2024 ____________________

Before RIPPLE, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Jerry Peoples and three friends hatched a plan to rob a marijuana dealer. What they did not know was that the police heard it all over a wiretap. As the plot was playing out, the police stepped in and arrested Peo- ples and his confederates. Federal charges followed, and, for his part, Peoples chose to go to trial. A jury found him guilty of violating the Hobbs Act by conspiring and attempting to rob a drug dealer. Peoples appeals, contending the district 2 No. 23-2847

court committed error in not granting his post-trial motions challenging the sufficiency of the government’s evidence. We affirm, as the case against Peoples was overwhelming. I On June 13, 2017, Jerry Peoples met Ali Salem at a gas sta- tion in Bridgeview, Illinois to obtain a sample of marijuana. But Peoples intended more than trying Salem’s marijuana. He used the meeting to set up a robbery of Salem’s supplier— someone Peoples believed had a substantial stash of mariju- ana somewhere nearby. With three friends (Kelvin Everett, Quincy Wright, and Gregory Blackwell), Peoples devised a plan to learn the whereabouts of Salem’s supplier. The idea was simple: Peoples would use the gas-station meeting to get the sample and then, with help from Everett, Wright, and Blackwell, the group would follow Salem back to his supplier. Once the whereabouts of the supplier became known, the crew would move in and steal the stash—or so they planned. The police heard the entire plot over a wiretap of Everett’s phone. Believing a violent crime was in the works, the officers got a step ahead and arrested Peoples and his crew as they sought to close in on Salem. A federal indictment followed, charging Peoples, as relevant here, with conspiring and at- tempting to interfere with commerce by robbing a drug dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), 2. The most damning evidence at trial came from the wire- taps the government played for the jury. In a conversation with Kelvin Everett, Peoples described the plan this way: Peoples: I promise that when I go meet him and then I know where he coming from so No. 23-2847 3

next when I follow him, I know where he coming from with the shit. … Peoples: We do our homework. We get in your car and boom and just go in. You know go up and down Harlem and Cicero. He gonna be meeting people and I know the car so bam … we on his ass dude. … Peoples: That’s what I’m saying. We grab him. We grab him I can guarantee you we grab him and we tell him look man, we need 500 of them thangs 200,000 fool. We can have that shit. … Peoples: We ain’t never gonna have to shit again fool. We buyin’ buildings after buildings G, I swear to God. But see the only thing we need to do is move fast before some- body beat us to it. Hearing this discussion left the police worried that Peo- ples was planning some sort of violent crime—perhaps a kid- napping or murder. So a group of officers hit the streets to conduct surveillance. One officer told the jury that Peoples, Everett, and Wright entered Everett’s home and, approximately 20 minutes later, left together in a car. Another officer explained that police then stopped the car, intending not to make arrests but in- stead to spook the crew from going forward with any planned crimes. The police’s ploy did not work. After the stop the crew returned to Everett’s house, where Peoples switched into a 4 No. 23-2847

different car and proceeded to meet with Salem at the desig- nated gas station. Meanwhile, Everett and Wright drove to pick up Blackwell and along the way called Blackwell to ask whether he “got the poles”—street jargon for firearms. The government’s case also included testimony from Ali Salem. He explained to the jury that Peoples called him on June 13, 2017 to obtain a sample of marijuana. Salem agreed and supplied the sample after a brief meeting with Peoples at the gas station. The account the jury heard from Salem aligned with the gas station’s video footage of the meeting. Salem fur- ther testified that he had given marijuana to Peoples twice be- fore. On one prior occasion, Salem added, Peoples expressed interest in meeting his supplier. After the meeting at the gas station, Peoples followed Sa- lem and phoned Everett—relaying real-time updates of Sa- lem’s exact location. The government played this call for the jury: Peoples: Listen, listen listen he on Harlem, he um, well he goin up um 87th down Harlem, he goin south, he goin um East down Harlem. I’m followin. … Peoples: [H]e scared man, and he got some more smoke, that’s what he tryin to give me, he got some more shit G, he gave me a sam- ple, that’s what he was callin me, tryin to give me, and get some more smoke. … Peoples: [L]isten, we on 87th and [] Oak Park Av- enue bro, I’m following, I’mma follow No. 23-2847 5

him, listen listen, I’m going to follow him as far as I can, jus jus come, come 87th real quick bro. … Peoples: I’m on his heels though, he can’t leave me though cause I’m on his heels. He on 87th goin down uh comin back off Harlem foo, like we passed Oak Park, we comin’ back to that area though. … Peoples: Yeah, if he turns on um 87th and and and Ridgeland, stay on 95th, you gon see him, he’s gonna come to 95th and Ridge- land bro. This discussion prompted law enforcement to foil the plot before the situation got out of control. As Peoples was relay- ing Salem’s whereabouts, Everett grew alarmed because the police had spotted and began trailing him. Peoples reacted with alarm of his own, telling Everett, “you know what to do, get off the phone and smoke their ass.” Everett, Wright, and Blackwell proceeded to lead police on a chase—first by car and then on foot. Officers found two loaded guns in a bag that the trio tried to carry over a fence while running from law en- forcement. The police later identified and arrested Peoples. At the close of the government’s case-in-chief, Peoples in- voked Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 and sought a judgment of acquittal. The district court reserved decision and sent the case to the jury. After the jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts, Peo- ples renewed his Rule 29 motion while also moving for a new 6 No. 23-2847

trial pursuant to Rule 33. Both motions focused on the suffi- ciency of the government’s evidence. The district court denied the motions, concluding that the evidence against Peoples was overwhelming. The district court later sentenced Peoples to concurrent terms of 110 months’ imprisonment. This ap- peal followed. II A The Hobbs Act makes it a crime for a person to “obstruct[], delay[], or affect[] commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery … or attempt[] or conspire[] so to do ….” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Adhering to our pattern instructions, the district court informed the jury that to sustain a conviction on the attempt count, the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Peoples knowingly attempted to obtain money or property from the victim; (2) Peoples did so by means of attempted robbery; (3) Peoples believed that the victim would have parted with the money or property because of the robbery; and (4) Peo- ples’s conduct would have affected or had the potential to af- fect interstate commerce. See William J. Bauer Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit, at 784 (2023 ed.). The district court added that an attempt also requires the intent to commit the full robbery and a substantial step taken toward that end. See id. at 77. A substantial step, the court ex- plained, “must be an act that strongly corroborates that the defendant intended to carry out the robbery.” Id. Putting the same point another way, we have conveyed that a substantial step is “something more than mere preparation, but less than the last act necessary before actual commission of the No. 23-2847 7

substantive crime,” United States v. Muratovic, 719 F.3d 809, 815 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Barnes, 230 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2000)), or “something that makes it reasona- bly clear that had [the defendant] not been interrupted or made a mistake … [he] would have completed the crime,” United States v. Sanchez, 615 F.3d 836, 844 (7th Cir. 2010) (alter- ations in original) (quoting United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 2008)). As for the conspiracy charge, the district court explained that the government had to prove not only that a conspiracy existed, but also that Peoples knowingly became a member of the conspiracy with an intent to advance its objective. See Wil- liam J. Bauer Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Cir- cuit, at 105; see also United States v. Jett, 908 F.3d 252, 273 (7th Cir. 2018). In reviewing the denial of a Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal, we apply the same standard as the district court. The overarching question is whether there was sufficient evi- dence to support the jury’s verdict. See United States v. Dewitt, 943 F.3d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir. 2019). In undertaking this in- quiry, we “consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government,” and will reverse “only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Blassingame, 197 F.3d 271, 284 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Moore, 115 F.3d 1348, 1363 (7th Cir. 1997)). Reversal under this standard, we have emphasized, is a “nearly insurmountable hurdle.” United States v. Garcia, 919 F.3d 489, 496 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Peoples faces a similar uphill climb on his motion for a new trial. Rule 33 authorizes a district court to vacate a 8 No. 23-2847

judgment and grant a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires.” Here, too, our review is limited and highly defer- ential, asking only “whether the district court’s ruling re- flected an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Jones, 79 F.4th 844, 859 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing United States v. Foy, 50 F.4th 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2022)). Indeed, we have underscored that the “ex- ercise of power conferred by Rule 33 is reserved for only the most ‘extreme cases,’” United States v. Linwood, 142 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Morales, 902 F.2d 604, 606 (7th Cir. 1990)), “those rare cases in which considera- tion of the evidence leaves a strong doubt as to the defend- ant’s guilt of the charged offense,” United States v. Washington, 184 F.3d 653, 658 (7th Cir. 1999). B The government urges us to forego review of the district court’s denial of Peoples’s request for a new trial, insisting that the motion was so underdeveloped in the district court (and again on appeal) as to preclude any meaningful judicial review. While a fair observation, the point need not detain us. Our review of the record shows that Peoples grounded his Rule 29 and 33 motions in the same core contention—that the government’s evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. In these circumstances, then, our review of the district court’s denial of Peoples’s Rule 29 motion is tantamount to reviewing the court’s denial of the Rule 33 motion for a new trial. On the merits, we agree with the district court’s observa- tions about the strength of the government’s case against Peo- ples. The jury easily could have concluded from the wiretap alone that Peoples, Everett, Wright, and Blackwell agreed and planned to rob Ali Salem’s marijuana supplier. In his own No. 23-2847 9

words, Peoples described his plan to meet with Salem, track Salem back to the supplier, and make them “cough up” drug proceeds and marijuana. Law enforcement surveillance cor- roborated the plot. And Salem’s testimony confirmed that he gave Peoples a sample of marijuana. The wiretap further es- tablished that Everett and Wright drove to pick up Blackwell, who brought two loaded firearms to carry out the robbery. The jury also heard how Everett, Wright, and Blackwell at- tempted to converge on Salem’s location—using real-time di- rections that Peoples relayed via phone as he followed in pur- suit. The jury received ample evidence from which to conclude that Peoples and his crew would have completed the robbery had police not interfered. See, e.g., Muratovic, 719 F.3d at 816 (finding the substantial step requirement satisfied where de- fendants assembled a team, finalized a robbery plan, and pro- cured firearms). Indeed, even after police conducted a traffic stop, Peoples kept pressing forward with the robbery plan. Absent law enforcement intervention, then, “the ordinary and likely course of things” would have resulted in the commis- sion of the robbery. United States v. Villegas, 655 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Gladish, 536 F.3d at 648). On this evi- dence, we have no difficulty concluding that the government proved that Peoples took a substantial step to rob Salem’s supplier. The evidence also sufficed to satisfy the Hobbs Act’s inter- state commerce element. In Taylor v. United States, the Su- preme Court determined that “it is enough [under 18 U.S.C. § 1951] that a defendant knowingly stole or attempted to steal drugs or drug proceeds.” 579 U.S. 301, 309 (2016). Where the “Government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that a robber 10 No. 23-2847

targeted a marijuana dealer’s drugs or illegal proceeds, the Government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that com- merce over which the United States has jurisdiction was af- fected.” Id. at 308. This is not a close question here. Recall that Peoples de- vised his plan on the belief that following Salem would lead to his supplier—and by extension, a large stash of marijuana. Salem testified he gave Peoples marijuana on June 13, 2017 as he had a time or two before, with Peoples expressing interest in meeting Salem’s supplier. What is more, Peoples’s own words, recorded on the wiretap, revealed his intent to target a drug distributor for both drugs and drug proceeds. He re- ferred, for example, to “get[ting] some more smoke” and de- manding “500 of them thangs 200,000 fool.” Peoples also told Everett, “we can have it all,” “[a]ll the money and every- thing”—enough that they could “buy[] buildings after build- ings.” This evidence gave the jury plenty to find that he in- tended to “obtain illegal drugs and the proceeds from the sale of illegal drugs. Such proof is sufficient to meet the commerce element of the Hobbs Act.” Taylor, 579 U.S. at 310. Finally, rounding out the elements of the attempt charge, Peoples’s statements also demonstrate his belief that Salem and the supplier would have parted with the money and drugs because of the robbery. C Peoples’s only response is to urge us to see the evidence as showing nothing more than a plot to get a sample of mari- juana. But that is an incomplete view of the record—one Peo- ples pressed at trial and the jury declined to accept. We need not accept it either. Peoples’s arguments run headlong into No. 23-2847 11

the highly deferential standard governing our review of a jury’s verdict. The jury had a more than sufficient basis to con- clude that Peoples conspired and attempted to interfere with commerce by robbing a drug dealer in violation of the Hobbs Act. We see no grounds to second guess their verdicts. For these reasons, we AFFIRM.