Israel Urzua Ortega v. Merrick Garland
Israel Urzua Ortega v. Merrick Garland
Opinion
In the
United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 21-3253 ISRAEL JUAN M. URZUA ORTEGA Petitioner, v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent. ____________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. No. A099-025-449 ____________________
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 12, 2022— DECIDED MARCH 29, 2024 ____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, KIRSCH, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judges. KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. Israel Juan Miguel Urzua Ortega, a native and citizen of Mexico, illegally reentered the United States, and his prior order of removal was reinstated. Ortega sought withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). Both an immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals found Ortega 2 No. 21-3253
ineligible for withholding of removal. Because substantial ev- idence supports the agency’s determination that Ortega failed to establish that he would be persecuted by individuals whom the Mexican government would be unable or unwilling to control, we deny the petition. I Israel Juan Miguel Urzua Ortega is a native and citizen of Mexico and has spent most of his life in Mexico City. Ortega and his family have experienced multiple attacks and threats of violence. When Ortega was young, his father was mur- dered. While the perpetrators were charged and sentenced, Ortega later learned that the murder was ordered by his fa- ther’s cousin, Tacho, who is a member of the Sinaloa cartel. When Ortega was a teenager and serving in the military, someone—who Ortega believes was sent by Tacho—verbally threatened to kill him and shot him in the leg. Ortega told his military general, who sent a captain-led escort to investigate the shooting, but the shooter had fled. After Ortega left the military to work in security as an ar- mored truck driver, he began receiving threatening messages on his beeper device, but he did not tell anyone about the threats. Ortega then changed jobs and started working as a firefighter, and he again received threatening messages. He informed the firefighter general, who agreed to transfer him to a different station. But he continued receiving similar mes- sages and had to be transferred to a third station. When leav- ing the third station one day, Ortega was followed by individ- uals in a vehicle, but he outmaneuvered them and called the police from a gas station. The police arrived, but Ortega did not file a police report. The next day, Ortega was again fol- lowed by individuals in a vehicle, one of whom pointed a gun No. 21-3253 3
at him. He was once more able to outmaneuver the car, and he called police detectives. The detectives assisted him right away and recommended that he file a report with the prose- cutor’s office, which he did. Soon after, in 2002, Ortega quit his job and came to the United States without authorization. He returned to Mexico in 2006 after his mother informed him that Tacho was threat- ening his son. While trying to reenter the United States via airplane using a fake visa, Ortega was discovered and ordered removed. But he eventually reentered the United States with- out authorization on foot at the land border. Even while re- siding in the United States, Ortega continued receiving nu- merous threatening messages and phone calls, which he sus- pects were from individuals associated with Tacho. In 2021, Ortega was arrested for driving on a revoked li- cense, and the Department of Homeland Security reinstated his 2006 removal order. Ortega claimed a fear of returning to Mexico, but the asylum officer determined that he did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. An immigra- tion judge vacated the decision, and withholding proceedings followed. After holding a hearing, the IJ denied Ortega’s with- holding application, finding that he “failed to establish that he would be persecuted by the government or groups or in- dividuals that the government is unwilling or unable to con- trol if he returns to Mexico.” In so holding, the IJ noted that the Mexican government was exceptionally responsive to the prior threats against Ortega and his family, Tacho was incar- cerated in Mexico, and Ortega had continued to receive 4 No. 21-3253
threats even while living in the United States. The Board of Immigration Appeals adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision. II “Where, as here, the BIA’s decision adopts and affirms the IJ’s conclusion as well as provides its own analysis, we review both decisions.” Guzman-Garcia v. Garland, 996 F.3d 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Legal questions are reviewed de novo, and findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evi- dence. Id. We will affirm so long as the agency’s decision “is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evi- dence.” Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d 822, 826 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). This standard is “extremely deferen- tial,” and we will reverse “only if the facts compel the oppo- site conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted). To qualify for withholding of removal, Ortega may show that he would be persecuted in Mexico because of his mem- bership in a particular social group, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), which here is his membership in the Urzua Ortega family. See Gonzalez Ruano v. Barr, 922 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir. 2019) (“We and other circuits have recognized that membership in a nu- clear family can satisfy the social group requirement.”) (cita- tions omitted). The feared persecution “must be attributable to the government or to a nongovernmental entity that the government is unable or unwilling to control.” Cruz-Martinez v. Sessions, 885 F.3d 460, 463 (7th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). Ac- tions of private citizens—such as Tacho—do not suffice “un- less the government is complicit in those acts or is unable or unwilling to take steps to prevent them.” Halim v. Holder, 755 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted); see also Hor v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497, 502 (7th Cir. 2005) (granting a peti- tion for review because the Algerian government was unable No. 21-3253 5
to protect the petitioner); Rosales Justo v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 154, 163 (1st Cir. 2018) (“[U]nwillingness and inability are distinct issues, and [] an applicant may be able to prove inability with- out proving unwillingness where the government’s willing efforts to protect its citizens fall short.”). Ortega argues that the IJ’s decision, as affirmed by the BIA, was not supported by substantial evidence because it failed to consider current conditions in Mexico and changes to his per- sonal circumstances. Regarding current country conditions, Ortega claims that the BIA should have reviewed the IJ’s de- cision de novo because the IJ ignored this evidence and thus committed legal error. But, as the BIA correctly found, the IJ’s decision explicitly referred to country conditions evidence, in- cluding the high rate of crime that goes unresolved and un- punished and the widespread corruption within the Mexican government. The BIA therefore properly reviewed the IJ’s de- termination on country conditions evidence for clear error, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i), and the BIA’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Importantly, “generalized conditions affecting large segments of a population do not, by them- selves, prove that [Ortega] faces persecution” and thus have “no significance” unless he can establish that he “is likely to be singled out for persecution.” Raghunathan v. Holder, 604 F.3d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Turning to Ortega’s personal circumstances, he argues that the Mexican government is less likely to protect him be- cause he is no longer employed by a Mexican government en- tity and has not been since 2002. This is mere speculation, and we are allowed to rely on the government’s past actions when assessing the risk of future persecution. See, e.g., Hernandez- Baena v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that 6 No. 21-3253
substantial evidence supported the IJ’s “conclusion that peti- tioners’ fear of future persecution was not objectively reason- able” where the police previously “responded immediately” to death threats). There is substantial evidence that Mexican authorities were willing to protect Ortega in the past. An es- cort was sent to investigate when Ortega was shot in the leg; Ortega was allowed to transfer fire stations twice after he re- ceived threatening messages; the police arrived the first time Ortega was followed by a vehicle (though he did not proceed with a police report); and when Ortega was again followed the next day, detectives helped him right away and recom- mended that he file a report with the prosecutor’s office. There is also substantial evidence that Mexican authorities are able to protect Ortega and his family. Officials previously charged and sentenced the individuals who murdered Ortega’s father. Further, Tacho is currently in prison, which undermines Or- tega’s concern that the Mexican government is unable to con- trol him. Under our highly deferential standard of review, we find that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s decision, as af- firmed by the BIA, that Ortega failed to establish that Mexico would be unable or unwilling to protect him. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. DENIED
Reference
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