In the

     United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 23-2343
CANDICE MARTIN, individually and as
Executrix of the Estate of Rodney Martin, deceased,
                                            Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                 v.

GOODRICH CORPORATION, formerly known as
B.F. GOODRICH COMPANY and
POLYONE CORPORATION, individually and as
Successor-By-Consolidation to the GEON COMPANY,
now known as AVIENT CORPORATION,
                                     Defendants-Appellants.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
                      Central District of Illinois.
         No. 1:21-cv-01323-JES-JEH — James E. Shadid, Judge.
                     ____________________

    ARGUED FEBRUARY 14, 2024 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2024
                 ____________________

   Before SCUDDER, ST. EVE, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
    ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. In Illinois, workers injured on the job
obtain compensation through an administrative scheme. The
relevant agency holds employers strictly liable for this
2                                                     No. 23-2343

administrative remedy, but keeps the claims out of court.
Much the same arrangement governs diseases contracted on
the job—yet unlike accidents at work, the harm from diseases
may not manifest for years or decades after employment ter-
minates. The state legislature tried to account for this differ-
ence in 2019, but the scope of that fix is uncertain.
    This case asks us to resolve that uncertainty. But rather
than risk unsettling Illinois’s intricate compensation appa-
ratus, we defer to the experts and certify three related ques-
tions to the Illinois Supreme Court.
                         I. Background
    Appellate jurisdiction here rests on 

(b),
which allows for interlocutory appeals when the district and
appellate courts agree—so long as the appeal meets certain
criteria. The jurisdictional hook requires that the case present
“a controlling question of law,” tricky enough to leave “sub-
stantial ground for difference of opinion,” whose resolution
will “materially advance the ultimate termination of the liti-
gation.” 

 When we take an appeal this way, the district
court identifies for us which “controlling question[s] of law”
the case presents—but our authority extends past answering
those questions. Instead, any “appeal under § 1292(b) brings
up the whole certified order,” Demkovich v. St. Andrew the
Apostle Par., 

 (7th Cir. 2021), often a ruling on a
motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Ashley W. v. Holcomb, 

,
591–92 (7th Cir. 2022). That accounts for our authority to “ad-
dress any issue fairly included within the certified order.”
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 

 (1996).
No. 23-2343                                                    3

    This case satisfies the § 1292(b) criteria: resolving the com-
plicated legal issues may well end the case. We start, then,
with the pertinent Illinois law.
A. Legal Background
    When Illinois employees contract a disease arising out of
or in the course of their employment, they can seek compen-
sation under the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act, 820
ILCS 310/1 et seq. (the “ODA”). That law borrows its structure
from the Worker’s Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/1 et seq.
“In enacting these statutes, the General Assembly established
a new framework for recovery to replace the common-law
rights and liabilities that previously governed employee inju-
ries.” Folta v. Ferro Eng’g, 

 (Ill. 2015).
    At a basic level, the statutes hold an employer “liable to
pay compensation to his own immediate employees” for their
injuries, 305/1(a)(3), and diseases, 310/7. To seek their com-
pensation remedy, workers apply to the Illinois Worker’s
Compensation Commission. In turn, that body awards or de-
nies compensation “upon the facts and circumstances of each
particular case.” Folta, 

.
    The issues here implicate the interplay of four aspects of
the ODA: (1) temporal limitations hampering old claims, (2)
exclusivity provisions channeling claims into the administra-
tive compensation protocols, (3) age-old exceptions to that ex-
clusivity, and (4) a 2019 statute adding a new exception.
   1. Temporal Limitations
    A worker who contracts a disease on the job must remain
mindful of two deadlines. The first appears at 820 ILCS
310/1(f) (“1(f)”). We discuss this section first because it begins
to run before its companion. Its relevant text follows:
4                                                    No. 23-2343

       No compensation shall be payable for or on ac-
       count of any occupational disease unless disa-
       blement, as herein defined, occurs within two
       years after the last day of the last exposure to the
       hazards of the disease.
Put in plain language, an employee cannot obtain compensa-
tion unless she becomes disabled within two years of her last
exposure to the hazard.
           The second timing provision appears at 820
       ILCS 310/6(c) (“6(c)”). This section provides in
       relevant part:
       In any case, other than injury or death caused
       by exposure to radiological materials or equip-
       ment or asbestos, unless application for com-
       pensation is filed with the Commission within 3
       years after the date of the disablement, where
       no compensation has been paid, or within 2
       years after the date of the last payment of com-
       pensation, where any has been paid, whichever
       shall be later, the right to file such application
       shall be barred.
In other words, an employee generally must apply for com-
pensation within three years of becoming disabled. But if her
employer pays some compensation, she may file her applica-
tion up to two years after the last compensation payment.
    These two deadlines work differently. For 1(f), the timing
of claim filing is immaterial. It requires only that the disable-
ment occurs within two years of exposure; the clock starts
with the end of exposure and counts until disablement. Then
there is 6(c), which by contrast does focus on the claim’s
No. 23-2343                                                   5

timing. Starting from the disablement that caps off the 1(f) pe-
riod, the worker typically has three years to apply for com-
pensation consistent with 6(c)’s mandate. Any application af-
ter that date is time-barred.
   We pause here to note another distinction between these
provisions. Where 6(c) instructs that untimely claims “shall
be barred,” the sole consequence 1(f) imposes is that “[n]o
compensation shall be payable.” The statutes impose different
ramifications for a missed deadline.
   2. Exclusivity Provisions
   The ODA contains exclusive remedy provisions that limit
the process for most workers to the statute’s prescribed chan-
nels. Two provisions preclude employees subject to the ODA
from seeking compensation outside of the statutory scheme.
    For one, “there is no common law or statutory right to re-
cover compensation or damages from the employer” or re-
lated entities. 820 ILCS 310/5. Pairing that with the statute’s
other dictate, that “the compensation herein provided for
shall be the full, complete and only measure of the liability of
the employer [and those other entities] … in place of any and
all other civil liability whatsoever,” 820 ILCS 310/11, gives a
complete picture of the ODA’s exclusivity provisions. See
Folta, 

.
    Just five years ago, there would have been little more to
say. In 2019, however, the Illinois legislature passed a statute
providing for an exception to these provisions. Today, both
exclusive remedy provisions apply “[e]xcept as provided in
Section 1.1,” the new amendment making clear that the exclu-
sivity provisions are not absolute. We will address this excep-
tion further below.
6                                                   No. 23-2343

    3. Historical Exclusivity Exceptions
    Even before the legislature narrowed the exclusivity pro-
visions, Illinois courts acknowledged certain limits to them.
See Collier v. Wagner Castings Co., 

 (Ill.
1980). A plaintiff could avoid the exclusivity provisions by
proving any of the following: “(1) that the injury was not ac-
cidental; (2) that the injury did not arise from his or her em-
ployment; (3) that the injury was not received during the
course of employment; or (4) that the injury was not compen-
sable under the Act.” Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., Inc., 

 (Ill. 1990).
     In Folta, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the last ex-
ception—the one for injuries “not compensable” under the
ODA. 

. James Folta was a product tester for
Ferro Engineering, a position that put him in contact with as-
bestos throughout his four-year employment. 

. He
left the job in 1970. 

 Under 6(c), asbestos exposure works a
little differently from other hazards. Claimants like Folta have
25 years from their last exposure, where others’ claims are
barred 3 years after disablement. Section 6(c) thus barred
Folta’s claim for compensation from 1995 on, since it stemmed
from asbestos exposure. Mr. Folta received his mesothelioma
diagnosis in May 2011, though—long after the 25-year asbes-
tos bar descended. 

 Even so, he sued Ferro Engineering,
and after his death his widow pressed on with the case. 

They submitted that because of 6(c)’s limitation, compensa-
tion was not available to Folta. There was never a time when
he both knew of the harm and could seek compensation con-
sistent with 6(c).
   The Folta court stressed that 6(c) is a statute of repose. As
such, it effectuates a legislative intent “to provide an absolute
No. 23-2343                                                    7

definitive time period within which all occupational disease
claims arising from asbestos exposure must be brought.” 

. Put another way, the statute’s purpose was not to en-
sure Folta’s diligence. Instead, it exalted certainty, aiming “to
extinguish the employer’s liability.” 

 That certainty would
vanish if plaintiffs like Folta could bring their claims in court
after 6(c) barred the ODA’s statutory remedy. 

.
    Further, the caselaw on the “not compensable” exception
had construed it to encompass only those injuries that could
not “categorically fit[] within the purview of the Act.” 

. Even in cases where 1(f) supplied the temporal bar, the
court reasoned that its “temporal limitation on the availability
of compensation benefits” did not “remove occupational dis-
eases from the purview of the Act.” 

. Same result: the
exclusivity provisions apply.
     All this added up to a loss for Folta. The court was “cog-
nizant of the harsh result” its interpretation had worked. 

Its hands were tied, though: any call for a change in the law
was “more appropriately addressed to the legislature.” Id.
   4. Exception 1.1
    The legislature answered the call four years later, in 2019,
with 820 ILCS 310/1.1, or “Exception 1.1.” That law explains
that the exclusivity provisions in the ODA “do not apply to
any injury or death resulting from an occupational disease as
to which the recovery of compensation benefits under this Act
would be precluded due to the operation of any period of re-
pose or repose provision.” 310/1.1.
   So when 6(c)—a “statute of repose” and thus a “period of
repose”—bars a claim, see Folta, 

, the
8                                                   No. 23-2343

exclusivity provisions fall away. It is less clear how 1(f)’s
“temporal limitation” interacts with Exception 1.1. 

B. Factual Background
    That brings us to this case. Rodney Martin was a lot like
James Folta—in the late 1960s and early 1970s, he worked
with a dangerous material. For Rodney, it was vinyl chloride
monomer (“VCM”), a petroleum-derived chemical essential
to the production of polyvinyl chloride, more familiar as PVC.
VCM is allegedly linked to angiosarcoma of the liver. At all
relevant times, Rodney worked for defendant Goodrich Cor-
poration; he started there in 1966 and retired in 2012. Until
1974, his work entailed exposure to VCM, but after that
Goodrich abated its use of the chemical.
    In 2019 (after Exception 1.1 passed) Rodney’s doctors di-
agnosed him with angiosarcoma of the liver. He passed away
in 2020. This suit followed in November 2021.
C. Procedural Background
    Rodney’s widow, Candice Martin, sued Goodrich and
joined PolyOne Corporation—a company that had bought
much of Goodrich’s PVC business—as a defendant. Her com-
plaint invoked Exception 1.1 to avoid the exclusivity provi-
sions. Later, PolyOne moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. For its part, Goodrich moved to dismiss under
the exclusivity provisions. It argued 1(f) was not a statute of
repose, and that 6(c) did not bar Martin’s claim—and thus Ex-
ception 1.1 did not apply. In the alternative, it argued that us-
ing Exception 1.1 to revive Martin’s claim would infringe its
due process rights under Illinois’s constitution. The district
court denied these motions and set the case on track for trial.
No. 23-2343                                                     9

    Goodrich asked the district court to certify its legal ques-
tions to us under 

(b). The court agreed to do
so, finding two questions that implicate “a controlling ques-
tion of law” whose resolution would “materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation” and thus fit the bill for
certification. We agreed to take the appeal. The district court’s
order certified two questions:
       1. Whether 820 ILCS 310/1(f) is a statute of re-
          pose for purposes of § 310/1.1?
       2. Whether applying 820 ILCS 310/1.1 to allow
          Plaintiff’s civil case to proceed would violate
          Illinois’s constitutional substantive due pro-
          cess?
                          II. Analysis
    We think the interconnected statutory provisions in the
ODA present three questions. Each gives us pause. Together,
they present a roadmap to handling claims for asbestosis, an-
giosarcoma, and other diseases that manifest only belatedly.
Given the number of cases where this roadmap will chart the
course for courts and litigants—plus Illinois’s policy interests
in its contours—we find each question fit for certification.
    We reach this conclusion by looking to Illinois’s factors for
selecting certification-worthy questions. The questions must
be potentially “determinative” of the case, and there must be
“no controlling precedents” in the Illinois Supreme Court. Ill.
Sup. Ct. R. 20(a). And we have our own guiding lights. “Most
important[]” among them is that we be “genuinely uncertain
about the answer to the state-law question.” Jadair Int’l, Inc. v.
Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co., 

 (7th Cir. 2023)
(cleaned up). The next consideration turns on the nature of
10                                                    No. 23-2343

the issue: if it is “an important issue of public concern” and
“likely to recur,” certification is a better bet. Cutchin v. Robert-
son, 

 (7th Cir. 2021). We also check and see
if the question might be of interest to the state supreme
court—further favoring certification if it’s likely “the result of
the decision in a particular case will exclusively affect the cit-
izens of that state.” 

.
A. 1(f) and Statutes of Repose
    Martin relies on Exception 1.1 to press her claim. To suc-
ceed, she must establish that any application for compensa-
tion benefits “would be precluded due to the operation of any
period of repose or repose provision.” 820 ILCS 310/1.1. If
there is such a provision here, it is 1(f). No one argues 6(c)
bars Martin’s claim, which she brought within three years of
Rodney’s diagnosis. And so we ask if 1(f)—which the Illinois
Supreme Court has called a “temporal limitation,” see Folta,
43 N.E.3d at 118—is a “period of repose or repose provision.”
    Lacking further guidance from the Illinois Supreme Court,
we are mindful that “the rulings of the state intermediate ap-
pellate courts must be accorded great weight.” State Farm
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pate, 

 (7th Cir. 2001). But they
point in both directions. Some recognize, for example, that
1(f) “operates as a statute of repose” (at least in terms of toll-
ing). Dickerson v. Indus. Comm’n, 

 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991). At the same time, others describe the provision
as “a condition precedent to recovery.” Docksteiner v. Indus.
Comm’n, 

 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). The cases
leave us at an impasse.
    Other avenues meet their own dead ends. We know that
in Illinois, “a statute of repose extinguishes the action after a
No. 23-2343                                                      11

defined period of time.” Evanston Ins. Co. v. Riseborough, 

 (Ill. 2014) (emphasis added). The very “right
to bring an action is terminated.” 

 But that does not resolve
this case. While 1(f) denies “compensation,” one remedy,
without explicitly barring an action, no other remedy exists.
We cannot discern if the Illinois courts would conclude that
barring a sole remedy counts as “extinguish[ing]” an action.
    In short, we are uncertain. And the stakes on this question
are high, both for this case and other long latency cases. If 1(f)
does not fit in the statute, Martin and many others lose. To
underscore the magnitude of this question, consider how it
came about. The Folta court granted discretionary review to
establish limits on plaintiffs’ recovery, even as it regretted the
“harsh result.” 

. The legislature responded
with Exception 1.1, and the governor signed on. All three state
branches agree: the ODA’s interaction with long latency dis-
eases is an important policy question.
    So we certify this first question: Is 1(f) a “period of repose or
repose provision” for 310/1.1 purposes?
B. Retroactivity and Statutory Interpretation
     Goodrich identifies another challenge for Martin: Excep-
tion 1.1 may not apply here. After all, Rodney’s VCM expo-
sure occurred decades before its enactment. In a line culmi-
nating in Perry v. Department of Finance and Professional Regu-
lation, 

 (Ill. 2018), Illinois courts have dis-
tilled their process for addressing this sort of retrospectivity
argument. There are (nominally) two steps.
       1. The “court first determines whether the leg-
          islature has expressly prescribed the tem-
          poral reach of the new law.” 

 (cleaned up).
12                                                   No. 23-2343

          If it has, the court fills that express prescrip-
          tion.
       2. If not, “then the court must determine
          whether applying the statute would have a
          retroactive impact.” Commonwealth Edison
          Co. v. Will Cnty. Collector, 

          (Ill. 2001). It should then read the statute to
          avoid those impacts.
We say “nominally” two steps because in practice “Illinois
courts need not go beyond step one.” Perry, 

. As it happens, “the legislature always will have clearly
indicated the temporal reach of an amended statute.” Caveney
v. Bower, 

 (Ill. 2003). That is because Section
4 of the Illinois Statute on Statutes essentially provides a back-
stop. It reads:
       No new law shall be construed to repeal a for-
       mer law, whether such former law is expressly
       repealed or not, as to any offense committed
       against the former law, or as to any act done,
       any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred,
       or any right accrued, or claim arising under the
       former law, or in any way whatever to affect any
       such offense or act so committed or done, or any
       penalty, forfeiture or punishment so incurred,
       or any right accrued, or claim arising before the
       new law takes effect, save only that the proceed-
       ings thereafter shall conform, so far as practica-
       ble, to the laws in force at the time of such pro-
       ceeding.
No. 23-2343                                                     13

5 ILCS 70/4. Put simply, a substantive statute either pro-
claims its own retrospective effect, or cedes that power to
Section 4. See Caveney, 

.
    The trouble here is it is unclear if Exception 1.1 controls its
own fate. It may reach back: it does command that exclusivity
provisions “do not apply” where a statute of repose would
otherwise bar the claim. That is categorical language—it
might express clear intent. Or it might be that those provi-
sions “do not apply” going forward, but still apply to pre-
2019 conduct. Then Section 4 would step in and render Excep-
tion 1.1 inapplicable here.
    Here too the uncertainty butts up against strong Illinois
policy interests. If Exception 1.1 applies only prospectively,
all those long latency cases dating to the asbestos era lie out-
side its bounds. In short, the same policy interests supporting
certifying the first question apply with near-equal force here.
   With that in mind, we certify a second question: If 1(f) falls
within Exception 1.1, what is its temporal reach—either by its own
terms or through Section 4?
C. Due Process Implications
    If Exception 1.1 does apply to this conduct, Goodrich
raises another argument, this time under the Illinois Consti-
tution. The company insists that in 1976 it vested a right to be
sure Martin would not bring a claim, when 1(f) barred his
right to seek compensation and the exclusivity provisions
stood in the way of any action in another forum. No doubt:
“once a claim is time-barred, it cannot be revived through
subsequent legislative action without offending the due pro-
cess protections of [Illinois’s] constitution.” Doe A. v. Diocese
of Dallas, 

 (Ill. 2009). Martin tracks with
14                                                  No. 23-2343

that, up to a point. Nevertheless, she resists the conclusion—
she claims that Goodrich’s right could not vest until Rodney’s
did, in 2019. By then the legislature had passed Exception 1.1.
     This question is no less fraught than the first two. The
problem is that 1(f) interacts oddly with the exclusivity pro-
visions. They are separate. It might be, for example, that in
1976 Goodrich vested a right not to pay compensation for
Martin’s claims, but never vested a right not to face those
claims in court. To further complicate the inquiry, there is
some authority for Martin’s position that Goodrich’s rights
accrue only when hers do. See Henrich v. Libertyville High
School, 

 (Ill. 1998) (immunity defense vests
“when the cause of action accrued”). But then as we know, a
statute of repose nips the cause of action in the bud. It never
accrues. See Evanston Ins. Co. v. Riseborough, 

(Ill. 2014) (“A plaintiff’s right to bring an action is terminated
when the event giving rise to the cause of action does not tran-
spire within the period of time specified in the statute of re-
pose.”). So, on Martin’s theory, it seems Goodrich would
never vest a right in the statute of repose.
    Yet again, these state law questions are complicated and
consequential in equal measure. For just that reason, we cer-
tify a third question: Would the application of Exception 1.1 to
past conduct offend Illinois’s due process guarantee?
                        III. Conclusion
    The resolution of these questions could dispose of an un-
told number of claims. Each claim, in turn, has big stakes for
its plaintiff. Illinois’s coordinate branches have signaled the
importance of these issues—and for all the weight Illinoisans
and their government place on these issues, they have zero
No. 23-2343                                                    15

effect outside the state. At the end of the day, these are Illinois
questions best left to Illinois judges.
    Consistent with that respect for institutional expertise, we
recognize there may be better ways to frame this case and its
questions. For that reason, we invite the Justices of the Illinois
Supreme Court to reformulate our questions if they wish. We
have no intention to limit the scope of their inquiry—these
questions reflect no more than our own understanding. The
Clerk of this Court will transmit the briefs and appendices in
this case, together with this opinion, to the Illinois Supreme
Court. On the request of that Court, the Clerk will transmit all
or any part of the record as that Court so desires.
                                          QUESTIONS CERTIFIED.