In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 24-1751
WAUKEGAN POTAWATOMI CASINO, LLC,
                                                  Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                 v.

CITY OF WAUKEGAN,
                                                 Defendant-Appellee.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
           Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
             No. 20-cv-00750 — John F. Kness, Judge.
                     ____________________

  ARGUED OCTOBER 30, 2024 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 14, 2025
               ____________________

   Before SCUDDER, ST. EVE, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.
    KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. Waukegan Potawatomi Casino, LLC
(WPC) says its Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated
when the City of Waukegan did not advance its casino pro-
posal for licensing consideration. WPC is convinced it experi-
enced intentional discrimination during the application pro-
cess—not as a protected class, but as a class of one. The district
court granted summary judgment for the City, reasoning that
tribal entities like WPC are not proper plaintiffs under
2                                                     No. 24-1751

 and, in any event, that the claim failed as a
matter of law. We affirm. WPC cannot carry its heavy burden
as a class-of-one plaintiff, even assuming it could maintain
such an action.
                                 I
    When the Illinois legislature authorized the Illinois Gam-
ing Board to issue a casino license in the city of Waukegan, it
tasked the City with certifying qualified applicants to the
Gaming Board for consideration. Waukegan Potawatomi Ca-
sino, LLC (WPC) was one hopeful contender. WPC is an Illi-
nois limited liability company fully owned by the Forest
County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin, descended
from the Potawatomi Indian Tribe (the Potawatomi). Out of
four candidates, WPC was the only one the City did not cer-
tify. To hear WPC tell it, this was the result of an application
process rigged against it at each step. Indeed, WPC alleges
that the City’s review process was a sham designed to benefit
another applicant, Lakeside Casino, LLC (Lakeside).
    Because this case comes to us at the summary judgment
stage, we construe the facts in the light most favorable to WPC
and take all reasonable inferences in its favor. FKFJ, Inc. v. Vil-
lage of Worth, 

, 584 (7th Cir. 2021). This does not
compel us to take “every conceivable inference” WPC sug-
gests. 

 (quotation omitted). Nor do we vouch for the
“objective truth of this account.” Brunson v. Murray, 

 (7th Cir. 2016).
    For an applicant to be eligible for consideration by the
Gaming Board, the City had to certify that it met certain stat-
utory requirements. 230 ILCS § 10/7(e-5). To accomplish this,
the City asked interested parties to submit applications laying
No. 24-1751                                                   3

out their proposed development plans for the casino. Five
companies submitted proposals. After one withdrew, the final
applicants were WPC, Lakeside, CDI-RSG Waukegan, LLC
(Rivers), and Full House Reports, Inc. (Full House).
    The proposals varied, as did the applicants’ casino experi-
ence. One key difference related to the proposed terms for de-
veloping Fountain Square, the City-owned property ear-
marked for the casino. WPC offered to purchase the site for
an amount equal to “+/- 15%” of the appraised value of the
property. A June 2019 appraisal by the City valued Fountain
Square at $5.625 million, but WPC was unaware of this ap-
praisal and expected additional negotiations to solidify these
terms. The other proposals offered anywhere from $11 million
to $30 million to purchase the property, with various options
for long-term leases, gaming revenues for the City, and an-
nual guarantees for the City between $1 million and $3 mil-
lion.
    The proposals also differed in other respects, such as the
square footage of the casinos, the number of gaming posi-
tions, and options for an entertainment complex, hotel, or
temporary casino during construction. WPC’s proposed ca-
sino was almost double the size of the next largest proposal,
had the most gaming positions, and did not offer an entertain-
ment complex, hotel, or temporary casino. The applicants
brought different levels of experience to the table, as well. The
Potawatomi operated two tribal casinos in Wisconsin. The
other applicants each operated at least four casinos across
multiple states.
    Central to this dispute is the relationship between the
City’s then-mayor, Samuel Cunningham, and Michael Bond,
a founding partner of Lakeside. Bond contributed generously
4                                                    No. 24-1751

to Cunningham’s mayoral campaign and was influential in
the election of several City Council members. Cunningham
initially assembled an internal committee to review the casino
proposals, but several members had ties to Bond. Before long,
a reporter emailed Cunningham about Bond’s possible undue
influence on the casino application process. The City began
looking for an outside consultant the next day and retained
C.H. Johnson Consulting soon thereafter.
    As part of the review process, Johnson Consulting and
City representatives met with each of the project teams. At
these meetings, Johnson Consulting requested additional in-
formation from the applicants as needed. To that end, Full
House was asked to provide estimated property tax infor-
mation, projected revenues and expenses, and job creation fig-
ures that it had failed to include in its original proposal. John-
son Consulting followed up after the meeting by email, and
Full House responded with the requested information. John-
son Consulting representatives testified that they needed this
information to perform an “apples to apples” comparison of
the applicants’ financial data. WPC was not asked to provide
any additional information or clarifications.
   A public hearing was held the following week. Each appli-
cant was given equal time to present their proposals and re-
spond to questions and comments. In its own presentation,
Johnson Consulting portrayed WPC’s proposed purchase
price as $5.625 million (the appraised value). A small notation
specified that WPC’s offer was +/- 15% of the appraised value,
but Johnson Consulting did not provide that range.
   A few weeks later, Lakeside emailed the City’s general
email address for casino-related matters seeking to enter into
a memorandum of understanding with the City. Under its
No. 24-1751                                                  5

terms, Lakeside’s original offer would stand if it was the only
applicant certified to the Gaming Board. But if the City certi-
fied multiple applicants, Lakeside would adjust its bid to
match the applicant offering less money to the City. This
email was forwarded to multiple City officials, including the
City’s corporation counsel Robert Long. Long did not forward
the email to anyone and did not disclose it to the Gaming
Board even though he was statutorily required to. Long testi-
fied that he did not read the memorandum of understanding
and disregarded it to avoid prejudicing the application pro-
cess. He said that Lakeside was looking for a “leg up” and that
he did not think that he or any other City official had author-
ity to grant the request. WPC suggests that Long concealed
this email from the City Council to benefit Lakeside.
   The same day Lakeside sent its memorandum of under-
standing, WPC delivered a letter to the City seeking to in-
crease its proposed purchase price to $12 million. Based on
Johnson Consulting’s presentation at the hearing, WPC was
concerned that the City had misconstrued its offer price. Long
advised Johnson Consulting not to consider this letter in its
analysis. He testified that it would have been difficult to
properly compare the candidates’ original proposals and any
enhanced offers, so he instructed Johnson Consulting to ex-
clude all supplemental information that the City did not spe-
cifically request. WPC says this directive was part of an or-
chestrated effort to prevent it from putting forward the best
proposal possible.
   The City Council met to decide which proposals to certify.
Johnson Consulting presented its findings at the meeting. Per
the City’s instruction, its analysis did not reflect WPC’s sup-
plemental letter or Lakeside’s memorandum of
6                                                 No. 24-1751

understanding, though the City Council was informed of
WPC’s revised offer. Johnson Consulting reported that each
applicant was qualified with the necessary skills to deliver the
casino. Still, it ranked Full House first, followed by Lakeside,
then Rivers, and WPC in last place. WPC believes that this
ranking was predetermined by Cunningham to diminish its
chances of certification. It also says that Johnson Consulting
concealed negative financial information about Full House to
bolster its report. Each council member testified that the
presentation had no influence on their decision, however, and
some were altogether unimpressed with it. Johnson Consult-
ing representatives could not articulate their ranking method-
ology when asked later.
    The City Council voted to certify Lakeside, Full House,
and Rivers to the Gaming Board for licensing consideration.
It did not certify WPC. All four council members with pur-
ported ties to Bond voted against WPC and in favor of the
others. Each testified that they voted independently and with-
out outside influence, though WPC disputes the truth of that
testimony. They supplied various reasons for their decision
not to certify WPC. These included the lack of an entertain-
ment center and other amenities for economic development,
the quality of WPC’s presentation, and the lack of detail and
transparency regarding WPC’s proposed purchase price. One
of the so-called Bond-backed council members, Keith Turner,
testified that it bothered him that WPC seemed to expect cer-
tification because they were a Native American tribe, despite
having the lowest purchase price of all the applicants. That
said, Turner also testified that Cunningham approached him
just before the vote and explicitly directed him to certify
Lakeside, Rivers, and Full House, but not WPC. Turner
No. 24-1751                                                     7

admitted that he voted as he did in part because of this in-
struction.
    Out of the remaining five council members, three were
against any casino in Waukegan and voted against every ap-
plicant. With only two votes in its favor, WPC’s proposal was
not certified. WPC successfully obtained reconsideration of
the vote a few days later, but the City Council once again de-
clined to certify it.
    WPC lodged a complaint against the City in Illinois state
court. Its first amended complaint alleged violations of the Il-
linois Gambling Act, the Illinois Open Meetings Act, and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under

. The City removed the case to federal court
based on federal question and supplemental jurisdiction.
While this case was pending, the Gaming Board issued the
casino license to Full House.
    The district court granted the City’s motion for summary
judgment. Expanding on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Community
of the Bishop Colony, 

 (2003), the district court con-
cluded that WPC could not maintain a § 1983 claim as an arm
of a sovereign Native American tribe. In the alternative, it de-
termined that WPC’s class-of-one equal protection claim
failed as a matter of law because WPC was not similarly situ-
ated to the other applicants and multiple conceivable rational
bases existed for the City’s conduct. The district court de-
clined to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state law claims and entered final judgment for the City. This
appeal followed.
8                                                     No. 24-1751

                                 II
    WPC seeks reversal on all fronts. According to WPC, the
district court erred when it held that tribes could never bring
§ 1983 claims. It contends that Inyo County allows tribes to use
§ 1983 to vindicate non-sovereign rights and characterizes its
equal protection claim as decidedly non-sovereign. WPC then
argues that summary judgment on its class-of-one claim was
improper because a reasonable jury could find that the City
irrationally discriminated against it throughout the applica-
tion process to benefit Lakeside. We review the grant of sum-
mary judgment de novo. LoBianco v. Bonefish Grill, LLC, 

 (7th Cir. 2024). We will affirm if there is no gen-
uine dispute of material fact and the City is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. FKFJ, Inc., 11 F.4th at 584.
                                 A
    As a threshold matter, WPC must be able to sue under
§ 1983 to bring its claim. In Inyo County, the Supreme Court
determined that tribes are not persons capable of suing under
§ 1983 to vindicate sovereign rights. 

. That de-
cision involved the Bishop Paiute Tribe’s attempt to “vindi-
cate its status as a sovereign immune from state processes un-
der federal law” after a search warrant was used to obtain rec-
ords from a tribally operated casino. 

. The Court held
that the Tribe did not qualify as a person capable of suit under
§ 1983 “in the situation here presented.” Id. at 704.
    In reaching this conclusion, the Court assumed that tribes,
like states, “are not subject to suit under § 1983.” Id. at 709. But
its analysis did not end there. Rather, the Court determined
that “qualification of a sovereign as a ‘person’ who may main-
tain a particular claim for relief depends not upon a bare
No. 24-1751                                                    9

analysis of the word ‘person’ but on the ‘legislative environ-
ment’ in which the word appears.” Id. at 711 (citations omit-
ted). The Court opined that § 1983 “was designed to secure
private rights against government encroachment, not to ad-
vance a sovereign’s prerogative to withhold evidence relevant
to a criminal investigation.” Id. at 712 (citation omitted). Be-
cause the claim of immunity was “by virtue of the Tribe’s as-
serted ‘sovereign’ status,” the Court held that it could not sue
“to vindicate the sovereign right it here claims.” Id. at 711–12.
    Inyo County left the door open to the possibility that tribes
could maintain § 1983 suits predicated on non-sovereign
rights. The district court shut that door. Its decision empha-
sized that sovereign tribes are immune from suit under the
statute. Because they are not persons capable of being sued
under § 1983, the court reasoned, they must not be persons
capable of bringing suit either. Viewing WPC as an arm of the
Potawatomi, the court deemed it unable to bring its § 1983 ac-
tion and granted summary judgment to the City.
    WPC does not meaningfully dispute its status as an arm
of the Potawatomi, nor can it. WPC is wholly owned and
funded by the Potawatomi. Its casino would be operated on
behalf of the Potawatomi as a sovereign entity to the benefit
of its tribal members (and exempt from federal income tax as
a result). Given this financial relationship and its background,
business purpose, and operational structure, WPC is squarely
an arm of the Potawatomi able to avail itself of the Tribe’s sov-
ereign immunity. Mestek v. LAC Courte Oreilles Cmty. Health
Ctr., 

, 259–60 (7th Cir. 2023).
   We have yet to determine whether tribes, or their arms,
can sue to vindicate non-sovereign rights under § 1983.
Courts have grappled with this issue since Inyo County. On
10                                                   No. 24-1751

one hand, it is a foundational principle of statutory interpre-
tation that a term is presumed to have the same meaning
throughout a statute. Brown v. Gardner, 

(1994). This presumption is “at its most vigorous when a term
is repeated within a given sentence.” 

 Indeed, § 1983 refer-
ences both persons who may be sued and persons who may
sue in the same breath. Building off this presumption and sov-
ereign immunity to suit under § 1983, the Fourth Circuit has
found that an arm of the state is incapable of maintaining
§ 1983 actions regardless of the nature of its claims. Va. Off. for
Prot. & Advoc. v. Reinhard, 

, 189–90 (4th Cir. 2005)
(analyzing Inyo County’s implications in the context of a state
agency and finding no “evidence of statutory intent to allow
suits by sovereigns under § 1983 that would overcome the
general presumption that ‘person’ in a statute does not in-
clude the sovereign”). In a similar vein, the Tenth Circuit has
remarked that “a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983 pos-
sesses neither ‘sovereign rights’ nor ‘sovereign immunity.’”
Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 

 (10th Cir. 2010).
    On the other hand, this reasoning renders Inyo County’s
painstaking analysis of the “legislative environment” of the
word “person” and the sovereign/non-sovereign rights dis-
tinction entirely gratuitous. The Sixth Circuit recognized as
much when it dispensed with a similar argument. Keweenaw
Bay Indian Cmty. v. Rising, 

, 596 & n.5 (6th Cir.
2009). For their part, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits seem to rec-
ognize the sovereign rights divide but have not affirmatively
held that tribes can sue to vindicate non-sovereign rights.
Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 611 F.3d at 1234–36; Skokomish Indian
Tribe v. United States, 

, 514–15 (9th Cir. 2005). To
add even more confusion to the mix, tribes have mounted
No. 24-1751                                                    11

attempts to bring § 1983 suits as parens patriae to enforce
quasi-sovereign rights, with varying degrees of success. Com-
pare Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Native Vill. of Curyung, 

, 399–402 (Ala. 2006) (permitting parens patriae ac-
tion), with Chemehuevi Ind. Tribe v. McMahon, 

 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding parens patriae action inconsistent
with § 1983).
   This is a difficult question that should not be taken lightly
given its significant implications for federalism and tribal
governance. However, we need not answer it today because
WPC’s claim would fail on the merits if allowed to proceed.
                                B
    WPC attempts to vindicate its Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection rights through § 1983. It invokes the so-
called class-of-one theory, which “on some rare occasions”
enables a plaintiff to succeed on an equal protection claim
even if they are not a member of a protected class. Ind. Land
Tr. #3082 v. Hammond Redevelopment Comm’n, 

 (7th Cir. 2024). “To state a claim under this theory, a plain-
tiff must allege (1) that they have been intentionally treated
differently from others similarly situated, and (2) that there is
no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” 

 (cleaned
up). This is a “heavy burden.” FKFJ, Inc., 11 F.4th at 588.
    The district court determined that WPC was not similarly
situated to the other casino applicants given the differences in
their proposals and experience. It then identified six conceiv-
able rational bases for the City’s decision not to certify WPC’s
proposal. Along with the reasons given by various council
members, the court noted the large size of the proposed ca-
sino compared to the lower-income Waukegan market,
12                                                  No. 24-1751

WPC’s lack of experience relative to the other candidates, and
potential competition concerns considering Waukegan’s
proximity to the Potawatomi’s Milwaukee casino.
    WPC urges that the district court had its argument all
wrong. It says the City’s disparate treatment and irrational
conduct occurred throughout the casino review process, not
just when the City Council voted on its proposal. Therefore,
we should begin our analysis at the start of the application
process and disregard the differences in the various proposals
when considering whether the applicants are similarly situ-
ated. In WPC’s telling, it is similarly situated to the other ca-
sino applicants in all material respects because, according to
Johnson Consulting, they were all qualified and able to de-
liver the casino.
    To support its theory, WPC contends that the City acted
irrationally when it permitted Full House to supplement its
financial information and concealed the supposedly illusory
nature of Lakeside’s offer but prohibited WPC from revising
its purchase price. It cites the omission of Full House’s nega-
tive financial information as further evidence of a contrived
review process. WPC also stresses that Turner’s testimony
about his conversation with Cunningham before the vote al-
lows us to infer that the other so-called Bond-backed council
members similarly voted according to Cunningham’s instruc-
tion. This, WPC insists, leads to the inference that Cunning-
ham and the City corrupted the entire application process and
manipulated what information was available to the City
Council to ensure that WPC, Lakeside’s strongest competi-
tion, was not certified to the Gaming Board. WPC asserts that
this inferential pileup is sufficient to permit a rational jury to
find in its favor.
No. 24-1751                                                   13

    WPC asks too much. When evaluating class-of-one claims,
we consider “only whether a conceivable rational basis for the
difference in treatment exists.” Hammond Redevelopment, 

 (quotation omitted). It is immaterial whether we
examine the vote itself or look at the entire review process and
its treatment of supplemental information. A conceivable ra-
tional basis exists for the City’s conduct, so WPC’s claim must
fail.
    As the district court noted, there are several plausible rea-
sons for the City’s decision not to certify WPC’s proposal. We
are not imagining these justifications—council members sup-
plied many of them. WPC argues that these reasons are not
conceivable in light of Turner’s conflicting testimony, so we
are allowed to consider animus and improper motive. At bot-
tom, this is an attempt to negate the proffered rational bases
by arguing an improper motive.
    Our recent decisions could not have been more clear: “It is
only when courts can hypothesize no rational basis for the ac-
tion that allegations of animus come into play.” 

 (quotation
omitted). It does not have to be “the actual justification” for
the different treatment. 145 Fisk, LLC v. Nicklas, 

 (7th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). Once a reason is iden-
tified, “[t]rue or not, we may look no further.” Hammond Re-
development, 107 F.4th at 698–99. WPC’s endeavor to undercut
the district court’s rational bases does not save its claim.
   Regardless, WPC has not established a material factual
dispute that would defeat summary judgment. To be sure, it
may be disputed whether Turner voted independently or ac-
cording to Cunningham’s instruction. But even if Cunning-
ham directed Turner to vote a certain way and he obliged,
WPC is not entitled to the string of inferences it requests. The
14                                                 No. 24-1751

bridge from a single council member’s inconsistent testimony
to a City-wide scheme rigged against WPC to benefit
Lakeside and Bond is built on speculation and conjecture.
“Speculation cannot create a genuine issue of fact that defeats
summary judgment. And speculation is insufficient to defeat
a summary judgment motion.” Flowers v. Kia Motors Fin., 

 (7th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted).
    The claim also fails to the extent that WPC tries to charac-
terize the disparate treatment as the City’s conduct through-
out the casino review process, namely its treatment of supple-
mental information. We need not imagine a rational basis for
this decision either. Johnson Consulting did not consider
WPC’s revised offer because the City did not request it. By
contrast, the City required additional information from Full
House to properly compare the proposals. WPC did not even
experience different treatment in this regard: Lakeside’s
memorandum of understanding was similarly disregarded,
not to benefit Lakeside but because the request was futile and
inappropriate. The same goes for WPC’s claim that Johnson
Consulting concealed negative financial information about
Full House. Even taking that as true, WPC cannot assert dis-
parate treatment because Rivers would have been similarly
disadvantaged by that conduct. FKFJ, Inc., 11 F.4th at 588
(class-of-one claims protect from government action “singling
out just one person for different treatment for arbitrary and
irrational purposes”) (quotation omitted).
     WPC says that, at summary judgment, its theory of the
case requires us to discredit the City’s testimony on these
points. But it provides no evidence disputing the facts beyond
its theory of animus. To properly establish a dispute of mate-
rial fact, WPC must present evidence based on personal
No. 24-1751                                                    15

knowledge setting forth specific facts showing a genuine issue
for trial. Johnson v. Adv. Health & Hosp. Corp., 

(7th Cir. 2018). And while we take reasonable inferences in
WPC’s favor, “we need not draw ‘every conceivable infer-
ence’” it requests. FKFJ, Inc., 11 F.4th at 585 (quotation omit-
ted). Theories do not create genuine factual disputes, and they
do not permit us to make the sort of credibility determinations
that WPC seeks. See id. And again, under our precedent, WPC
is not able to undercut the conceivable rational bases by alleg-
ing animus.
    The myriad rational bases for the City’s conduct are “in-
dependent, sufficient reason[s]” for affirming summary judg-
ment. Hammond Redevelopment, 

. But WPC has
failed to identify a similarly situated comparator who was
treated more favorably, anyway. The casino applicants and
their proposals varied in many important respects. And at
least one significant difference emerges if we focus our gaze,
as WPC insists, on the start of the review process and what
supplementation was allowed: the City needed additional in-
formation from Full House, but not WPC. WPC’s class-of-one
claim fails under either prong.
    The City’s casino review process may have been flawed.
But the absence of perfection in a process does not prove in-
tentional discrimination, nor does a “tapestry” of potentially
culpable facts strung together by a theory. FKFJ, Inc., 11 F.4th
at 591, 593. The bar is intentionally high for class-of-one plain-
tiffs, and WPC does not reach it.
                                                       AFFIRMED
16                                                  No. 24-1751

    SCUDDER, Circuit Judge, concurring. I agree with and join
the majority’s opinion in full. I write separately to expand on
and highlight the importance and difficulty of the question
properly saved for another day—whether an Indian tribe or
its corporate affiliate may bring suit pursuant to 

. That future day and case will come and, in the mean-
time, the judiciary (and ultimately the Supreme Court) would
be well-served by amicus curiae and legal scholars affording
the issue the careful consideration it deserves.
                                I
    As the majority opinion observes, today’s law provides
some, though not complete, guidance on whether an Indian
tribe or its corporate affiliate may bring suit under § 1983. We
know that tribes cannot bring a § 1983 action to vindicate a
sovereign right. That is the holding of Inyo County v. Paiute-
Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Community of the Bishop Colony,

 (2003). But what the Justices have yet to resolve
is whether § 1983 allows a tribe to pursue claims that could be
brought by nonsovereign, private individuals and entities.
    In Inyo County the Supreme Court addressed whether a
tribe and its wholly owned gaming corporation could sue un-
der § 1983 to prevent non-tribal law enforcement officers from
executing state-issued search warrants to seize tribal records.
Section 1983, the Court explained, “was designed to secure
private rights against government encroachment, not to ad-
vance a sovereign’s prerogative to withhold evidence rele-
vant to a criminal investigation.” Id. at 712 (citation omitted).
On this reasoning, it held that an Indian tribe “may not sue
under § 1983 to vindicate” a “sovereign right,” such as the
right to sovereign immunity. Id. But the Court left open the
possibility that § 1983 might authorize suit by a tribe where
No. 24-1751                                                   17

the asserted right is one that nonsovereigns could bring under
similar circumstances. It suggested, for example, that the re-
sult might have been different had the tribe claimed that the
warrant at issue lacked probable cause—a Fourth Amend-
ment violation actionable via § 1983 by an individual tribe
member or other private person. See id. at 711–12.
    While the Court purported to resolve the case on the
grounds that a tribe does not qualify as a “person” within the
meaning of § 1983 when it seeks to vindicate sovereign im-
munity affirmatively as a plaintiff, see id. at 704, Inyo County
might be better understood as holding that sovereign immun-
ity is not a “right” actionable under the statute. Indeed, that
was Justice Stevens’s view. See id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in the judgment). Who can bring a § 1983 action and for
the violation of which rights are two distinct questions.
    In applying Inyo County in later cases, the panel opinion
recognizes that other circuits have focused on the nature of
the right asserted to determine whether an Indian tribe is a
suitable § 1983 plaintiff. See, e.g., Skokomish Indian Tribe v.
United States, 

, 514–16 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(holding that a tribe may not assert treaty-based rights under
§ 1983); Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. Rising, 

, 596
& n.5 (6th Cir. 2009) (suggesting that a tribe can bring a § 1983
claim where the rights at issue can be vindicated by “private,
nonsovereign entities”); Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Okla. Tax
Comm’n, 

, 1234–36, 1235 n.11 (10th Cir. 2010) (ex-
plaining that “the viability of a tribe’s § 1983 suit depended
on whether the tribe’s asserted right was of a sovereign na-
ture” and holding the tribe was not a “person” where its claim
sought “to vindicate [its] status as a sovereign immune from
[the state]’s cigarette state tax enforcement scheme”); Becker v.
18                                                   No. 24-1751

Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Rsrv., 

,
1205–06 (10th Cir. 2017) (upholding dismissal of a § 1983
claim where the right asserted was “at its core, the right of
tribal sovereignty”). In short, these courts all determined that
the claim at issue involved a sovereign right (or remanded for
the district court to conduct that inquiry), so they did not need
to proceed past Inyo County.
    Here, the district court held that Inyo County prevented
Waukegan Potawatomi Casino from bringing a class-of-one
equal protection claim pursuant to § 1983—concluding that it
is a “Gordian knot to untangle [WPC’s] sovereign status and
conspicuously sovereign interests in getting certified for a ca-
sino license from its putative ‘non-sovereign’ interests.”
Waukegan Potawatomi Casino, LLC v. City of Waukegan, No. 20-
cv-00750, 

, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2024). To-
day’s opinion properly and carefully declines to resolve
whether this § 1983 action seeks to vindicate a sovereign right
or a private right. A future case, however, is sure to require
us to answer the question left unresolved by Inyo County.
                                II
    Where an Indian tribe does not assert a sovereign right—
and Inyo County consequently does not bar the claim—its abil-
ity to bring a § 1983 action presents a difficult question. In de-
termining “whether a legislatively conferred cause of action
encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim,” the Supreme
Court has instructed us to apply “traditional principles of
statutory interpretation” and ask whether the plaintiff “fall[s]
within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.”
See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 

, 127–29 (2014) (citation omitted). So we begin, as al-
ways, with the text of the statute. Section 1983 provides:
No. 24-1751                                                    19

       Every person who, under color of any statute,
       ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
       State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
       subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
       the United States or other person within the ju-
       risdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
       rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
       Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
       party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
       or other proper proceeding for redress ….

.
   By its terms, a tribe can only be a § 1983 plaintiff if it is a
“person within the jurisdiction [of the United States].” But
Congress did not define in the statute who qualifies as a “per-
son” or what it means to be “within the jurisdiction” of the
United States. So looking to the statute’s broader context and
purpose, a court must reason from first principles to discern
the meaning of these two provisions.
                                A
   The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is that words
in a statute take their “ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning.” Delaware v. Pennsylvania, 

 (2023)
(quoting Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 

 (2014)).
This analysis is often informed by dictionaries and, where rel-
evant, the Dictionary Act.
    Congress enacted the Dictionary Act just two months be-
fore the Civil Rights Act of 1871—the original version of
§ 1983. The Dictionary Act provided that “the word ‘person’
may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corpo-
rate … unless the context shows that such words were
20                                                    No. 24-1751

intended to be used in a more limited sense.” Act of Feb. 25,
1871, § 2, 

. In Monell v. Department of Social Services
the Court relied on this definition to conclude that municipal-
ities are a suable “person” within the meaning of § 1983. See

, 688–89 (1978). If the public understanding of the
terms “bodies politic and corporate” at the time of § 1983’s
enactment also included Indian tribes, then that may suggest
they are persons entitled to bring suit.
    Since an Indian tribe has sovereign status, the inquiry
might also take direction from how § 1983 otherwise treats
states in the Union. We have determined that states cannot
bring a § 1983 claim. See Illinois v. City of Chicago, 

 (7th Cir. 1998). And one of our fellow circuits has held that
the same is true of state agencies. See Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc.
v. Reinhard, 

, 189–90 (4th Cir. 2005). But states and
tribes are sovereigns of a different type. The “sovereignty that
the Indian tribes retain,” the Supreme Court has emphasized,
“is of a unique and limited character.” United States v. Cooley,

 (2021) (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 

 (1978)). So perhaps the same principles need not
control.
    Whether an Indian tribe can bring a § 1983 action as a
plaintiff might also be informed by a related question:
whether a tribe is subject to liability as a § 1983 defendant. A
tribe is protected by sovereign immunity. This immunity, the
Supreme Court has held, extends to suits arising from a tribe’s
commercial activities and is only abrogated where Congress
does so “unequivocally.” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty.,

 (2014) (citation omitted). In Will v. Michigan
Department of State Police the Court concluded that the text of
§ 1983 did not contain the requisite clear abrogation of
No. 24-1751                                                     21

sovereign immunity—at least when it comes to states. See 

 (1989). And, in Inyo County, the Court assumed that
tribes are similarly not “person[s]” subject to a § 1983 suit. See

 (citing Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc.,

, 754 (1998)).
    Section 1983 uses the word “person” to describe both
those who can sue and those who are subject to liability under
the statute. And courts “generally presume that ‘identical
words used in different parts of the same [statute] are in-
tended to have the same meaning.’” United States v. Cleveland
Indians Baseball Co., 

 (2001) (quoting Atl.
Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 

 (1932)).
Relying on this presumption, the district court here reasoned
that a tribe “cannot both benefit from the immunities of § 1983
as a potential defendant as well as its protections as a poten-
tial claimant.” Waukegan Potawatomi Casino, 

,
at *7.
    But remember that the Inyo County Court declined to rest
its decision on the basis that a tribe is not a “person” subject
to suit under § 1983. See 538 U.S. at 710–11. It explained that
whether a sovereign qualifies as a “‘person’ who may main-
tain a particular claim for relief depends not upon a bare anal-
ysis of the word ‘person,’ but on the legislative environment
in which the word appears.” Inyo County, 

 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). This im-
plies that a proper dimension of the analysis requires as-
sessing what Congress intended in enacting § 1983.
   Congress enacted § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871—the
precursor to § 1983—“for the express purpose of ‘enforc[ing]
the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,’” Mitchum v.
Foster, 

 (1972) (quoting Act of April 20, 1871,
22                                                   No. 24-1751

), “in response to the widespread deprivations of
civil rights in the Southern States and the inability or unwill-
ingness of authorities in those States to protect those rights or
punish wrongdoers,” Felder v. Casey, 

 (1988)
(citing Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 

, 503–05 (1982)). The
Supreme Court has underscored that Congress intended the
enactment “to provide a remedy, to be broadly construed,
against all forms of official violation of federally protected
rights.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 700–01; see also Wyatt v. Cole, 

 (1992) (explaining that the “purpose of § 1983 is
to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to
deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and
to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails”).
    A broad construction of § 1983 might allow a tribe to bring
suit wherever it has been deprived of a right protected by fed-
eral law. But the Court has, in other contexts, restricted the
scope of the remedy available under § 1983—for example, by
holding that states are not suable “persons,” limiting which
violations of law amount to a “right,” and incorporating the
common law doctrine of qualified immunity. See, e.g., Will,
491 U.S. at 64–66 (finding that a state is not a “person” subject
to suit under § 1983); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 

(2002) (explaining that, “if Congress wishes to create new
rights enforceable under § 1983, it must do so in clear and un-
ambiguous terms”); Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion County v.
Talevski, 

, 180 (2023) (reaffirming that “[s]tatutory
provisions must unambiguously confer individual federal
rights” to be actionable under § 1983); Vega v. Tekoh, 

 (2022) (holding that a Miranda violation does not pro-
vide a basis for a § 1983 claim); Pierson v. Ray, 

 (1967) (concluding that the § 1983 legislative record “gives
no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale
No. 24-1751                                                   23

all common-law immunities”); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 

, 741 (2011) (explaining that, to defeat qualified immunity,
“existing precedent must have placed the statutory or consti-
tutional question beyond debate”); Kisela v. Hughes, 

 (2018) (per curiam) (emphasizing that “immunity
protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who know-
ingly violate the law” (citation omitted)).
    Against this backdrop, whether Congress intended the
statute to authorize lawsuits brought by Indian tribes is not
an easy question.
                               B
    Similar interpretive difficulty arises in determining
whether an Indian tribe is a person “within the jurisdiction
of” the United States for purposes of § 1983. We must “orient
ourselves,” again, “to the time of the statute’s adoption.” Bos-
tock v. Clayton County, 

 (2020).
    In April 1870, following the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Senate instructed its Judiciary Committee to
“report to the Senate the effect of the fourteenth amendment
to the Constitution upon the Indian tribes of the country; and
whether by the provisions thereof the Indians are not citizens
of the United States.” S. Rep. No. 41-268, at 1 (1870). The Com-
mittee produced a report concluding that “the Indian tribes
within the limits of the United States, and the individuals,
members of such tribes, while they adhere to and form a part
of the tribes to which they belong, are not, within the meaning
of the fourteenth amendment, ‘subject to the jurisdiction’ of the
United States.” 

 at 10–11. Only four months after the Com-
mittee released this report, Congress—pursuant to its
24                                                    No. 24-1751

authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment—enacted
the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
    Just over a decade later, in 1884, the Supreme Court held
that children of members of an Indian tribe are not “born in
the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof”
within the meaning of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Elk
v. Wilkins, 

, 102–03 (1884). The import of the 1870
Senate Judiciary Committee report did not go unnoticed. In
his dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan quoted from the report
to support his conclusion that the Amendment did grant citi-
zenship to individuals who severed relations with their tribe
and, therefore, had subjected themself to the jurisdiction of
the United States. See 

, 118–19 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
    To be sure, the phrases “within the jurisdiction of the
United States” as used in § 1983 and “subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States” within the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment are not identical. But this history never-
theless provides some reason to doubt that the enacting Con-
gress would have considered tribes to be within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States for purposes of § 1983.
    This inquiry, however, might also be informed by an anal-
ysis of Congress’s power over Indian affairs. See Haaland v.
Brackeen, 

, 272–76 (2023) (describing the sources of
Congress’s power to legislate with respect to Indian tribes).
The Court has characterized this authority as “plenary and
exclusive” and “muscular,” which might suggest the opposite
conclusion. 

 at 272–73 (collecting cases).
                                III
   Whether an Indian tribe can bring a § 1983 action after Inyo
County is a question as difficult as it is important. Tribes, like
No. 24-1751                                                   25

natural persons and corporations, have rights protected by
federal law. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes
of Yakima Indian Nation, 

, 499–502 (1979) (allowing
tribes to bring an equal protection challenge to state jurisdic-
tional classifications); United States v. Sioux Nation, 

 (1980) (requiring the federal government to pay just
compensation for taking of tribal property). And everyone
considering these issues is sure to recall Chief Justice Mar-
shall’s oft-quoted observation that “it is a general and indis-
putable rule[] that where there is a legal right, there is also a
legal remedy … whenever that right is invaded.” Marbury v.
Madison, 

 (1803) (quoting 3 W. Black-
stone, Commentaries *23). But as Chief Justice Marshall also
recognized, tribes occupy a distinct status in the American
system of government. “The condition of the Indians, in rela-
tion to the United States,” he wrote, “is perhaps unlike that of
any other two people in existence.” Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,

 (1831).
    Answering this question thus implicates unique consider-
ations and impacts several fundamental areas of law. Yet it
must await resolution another day in a different case. With
these concurring observations, I join today’s opinion.