In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-1196 KELLY J. CHAVEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.

MARTIN J. O’MALLEY, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division. No. 1:22-cv-00062-WCL — William C. Lee, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 5, 2023 — DECIDED MARCH 22, 2024 ____________________

Before HAMILTON, BRENNAN, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Kelly Chavez has suffered from various mental and physical impairments for many years. Af- ter she was denied supplemental security income, an admin- istrative law judge conducted a hearing at which a vocational expert testified. The ALJ found that Chavez could perform 2 No. 23-1196

jobs that existed in significant numbers in the economy and affirmed the denial. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s find- ings. Chavez contends that the vocational expert did not pro- vide substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s decision, but we disagree and affirm. I. Background Chavez applied for supplemental security income in 2019, asserting she had been disabled since 2007. Her application was denied initially and on reconsideration. She requested and received a hearing before an ALJ in 2020 during which she objected to the reliability of a vocational expert’s testi- mony about job number estimates. The ALJ agreed that the estimates were not reliable and ordered a supplemental hear- ing. A. The Supplemental Hearing Chavez and a new vocational expert, Sarah Holmes, testi- fied at the April 2021 supplemental hearing. Holmes has served as a vocational expert witness in Social Security mat- ters since 2018 and has board certifications as a Certified Re- habilitation Counselor and Licensed Professional Counselor. Chavez’s counsel did not object to Holmes’s qualifications. Holmes testified that a person with Chavez’s age, back- ground, and ability to perform a reduced range of light work would be able to perform several light exertion jobs, including cleaner, office helper, and storage rental clerk. She provided a corresponding number from the Dictionary of Occupational No. 23-1196 3

Titles (“DOT”) for each occupation.1 Holmes estimated those occupations existed in the following numbers in the national economy: 222,000 cleaner jobs, 14,000 office helper jobs, and 63,000 storage rental clerk jobs. Holmes explained that those jobs were examples, not an exhaustive list, and she testified that there were another 24,700 representative jobs that Chavez could perform at the sedentary level. After Holmes testified, Chavez’s counsel asked her how recent the national-job numbers were. Holmes said she used the most recent available data, which was from 2021. She ex- plained that she used a software program, Job Browser Pro, to estimate the number of jobs. That program uses data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to provide job numbers by DOT title. Chavez’s attorney then questioned Holmes: Q: So, tell me what formula … Job Browser Pro uses to weight the numbers in the [Standard Occupational Classification (“SOC”)] codes, to weight the DOT categories and the SOC codes? A: Now, I would have to read that specifically from the information that I have here. I can’t tell you ex- actly off hand that particular data. Q: So, the answer is that you’re sitting there, you don’t know, is that correct? A: As I’m sitting here right now, correct. I could read the summary and abstract for SkillTRAN

1 DOT 323.687-014, 1991 WL 672783 (cleaner, housekeeper); DOT

239.567-010, 1991 WL 672232 (office helper); and DOT 295.367-026, 1991 WL 672594 (storage rental clerk). 4 No. 23-1196

estimating employment numbers, which I have in front of me, but I don’t know it just off the top of my head.2 Chavez’s attorney did not ask Holmes to read the summary and began a new line of questioning. Chavez’s counsel objected to the reliability of Holmes’s testimony, including:  That it was insufficient because she “cannot de- scribe the weighing formula from Job Browser Pro”;  Any “top down weighing methodology” could not be reliable given the “mismatching of the SOC codes and the DOT codes”; and  Unless there was a rational way of severing the dif- ferent skill and exertional levels within the SOC codes, “any weighing of a DOT title within a SOC code cannot yield a reliable result.” The ALJ considered those objections and asked Holmes clari- fying questions. Holmes explained that, in Job Browser Pro, jobs “are broken out by DOT title and not by SOC code.” When asked if other vocational experts use Job Browser Pro,

2 SkillTRAN is the company that produces the Job Browser Pro soft-

ware. See Job Browser Pro, SKILLTRAN LLC, https://skilltran.com/in- dex.php/products/pc-based-solutions/job-browser-pro (last visited March 22, 2024). The document that Holmes referenced is publicly available. See SKILLTRAN LLC, SKILLTRAN PROCESS FOR ESTIMATING EMPLOYMENT NUMBERS 1–10 (2020), https://skilltran.com/pubs/DOTemp- num_method.pdf. No. 23-1196 5

Holmes responded: “I’m not saying other people don’t use other things, but every person that I know that does this work, uses, relies upon Job Browser Pro.” Chavez’s counsel then asked Holmes if “Job Browser Pro uses a formula in order to weight DOT title occupations that exist within a SOC code, in order to reach their number for the DOT title.” Holmes confirmed that was correct. Chavez’s attorney did not pose any more questions about the formula. B. The ALJ’s Decision In August 2021, the ALJ ruled that Chavez was not disa- bled and denied Chavez’s application for supplemental secu- rity income. Applying the familiar five-step process set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920, the ALJ found that Chavez had numer- ous severe impairments. Those include migraine disorder, asthma, lumbar and cervical degenerative disc disease, neuropathy of the left leg, acoustic neuroma, obesity, social anxiety disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, depressive disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. The ALJ also deemed Chavez to have the residual functioning capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b), with specific exceptions. The ALJ concluded that Chavez could not perform her past work, but that she could perform jobs existing in the national economy such as cleaner, office helper, and storage rental clerk. The ALJ overruled Chavez’s objections to Holmes’s testi- mony: The vocational expert was found to be a quali- fied expert by this agency, and [Chavez’s] coun- sel agreed to this prior to her testimony. The vo- cational expert stated that the jobs she offered 6 No. 23-1196

were not an exhaustive list of possible jobs that would satisfy the hypothetical and that her job numbers were based on numbers given by the [Bureau of Labor Statistics] and JobBrowser Pro, which gives the number of jobs by the DOT code. The vocational expert testified that this is standard procedure among the vocational ex- perts she knows. … [B]ased on careful consider- ation of the totality of the record, the [ALJ] finds the testimony of the [v]ocational [e]xpert con- forms to the rules and regulations of the Social Security Administration and is therefore ac- cepted. Chavez appealed, and the Appeals Council denied review. She then sought judicial review. C. The District Court’s Decision The district court affirmed the ALJ’s findings. Because Holmes identified the source for her job number estimates, of- fered to provide additional information on the underlying data source, and gave a straightforward explanation for the reliability of the numbers she provided, the district court con- cluded that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. So, the district court granted judgment for the Com- missioner. On appeal, Chavez asks us to conclude that Holmes’s tes- timony is unreliable, and that substantial evidence does not No. 23-1196 7

support the ALJ’s finding that Chavez could perform jobs that existed in significant numbers in the economy.3

II. Discussion This court reviews de novo the district court’s judgment affirming the Commissioner’s decision. Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2021). But we “apply a deferential standard of review when assessing the ALJ’s decision.” Skin- ner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). A reviewing court “will not reweigh the evidence, resolve debatable evi- dentiary conflicts, determine credibility, or substitute [its] judgment for the ALJ’s determination so long as substantial evidence supports it.” Gedatus, 994 F.3d at 900. Substantial ev- idence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Skinner, 478 F.3d at 841 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). If substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclu- sions, the court “must affirm the ALJ’s decision even if rea- sonable minds could differ about the ultimate disability find- ing.” Brown v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 2016). A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework To establish disability, a claimant must show that he or she “is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by rea- son of any medically determinable physical or mental impair- ment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Commissioner utilizes a five-step sequential evaluation

3 This court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42

U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). 8 No. 23-1196

process to determine whether a claimant can engage in sub- stantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; see Weatherbee v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 565, 568–69 (7th Cir. 2011). Only step five of the disability evaluation process is at is- sue here: whether Chavez could perform jobs that existed in significant numbers in the economy. At the fifth step, the Commissioner bears the burden to establish that the claim- ant—considering age, education, job experience, and func- tional capacity to work—can perform other work and that such work exists in the national economy in significant num- bers. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.912(b)(3), 416.920(g), 416.960(c); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). If the claimant is unable to make an adjustment to other work, she will be found disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g). B. Step Five and the Vocational Expert’s Testimony ALJs commonly rely on vocational experts to provide “an impartial assessment” of the (1) “types of occupations in which claimants can work” and (2) “availability of positions in such occupations.” Weatherbee, 649 F.3d at 569 (citing Lis- kowitz v. Astrue, 559 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2009)). Vocational experts are experienced in job placement and typically hold advanced degrees in vocational rehabilitation or psychology. Sok v. Kijakazi, No. 21-3039, 2022 WL 17413558, at *1 (7th Cir. Dec. 5, 2022). To make their assessment, vocational experts may rely on a variety of sources and tools, as well as their knowledge of the job market, experience placing individuals in jobs, and surveys of employers. Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. ---, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1152–53 (2019). The Social Security Administration uses the DOT to cate- gorize occupations. Fetting v. Kijakazi, 62 F.4th 332, 337 (7th No. 23-1196 9

Cir. 2023). Once a vocational expert determines the types of occupations in which a claimant can work, the expert pro- vides the corresponding DOT number. Id. But the DOT does not provide job numbers for each occupation. So vocational experts convert job numbers from the Bureau of Labor Statis- tics—which uses the SOC system—to the DOT system. Id. There are widely used, commercially available resources that help with this conversion process. One is the Job Browser Pro software. See Chavez v. Berryhill, 895 F.3d 962, 966 (7th Cir. 2018).4 When an ALJ bases a decision on the testimony of a voca- tional expert, the substantial evidence standard requires the ALJ to “ensure that the [vocational expert’s job number esti- mate] is the product of a reliable method.” Fetting, 62 F.4th at 339 (citing Brace v. Saul, 970 F.3d 818, 821 (7th Cir. 2020)). A “precise count is not necessary,” but the vocational expert’s testimony “must be supported with evidence sufficient to provide some modicum of confidence in its reliability.” Id. (citing Brace, 970 F.3d at 822). “[A]ll the substantial evidence standard requires” is that a vocational expert “gave enough detail for [the Court] to understand the sources of his data and the general process he adopted.” Hohman v. Kijakazi, 72 F.4th 248, 254 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Fetting, 62 F.4th at 339).

4 Chavez previously applied for supplemental security income in

2010. In Chavez v. Berryhill, this court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. 895 F.3d 962, 966 (7th Cir. 2018). The administrative decision on appeal here concerns only Chavez’s 2019 application and is not related to the proceedings on remand follow- ing her previous case. 10 No. 23-1196

This “case-by-case” inquiry considers “all features of the [vocational expert’s] testimony” to determine whether the testimony establishes “‘more than a mere scintilla’ of evi- dence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion.” Hohman, 72 F.4th at 252 (citing Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1156–57). “[W]hatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154. But a critical aspect of the vocational expert’s job esti- mation process is how that expert matches general economic data reported in SOC codes to specific DOT numbers used by the agency. See Ruenger v. Kijakazi, 23 F.4th 760, 761–62 (7th Cir. 2022) (“This creates a matching problem … .”); Brace, 970 F.3d at 820–21 (“Because the database of job titles is so outdated, an expert’s methodology for connecting job titles to reliable estimates of the number of jobs for each title is espe- cially important.”). 1. The vocational expert provided reliable testimony. Here, the ALJ could “readily trace the path of [Holmes’s] reasoning” for her job number estimates. Hohman, 72 F.4th at 253. Holmes testified that Job Browser Pro used 2021 data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to provide the most recent job numbers. She explained that by providing job numbers by DOT title, rather than SOC code, Job Browser Pro was able to exclude numbers from occupations that did not fit Chavez’s situation. In response to questioning from Chavez’s counsel, Holmes identified the SOC codes that corresponded to each of the DOT titles she listed as suitable for Chavez, and the ex- ertional and skill levels of all the DOT titles that fell under each SOC code. Cf. Ruenger, 23 F.4th at 763 (remanding where the vocational expert “obscured the origin of her job estimates and even denied the most likely source—SOC codes.”). No. 23-1196 11

Holmes also described how Job Browser Pro worked. She confirmed that the software used a formula to weigh the DOT occupations within a SOC code in order to reach their number for the DOT title. She even offered to provide detailed infor- mation about Job Browser Pro’s underlying formula: “I could read the summary and abstract for SkillTRAN estimating em- ployment numbers, which I have in front of me… .” But Chavez’s counsel did not accept her offer and moved to an- other line of questioning: “Okay. Let’s look at the cleaner job.” After considering objections by Chavez’s counsel, the ALJ asked Holmes additional questions clarifying how Job Browser Pro separated jobs and confirming that many voca- tional experts use the software. So, Holmes did provide substantial evidence and the ALJ appropriately relied on her testimony. Even if Holmes had not explained her method in detail, it was enough of a “rea- soned and principled explanation” to meet the low substan- tial evidence threshold. Chavez, 895 F.3d at 970. The jobs Holmes identified and the ALJ ultimately relied on—cleaner, office helper, and storage rental clerk—are prev- alent within the national economy. Chavez “cannot credibly argue” that these jobs, which are “commonly found in the na- tional economy,” do not exist in significant numbers. Sok, 2022 WL 17413558, at *2. To avoid foreclosing the claimant from disability benefits on “the basis of the existence of a few iso- lated jobs,” the vocational expert must show that the jobs exist in significant numbers. Walker v. Mathews, 546 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1976); see Sok, 2022 WL 17413558, at *2. This is satis- fied by the common nature of the jobs and supports the ALJ’s reasonable reliance on her testimony. 12 No. 23-1196

Holmes also testified that every vocational expert she knows relies on Job Browser Pro. Her reliance on a source that is “well-accepted” in her field supports her opinion. See Biestek, 139 S. Ct. 1155; Bruno v. Saul, 817 F. App’x 238, 241, 243 (7th Cir. 2020) (affirming vocational expert testimony based on the “SkillTRAN approach”); Purdy v. Berryhill, 887 F.3d 7, 14, 16–17 (1st Cir. 2018) (affirming and describing Job Browser Pro as “widely relied upon by vocational experts in estimat- ing the number of relevant jobs in the national economy”). Holmes’s testimony was also reliable for other reasons. She served as a vocational expert in Social Security proceed- ings for three years. She confirmed that her resume—which shows education including a Master of Science in rehabilita- tion psychology and more than two decades of professional experience as a vocational consultant—accurately reflected her professional qualifications. She also testified that, as part of her education and training, she took statistics classes and conducted population surveys. So, she had “top-of-the-line credentials, including professional qualifications and many years’ experience.” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1155, 1153 (affirming ALJ’s denial of benefits after relying on testimony of voca- tional expert with five years’ experience in Social Security proceedings and ten years’ experience counseling those with disabilities about employment opportunities). Chavez submits that Holmes did not explicitly tie her pro- fessional experience to her job number estimates. But a voca- tional expert need not do so for her testimony to constitute substantial evidence. In Biestek, the Court recognized a voca- tional expert’s qualifications based on his resume. See id. at 1153. The ALJ’s findings about job number estimates, which were based on that expert’s testimony, were affirmed. Id. at No. 23-1196 13

1157. That standard is satisfied here because the ALJ ques- tioned Holmes about her resume and experience and specifi- cally inquired about her job estimates and methodology. And although not Chavez’s burden, she simply did not offer any evidence conflicting with Holmes’s opinion on the jobs she could perform and their existence in substantial numbers in the economy. In sum, the ALJ relied on vocational expert testimony from an undisputed expert in the field who:  used a generally accepted source of job num- bers;  provided a straightforward overview of how the source worked;  offered to provide additional information about the source’s underlying formula;  provided additional details about the jobs she selected in response to the claimant’s questions; and  identified jobs commonly found in the national economy. The expert “gave enough detail for [the Court] to understand the sources of h[er] data and the general process [s]he adopted.” Hohman, 72 F.4th at 254 (quoting Fetting, 62 F.4th at 339). The ALJ therefore satisfied the Commissioner’s “modest evidentiary burden.” Sok, 2022 WL 17413558, at *2. 2. The underlying formula need not be explained. Chavez argues that Holmes’s evidence is less than sub- stantial because she did not explain Job Browser Pro’s under- lying formula. Holmes consulted Job Browser Pro to obtain 14 No. 23-1196

job number estimates which, Chavez concedes, is a generally accepted methodology. But in Chavez’s view, the lack of an explanation is “conclusive proof” that Holmes’s testimony is unreliable and that therefore the ALJ’s conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence. We reject this argument for three reasons. First, Chavez’s position is contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in Biestek that categorical rules regarding the substan- tiality of a vocational expert’s opinion are inappropriate. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1157. There, the claimant petitioned the Supreme Court to adopt a categorical rule precluding a voca- tional expert’s testimony from qualifying as substantial evi- dence if the expert declined a claimant’s request to provide supporting data. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1153–54. The Court re- jected that request and held that the inquiry in determining substantiality of evidence must be case-by-case. Id. at 1157. Adjudicators should evaluate the entirety of a vocational ex- pert’s testimony. Even if an expert refused to provide the un- derlying data, the expert’s testimony could still constitute substantial evidence if it had other markers of reliability. Id. at 1156–57. As in Biestek, Chavez’s request for a categorical rule is in- appropriate. A vocational expert’s testimony is not precluded simply because the expert did not describe the underlying for- mula of the resource relied upon. Instead, the court looks at the expert’s testimony as a whole and the specific facts of this case. As discussed above, Holmes’s testimony has sufficient indicia of reliability to clear the low substantial evidence threshold. No. 23-1196 15

Second, Chavez’s argument runs counter to this court’s law recognizing that a vocational expert is not required to ex- plain the statistical basis for the sources on which she relies. In Liskowitz, this court ruled that the ALJ was entitled to rely on a vocational expert’s testimony despite the expert’s admis- sion that she could not assess the degree of accuracy of the underlying data sources on which she relied. 559 F.3d at 743. Even so, the vocational expert explained that her sources were widely recognized as acceptable in the vocational rehabilita- tion field. Id. The court emphasized that “[t]he witness was testifying as a vocational expert, not a census taker or statisti- cian.” Id.; see Hohman, 72 F.4th at 254 (reiterating that voca- tional experts need not “provide exact data or calculations”); see also Fetting, 62 F.4th at 339–40. And, in Bruno, the court af- firmed the ALJ’s reliance on vocational expert testimony us- ing the “SkillTRAN approach,” even though the expert “did not reveal the precise mechanics and statistical model in- volved.” 817 F. App’x at 243; see also Case v. Kijakazi, No. 22- 2379, 2023 WL 4882880, at *3 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 2023) (holding that “[t]he inability of the vocational expert to precisely ex- plain the software’s algorithms does not render his explana- tion unreliable”). Chavez relies on Westendorf to argue that remand is needed because the vocational expert did not sufficiently ex- plain Job Browser Pro’s underlying formula. But in Westen- dorf, claimants’ counsel did not decline the vocational expert’s offer to provide details about the program’s underlying meth- odology as Chavez’s counsel did here. Westendorf v. Saul, No. 19-cv-1019, 2020 WL 4381991, at *1–2 (W.D. Wis. July 31, 2020) (the vocational expert promised to provide a document dis- cussing Job Browser Pro’s methodology after the hearing, counsel made a conditional objection to the testimony 16 No. 23-1196

pending review of the document, and counsel raised post- hearing objections specific to the methodology described). Third, Holmes was willing to provide the very infor- mation Chavez complains is missing from the record—details regarding Job Browser Pro’s methodology—but Chavez’s counsel did not pursue the matter. Vocational experts are en- couraged, but not required, to have underlying sources avail- able at the hearing. Krell v. Saul, 931 F.3d 582, 586–87 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Biestek, 139 S. Ct. 1157). Here, Holmes was pre- pared to provide further detail. As the district court ex- plained, Chavez “cannot decline an offer of information and then object that the information was not recited into the rec- ord.” 3. The ALJ properly considered whether the vocational ex- pert’s evidence was cogent and thorough. Chavez now criticizes the ALJ for not seeking out the ex- planation that her attorney declined. But where a vocational expert’s testimony was sufficiently “cogent and thorough” and “did not give the ALJ any reason to suspect that his meth- odology was unreliable,” the ALJ is “not required to seek fur- ther clarification.” Fetting, 62 F.4th at 340. As Fetting stated, a “reliable methodology is based on well-accepted sources.” Id. at 339 (quotations omitted). Here, Holmes testified “every person” she knew that “does this work, uses, relies upon Job Browser Pro.” Fetting ruled that a vocational expert’s explanation “must be sufficient to instill some confidence that the estimate was not conjured out of whole cloth.” Id. (quotations omitted). There, the vocational expert used “a simple formula … not a hard and fast scientific type formula” and did not conduct any No. 23-1196 17

“formal analysis.” Id. at 336 (quotations omitted). But the court found the vocational expert’s testimony “sufficiently co- gent and thorough for the ALJ to rely on it.” Id. “To be sure, the [vocational expert] could have explained his methodology more clearly, but he gave enough detail for us to understand the sources of his data and the general process he adopted.” Id. Holmes did that and more. She testified as to how Job Browser Pro uses data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to provide job numbers, offered to provide SkillTRAN’s descrip- tion of the formula Job Browser Pro uses, and clarified how Job Browser Pro separated jobs by DOT title. We have spoken to the reliability of the authority a voca- tional expert can use and still be deemed to have presented substantial evidence. In Leisgang v. Kijakazi, 72 F.4th 216 (7th Cir. 2023), an ALJ credited the testimony of a vocational ex- pert who relied on a publication that applied the equal distri- bution method to estimate job numbers. Id. at 220. The ALJ denied Social Security benefits. Id. at 219. When “asked if the [vocational expert] believed the equal distribution method was reliable, [he] reported that it was the only method he had available.” Id. at 219. The court in Leisgang recognized the sharp criticisms of the equal distribution method, and cited law “identifying the ‘illogical assumption’ underlying the equal distribution method and its ‘distorting effects.’” Id. at 220 (citing Chavez, 895 F.3d at 966). Still, the court affirmed the ALJ’s denial based on the vocational expert’s testimony. Id. Like in Leisgang, “nothing about [Holmes’s] testimony” indicated “that the ALJ could not put some modicum of confidence in the [her] job-number estimates.” Id. at 220 (quo- tations omitted). By declining to pursue Holmes’s offer to pro- vide further detail about her source’s methodology, Chavez 18 No. 23-1196

failed to “give the ALJ any reason to suspect that h[er] meth- odology was unreliable.” Fetting, 62 F.4th at 340. Chavez’s questions established only that Holmes could not explain Job Browser Pro’s formula without consulting her source. But that does not make her testimony unreliable. And it does not prove that “Job Browser Pro was simply a black box to the vocation expert.” See Westendorf, 2020 WL 4381991, at *3. 4. The ALJ properly considered and overruled Chavez’s ob- jections. Chavez says the ALJ did not sufficiently follow up on her objections. But Leisgang explains that an ALJ is better able to “unpack and untangle objections and concerns” about the vo- cational expert’s testimony. Leisgang, 72 F.4th at 220. “And the ALJ is best positioned to do so when the claimant identifies those objections and concerns expressly, allowing the proper development of the evidentiary record in real time.” Id. In her principal brief, Chavez says she made a “direct ob- jection about how the methodology allocates data from SOC codes to DOT codes, the most critical component of an esti- mation methodology.” But it is unclear to what “direct objec- tion” Chavez refers. Chavez’s attorney objected to “any top down weighing methodology” and asserted that “any weigh- ing of a DOT title within a SOC code cannot yield a reliable result” But these complaints are not specific to Job Browser Pro’s statistical methodology or to Holmes’s use of data from that program. And after Chavez’s counsel lodged these objec- tions, the ALJ asked follow-up questions to confirm that Job Browser Pro could weed out jobs that were inconsistent with the limitations in the hypothetical question and that the pro- gram is widely relied upon in the vocational expert field. No. 23-1196 19

If Chavez is suggesting her objections should have prompted the ALJ to ask additional questions, we disagree, as her attorney’s objections did not give the ALJ any reason to believe that Holmes’s testimony might be unreliable. See Fetting, 62 F.4th at 340; see also Leisgang, 72 F.4th at 220–21. The substantial evidence standard is “‘not high,’” Fetting, 62 F.4th at 338 (quoting Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154), and, for the reasons explained, Holmes’s testimony satisfies it. Finally, Chavez criticizes the ALJ’s reasons for overruling her objections to Holmes’s testimony. Agency guidance di- rects ALJs to “[r]ule on any objection(s)” to a vocational ex- pert’s testimony by addressing them “on the record during the hearing, in narrative form as a separate exhibit, or in the body of his or her decision.” SSA, Hearings, Appeals, and Liti- gation Law Manual I-2-6-74 (June 16, 2016). The ALJ did that. Although Chavez believes the ALJ wrongly overruled her ob- jections, she has not shown that the ALJ was required to do anything further to address them. III. Conclusion Holmes’s vocational expert testimony provided substan- tial evidence for the ALJ’s finding that Chavez could perform jobs that existed in significant numbers in the economy. The ALJ’s decision aligns with this court’s precedent on this ques- tion, and the ALJ appropriately addressed Chavez’s objec- tions. For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.