In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                  For the Seventh Circuit
                      ____________________
No. 24-1420
EDWARD FRANCIS BACHNER, IV and
REBECCA GAY BACHNER,
                                             Petitioners-Appellants,

                                  v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
                                               Respondent-Appellee.
                      ____________________

               Appeal from the United States Tax Court.
              No. 23219-15 — Richard T. Morrison, Judge.
                      ____________________

  SUBMITTED AUGUST 28, 2024 — DECIDED JANUARY 7, 2025
                ____________________

   Before SCUDDER, KIRSCH, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges.
    SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. For three years Edward Bachner
filed tax returns that fraudulently claimed refunds by inflat-
ing both his income and tax withholdings. The IRS detected
the fraud and responded by imposing civil penalties. Upon
receiving the Service’s notice of penalties, Bachner petitioned
the United States Tax Court for a redetermination and then
spent years litigating his dispute with the IRS. In time a trial
ensued, which Bachner chose not to attend, and ended with
2                                                   No. 24-1420

the Tax Court sustaining the penalties. Bachner and his wife,
Rebecca, who filed joint tax returns, now appeal and chal-
lenge the Tax Court’s judgment. Finding no errors, we affirm.
                                I
                               A
    The events giving rise to Bachner’s tax problems go back
twenty years. In joint tax returns filed with his wife Rebecca
for tax years 2005 to 2007, Edward reported fictitious wages
and tax withholdings, claiming hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars in unwarranted refunds from the U.S. Treasury. Around
the same time, Edward also illicitly obtained a dangerous,
poisonous substance and fraudulently procured a life insur-
ance policy. This conduct led to federal criminal charges, with
Edward then pleading guilty to making a false claim to the
IRS (for the 2005 tax year), possessing a biological agent for
use as a weapon, and wire fraud. Edward admitted in his plea
agreement that he also submitted false refund claims to the
IRS for tax years 2006 and 2007. He served about seven years
in federal prison.
    Upon Edward’s release in 2015, the IRS issued a notice of
deficiency for the three tax years 2005 through 2007. The Ser-
vice addressed the notice to both Edward and Rebecca but
identified Edward as the only liable party and stated that it
had “granted full relief” to Rebecca as an innocent spouse.
The notice informed Edward that the IRS sought to recover
civil-fraud penalties under § 6663(a) of the Tax Code, speci-
fied the amounts of the penalties (totaling $393,807 for the
three years), and explained how the Service calculated them.
The notice also identified that, for the three years in question,
Edward had reported fake wages and tax withholdings, and,
No. 24-1420                                                   3

as a result, the Bachners underpaid their federal income taxes
by hundreds of thousands of dollars. The Bachners jointly pe-
titioned the Tax Court to challenge the validity of the notice
of deficiency and the associated penalties.
                               B
  Only a few aspects of the lengthy proceedings in the Tax
Court are relevant to this appeal.
    First, the Tax Court rejected the Bachners’ challenges to
the validity of the IRS’s notice of deficiency. They argued that
the notice was invalid because it identified only “penalties,”
not a tax “deficiency” as defined by § 6211 of the Tax Code.
They also contended that the limitations period had expired,
the IRS had ignored certain procedures in assessing the pen-
alties, and the notice improperly included Rebecca, who had
received innocent-spouse status. The Tax Court rejected all of
these arguments.
    Second, the Bachners insisted that they had not underpaid
any income taxes. In their view, they had merely received
more than what they deserved in refunds. So they claimed
that Edward could not be liable under § 6663(a) for fraud pen-
alties arising from an underpayment of taxes. The Tax Court
rejected this argument too.
    Third, the IRS persuaded the Tax Court to accept certain
proposed stipulations about the false tax returns. See T.C. R.
91(f) (outlining the Tax Court’s requirements for pretrial stip-
ulations). The Bachners had asserted that their privilege
against self-incrimination allowed them to stay silent about
those facts. Once again the Tax Court disagreed, emphasizing
that the chance of another prosecution for the false tax returns
was remote. The Bachners then contended, without
4                                                   No. 24-1420

elaboration, that the IRS’s evidence was “invalid.” The Tax
Court accepted the IRS’s exhibits and, finding support in
those exhibits, deemed stipulated most of the facts outlined
by the Service.
    The proceedings ended with a trial, which the Bachners
chose not to attend, and a judgment sustaining the fraud pen-
alties in their entirety against Edward.
   The Bachners then sought our review. They again contest
the validity of the IRS’s notice of deficiency, a challenge that
implicates the Tax Court’s jurisdiction. See Murray v. Comm’r,

 (7th Cir. 1994). Jurisdiction aside, they also
question whether the Tax Court properly imposed the fraud
penalties when, they continue to insist, they did not underpay
any income taxes.
                               II
    We begin with a point on our own jurisdiction. Because
this appeal comes to us in the names of both Edward and Re-
becca, we must assess whether both have standing to appeal
the Tax Court’s judgment. This inquiry turns on whether they
both have alleged an injury that a favorable ruling on appeal
can redress. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 

, 560–61
(1992).
    We have no difficulty concluding that Edward meets these
requirements. An injury in fact, the Supreme Court has ex-
plained, is a “concrete and particularized” harm. 

.
The requisite harm must be “real,” not “abstract,” and it must
affect the plaintiff “in a personal and individual way.” Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins, 

, 339–40 (2016). For Edward, the Tax
Court’s judgment leaves him on the hook for close to $400,000
No. 24-1420                                                     5

in tax penalties. And a favorable ruling from our court could
reduce or eliminate that penalty. Edward has standing.
    But not so for Rebecca. The IRS granted her inno-
cent-spouse status, which acts as an exception to the Tax
Code’s general rule that married couples filing joint returns
are jointly and severally liable for income tax liabilities. See
I.R.C. § 6015 (establishing and defining innocent-spouse re-
lief); see also Rogers v. Comm’r, 

, 579 (7th Cir. 2021)
(explaining the innocent-spouse exception). Rebecca is there-
fore “relieved of liability” for tax, penalties, and interest for
the three tax years at issue in this case, see I.R.C. § 6015(b),
and the Tax Court’s judgment did not harm her in any way.
Nor has she alleged that any harm to Edward will affect her
personally. See Spokeo, 

. In these circumstances,
and because the Bachners have not provided any other basis
for Rebecca having Article III standing, we dismiss her from
this appeal.
                               III
    Returning to Edward, he presses two primary issues on
appeal. He suggests that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to
conduct a deficiency proceeding because the IRS never found
a “deficiency” in tax payments. Edward further contends that,
jurisdiction aside, the Tax Court could not assess a fraud pen-
alty against him because he did not “underpay” his taxes. As
Edward sees it, he merely received a larger refund than what
he was owed. He is mistaken on both points.
                                A
    The Tax Court’s jurisdiction hinges on the IRS’s issuance
of a valid notice of deficiency—a point Edward does not dis-
pute. See I.R.C. §§ 6212–14; Murray, 

 (collecting
6                                                     No. 24-1420

cases). The Tax Code defines a “deficiency” as the amount the
IRS determines that the taxpayer owes, less any amount the
taxpayer reported on his tax return, calculated “without re-
gard” to any credits for withholdings on wages. I.R.C.
§ 6211(a), (b)(1); see also Murray, 

. Generally, a
deficiency results from a taxpayer’s understatement of tax li-
ability on a federal tax return. See Murray, 

. But
here Edward overstated his tax liabilities by reporting ficti-
tious, inflated wages, so his notice of determination identified
no tax deficiency. Rather, the notice listed only “penalties”
arising from Edward’s fraudulent overstatement of his tax
withholdings, which, in turn, gave rise to his fraudulent re-
fund requests of the IRS. By Edward’s measure, the absence
of a finding of a deficiency deprived the Tax Court of jurisdic-
tion.
    We disagree. The “penalties” listed in Edward’s notice
gave the Tax Court jurisdiction to review the IRS’s determi-
nations, just as a “deficiency” would have. In § 6665(a), Con-
gress made clear that penalties in Chapter 68 of the Tax Code
(of which the § 6663 fraud penalty is a part) shall be treated
“in the same manner as taxes.” The IRS assesses and collects
a tax deficiency by issuing a notice of determination,
see I.R.C. §§ 6212–13, so by issuing a notice of determination
that stated Edward’s fraud penalties, the IRS properly treated
those penalties “in the same manner” as it would a tax defi-
ciency, see id. § 6665(a).
    In the final analysis, then, a deficiency that satisfies § 6211
is not a jurisdictional necessity. The notice advising Edward
of the penalties owed, and the Bachners’ timely petition con-
testing it, combined to provide the Tax Court with jurisdiction
over the administrative deficiency proceeding. See I.R.C.
No. 24-1420                                                   7

§ 6213(a) (providing the Tax Court with jurisdiction upon the
receipt of a timely petition for redetermination); T.C. R. 13(a)
(making clear that the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction without a
notice of deficiency).
                               B
    On a different front, Edward contends that he did not “un-
derpay” his taxes and therefore that § 6663(a), the provision
of the Tax Code pursuant to which the IRS imposed penalties
against him, does not apply. Here, too, we have a different
view.
    By its terms, § 6663(a) instructs that, if a taxpayer under-
pays taxes, and “any part” of that underpayment is due to
fraud, the taxpayer owes a penalty. Put most simply, the pro-
vision requires the IRS to show that the taxpayer’s fraud led
to an underpayment of taxes—by, for example, overstating
tax withholdings to trigger fraudulent refunds.
    A neighboring provision supplies important direction.
Section 6664(a) explains that, for the purposes of a fraud pen-
alty, an underpayment occurs when the amount that the IRS
determines a taxpayer owes is greater than what the taxpayer
reports as owed. Edward assumes that this provision equates
“underpayments” with “deficiencies” and, by extension, ex-
cludes taxpayers like him who fraudulently overstate the
amount they owe to inflate their refunds. But the Treasury
Regulations refute his assumption. The applicable regulation
(whose validity Edward does not challenge) explains that to
calculate an underpayment, the amount of tax reported is re-
duced by the excess of the amount of withholdings reported
above the amount actually withheld. 

-
2(c)(1). In more simplified terms, this means that when a
8                                                 No. 24-1420

taxpayer overstates his withholdings, the amount of tax re-
ported decreases, and the underpayment increases for the
purpose of calculating the fraud penalty. See 

 § 1.6664-2(g)
(Example 3).
    That is what happened here. Over three tax years, Edward
overstated—by hundreds of thousands of dollars—the
amount of tax withheld on his fictitious wages. And the IRS,
in calculating his underpayment, reduced the amount of tax
reported by the amount of the overstated withholdings. Take
2005, for example. The Service determined that Edward actu-
ally owed $10,396 in federal income taxes. Edward, mean-
while, reported that he owed $122,798, and he overstated his
withholding credits by $222,905. Reducing the tax that Ed-
ward reported ($122,798) by the excess withholding credits
that he fraudulently claimed ($222,905) yields a negative
$100,107. Adding that figure to the tax he actually owed
($10,396) yields an underpayment of $110,503 under 

. So, although the tax that Edward reported was
greater than what the IRS determined he owed (meaning
there was no “deficiency”), his overstated withholdings
caused an underpayment of $110,503 for 2005. It was that un-
derpayment that provided the baseline for the IRS’s compu-
tation of the 2005 tax fraud penalty. The other two years
yielded comparable underpayments and, by extension, fraud
penalties under § 6663(a).
   Based on these underpayments (whose computations Ed-
ward has never challenged) for the three tax years in question,
the Tax Court committed no error in sustaining the penalties
under § 6663(a).
No. 24-1420                                                     9

                               IV
   Edward’s remaining arguments need not detain us.
    Foremost, Edward’s additional attacks on the validity of
the notice of deficiency fall short. He observes that the IRS in-
cluded Rebecca’s name in the address line of the notice and
contends that her inclusion, despite her innocent-spouse sta-
tus, renders the notice invalid. Not so in our view. Indeed, the
notice contained all necessary information: the name of the
taxpayer against whom and statutes under which the IRS
sought penalties, along with the basis for and computation of
those penalties. See I.R.C. §§ 6751(a), 7522(a); see also Portillo
v. Comm’r, 

 (5th Cir. 1991).
    Edward also suggests that the notice was time-barred, but
this case involves a “false or fraudulent return with the intent
to evade tax,” so the assessment could be made “at any time.”
I.R.C. § 6501(c)(1).
     Finally, Edward contends that the IRS did not conduct an
audit in compliance with its own regulations before issuing
the notice. Not only does this view lack support in the record,
but any such deviation from protocol would be relevant only
if it produced “an assessment without any factual founda-
tion.” Zuhone v. Comm’r, 

, 1326–27 (7th Cir. 1989).
Edward has made no attempt at such a showing.
    Edward fares no better in his challenges to various proce-
dural aspects of the Tax Court’s proceedings. For starters, he
has no basis to argue that the court exhibited any bias against
him—adverse rulings alone are not evidence of bias. Liteky v.
United States, 

 (1994). Nor did the Tax Court
commit any clear error in overruling his assertion of the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination and accepting the IRS’s
10                                                  No. 24-1420

proposed facts. Edward does not—indeed, could not—articu-
late any “real and appreciable” risk of another criminal pros-
ecution from responding. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct.,

 (2004). Recall that Edward was already pros-
ecuted for misconduct related to the 2005 tax return, and the
government chose not to prosecute him for misconduct re-
lated to the 2006 and 2007 tax years that he stipulated to in his
plea deal. Further still, all facts that the Tax Court deemed
stipulated found ample support in the IRS’s exhibits, judi-
cially noticed facts about Edward’s criminal case, and testi-
mony from an IRS agent. And in the Tax Court (and again
here) Edward made no real effort to dispute this evidence.
   For these reasons, we AFFIRM the Tax Court’s decision to
sustain penalties against Edward Bachner and DISMISS Re-
becca Bachner from this appeal.