In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
No. 23-3338
THOMAS GHELF, et al.,
                                               Plaintiffs-Appellants,
                                v.

TOWN OF WHEATLAND, et al.,
                                              Defendants-Appellees.
                    ____________________

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the
                  Western District of Wisconsin.
         No. 3:22-cv-00530 — William M. Conley, Judge.
                    ____________________

   ARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2024 — DECIDED MARCH 10, 2025
                ____________________

   Before RIPPLE, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.
    RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Thomas Ghelf, Tricia Hansen, Con-
stance and Thomas Klein, Maureen Sommerfeld, and Missis-
sippi Sports and Recreation, Incorporated (“MSR”), brought
this action in the district court, alleging that the Town of
Wheatland (“the Town”), current and former Town officials,
Vernon County (“the County”), the Vernon County Treasurer,
and unknown Town and County agents and employees had
violated their constitutional rights by engaging in a
2                                                    No. 23-3338

harassment campaign. According to the complaint, this cam-
paign included coordinated complaints about the plaintiffs’
businesses by Town officials, unlawful arrests of Mr. Ghelf
and MSR employees by County officers, failures to respond to
the plaintiffs’ requests for emergency services by the Town
and the County, excessive and inaccurate increases of prop-
erty tax assessments by the Town, the County’s foreclosure
action to collect the unpaid taxes and interest, and the Town’s
designation of a private driveway as a public road.
    The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ tax assessment
and road claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ab-
stained from exercising jurisdiction over the foreclosure
claims, and dismissed the remaining claims for failure to state
a claim. We now reverse the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ road
claims. We affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ other claims
but our reasoning differs in many instances from that of the
district court.
                                I
                       BACKGROUND
    Because this is an appeal of the district court’s dismissal of
the plaintiffs’ complaint, we assume that the well-pleaded
factual allegations in the complaint are true. Taylor v. Salvation
Army Nat’l Corp., 

, 1022 (7th Cir. 2024). “Those
allegations form the basis of this rendition of the facts.” 

No. 23-3338                                                             3

    A. Facts
                  1. The Parties and Properties
    Plaintiffs Mr. Ghelf, Ms. Hansen, the Kleins, Ms. Sommer-
feld, 1 and MSR own abutting properties in the Town of
Wheatland, Vernon County, Wisconsin. The individuals are
all family members. 2 The MSR property contains Mr. Ghelf’s
and Ms. Hansen’s home, an adult entertainment venue, a boat
landing, and a campground. Prior to her death, Ms. Sommer-
feld lived on abutting property owned by Mr. Ghelf and
Ms. Hansen, and the Kleins own and live on another abutting
property. The MSR property can only be accessed by a private
driveway that runs through the property owned by Mr. Ghelf
and Ms. Hansen.
   The defendants are the Town of Wheatland, Town Chair-
man Jayne Ballwahn, former Town Chairman Robert Streeter
(now deceased), former Town Supervisor Don Williams, un-
known Town agents and employees, Vernon County, County
Treasurer Karen DeLap, and unknown County agents and
employees.
                         2. The Allegations
    In their complaint, the plaintiffs narrate what they charac-
terize as a decades-long harassment campaign that began
while Mr. Ghelf was serving as a Town Supervisor along with


1 Ms. Sommerfeld died after the filing of this action. Mr. Ghelf and

Ms. Hansen were substituted as the personal representatives of her estate.
2Mr. Ghelf and Ms. Hansen are married, and Ms. Sommerfeld is
Mr. Ghelf’s sister. Ms. Klein is Mr. Ghelf’s daughter and is married to
Mr. Klein. At the time of the filing of the complaint, Mr. Ghelf and
Ms. Sommerfeld owned MSR.
4                                                 No. 23-3338

Mr. Streeter from April 2007 to April 2009. This campaign in-
cluded: coordinated complaints about the plaintiffs’ busi-
nesses leading to a shutdown of electrical services on their
property and the unlawful arrests of Mr. Ghelf and MSR em-
ployees; the failure to provide emergency services to
Mr. Ghelf, Ms. Sommerfeld, and their brother-in-law; exces-
sive and inaccurate tax assessments and a foreclosure action
to collect unpaid taxes and interest; and the designation of a
private driveway as a public road.
    i. Campground Contract, Complaints, and Arrests
    The complaint alleges that while Mr. Ghelf was a Town
Supervisor, Mr. Streeter and Mr. Williams attempted to pre-
vent him from contracting with the County to run a
campground, marina, and concession stand at a county park
and campground. Mr. Ghelf was nonetheless awarded the
contract in 2008. In April 2009, Mr. Streeter and Mr. Williams
were elected Town Chairman and Town Supervisor, respec-
tively, defeating Mr. Ghelf and his brother.
    In the meantime, Mr. Ghelf and Ms. Sommerfeld had
made plans to open a bar, restaurant, and banquet hall on the
MSR property in the summer of 2009. Mr. Streeter, Mr. Wil-
liams, and a group they formed, De Soto Area Business Part-
ners, coordinated making daily complaints to the Wisconsin
Department of Commerce alleging problems with the soon-
to-open operation. Consequently, a Wisconsin Department of
Commerce inspector ordered the shut off of electrical services
to the property just before the business’s scheduled opening.
The bar, restaurant, banquet hall, and campground, as well as
the home of Ms. Sommerfeld and the home of Mr. Ghelf and
Ms. Hansen, all lost power in the resulting outage. About one
week later, the Wisconsin Department of Commerce’s lead
No. 23-3338                                                   5

inspector visited the property and, finding no ground for
shutting off electrical services, ordered their restoration.
    According to the complaint, in August 2009, MSR decided
to convert the bar, restaurant, and banquet facility to Gun-
ner’s Bar and Girls (“Gunner’s”), an adult entertainment
venue. Mr. Streeter, Mr. Williams, and the De Soto Area Busi-
ness Association filed baseless complaints with the Wisconsin
Department of Justice and the County Sheriff’s Department,
alleging the presence of illegal drugs and prostitution at the
venue. The Wisconsin Department of Justice found no evi-
dence of illegal activity. Nevertheless, in December 2009, the
County Sheriff’s Department raided Gunner’s and arrested
Mr. Ghelf and nine MSR performers for violating the
County’s obscenity ordinance. According to the plaintiffs,
that ordinance is void because in State ex rel. Teunas v. County
of Kenosha, 

 (Wis. 1988), the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin held that Wisconsin counties cannot enact such or-
dinances.
    Mr. Ghelf and MSR sued the County in 2015. The parties
reached a settlement agreement on September 6, 2017, dis-
missing the suit with prejudice and releasing the County and
all past, present, and future County officials, employees, and
agents from all claims that Mr. Ghelf and MSR had or may
have had against them prior to that date.
         ii. Failures to Render Emergency Services
    In February 2012, Chuck Sanborn, Mr. Ghelf’s and
Ms. Sommerfeld’s brother-in-law, suffered a heart attack on
the plaintiffs’ property. Sanborn’s daughter called emergency
services, but the Town did not respond to the call and the
County’s emergency responders “took more than 45 minutes
6                                                 No. 23-3338

to an hour before responding.” 3 Sanborn died before emer-
gency services arrived. Many people later told Sanborn’s fam-
ily members that the Town failed to respond because the
emergency responders believed Mr. Ghelf was the one in dan-
ger.
     In January 2016, Ms. Sommerfeld called the County Sher-
iff’s Department to request assistance in dealing with unruly
patrons at Gunner’s. The Sheriff’s Department responded
sixty to ninety minutes later. By that time, Mr. Ghelf and
Ms. Sommerfeld had been beaten up, and Ms. Sommerfeld
had suffered major injuries. The Sheriff’s Department made
no arrests and informed Mr. Ghelf that if future requests were
made for assistance at Gunner’s, “then the Sheriff’s Depart-
ment would ticket [Mr.] Ghelf for disorderly conduct if the
Sheriff’s Department was going to ticket someone else.” 4 In
contrast to the plaintiffs’ experience, the appropriate emer-
gency services respond promptly to calls from “other simi-
larly situated residents and businesses.” 5
iii. Property Tax Assessments and Foreclosure Proceedings
    In 2009, the Town drastically increased the property tax
assessments on MSR’s property: from 2008 to 2009, gross
taxes increased from $205.78 to $33,067.17 on the boat landing
parcel and from $6,434.38 to $12,647.83 on the Gunner’s par-
cel. Mr. Ghelf challenged the assessments at the Town’s 2009
Open Book Meeting, and Town Assessor Charlotte Johnson



3 R.1 ¶ 60.

4 Id. ¶ 66.

5 Id. ¶ 68.
No. 23-3338                                                         7

told Mr. Ghelf that his objections would have to be reviewed. 6
Mr. Ghelf again objected to the assessments at the 2009 Board
of Review Meeting, held immediately after the 2009 Open
Book Meeting, but the Board did not take any action at the
meeting and did not meet again to address Mr. Ghelf’s con-
cerns.
    MSR did not receive notice of an open book or Board of
Review meeting in 2010, and from 2010 to 2013, MSR did not
receive any notices about its tax assessments. Ms. Sommerfeld
attended the 2012 Open Book Meeting on MSR’s behalf.
There, Johnson informed Ms. Sommerfeld that she would be
willing to reduce MSR’s 2011 assessment and to recommend
to the Board of Review that it reduce MSR’s 2009–2010 assess-
ments, and that her earlier assessments were based on unreli-
able maps. Because only one member of the Town Board was
present at the 2012 Open Book Meeting, however, a Board of
Review meeting did not convene.
    In 2014, Johnson’s tax assessor license was revoked and
the Wisconsin Department of Revenue ordered the Town to
correct Johnson’s mistakes. At the 2014 Open Book Meeting,
the new tax assessor told Ms. Sommerfeld that he would ad-
just MSR’s assessments “in the Fall.” 7 Again, the Board of Re-
view did not hold a hearing because too few Town Board
members were present. As of the time of the filing of the com-
plaint, the County had not altered MSR’s tax assessments.



6 At open book meetings, property owners may discuss property assess-

ments with the assessor and the assessor may make necessary changes to
the assessment. 

.
7 R.1 ¶ 91.
8                                                   No. 23-3338

    In 2015, MSR filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in
Vernon County Circuit Court. It sought to require the Town
to reconvene the Board of Review to hear MSR’s challenges to
the 2009–2013 tax assessments. The Town moved for sum-
mary judgment, arguing that MSR failed to comply with the
statutory prerequisites to challenge its assessments. The cir-
cuit court granted this motion. The Court of Appeals of Wis-
consin affirmed that decision in 2016, holding that MSR had
failed to satisfy the necessary statutory prerequisites. MSR
did not present, the court held, any evidence in the circuit
court “that it filed a correct and timely written objection with
the clerk of the board of review, or obtained a waiver of that
requirement, at any board of review meeting between 2009
and 2013.” 8
    In 2022, the County filed a tax lien foreclosure action to
recover MSR’s unpaid taxes and interest. The Vernon County
Circuit Court stayed those proceedings pending resolution of
this federal suit.
                    iv. Road Declaration
    In July 2020, the Town passed a resolution “validat[ing]”
Pennel Lane as a public road. 9 The plaintiffs claim that this
road is a private driveway with a commercial permit rather
than a public road. The Wisconsin Department of Transporta-
tion issued driveway permits to the Ghelfs in the 1960s that
indicate that it is a private road. Some maps refer to the drive-
way as “Ghelf Road” and others designate the southern



8 R.11-2 ¶ 12.

9 R.16-1 ¶ 7.
No. 23-3338                                                     9

portion of the driveway as “Pennel Lane.” 10 Throughout their
ownership, the Ghelfs have maintained the entire driveway.
A Town-owned vehicle entered the road on only one occa-
sion: in December 2021, a snowplow entered the driveway
even though the driveway already had been plowed. The
plow traveled at an excessive speed and struck Mr. Klein.
    In August 2020, Mr. Ghelf and MSR filed a petition for cer-
tiorari review in Vernon County Circuit Court seeking an or-
der invalidating the Town’s resolution. In January 2021, the
state court dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust admin-
istrative remedies. That decision was not appealed.
           3. The Claims Set Forth in the Complaint
    The plaintiffs filed this action in the district court on Sep-
tember 15, 2022. In claims brought under 

,
their complaint set forth a number of constitutional viola-
tions. First, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ tax as-
sessments and foreclosure action constitute a constructive
taking of their property in violation of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. Second, they claimed that by asserting
that the driveway is a public road, the defendants violated the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Third, they claimed that
the defendants retaliated against the plaintiffs’ operation of
an adult entertainment venue and therefore violated the First
Amendment. In support of this claim, the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants organized a harassment and intimidation
campaign by overburdening Gunner’s with regulatory ac-
tions, failing to respond to requests for emergency services,
excessively raising property taxes, seeking to foreclose on the
MSR property, and claiming the driveway is a public road.

10 R.1 ¶ 100.
10                                                   No. 23-3338

Fourth, they claimed the defendants violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause by conducting a har-
assment campaign against them and, in particular, by failing
to provide emergency services. Fifth, the plaintiffs claimed
that the defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause by harassing the plaintiffs, particularly by
constructively taking two MSR property parcels and by fail-
ing to render emergency services.
    The plaintiffs requested: (1) a declaration under 

 that the disputed road is a private driveway and, relat-
edly, a declaratory judgment that there is no public road on
their property; (2) a declaration under 

 of the
correct amount of property taxes and interest and, relatedly,
a declaratory judgment that the assessed taxes and interest
are invalid; (3) an injunction requiring that the Town not rep-
resent that the disputed road is public and that it “take rea-
sonable steps to correct any and all Town generated maps;”11
(4) an injunction requiring the Town and the County to cease
their “efforts to foreclose on [p]laintiffs’ property and to enter
into a reasonable plan with the [p]laintiffs for the correction
of the amount of property taxes owed (if any) and the pay-
ment thereof;” 12 (5) compensatory and punitive damages; and
(6) the plaintiffs’ “costs, interest[,] and reasonable attorneys’
fees.” 13
   Going forward, we will refer to the plaintiffs’ claims based
on the property tax assessments as the “tax assessment


11 R.1 at 36.

12 

13 

No. 23-3338                                                  11

claims,” the claims based on the ongoing foreclosure action as
the “foreclosure claims,” and the claims based on the dis-
puted road as the “road claims.”
   B. Disposition in the District Court
   The defendants filed motions to dismiss under sections
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The district court granted these motions.
     The district court first dismissed some of the claims for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and on abstention grounds.
In its view, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived it of subject
matter jurisdiction over the tax assessment and road claims
and perhaps over the foreclosure claims. It also held that the
Tax Injunction Act barred it from ruling on the tax assessment
and foreclosure claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. It
further held that comity required it to abstain from consider-
ing the plaintiffs’ “related state tax claims” for compensatory
and punitive damages. Ghelf v. Town of Wheatland, No. 22-cv-
530, 

, at *8 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 8, 2023) (citing
Fair Assessment in Real Est. Ass’n v. McNary, 

(1981)). Further, the district court concluded that it was re-
quired to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the plain-
tiffs’ tax assessment, road, and foreclosure claims under the
Younger abstention doctrine.
    The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ remaining
claims under Rule 12(b)(6). It held that all claims Mr. Ghelf
and MSR may have had against the County, County Treas-
urer DeLap, and unknown County agents and employees for
conduct occurring on or before September 6, 2017, were
barred by the settlement agreement, and any remaining
12                                                        No. 23-3338

claims were time-barred by the applicable statute of limita-
tions. 14
                                   II
                           DISCUSSION
     A. The Tax Assessment and Foreclosure Claims
    The defendants maintain that the Tax Injunction Act
(“TIA”) deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the tax assessment and foreclosure claims. The
plaintiffs disagree and contend that, “at a minimum,” the TIA
does not foreclose their First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ment claims for compensatory and punitive damages. 15
   The defendants are correct. The TIA and comity principles
deprived the district court of jurisdiction over the tax assess-
ment and foreclosure claims. The TIA provides:
        The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or
        restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any
        tax under State law where a plain, speedy and
        efficient remedy may be had in the courts of
        such State.

. The statute’s coverage is broad; it deprives
district courts of jurisdiction over suits seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief from all state taxes, including municipal


14 See supra regarding the details of the settlement agreement. We do not

reach the parties’ arguments with respect to the impact of the settlement
agreement because, as described later in this opinion, we find all claims
potentially barred by the settlement agreement to be barred by the appli-
cable statute of limitations.
15 Appellants’ Br. 27.
No. 23-3338                                                                  13

and local taxes. 16 The tax assessment and foreclosure claims
for injunctive and declaratory relief are therefore barred by
the TIA as long as a “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” is
available. Id.
   The district court correctly concluded that the plaintiffs
had such a remedy. It noted that “Wisconsin Stat. Chs. 70 and
74 provide a comprehensive scheme for challenging property
tax assessments, which the state court determined that MSR
did not follow.”17 Moreover, continued the district court,
“federal courts have repeatedly held that Wisconsin’s pro-
cesses for challenging tax determinations and foreclosures
meet the requirement for a plain, speedy, and efficient state
court remedy.”18 In sum, the district court correctly held that
MSR’s plain, speedy, and efficient remedy was its oppor-
tunity to challenge the tax assessments in the state writ of
mandamus proceedings and that MSR simply did not take ad-
vantage of this opportunity.
    The district court’s decision in this respect is supported by
well-established principles. For a remedy to be plain, speedy,
and efficient, it must “meet[ ] certain minimal procedural crite-
ria” and “provide[ ] the taxpayer with a ‘full hearing and


16 See Scott Air Force Base Props., LLC v. Cnty. of St. Clair, 

(7th Cir. 2008) (first citing California v. Grace Brethren Church, 

 (1982); then citing RTC Com. Assets Tr. 1995–NP3–1 v. Phx. Bond & In-
dem. Co., 

 (7th Cir. 1999); and then citing Hager v. City of
W. Peoria, 

, 868 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996)).
17 Ghelf v. Town of Wheatland, No. 22-cv-530, 

, at *8 (W.D.

Wis. Nov. 8, 2023) (citing Hermann v. Town of Delavan, 

,
858–59 (Wis. 1998)).
18 

14                                                    No. 23-3338

judicial determination’ at which she may raise any and all
constitutional objections to the tax.” Scott Air Force Base Props.,
LLC v. Cnty. of St. Clair, 

 (7th Cir. 2008) (alter-
ations in original) (quoting Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 

 (1981)). Indeed, we previously have held
that Wisconsin “provides a ‘plain, speedy and efficient’ rem-
edy for taxpayers seeking to challenge Wisconsin taxes.”
Darne v. Wisconsin, 

, 489–90 (7th Cir. 1998).
    As set forth by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Her-
mann v. Town of Delavan, 

 (Wis. 1998), Wiscon-
sin law requires that a taxpayer “objecting to either the valu-
ation or the amount of property assessed by the taxing district
… file such objection with the clerk of the board of review
prior to adjournment of public hearings by the board.” 

 at
858 (citing 

(7)(a)). An individual who files an
objection may then “appeal the determination of the board by
an action for certiorari,” “file a written complaint with the de-
partment of revenue requesting that the department revalue
the property and adjust the assessment thereof,” or “file a
claim against the taxation district for an excessive assessment
to recover any amount of property tax imposed as a result of
the excessive assessment.” 

 (citing 

(13),
70.85, 74.37(2)(a)).
     In the state writ of mandamus suit, the Town presented
evidence showing MSR did not “file[] a written objection to
its tax assessments before or during the Town board of review
meetings for 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, or 2013 or obtain[] waiver
of the written objection requirement at those meetings.”19
MSR presented no evidence to the contrary. The Court of

19 R.11-2 ¶ 12.
No. 23-3338                                                              15

Appeals of Wisconsin therefore found the “record estab-
lishe[d] as undisputed” that MSR failed to object or receive a
waiver as required by section 70.47(7)(a) of the Wisconsin
Statutes and affirmed the circuit court’s order dismissing
MSR’s petition for a writ of mandamus. 20
    MSR had a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy in the Wis-
consin courts: the state writ of mandamus case provided MSR
“a ‘full hearing and judicial determination’” where it could
have raised its constitutional objections. 21 Because Wisconsin
provided MSR with such a remedy, the district court had no
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ tax assessment and foreclosure
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.
    The district court also refused to hear the merits of the
plaintiffs’ “related state tax claims” for compensatory and pu-
nitive damages. 22 It stated that “federal district courts are gen-
erally directed to abstain from considering claims for dam-
ages over related state tax claims” and that “comity requires
taxpayers seeking damages to pursue relief in state courts, as-
suming that state-court remedies are ‘plain, adequate, and
complete,’ as they are here.” 23 We agree. “Principles of comity


20 

21 Scott Air Force Base Props., 

 (quoting Rosewell v. LaSalle

Nat’l Bank, 

 (1981)); R.11-2 (showing Wisconsin state
courts considered and decided MSR’s petition); e.g., Cath. Charities Bureau,
Inc. v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n, 

, 671–72, 684–92 (Wis. 2024)
(showing Wisconsin state courts can decide taxpayers’ federal constitu-
tional claims).
22 Ghelf, 

, at *8.

23 

 (quoting Fair Assessment in Real Est. Ass’n v. McNary, 

 (1981)).
16                                                           No. 23-3338

bar a taxpayer from contesting the validity of a state tax in a
section 1983 damage action if there is a ‘plain, adequate, and
complete’ state remedy available.” Werch v. City of Berlin, 

 (7th Cir. 1982) (quoting Fair Assessment in Real
Est. Ass’n, 

). This principle is rooted in “[t]he
scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state gov-
ernments which should at all times actuate the federal
courts.” Fair Assessment in Real Est. Ass’n, 454 U.S. at 115–16
(alteration in original) (quoting Matthews v. Rodgers, 

 (1932)). “[T]he ‘plain, adequate, and complete’ re-
quirement in the comity analysis is identical to the ‘plain,
speedy and efficient’ requirement under the Tax Injunction
Act.” A.F. Moore & Assocs., Inc. v. Pappas, 

, 896 (7th
Cir. 2020) (quoting Fair Assessment in Real Est. Ass’n, 

 n.8). Because the plaintiffs’ “plain, speedy and effi-
cient” remedy was thus also “plain, adequate, and complete,”
the district court lacked jurisdiction over the tax assessment
and foreclosure claims. 

    In sum, the district court correctly determined that the TIA
and comity principles prevented it from reaching the merits
of the plaintiffs’ tax assessment and foreclosure claims for de-
claratory, injunctive, compensatory, and punitive relief. It
correctly dismissed these claims. 24


24 We therefore need not reach the plaintiffs’ contentions that the district

court erred in holding that the Rooker-Feldman and Younger abstention doc-
trines also bar these tax-related claims. We also note before proceeding
that we are not persuaded by the defendants’ argument that this case
should be stayed under the Colorado River abstention doctrine in light of
the state foreclosure proceedings. The Colorado River doctrine is inapplica-
ble when the federal and state court actions are not parallel. Freed v. J.P.
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 

 (7th Cir. 2014). The ongoing
( … continued)
No. 23-3338                                                                  17

    B. Statute of Limitations
    We now turn to the defendants’ contention that all the
plaintiffs’ claims that arose before September 15, 2016 are
barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiffs’ allegations
focus heavily on conduct that occurred before September 15,
2016, including the alleged failures to provide emergency ser-
vices and the overburdening of Gunner’s with regulatory ac-
tions. The plaintiffs submit that their claims are not barred by
the statute of limitations and invoke the continuing-violation
doctrine.
    The district court held that Wisconsin’s statute of limita-
tions barred the “plaintiffs’ remaining claims related to vari-
ous alleged actions by defendants before 2009 and their al-
leged failure to provide emergency services in 2012 and Janu-
ary 2016.” Ghelf, 

, at *10. It highlighted the
time constraints imposed by the statute of limitations: six
years “[f]or alleged constitutional injuries that occurred be-
fore April 5, 2018” and, given an amendment in Wisconsin
law, three years “for injuries that occurred after April 5, 2018.”


state suit is an in rem action for foreclosure of tax liens, and the only par-
ties to the state action are MSR and the County. The state action is thus
missing a key defendant to this federal suit, the Town, against which in-
dividual allegations are made, such as the allegedly improper assertion
that the disputed road is public. Cf. Clark v. Lacy, 

 (7th Cir.
2004). And only in this federal suit do the plaintiffs request “[a] declara-
tory judgment that there is no public road on the [p]laintiffs’ property”
and “[a]n injunction against the Town of Wheatland instructing it not to
represent to anybody that there is a public road on the [p]laintiffs’ prop-
erty, and to take reasonable steps to correct any and all Town generated
maps.” R.1 at 35–36; cf. GeLab Cosms. LLC v. Zhuhai Aobo Cosms. Co., 

 (7th Cir. 2024). Because the state and federal cases are not
parallel, the Colorado River abstention doctrine is inapplicable.
18                                                   No. 23-3338

 The court then found that because the “[p]laintiffs filed
their federal court complaint on September 15, 2022, … any
claim based on events occurring before September 15, 2016 or
between April 5, 2018 and September 15, 2019 is time-barred.”

 The district court held that the plaintiffs’ remaining claims
related to events that occurred before September 15, 2016, and
therefore were untimely. See 

 It declined to use the contin-
uing-violation doctrine because there were no acts over which
it had jurisdiction that could have potentially brought “the
earlier actions within the applicable statutes of limitations.”

    “Claims under § 1983 borrow the statute of limitations for
personal injury actions in the state in which the cause of action
arose.” Cielak v. Nicolet Union High Sch. Dist., 

 (7th Cir. 2024) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 

(2007)). Prior to April 5, 2018, section 893.53 of the Wisconsin
Statutes “provided for a six-year statute of limitations, but
since then the limit has been three years.” 

 (citing 

 (2016), amended by 2017 Wis. Act 235 (eff. Apr. 5,
2018)). Under federal law, which governs the accrual of § 1983
claims, “a plaintiff’s claim accrues when he ‘has a complete
and present cause of action, that is, when the plaintiff can file
suit and obtain relief’ because, at that point, the plaintiff
knows or should know that his constitutional rights were vi-
olated.” Id. (quoting Towne v. Donnelly, 

, 670–71
(7th Cir. 2022)); see also Heard v. Sheahan, 

, 317–18
(7th Cir. 2001).
    We agree with the defendants that the plaintiffs’ claims
that arose before September 15, 2016, are time-barred. Regard-
ing the improper provision of emergency services in particu-
lar, the plaintiffs had a complete and present cause of action
No. 23-3338                                                     19

in February 2012 for the failure to render services to Sanborn,
and in January 2016 for the County Sheriff’s Department’s re-
sponse to Ms. Sommerfeld’s request for aid at Gunner’s. And
concerning the overburdening of Gunner’s with regulatory
actions, the plaintiffs had a complete and present cause of ac-
tion in 2009, when Mr. Streeter, Mr. Williams, and the De Soto
Business Association made the complaints and when the
County Sheriff’s Department made the arrests. The plaintiffs’
claims regarding the events prior to September 15, 2016, thus
accrued over six years before the plaintiffs filed their com-
plaint in federal court on September 15, 2022. See Cielak, 

. Under the Wisconsin statute of limitations, those
claims are untimely. See 

    To save their claims from being time-barred, the plaintiffs
invoke the continuing-violation doctrine. This doctrine is “a
special accrual rule under which a claim accrues not just once
but repeatedly as a defendant continually wrongs a plaintiff.”
Milchtein v. Milwaukee Cnty., 

, 823 (7th Cir. 2022).
The plaintiffs submit that the continuing-violation doctrine
applies because the defendants have committed a series of
harassing acts against them—in their words, “a pattern of
continuing harassment.” 25 However, when a defendant com-
mits numerous transgressions, but each act is “wrongful in-
dependent of other events,” each act is considered discrete
and has its own period of limitations. Moore v. Burge, 

 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Mor-
gan, 

, 110–15 (2002)). Here, the plaintiffs allege
acts that were each independently wrongful, such as the fail-
ures to render emergency services, the filings of baseless


25 Appellants’ Br. 39.
20                                                             No. 23-3338

complaints, and the execution of unlawful arrests. The plain-
tiffs therefore were required to bring their claims arising from
these discrete acts within the limitations period applicable to
each act. Having failed to do so, their claims arising from acts
committed before September 15, 2016, were untimely and
were properly dismissed by the district court.
     C. Road Claims
    The only claims remaining are the road claims. We now
examine whether those claims are precluded by the state
court’s dismissal of Mr. Ghelf’s and MSR’s petition for certio-
rari review. 26 We first decide whether the doctrine of claim


26 Contrary to the defendants’ contention and the district court’s holding,

our jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ road claims is not barred under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply un-
less, among the satisfaction of other conditions, the state-court judgment
at issue “caused the alleged injury underlying the federal claim.” Gilbank
v. Wood Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 

 (7th Cir. 2024) (en
banc). The plaintiffs’ road claims are based on the Town’s July 2020 decla-
ration that the disputed road is public. This alleged injury was complete
before the state court dismissed Mr. Ghelf’s and MSR’s petition for certio-
rari review in January 2021. Because the plaintiffs’ road claims are inde-
pendent of the state-court judgment, Rooker-Feldman does not bar our ju-
risdiction. See 

 at 766–67.
     Nor was the district court required to abstain from deciding the plain-
tiffs’ road claims under the Younger abstention doctrine. Federal absten-
tion is only appropriate under Younger v. Harris, 

 (1971), and its
progeny when, among the satisfaction of other conditions, there are ongo-
ing “judicial or judicial in nature state proceedings.” Tr. & Inv. Advisers,
Inc. v. Hogsett, 

, 295 (7th Cir. 1994) (first citing Middlesex Cnty.
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 

 (1982); and then
citing American Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps. v. Tristano, 

, 1305 (7th Cir. 1990)). Because there are no ongoing state judicial
( … continued)
No. 23-3338                                                        21

preclusion bars these claims. We then examine whether the
doctrine of issue preclusion bars these claims.
                       1. Claim Preclusion
    To determine whether the doctrine of claim preclusion
bars the plaintiffs’ road claims, we apply Wisconsin law. See
Adams Outdoor Advert. Ltd. P’ship v. City of Madison, 

, 1117 (7th Cir. 2023). “Claim preclusion bars all subse-
quent actions between the same parties as to all matters that
were litigated or that might have been litigated in the former
proceeding.” 

 (citing Teske v. Wilson Mut. Ins. Co., 

 (Wis. 2019)). Ordinarily, three elements must
be satisfied for claim preclusion to apply: “(1) an identity of
the parties or their privies in the prior and present lawsuits;
(2) a final judgment on the merits in the prior action; and
(3) an identity of the causes of action in the two suits.” 

 (cit-
ing Teske, 

).
    In Hanlon v. Town of Milton, 

 (Wis. 2000),
however, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that plaintiffs
are not required to join “a § 1983 claim with a certiorari pro-
ceeding brought pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 68.” Id. at 49–50.
The court highlighted numerous differences between section
1983 claims and chapter 68 certiorari proceedings and con-
cluded that joining these claims would not accomplish “the
principles underlying the doctrine of claim preclusion.” Id. at
49.
   Given the Supreme Court of Wisconsin’s decision in
Hanlon, the plaintiffs were not required to join their section


proceedings regarding the road claims, the Younger abstention doctrine
does not apply.
22                                                          No. 23-3338

1983 road claims, alleging First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ment violations, to Mr. Ghelf’s and MSR’s petition for certio-
rari review filed pursuant to section 68.13 of the Wisconsin
Statutes.27 See id.; see also Wilhelm v. Cnty. of Milwaukee, 

, 845–46 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hanlon, 612 N.W.2d
at 48–49) (holding that the plaintiff was not required to bring
his section 1983 claim in connection with his petition for cer-
tiorari). The plaintiffs’ road claims therefore are not barred by
claim preclusion.
                         2. Issue Preclusion
     We now turn to issue preclusion. We must give a Wiscon-
sin state court judgment the same preclusive effect it would
have in Wisconsin state court. See First Weber Grp., Inc. v. Hors-
fall, 

 (7th Cir. 2013) (first citing Allen v.
McCurry, 

 (1980); and then citing 

). Issue preclusion under Wisconsin law is “designed to
limit the relitigation of issues that have been contested in a
previous action between the same or different parties.” 

 at
772–73 (quoting Michelle T. by Sumpter v. Crozier, 

 (Wis. 1993)). “Wisconsin courts apply the following
general rule: ‘When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated
and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the deter-
mination is essential to the judgment, the determination is
conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties,
whether on the same or a different claim.’” 

 at 773 (quoting


27 Mr. Ghelf and MSR also cited section 82.15 of the Wisconsin Statutes as

authority for their petition for certiorari review. Section 82.15 provides
that “[a]ny person aggrieved by a highway order, or a refusal to issue such
an order, may seek judicial review under” section 68.13 of the Wisconsin
Statutes. 

.
No. 23-3338                                                     23

Hlavinka v. Blunt, Ellis & Loewi, Inc., 

 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1993)).
    Wisconsin courts analyze issue preclusion questions in
two steps. The court first determines “whether issue preclu-
sion can, as a matter of law, be applied.” Dostal v. Strand, 

 (Wis. 2023). This inquiry requires the court
to decide “whether the issue or fact was actually litigated and
determined in the prior proceeding by a valid judgment in a
previous action and whether the determination was essential
to the judgment.” 

 “An issue is actually litigated when it is
properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submit-
ted for determination, and is determined.” 

 (internal quota-
tions omitted) (quoting In re Est. of Felt v. Felt, 

,
376–77 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002)). If the court concludes that issue
preclusion may be applied, the court next decides “whether
the application of issue preclusion would be fundamentally
fair.” 

    Here, issue preclusion fails at the first step. Mr. Ghelf’s
and MSR’s petition for certiorari review contended that the
Town “failed to act according to Ch. 82, Wis Stats., as to the
procedure and process necessary to lay out a new town road”
and requested an order invalidating the Town’s 2020 resolu-
tion that “validate[d]” Pennel Lane as a public road. 28 The
Vernon County Circuit Court dismissed Mr. Ghelf’s and
MSR’s petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
By contrast, the plaintiffs claim in this suit that the defendants
violated the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments by as-
serting that the driveway is a public road.



28 R.16-1 ¶¶ 7, 16.
24                                                  No. 23-3338

    The merits of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims were not
raised before the state court and were not “determined in the
prior proceeding by a valid judgment in a previous action.”

 Because the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims were not actu-
ally litigated and no determination of these issues was essen-
tial to the state court’s judgment, the road claims are not sub-
ject to issue preclusion. See 

   Because federal subject matter jurisdiction is proper over
the road claims and those claims are not barred by preclusion
doctrines, we conclude that the district court improperly dis-
missed these claims. The district court’s judgment as to the
road taking claim and First Amendment retaliation claim, to
the extent the First Amendment claim arises from the defend-
ants’ assertion that the private driveway is a public road, is
thus reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
    And, because the road claims, although levied against all
the defendants, arise from only the Town’s and Town Chair-
man Ballwahn’s alleged actions, Mr. Streeter, Mr. Williams,
the County, County Treasurer DeLap, and the unknown
County agents and employees should be dismissed from this
suit. See Bank of America, N.A. v. Knight, 

 (7th
Cir. 2013) (“Each defendant is entitled to know what he or she
did that is asserted to be wrongful. A complaint based on a
theory of collective responsibility must be dismissed.”).
     D. Town Chairman Ballwahn’s Personal Involvement
   The defendants submit that Town Chairman Ballwahn
should be dismissed from this suit because “Plaintiffs have
not plead any facts that plausibly suggest that Jayne Ballwahn
No. 23-3338                                                          25

was personally involved in a constitutional violation.”29 The
plaintiffs argue that they have plausibly alleged that Town
Chairman Ballwahn was liable for the claimed constitutional
violations. They allege that Town Chairman Ballwahn was
the Town’s final decisionmaker regarding the road resolution
and point to the space for her signature on the Town’s 2020
road resolution.
    “To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must estab-
lish that a defendant was personally responsible for the dep-
rivation of a constitutional right.” Gentry v. Duckworth, 

 (7th Cir. 1995). There must be “some causal connec-
tion or affirmative link between the action complained about
and the official sued.” 

    The plaintiffs’ allegations against Town Chairman Ball-
wahn satisfy this requirement at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
The plaintiffs submit that Ms. Ballwahn is the Town Chair-
man and that she, as one of the defendants, engaged in the
allegedly unconstitutional conduct that harmed the plaintiffs.
Further, as the plaintiffs point out, the road resolution pro-
vided a space for Ms. Ballwahn to sign for the Town as Town
Chairman, indicating that she acted on the Town’s behalf in
declaring the disputed road to be public. Town Chairman
Ballwahn’s position, in conjunction with the evidence show-
ing that her signature was required to adopt the road resolu-
tion, sufficiently establishes an affirmative link between
Town Chairman Ballwahn and the actions the plaintiffs allege
in their complaint. See 

 The plaintiffs thus have adequately


29 Appellees’ Br. 46. The district court did not address the allegations

against Town Chairman Ballwahn in its order dismissing the plaintiffs’
claims.
26                                                No. 23-3338

pleaded that Town Chairman Ballwahn “was personally re-
sponsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.” 

Town Chairman Ballwahn should not be dismissed from this
suit at this point.
                         Conclusion
   For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The parties shall bear their own costs in this appeal.
     AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED and REMANDED in part