In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024
LSP TRANSMISSION HOLDINGS II, LLC, et al.,
                                          Plaintiffs-Appellees,
                                 v.

JAMES F. HUSTON, Chairman,
Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission, et al.,
                                     Defendants-Appellants,

                                and

NORTHERN INDIANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, et al.,
                        Intervening Defendants-Appellants.
                    ____________________

        Appeals from the United States District Court for the
        Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
         No. 24-cv-1722 — Tanya Walton Pratt, Chief Judge.
                    ____________________

   ARGUED JANUARY 27, 2025 — DECIDED MARCH 13, 2025
               ____________________

   Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI,
Circuit Judges.
   HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff LSP Transmission Hold-
ings II, LLC, and several of its affiliates seek to build and
2                             Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

operate interstate electricity transmission lines in Indiana. An
Indiana statute gives incumbent electric companies rights of
first refusal to build and operate new interstate transmission
facilities that connect to facilities they own. 

-
38-9(a)(1) (2024). Plaintiffs contend in this appeal that the In-
diana statute violates the dormant commerce clause implied
in Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution. The
district court issued a preliminary injunction barring the
Chair and Commissioners of the Indiana Utility Regulatory
Commission (collectively, the IURC Commissioners) from en-
forcing the statute.
    The IURC Commissioners and several intervening de-
fendants have appealed that injunction. We vacate the injunc-
tion for lack of standing. Plaintiffs have not shown that the
injunction is reasonably likely to redress or prevent their
feared injuries. As we explain below, the IURC Commission-
ers have no relevant responsibilities for enforcing the chal-
lenged statute. Any genuine redress would have to operate
against a non-party, Midcontinent Independent System Op-
erator (MISO), a non-governmental entity that plans, ap-
proves, and assigns construction for new interstate transmis-
sion projects in Indiana.
    Plaintiffs argued to this court and the district court that
they have standing because it seemed reasonably likely that,
even though MISO is not a party to this lawsuit or the injunc-
tion, it would respond to a preliminary injunction against the
IURC Commissioners by treating the Indiana law as void and
inapplicable. The district court agreed. LSP Transmission Hold-
ings II, LLC v. Huston, No. 1:24-CV-01722-TWP-MG, 

, at *5–6 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 6, 2024). MISO has now made
clear that it need not and will not respond to the preliminary
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                               3

injunction as plaintiffs and the district court expected, so that
theory of standing is not viable.
    The dissenting opinion would find standing on a different
and novel theory that has not been presented by plaintiffs,
was not adopted by the district court, and has not been the
subject of any briefing or argument. That theory would treat
the injunction as having ordered the IURC to use its regula-
tory powers to block construction of new facilities approved
by MISO and (implicitly) by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC). The injunction does not actually say
that, though, and no party has interpreted it that way. That
interpretation would also likely force a direct federal-state
regulatory conflict between FERC and the IURC. Accordingly,
we decline to adopt this novel theory and conclude that plain-
tiffs lack standing to seek this preliminary injunction.
I. Statutory and Regulatory Background
    To explain, we begin with background on the respective
roles of the IURC, FERC, and MISO, and on rights of first re-
fusal in construction of new interstate transmission facilities.
Disagreement over the roles of federal and state electricity
regulators is not new. As the electricity industry expanded in
the late nineteenth century, States tried to regulate their grids
statewide. General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 

, 289 n.7
(1997), citing Robert L. Swartwout, Current Utility Regulatory
Practice from a Historical Perspective, 

,
298 (1992). These one-size-fits-all approaches proved “inflexi-
ble, impractical, untimely and burdensome on the legisla-
tures,” so States left regulation up to local governments.
Swartwout, supra, at 298.
4                             Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

    Some local governments adhered to laissez-faire economic
principles in utility management, which led to “predictable
and disastrous” consequences: “an initial period of ‘wasteful
competition,’ followed by massive consolidation and the
threat of monopolistic pricing.” General Motors, 

(footnotes omitted), citing Dorner, Initial Phases of Regulation
of the Gas Industry, in 1 Regulation of the Gas Industry § 2.03
(American Gas Ass’n 1996). Others granted overlapping fran-
chises for utility operation (including, infamously, “45 mostly
overlapping franchises … for electric utility operation in Chi-
cago between 1882 and 1905”). Swartwout, supra, at 299. Chas-
tened by this experience, States began to provide “a single,
local franchise with a business opportunity free of competi-
tion ….” General Motors, 

; see also New York v.
FERC, 

 (2002) (“In 1935, when the FPA became
law, most electricity was sold by vertically integrated utilities
that … operated as separate, local monopolies subject to state
or local regulation.”).
    In 1927, the Supreme Court held that States could not reg-
ulate certain elements of interstate electricity transmission.
Public Utilities Comm’n of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Elec.
Co., 

, 89–90 (1927), abrogated by Arkansas Elec. Co-
operative Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 

(1983). The Attleboro ruling created an important regulatory
gap for a few years by allowing only the federal government
to regulate interstate electrical transmission. New York, 

. Enter Congress in 1935 with the Federal Power Act
(FPA or the Act). The Act created the Federal Power Commis-
sion (FERC’s predecessor) to regulate “the transmission of
electric energy in interstate commerce” and “the sale of elec-
tric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.” See 

 at 6–
7 (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting 16 U.S.C.
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                                  5

§ 824(b). The Act requires all “rates and charges made, de-
manded, or received by any public utility for or in connection
with the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission” to be “just and reasonable.”
16 U.S.C. § 824d(a). It also gives federal regulators the power
to correct unlawful practices, including unreasonable rates.
New York, 

, citing 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a).
     To carry out that provision, the Act requires each regu-
lated utility to file with FERC its “rates and charges,” along
with “the classifications, practices, and regulations affecting
such rates and charges.” 16 U.S.C. § 824d(c). For our pur-
poses, that filing is known as a tariff. See Morgan Stanley Cap-
ital Group Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1, 

(2008). Utilities may not change their tariffs without giving
notice to FERC and to the public, § 824d(d), and FERC has the
authority to “suspend the operation” of a changed tariff, sub-
ject to some procedural constraints. § 824d(e).
    Since the 1990s, FERC has encouraged owners of interstate
transmission systems to establish non-governmental entities
to plan and operate interstate transmission in their respective
regions. See, e.g., Promoting Wholesale Competition Through
Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public
Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Trans-
mitting Utilities, 

-01, at 21,552 (Apr. 24,
1996) (“[W]e see many benefits in ISOs, and encourage utili-
ties to consider ISOs as a tool to meet the demands of the com-
petitive marketplace.”); Regional Transmission Organizations,

, 

, at *37 (Dec. 20, 1999)
(“We conclude that properly structured RTOs throughout the
United States can provide significant benefits in the operation
of the transmission grid.”).
6                             Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

    These Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) are
“voluntary associations of utilities that own electrical trans-
mission lines interconnected to form a regional grid and that
agree to delegate operational control of the grid to the associ-
ation.” Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 

, 769
(7th Cir. 2013), citing 

(j) & (k)(1)(i). Many are
managed by Independent System Operators (ISOs) like
MISO, which are non-profit entities that run the RTOs in “a
nondiscriminatory manner.” 

, quoting Morgan Stan-
ley, 554 U.S. at 536–37. As required, MISO has filed with FERC
a tariff outlining its rates, charges, and practices affecting such
rates and charges. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(c). FERC may review
changes to a tariff like MISO’s to determine whether the
changes are just and reasonable. Entergy Arkansas, LLC v.
FERC, 

, 587 (D.C. Cir. 2024), citing 16 U.S.C.
§ 824d(a). MISO is also responsible for planning expansions
and upgrades to the grid in its area. See Illinois Commerce
Comm’n, 721 F.3d at 770.
    Before 2011, as a matter of federal law, when MISO de-
cided that a new interstate transmission facility was needed
in some part of its region, the MISO member that served the
local area where the facility would be built had a right of first
refusal to build the new facility. MISO Transmission Owners v.
FERC, 

 (7th Cir. 2016). This was because
FERC had approved a provision in MISO’s tariff that con-
ferred a federal right of first refusal for incumbent transmis-
sion owners in MISO’s area to build new interstate facilities
in their service areas. See 

   In 2011, however, FERC changed its policy. FERC’s Order
1000 required RTOs and ISOs like MISO to remove provisions
from their tariffs that “grant[ed] incumbent transmission
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                                 7

providers a federal right of first refusal to construct transmis-
sion facilities selected in a regional transmission plan for pur-
poses of cost allocation.” Transmission Planning & Cost Alloca-
tion by Transmission Owning & Operating Public Utilities (Order
1000), 

, at ¶ 253, 

, at *81
(July 21, 2011).
    That policy change by FERC—abrogating the federal
rights of first refusal—was challenged and upheld. See, e.g.,
MISO Transmission Owners, 

 (“In summary,
FERC’s abrogation of the right of first refusal in the MISO
Transmission Owners Agreement was lawful.”); South Caro-
lina Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 

, 76–77 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(noting that Order 1000 was based on market competition the-
ory and reflected a reasoned decision that rights of first re-
fusal would lead to “unjust” or “unreasonable” practices).
    At the same time, however, Order 1000 made crystal clear
that it did not “limit, preempt, or otherwise affect state or lo-
cal laws or regulations with respect to construction of trans-
mission facilities ….” Order 1000, 

 at ¶ 227.
Taking FERC at its word, MISO amended its tariff to incorpo-
rate any applicable state and local right of first refusal laws.
MISO Tariff, Attachment FF, ¶ VIII.A.1 (MISO “shall comply
with any Applicable Laws and Regulations granting a right of
first refusal to a Transmission Owner.”).
    Several States in the MISO region enacted state rights of
first refusal, including Indiana through House Enrolled Act
1420, 2023 Ind. Acts 1444–46 (codified at 

-
9). See also, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 216B.246, subdiv. 2 (2024); 

 (2024). Indiana’s right of first refusal
law gives an “incumbent electric transmission owner” the
right to “construct, own, operate, and maintain” an electricity
8                                  Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

transmission facility that has been “approved for construction
through a regional transmission organization planning pro-
cess and that connects to an electric transmission facility
owned by the incumbent electric transmission owner.” 

(a)(1) (2024). 1
II. Factual and Procedural Background
    In 2022, MISO began planning a new batch of transmission
projects as part of its “Long Range Transmission Planning”
initiative. It divided those projects into several “tranches,” the
first of which was approved in July 2022. Tranche 2 was an-
nounced in December of that year. In March 2024, MISO re-
leased specific Tranche 2.1 plans, including several projects in
Indiana.
    Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the IURC Commission-
ers in October 2024 challenging Indiana’s right of first refusal
law on several grounds, focusing most on the dormant com-
merce clause. Plaintiffs expected the MISO Board to approve
the Tranche 2.1 projects at a meeting scheduled for December
10–12, 2024. Plaintiffs also expected that MISO’s approval of
those projects would result in immediate assignment of con-
struction of the projects to incumbents in accordance with
HEA 1420 and MISO’s tariff. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary

    1 Similar laws have been challenged on dormant commerce clause

grounds in two other circuits with different results. See LSP Transmission
Holdings, LLC v. Sieben, 

 (8th Cir. 2020) (upholding Minnesota
law against dormant commerce clause challenge); NextEra Energy Capital
Holdings, Inc. v. Lake, 

 (5th Cir. 2022) (reversing dismissal of
dormant commerce clause claim); see also NextEra Energy Capital Holdings,
Inc. v. Jackson, No. 1:19-CV-626-DII, 

, at *17 (W.D. Tex.
Oct. 28, 2024) (district court opinion on remand, granting judgment on the
pleadings for plaintiffs on dormant commerce clause claim).
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                               9

injunction—but only against the IURC Commissioners—to
enjoin the Commissioners from “enforcing Indiana House En-
rolled Act 1420 of 2023.” Several incumbent transmission
owners intervened to defend their rights of first refusal under
the Indiana statute. Plaintiffs did not seek injunctive relief
against MISO or even name it as a defendant.
    The IURC Commissioners challenged plaintiffs’ standing
to seek an injunction preventing the Commissioners from en-
forcing the rights of first refusal. Intervenor defendants made
related arguments under the preliminary injunction standard.
Both the IURC Commissioners and the intervenor defendants
argued that the IURC simply does not “enforce” the rights of
first refusal, so an injunction running only against the IURC
Commissioners could not redress or prevent the injuries that
plaintiffs feared.
    On December 6—four days before MISO’s Board was
scheduled to begin its meeting on the Tranche 2.1 projects—
the district court issued a preliminary injunction. It found that
plaintiffs had standing because “the IURC enforces the rights
of first refusal” and concluded that, if it enjoined the IURC
from enforcing HEA 1420, MISO would “no longer be permit-
ted to recognize an incumbent’s right of first refusal….” LSP
Transmission Holdings II, LLC v. Huston, No. 1:24-CV-01722-
TWP-MG, 

, at *5–6 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 6, 2024).
The district court also found that plaintiffs were likely to suc-
ceed on the merits of their commerce clause challenge, 

 at
*7–9, and that the equities weighed in favor of enjoining en-
forcement of the law. 

 at *9–10.
   The IURC Commissioners and the intervening defendants
appealed on December 11, seeking a stay of the injunction
pending appeal and an administrative stay of the injunction
10                            Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

pending resolution of that motion. This court granted the ad-
ministrative stay at around 7:30 am Central Time on Decem-
ber 12. Later that morning, MISO approved the Tranche 2.1
projects. That action started a 90-day clock for incumbents in
Indiana to notify the IURC whether they intended to exercise
their rights of first refusal on those Tranche 2.1 projects. See

(c) (2024).
    On December 17, this court heard argument on defend-
ants’ request for a stay pending appeal. We granted the stay
and set argument on the merits of the appeal for January 27,
2025. We also invited MISO to offer its position on “whether
(and on what basis, voluntarily or under legal obligation) it
would adhere to any court orders or judgments addressing
the constitutionality of the right of first refusal” in HEA 1420,
and we invited FERC to provide its perspective on “whether
the Federal Power Act and its implementing regulations, pol-
icies, or directives address the legality and enforceability (un-
der the U.S. Constitution or otherwise) of state law rights of
first refusal available to incumbent electric transmission own-
ers.”
    We thought that order would preserve the status quo until
oral argument, but we were wrong. On December 30, plain-
tiffs moved for reconsideration of the order granting a stay
pending appeal, asserting that MISO was going to decide “no
later than January 13, 2025” which of the Tranche 2.1 projects
in Indiana would be designated for competitive bidding and
which would go to incumbents under their rights of first re-
fusal. Plaintiffs also stated their belief that MISO would treat
such designations as irreversible. We expedited briefing on
the motion to reconsider and ultimately granted it, conclud-
ing that the “equitable factors weigh in favor of lifting the stay
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                                      11

and allowing the district court’s order preliminarily enjoining
the enforcement of House Enrolled Act 1420 to take effect.” At
that point, however, we had not yet heard from MISO or
FERC, the entities closest to the center of this controversy. The
parties then filed full briefs on the merits of this appeal. As
invited, MISO and FERC both filed amicus briefs. 2
    We held argument on January 27, 2025. We now vacate the
preliminary injunction and remand the case to the district
court for further proceedings. The relief at issue in this ap-
peal—a preliminary injunction against only the IURC Com-
missioners—would not redress and is not redressing plain-
tiffs’ anticipated harm. That means plaintiffs lack standing to
seek the requested injunction.
III. Standing for the Preliminary Injunction
    “[T]o establish standing, a plaintiff must show (i) that he
suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by
the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be re-
dressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 

, 423 (2021), citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 

, 560–61 (1992). “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing
separately for each form of relief sought.” Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 

 (2000).
   A core tenet of standing doctrine under Article III of the
Constitution is the general rule “barring adjudication of gen-
eralized grievances more appropriately addressed in the

   2 Plaintiffs later filed a motion to respond to MISO’s and FERC’s ami-

cus briefs. We grant that motion. The tendered response shall be deemed
filed, and we have considered that brief as well as the responses during
oral argument.
12                             Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

representative branches ….” Allen v. Wright, 

(1984), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 

, 126 & 127 n.3
(2014) (endorsing principle under Article III). The central
problem with plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief is redress-
ability. As we see it, there are two related issues: whether
plaintiffs sued the right defendants and whether plaintiffs
sought relief that would likely redress or prevent the harm
they fear. We address each in turn.
     A. The IURC Commissioners
    Plaintiffs believe the rights of first refusal granted under
HEA 1420 are unconstitutional. They seek to require MISO to
assign the rights to build and operate the Indiana Tranche 2.1
projects using competitive bidding by all interested and qual-
ified bidders. Plaintiffs did not, however, seek any injunctive
relief against MISO itself or even name MISO as a defendant.
        1. The District Court’s Approach to Redressability
   The district court concluded that the requested injunction
would likely redress or prevent plaintiffs’ feared injuries: “Be-
cause the IURC enforces the rights of first refusal, see 

, LSP’s alleged injury is traceable to the IURC
Defendants. … IURC would no longer be permitted to recog-
nize an incumbent’s right of first refusal, and neither, in turn,
would MISO.” LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC v. Huston,

, at *6. The court accordingly issued an in-
junction against the IURC Commissioners. They were “pre-
liminarily enjoined from enforcing the rights of first refusal of
Indiana Code § 8-1-38-9.” The injunction did not and could
not declare § 8-1-38-9 unconstitutional or prevent its enforce-
ment more generally. Nor did the injunction purport to affect
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                              13

IURC’s enforcement of any laws other than § 8-1-38-9 or to
order the IURC to block construction of any projects that
MISO might approve.
    On appeal, we have had the benefit of more thorough
briefing, as well as a statement from MISO on how it views
the interplay among HEA 1420, FERC, and the IURC. We con-
clude that the district court’s preliminary injunction against
the IURC Commissioners has not and would not redress or
prevent plaintiffs’ feared injuries.
    This case presents an unusual situation. Plaintiffs and the
dissenting opinion insist that a governmental body has pow-
ers that the governmental body says it does not have. The
IURC Commissioners insist that the IURC has no role in en-
forcing rights of first refusal under HEA 1420. The IURC
Commissioners told us in their brief, for example: “But the
named defendants here—IURC’s Chairman and Commis-
sioners—do not participate in designating MISO-planned
projects. Nor does IURC have any enforcement authority over
how MISO conducts those awards.” Appellants’ Br. at 24; ac-
cord, id. at 25 (“IURC does not participate in the approval or
allocation of MISO-planned projects for any electric transmis-
sion owner.”). Counsel for the Commissioners also told us at
oral argument that even if there were a final judgment declar-
ing HEA 1420 unconstitutional, IURC “wouldn’t have any en-
forcement authority to do anything” to prevent construction
consistent with a MISO award. Oral Arg. at 22:45–24:30; 24:10.
Based on our review of the statutes, we agree with the IURC’s
assessment of its own powers.
   HEA 1420 vests incumbents with a right to build new
transmission projects. See § 8-1-38-9(a). To exercise that right,
an incumbent must “give written notice” to the IURC within
14                            Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

90 days of project approval of its intent to construct the new
project. § 8-1-38-9(c). If the incumbent notifies the IURC of its
intent “not to construct the approved electric transmission fa-
cility, another entity may seek to construct [the facility] in ac-
cordance with the regional transmission organization plan-
ning process and this chapter.” Id. A constructing incumbent
must provide the IURC with a brief description of the con-
struction, the reason for the construction, an estimate of the
total cost of the project, and a copy of the rate that it has most
recently filed with FERC. § 8-1-38-9(d)(1) & (d)(2). The incum-
bent must also, “to the extent commercially practicable, use
competitively bid engineering, procurement, or construction
contracts, as applicable, that meet all the technical, commer-
cial, and other specifications, such as safety performance, re-
quired by the incumbent electric transmission owner with re-
spect to the electric transmission facility.” § 8-1-38-9(e).
    These provisions grant incumbency rights of first refusal,
but they do not give the IURC any enforcement authority to
police or enforce those rights. Even the subsections of the stat-
ute that mention the IURC make clear that the IURC functions
only as a notice repository, not as an enforcer of the rights of
first refusal. See, e.g., § 8-1-38-9(c) (requiring an incumbent
exercising a right of first refusal to “give written notice to the
commission” and specifying that if an incumbent declines
that right, any other aspiring constructor must go to the RTO
for approval); § 8-1-38-9(d) (requiring a constructing incum-
bent to provide the IURC with information about the con-
struction project).
    In sum, HEA 1420 requires incumbents exercising rights
of first refusal to file notice with the IURC at several different
points during the construction project. That is all HEA 1420
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                              15

has to say about the IURC. If the incumbent does not wish to
build the project, HEA 1420 directs non-incumbents to seek
construction approval from the RTO “in accordance with the
regional transmission organization planning process and this
chapter.” § 8-1-38-9(c). No provision gives the IURC any re-
sponsibilities toward RTOs’ or ISOs’ decisions assigning pro-
jects, whether based on the statutory rights of first refusal or
any other considerations. Enjoining the IURC Commissioners
from enforcing HEA 1420 therefore cannot redress or prevent
plaintiffs’ harm.
       2. The Dissenting Approach to Redressability
     The dissenting opinion offers a different perspective. Re-
lying on the IURC’s general power to enforce public utility
laws in Indiana Code § 8-1-2-115, the dissenting opinion
treats the preliminary injunction as requiring the IURC to use
its statutory powers to block construction when an incumbent
seeks to build a project assigned by MISO in reliance upon the
HEA 1420 right of first refusal. The preliminary injunction
does not purport to do that, and neither plaintiffs, defendants,
intervenor-defendants, nor the district court have interpreted
the preliminary injunction that way.
    That fact alone counsels against consideration of the dis-
senting theory here. In California v. Texas, 

 (2021),
the Supreme Court faced similar standing problems in a chal-
lenge to the Affordable Care Act. Justice Thomas wrote a per-
suasive concurring opinion explaining why resolving a case
based on a theory of standing that connects an unenforceable
provision to other statutory provisions, without briefing from
the parties, is not prudent. “This lack of legal development is
particularly significant because standing-through-insevera-
bility—assuming it is a legitimate theory of standing—is
16                            Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

fundamentally a merits-like exercise that requires courts to
apply ordinary principles of statutory interpretation to deter-
mine if it is at least ‘arguable’ that a statute links the lawful-
ness of one provision to the lawfulness of another. Thus, a
failure to develop a standing-through-inseverability argu-
ment poses a significant obstacle to review.” 

 at 684 n.2
(Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
    There are good reasons why plaintiffs and the district
court have not pursued the dissenting theory. Under the dis-
senting opinion’s approach, the district court would have or-
dered (or actually did order) the IURC to block construction
of interstate transmission projects approved and assigned by
MISO. Those projects lie squarely in the heartland of FERC’s
jurisdictional territory. That approach would force the IURC
into a power struggle with FERC over whether legitimately
assigned and important projects may be constructed—essen-
tially obliging the State officials to block construction projects
approved by federal authorities.
    The dissenting opinion would in effect conscript the IURC
to enforce the dormant commerce clause rather than carry out
its more general duties to enforce Indiana public utility laws.
And it would do so to accommodate plaintiffs’ tactical choice
not to sue the entity that is actually complying with HEA
1420, which is MISO, acting under its FERC-approved tariff.
    There is another problem with the dissenting approach. It
assumes that plaintiffs have standing to seek an injunction
that would employ the rest of Indiana public utility law to
prevent enforcement of HEA 1420. But none of plaintiffs’
claimed or feared harms come from any provisions of Indiana
law other than HEA 1420. This creates a traceability problem
linked to severability.
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                             17

    In California v. Texas, the Supreme Court rejected a similar
argument that a plaintiff had standing when his alleged harm
came from an unenforceable provision, even when relief
could have operated against other statutory provisions. 

. In that case, several States and individuals chal-
lenged the Affordable Care Act’s requirement that individu-
als obtain health insurance coverage. However, amendments
to the Affordable Care Act set the penalty for failure to obtain
health coverage at $0 (effectively nullifying any enforcement
authority). 

. The Supreme Court held that plaintiffs
accordingly lacked standing. While the Affordable Care Act
told individuals to obtain minimum coverage, it had “no
means of enforcement. … Because of this, there is no possible
Government action that is causally connected to the plaintiffs’
injury….” 

. The State plaintiffs in that case nonethe-
less asserted that they had standing because the individual
mandate “also causes them to incur additional costs directly”
by requiring them to provide information to insurance bene-
ficiaries and the IRS. 

.
   The Supreme Court rejected this argument: “The problem
with these claims, however, is that other provisions of Act, not
the minimum essential coverage provision, impose these
other requirements. Nothing in the text of these form provi-
sions suggests that they would not operate without [the alleg-
edly unconstitutional provision].” 

 The Court explained
why this approach failed to confer Article III standing: “To
show that the [individual mandate] is unconstitutional would
not show that enforcement of any of these other provisions
violates the Constitution. … The Government’s conduct in
question is therefore not ‘fairly traceable’ to enforcement of
18                                  Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

the ‘allegedly unlawful’ provision of which the plaintiffs com-
plain ….” 

, quoting Allen, 

. 3
    So too here. Plaintiffs contend that only HEA 1420 is un-
constitutional. As in California, the injunction bars the named
defendants from enforcing the allegedly unconstitutional pro-
vision, but they do nothing to enforce that provision. The dis-
senting opinion would try to redress the injury allegedly
caused by that provision by enjoining the IURC from exercis-
ing duties imposed by other statutory provisions. But plain-
tiffs do not allege that “enforcement of any of these other pro-
visions violates the Constitution.” California, 593 U.S. at 679.
As a result, plaintiffs have not shown that the IURC’s other
conduct is “fairly traceable” to the allegedly unconstitutional
action, and they cannot manufacture standing by seeking re-
dress through an injunction against enforcement of the other
(constitutional) statutory provisions. Id.; see also Blum v.
Yaretsky, 

 (1982) (“Nor does a plaintiff who
has been subject to injurious conduct of one kind possess by
virtue of that injury the necessary stake in litigating conduct
of another kind, although similar, to which he has not been
subject.”); Davis v. Colerain Township, Ohio, 

, 171
(6th Cir. 2022) (“[W]hen a plaintiff has been injured by one
part of a law, the plaintiff cannot invoke that injury to chal-
lenge other parts of the law that have done nothing to the
plaintiff.”), citing California, 593 U.S. at 678–79; National Feder-
ation of the Blind of Texas, Inc. v. Abbott, 

 (5th


     3 The dissenting opinion in California adopted the same view of stand-

ing—and cited some of the same cases, including Seila Law LLC v. CFPB,

, 211 (2020)—as the dissenting opinion in this case. See Califor-
nia, 593 U.S. at 698–703 (Alito, J., dissenting). Those arguments did not
carry the day in that case and should not do so here.
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                                              19

Cir. 2011) (plaintiffs did not allege injury from one statutory
provision, so—despite “limits imposed on them” by another
statutory provision—they did not have standing).
    The dissenting opinion’s demand that the IURC act to
block MISO-approved projects runs contrary to both federal
precedent and Indiana law on severability and redressability.
See California, 593 U.S. at 678 (“The problem with these claims,
however, is that other provisions of Act, not the minimum es-
sential coverage provision, impose these other requirements.
Nothing in the text of these form provisions suggests that they
would not operate without [the challenged provision].”). It is
well-established that a court should “refrain from invalidat-
ing more of the statute than is necessary…. ‘[W]henever an
act of Congress contains unobjectionable provisions separable
from those found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of this
court to so declare, and to maintain the act in so far as it is
valid.’” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 

 (1987)
(alterations in original), quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 

 (1984) (plurality opinion). 4
    HEA 1420 is clearly severable from the other provisions of
Indiana law dealing with utility regulation. First, contrary to
the dissenting opinion, Indiana law provides a general
“firewall” separating unconstitutional provisions from other
statutory components: “If any provision of this Code as now

    4 Indiana courts also follow this approach to severability. See, e.g.,

Paul Stieler Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Evansville, 

, 1278–79 (Ind.
2014), citing Dorchy v. Kansas, 

, 289–90 (1924); Ettinger v. Stu-
devent, 

 (Ind. 1942) (“Where the legislature attempts
to do several things one of which is invalid it may be discarded if the re-
mainder of the act is workable and in no way dependent upon the invalid
portion.”).
20                            Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

or later amended or its application to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect
other provisions that can be given effect without the invalid
provision or application.” 

(a); cf. post at 38.
Moreover, the other provisions of Chapter 38—which impose
the IURC’s statutory obligations—were in place and effective
well before HEA 1420 took effect in 2023. See, e.g., 2013 Ind.
Acts 1767–1770 (enacting other provisions of Chapter 38). The
provisions of Chapter 2 cited for the IURC’s broad authority
over public utilities have been in effect since at least the 1970s
and 1980s, with many dating from the early 20th century. See,
e.g., 1913 Ind. Acts 167–214 (creating the IURC’s predecessor),
177 (vesting commission with authority to set rates); 

 (defining scope of Commission’s authority to
regulate relations between utilities and the public); 1984 Ind.
Acts 678–743 (overhauling Chapter 2 and the powers of the
Commission); 2017 Ind. Acts 3736–3751 (amending certain
elements of the IURC’s authority over public utility rate-
setting).
    Those older provisions of Indiana public utility law are
easily enforceable whether or not HEA 1420 is in effect; they
do not depend and have never depended on the later-enacted
HEA 1420. See Paul Stieler Enterprises, 2 N.E.3d at 1278–79.
This serves as a firewall preventing courts from upending the
entire Indiana utility code upon finding one provision uncon-
stitutional. Cf. California, 593 U.S. at 679 (rejecting effort to
overturn entire Affordable Care Act based on challenge to one
unenforceable provision). HEA 1420’s relative brevity and re-
cent enactment show its limited role in Indiana utility law
generally. Our analysis of redressability should recognize
that reality.
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                                        21

    The IURC’s minimal role under HEA 1420—receiving no-
tices that incumbents are exercising rights of first refusal—
could not cause plaintiffs’ feared harm. Instead, plaintiffs’
feared irreparable injury would result “from the independent
action of some third party not before the court.” Allen, 

 (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Simon
v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 

 (1976).
That means plaintiffs lack standing.
    We do not suggest that MISO’s actions are independent of
HEA 1420. Its FERC-approved tariff requires MISO to comply
with HEA 1420, after all. But MISO’s actions on these projects
are independent of the IURC Commissioners, who are the
only parties subject to this preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs
chose not to sue and seek relief against MISO. Because the
IURC simply has no statutory duty to enforce the rights of first
refusal established under HEA 1420, the preliminary injunc-
tion has not—and could not be expected to—redress the harm
plaintiffs fear. As a result of plaintiffs’ choice not to name
MISO as a defendant, redressability is missing here.5
    B. Preliminary Injunction
   Plaintiffs argue that even if the IURC is not directly in-
volved in enforcing Indiana’s rights of first refusal, the pre-
liminary injunction against enforcement of HEA 1420 should
render the law no longer “applicable” under the language of
MISO’s tariff, thereby preventing MISO from awarding


    5 The dissenting opinion submits that uncertainty regarding how to

properly sue MISO makes the IURC a proper defendant. Post at 43. Re-
spectfully, the possible merits of a different hypothetical lawsuit against
an entity not before the court have no bearing on whether plaintiffs have
standing in this case.
22                             Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

contracts on the basis of that law. As noted, the district court
adopted this reasoning. LSP Transmission Holdings, 

, at *6.
    We see three problems with plaintiffs’ reasoning. First, the
well-understood limits of a preliminary injunction support
defendants’ position that the injunction does not change the
applicability of the law in question to non-parties. As the Su-
preme Court reminded us just last month: “Preliminary in-
junctions, however, do not conclusively resolve legal dis-
putes.” Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. —, —, No. 23-621, slip op. at
6, 

, at *4 (Feb. 25, 2025). When deciding
whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a court must deter-
mine whether the movant is “likely to succeed on the mer-
its….” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 

(2008). Based on that early assessment, a court may determine
whether State officials ought to be able to enforce the law
pending further proceedings. But a preliminary injunction is
“not a preliminary adjudication on the ultimate merits: it is an
equitable device for preserving rights pending final resolu-
tion of the dispute.” Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software,
Inc., 

 (9th Cir. 1984); accord, Lackey, 604 U.S.
at —, slip op. at 6, 

, at *4.
    As we have explained, the difference between a prelimi-
nary injunction and a permanent injunction is meaningful: “in
granting or denying a preliminary injunction, the court [de-
cides] only the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits,
whereas in granting or denying a permanent injunction, it [de-
cides] their actual success on the merits.” Lacy v. Cook County,

 (7th Cir. 2018), citing Michigan v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 

, 782 (7th Cir. 2011); accord, Mon-
roe v. Bowman, 

, 690–91 (7th Cir. 2024) (district
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                                              23

court could not retroactively convert preliminary injunction
into permanent injunction). “In other words, only a hearing
on permanent injunctive relief would result in conclusive find-
ings …; any judicial findings made in deciding preliminary re-
lief would remain subject to change.” Lacy, 

,
citing Michigan, 667 F.3d at 782. That is true between the par-
ties to the case in which a preliminary injunction is issued,
and a preliminary injunction ordinarily has no bearing on
whether a law remains “applicable” or even “in effect” as ap-
plied to persons and entities not before the issuing court, like
MISO in this case. 6
    Second, MISO does not view itself as bound by the injunc-
tion, and as a matter of law it is not bound. In its amicus brief,
MISO noted that the district court’s preliminary injunction
“does not direct MISO to take any action, nor does it prohibit
MISO from taking any action,” and MISO explained its view
that the preliminary injunction was not a final adjudication of

    6 For this reason, plaintiffs are incorrect in asserting that a favorable

ruling in this appeal would remove “an unlawful barrier” to their partici-
pation in the interstate transmission market. A favorable ruling would not
“remove” such a barrier at all. It would instead only (1) perhaps prevent
the IURC from receiving notices from incumbents intending to exercise
rights of first refusal and (2) indicate our belief that plaintiffs would be
“likely” to prevail in an ultimate trial on the merits. For the reasons ex-
plained above, the statute’s continued legitimacy absent a final judgment
distinguishes this situation from the cases cited in plaintiffs’ brief. See, e.g.,
Reed v. Goertz, 

 (2023) (plaintiff had standing to challenge
State DNA testing procedures because prosecutor relied on those proce-
dures to deny DNA testing, making it “substantially likely” that favorable
decision would result in relief); DIRECTV, Inc. v. F.C.C., 

, 829–
30 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (DIRECTV had standing to challenge rule requiring it
to divest certain holdings upon winning an auction because rule was an
allegedly “unlawful barrier” to its participation in the auction).
24                                  Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

the statute’s constitutionality. MISO’s position is that the lan-
guage in its tariff—which obliges it to “comply with any Ap-
plicable Laws and Regulations granting a right of first refusal
to a Transmission Owner”—does not require it to comply
with a preliminary injunction against another entity’s sup-
posed enforcement of a right of first refusal statute.
    Seeking to remedy this problem, after oral argument in
this appeal, plaintiffs filed a complaint with FERC asserting
that MISO is violating its tariff by continuing to assign pro-
jects based on HEA 1420 despite issuance of the preliminary
injunction. But this maneuver proves defendants’ point: the
preliminary injunction will not redress or prevent the harm
plaintiffs fear absent an uncertain result in other proceed-
ings. 7

     7  The dissenting opinion implies that plaintiffs’ constitutional
challenge to HEA 1420 simply must be justiciable. Post at 42. The position
is not persuasive for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
rejected such arguments when a plaintiff otherwise fails to show standing.
E.g., FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Med., 

 (2024) (“The
‘assumption’ that if these plaintiffs lack ‘standing to sue, no one would
have standing, is not a reason to find standing.’ Rather, some issues may
be left to the political and democratic processes….” (internal citations
omitted)), quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 

 (1974); Kurowski v. Krajewski, 

 (7th Cir. 1988) (“In
some cases no one will have standing to sue.”). Second, and more
specifically, plaintiffs can raise their constitutional issues in proceedings
before FERC, whose decisions are subject to review by Article III courts.
See 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (FERC shall resolve challenges to practices affecting
the rates by order); 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b) (any party aggrieved by a FERC
order may “obtain a review of such order” in the D.C. Circuit or
geographic circuit); cf. United States v. Richardson, 

 (1974)
(“In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual or class to
litigate these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter
is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                                            25

    Plaintiffs argue that a plaintiff can establish redressability
and therefore standing when a court’s order is likely to make
third parties act in a particular way that would redress the
plaintiff’s harm. Appellees’ Br. at 24–27, first citing Skyline
Wesleyan Church v. California. Dep’t of Managed Health Care, 

, 742 (9th Cir. 2020), and then citing Bennett v. Spear,

 (1997). That’s true as a general rule. But given
MISO’s legally correct view that it is not bound by this pre-
liminary injunction because it is not a party, it is not likely that
the injunction would cause MISO to act in a way that would
prevent or redress plaintiffs’ feared injuries. The dissenting
opinion is correct in saying “it is a bedrock principle that a
federal court cannot redress ‘injury that results from the inde-
pendent action of some third party not before the court.’” Post
at 41, quoting Murthy v. Missouri, 

 (2024). 8


political process. … Lack of standing within the narrow confines of Art.
III jurisdiction does not impair the right to assert his views in the political
forum or at the polls.”).
    8 Our view is also consistent with FERC’s statement in unrelated

proceedings that a developer’s “rights to own, develop, and construct [a]
Project” under an Iowa right of first refusal statute remained “uncertain”
notwithstanding an Iowa Supreme Court preliminary injunction against
enforcement of that statute. ITC Midwest, LLC, 

 at ¶¶ 34-
35, 

, at *7–8 (Nov. 16, 2023) (“[U]nless and until the Iowa
ROFR Statute is ruled unconstitutional, the Project was properly assigned
to ITC Midwest under MISO’s Tariff.”); see also LS Power Midcontinent,
LLC v. State, 

, 322 (Iowa 2023) (underlying Iowa Supreme
Court case, reversing court of appeals’ decision on standing and granting
temporary injunction to stay enforcement of Iowa right of first refusal law
pending litigation of merits of state constitutional challenge). To be sure,
that FERC decision arose in a different posture than this case. The dispute
was whether costs incurred by a constructing utility “after the Iowa
Supreme Court enjoined the ROFR statu[t]e’s effectiveness” would be
26                                 Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

    Third, the plain terms of this particular injunction show
the limited scope of relief that plaintiffs sought here. By nam-
ing only the IURC Commissioners as defendants, plaintiffs
ensured that the district court’s order could not operate
against MISO directly. See Driftless Area Land Conservancy v.
Valcq, 

, 522 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[A] federal injunction
prevents state officials from enforcing the challenged statute,
regulation, or agency action in the future based on its incom-
patibility with federal law. An injunction operates on the en-
joined officials; the law, regulation, or agency action remains
on the books ….”); United States v. Kirschenbaum, 

 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A district court may not enjoin non-par-
ties who are neither acting in concert with the enjoined party
nor are in the capacity of agents, employees, officers, etc. of
the enjoined party”), first citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d), and then
citing Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 

 (1945). MISO
is the entity that is responsible for “assigning” contracts, as
plaintiffs made clear when they petitioned for reconsideration
asserting their fear of irreparable harm resulting from MISO
assignments.9


deemed per se “imprudent” and therefore non-recoverable. See ITC
Midwest, 

, at ¶ 25. But it shows nonetheless that FERC
does not view a preliminary injunction against state regulatory
enforcement of a state right of first refusal law as a conclusive
determination that project assignment is invalid.
     9 Preliminary injunctions may operate against non-parties who are of-

ficers, agents, servants, employees, or attorneys of the enjoined parties or
are otherwise in active concert or participation with them. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 65(d)(2). None of those circumstances are present here. Plaintiffs do not
argue that MISO is acting in concert or participation with the IURC. In-
stead, MISO is continuing to comply with HEA 1420 based on the inde-
pendent legal effect of its FERC-approved tariff.
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                                        27

    This outcome is also consistent with congressional direc-
tion on electricity regulation. The Federal Power Act specifies
that “electric energy shall be held to be transmitted in inter-
state commerce”—and therefore subject to FERC regulation—
“if transmitted from a State and consumed at any point out-
side thereof ….” 

(c). The Supreme Court has
explained that this text “unambiguously authorizes FERC to
assert jurisdiction over” interstate transmission. New York v.
FERC, 

, 19–20; 

 (“[T]he FPA contains … ‘a
clear and specific grant of jurisdiction’ to FERC over interstate
transmissions ….”), quoting FPC v. Southern California Edison
Co., 

 (1964).
    The rights of first refusal challenged in this appeal passed
through two separate federal checkpoints—subject to exten-
sive FERC oversight—before taking effect. First, in Order
1000, FERC amended its cost allocation requirements for pub-
lic utility transmission providers to remove federal rights of
first refusal, but FERC explicitly allowed States to grant their
own. See Order 1000, 

 at ¶ 227 (removing
federal right of first refusal to “provide flexibility for public
utility transmission providers in each region to propose …
how best to address participation by nonincumbents” but
noting that “nothing in this Final Rule is intended to limit,
preempt, or otherwise affect state or local laws or regulations
with respect to construction of transmission facilities, includ-
ing but not limited to authority over siting or permitting of
transmission facilities.”). 10


    10 We borrow the phrase “federal checkpoints” from Merrion v. Jicarilla

Apache Tribe, 

 (1982), where the Supreme Court found that
a federal agency’s approval of an Indian tribe’s arguably discriminatory
tax meant the tax did not violate the Indian commerce clause. See also
28                                  Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

    Second, and more specifically, FERC approved MISO’s
tariff, which provides that MISO “shall comply with any Ap-
plicable Laws and Regulations granting a right of first refusal
to a Transmission Owner.” MISO Tariff, Attachment FF,
¶ VIII.A.1. MISO’s tariff thus adopts HEA 1420, and FERC’s
approval of the tariff gave the tariff the effect of federal law.
FERC had the power to reject that proposed term if it thought
its application would not be “just and reasonable.” See 16
U.S.C. § 824d(a)–(d). It decided to leave that question to the
States. Moreover, as noted above, there are congressionally
established paths for aggrieved parties to seek review of that
policy decision by both FERC and federal courts of appeals.
See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a); 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b).
     Early in this case, plaintiffs relied on MISO’s statement in
an amicus brief to the Iowa Supreme Court that “no [rights of
first refusal] will be accorded to Iowa projects” subsequently
assigned by MISO after an Iowa trial court entered a final
judgment and permanent injunction against the Iowa law.
Plaintiffs here argued—and the district court agreed—that the
Iowa amicus brief showed that MISO would similarly refrain
from assigning projects based on HEA 1420 if the district
court issued a preliminary injunction in this case against
IURC enforcement of it pending a final judgment on the mer-
its. LSP Transmission Holdings, 

, at *6 (district
court order citing that amicus brief in Iowa). Plaintiffs
dropped that argument in their merits brief to this court.
There were two good reasons to do so.



White v. Massachusetts Council of Const. Employers, Inc., 

, 213 &
213 n.11 (1983) (federal agency approval of city policy favoring local con-
tractors meant policy did not violate dormant commerce clause).
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                                 29

    First, as explained above, MISO has made clear in this court
that it does not view itself as bound by the preliminary injunc-
tion directed only against the IURC Commissioners. Second,
the fact that the Iowa state trial court had issued a final judg-
ment and permanent injunction adjudicating that the Iowa
right of first refusal was unconstitutional under state law
made that case critically different from this one. MISO’s rep-
resentation in Iowa that it would be bound by that final judg-
ment is understandable: such a judgment can deprive the stat-
ute of effect, unlike a preliminary injunction that simply pre-
vents enforcement by a particular entity (in this case the
IURC) against particular plaintiffs. See GEFT Outdoors, LLC v.
City of Westfield, 

, 369–70 (7th Cir. 2019) (“After a
court holds that a statute or ordinance is unconstitutional,
that legislation is void.… But the court’s ruling that the law is
invalid is the crucial trigger for voiding it.”) (internal citations
omitted).
   The dissenting opinion suggests that this opinion is inter-
nally inconsistent because it implies that plaintiffs might have
standing to seek a permanent injunction but adopts reasoning
that would deny them standing for a permanent injunction.
See post at 40–41. To be clear, we do not intend to imply any
conclusion about whether plaintiffs would have standing to
seek a permanent injunction against the IURC Commissioners
under a theory that MISO would feel itself bound by a final
judgment treating HEA 1420 as unconstitutional. It is not im-
possible, but it is difficult, to establish standing based on a
prediction about how a non-party is likely to respond to a
court decision. Here is what the Supreme Court said in reject-
ing such an attempt in California v. Texas:
30                            Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

       We have said that, where a causal relation be-
       tween injury and challenged action depends
       upon the decision of an independent third party
       (here an individual’s decision to enroll in, say,
       Medicaid), “standing is not precluded, but it is
       ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to estab-
       lish[.]” Lujan, 

 (quoting Allen, 

); see also [Clapper v. Amnesty Interna-
       tional USA, 

 (2013)] (expressing
       “reluctance to endorse standing theories that
       rest on speculation about the decisions of inde-
       pendent actors”). To satisfy that burden, the
       plaintiff must show at the least “that third par-
       ties will likely react in predictable ways.” De-
       partment of Commerce v. New York, 

,
       768 (2019). And, “at the summary judgment
       stage, such a party can no longer rest on … mere
       allegations, but must set forth … specific facts”
       that adequately support their contention. Clap-
       per, 568 U.S., at 411–412 (internal quotation
       marks omitted). The state plaintiffs have not
       done so.
593 U.S. at 675.
    Principles of judicial restraint call for us to focus on the
only order on appeal: the preliminary injunction. MISO has
told us and shown us that the preliminary injunction against
the IURC Commissioners is not affecting its actions. Standing
to seek permanent injunctive relief is not before this court in
this appeal. In addition, developments before FERC or deci-
sions by MISO may affect future proceedings before the dis-
trict court. We cannot and should not try to determine
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                          31

plaintiffs’ standing to seek a permanent injunction when so
much is still subject to change.
    In sum, plaintiffs lacked standing to seek the preliminary
injunction here because the injunction against the IURC did
not oblige MISO—the entity actually responsible for assign-
ing these projects and for the harm plaintiffs fear—to act in
any particular way. Nor did the injunction prompt MISO to
modify its actions. The preliminary injunction is hereby
VACATED and the case is REMANDED to the district court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
32                           Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

   SCUDDER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. LSP Transmission
Holdings seeks to build electric transmission lines in Indiana
but is unable to compete for these projects because of the
State’s House Enrolled Act 1420. The statute affords “incum-
bents,” companies who already own transmission lines in In-
diana, a right of first refusal. As its name implies, the right
gives existing transmission providers the option to construct
any new projects that connect to their existing lines without
having to bid or otherwise compete for those projects.
    LSP and affiliated companies invoked 

 and
brought suit against the Chair and Commissioners of the In-
diana Utility Regulatory Commission. They claim HEA 1420
violates the Constitution by discriminating against interstate
commerce and sought and received preliminary injunctive re-
lief before the district court. The Commissioners now appeal,
joined by several companies that qualify as incumbents under
HEA 1420 who intervened to defend the Indiana statute.
    I would affirm. LSP not only has standing but also has
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits because
HEA 1420 facially discriminates against interstate commerce
and Congress has not clearly authorized that discrimination.
The balance of equities also weighs in favor of injunctive re-
lief.
                               I
   Article III’s Case or Controversy limitation makes LSP’s
standing the necessary and proper beginning point. At the
preliminary injunction stage, the plaintiffs must make a “clear
showing” that they are “‘likely’ to establish each element of
standing.” Murthy v. Missouri, 

 (2024) (quoting
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                              33

Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 

(2008)). LSP clears this modest hurdle.
                               A
    Article III standing doctrine requires LSP to make the
threefold showing that it “(1) suffered an injury in fact,
(2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the de-
fendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 

, 338
(2016) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 

, 560–
61 (1992)).
   LSP alleges that HEA 1420 inflicts commercial injury—in
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause—by depriving
the company of the ability to compete on equal terms for
transmission projects in Indiana. Evaluating this allegation
benefits from knowing more about the Indiana statute.
    Section 8-1-38-9(a) provides an “incumbent electric trans-
mission owner” with the “right to construct, own, operate,
and maintain” not only an electric transmission facility “that
connects to an electric transmission facility owned by the in-
cumbent electric transmission owner,” but also “[u]pgrades
to an existing electric transmission facility owned by the in-
cumbent.” 

(a). The statute defines “in-
cumbent electric transmission owner” as a “public utility that
owns, operates, and maintains an electric transmission facility
in whole or in part in Indiana.” 

 § 8-1-38-2.
    For a project to trigger a right of first refusal, a regional
transmission organization, here the Midcontinent Independ-
ent System Operator (MISO), must approve it. See id. § 8-1-38-
9(a). And because the right is limited to projects approved
through MISO’s planning process, HEA 1420 only regulates
34                             Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

transmission lines that connect to the interstate electric grid—
even if an individual project is confined within the state bor-
ders of Indiana.
    HEA 1420 gives incumbents first dibs to construct qualify-
ing projects. A non-incumbent, by contrast, is only permitted
to compete for transmission projects when the incumbent
provides the Commission notice that it does not intend to ex-
ercise its right of first refusal. See id. § 8-1-38-9(c).
    LSP’s complaint named the Commissioners of the Indiana
Utility Regulatory Commission as defendants and sought de-
claratory relief that Indiana Code § 8-1-38-9, as amended by
HEA 1420, is unconstitutional and an order enjoining the
Commissioners from enforcing the statute. In granting LSP’s
motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court en-
joined the “Commissioners of the Indiana Utility Regulatory
Commission, their agents, servants, and employees, and per-
sons acting in concert or participation with them” from “en-
forcing the rights of first refusal of Indiana Code § 8-1-38-9.”
    Returning, then, to the requirements of Article III stand-
ing, LSP seeks to bid on several transmission projects in Indi-
ana but cannot do so unless the incumbents decline to exercise
their statutory right of first refusal. The “inability to compete
on an equal footing in the bidding process,” the Supreme
Court has recognized, satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement.
Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of
Jacksonville, 

 (1993); see also All. for Clean Coal
v. Miller, 

 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying City of Jack-
sonville in the dormant Commerce Clause context and finding
the inability to “compete on an equal footing in interstate
commerce” a sufficient injury). Indeed, the panel majority
does not dispute that the injury-in-fact requirement is met
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                                 35

here. I too have little trouble concluding that LSP is likely to
suffer a concrete and actual injury by losing the ability to com-
pete for certain transmission projects because of HEA 1420.
    From there the questions are whether that injury is fairly
traceable to the Commissioners and capable of being re-
dressed through a favorable judicial decision. Causation and
redressability, the Supreme Court has emphasized, are often
“flip sides of the same coin.” FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med.,

, 380–81 (2024) (quoting Sprint Commc’ns Co. v.
APCC Servs., Inc., 

 (2008)). “If a defendant’s
action causes an injury, enjoining the action or awarding dam-
ages for the action will typically redress that injury.” 

.
    Every indication in Indiana law is that the Commission, in
the words of HEA 1420, has the power to prevent an incum-
bent from being able to “construct, own, operate, and main-
tain” an electric transmission project in Indiana awarded pur-
suant to a right of first refusal. 

(a). The
Indiana General Assembly has expressly charged the Utility
Regulatory Commission with the power and duty to “en-
force … all … laws[] relating to public utilities.” 

 § 8-1-2-
115. There is no doubt that HEA 1420 is such a law. Its right
of first refusal is codified in the title of the Indiana Code gov-
erning utilities. And to qualify as an “incumbent” under the
statute one must be “a public utility that owns, operates, and
maintains an electric transmission facility in whole or in part
in Indiana.” Id. § 8-1-38-2 (emphasis added). The Commis-
sioners thus “possess[]” overarching “enforcement authority”
that “a federal court might enjoin [them] from exercising.”
Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 

, 43 (2021).
   Everyone agrees that the Commission is the regulatory
agency with authority over public utilities in Indiana.
36                            Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

Everyone agrees that HEA 1420 is a law “relating to public
utilities.” And everyone agrees that, when an incumbent is
awarded a transmission project pursuant to HEA 1420, mov-
ing forward with that project will necessarily involve activity
in Indiana. It defies belief that the Indiana General Assembly
vested the Commission with broad enforcement authority but
the Commissioners are nevertheless powerless to impose any
limitation on a utility company’s ability to construct, own, op-
erate, or maintain electric transmission facilities within the
State. To adopt that view is to conclude that Indiana law does
not mean what it says.
    It is inconceivable that the named defendants could not
give effect to the district court’s injunction—prohibiting them
from enforcing the right of first refusal pursuant to a statute
that the court has declared likely violates the dormant Com-
merce Clause. Because the preliminary injunction denies in-
cumbents the right that HEA 1420 provides (constructing,
owning, operating, and maintaining a transmission facility
without a competitive bidding process), it follows that LSP’s
injury (the inability to compete on equal terms) is redressable
by a federal court order.
                               B
   The Commissioners and panel majority press a different
analysis. They emphasize that it is MISO—not the Commis-
sion—who shoulders responsibility for assigning a transmis-
sion project to an incumbent in accordance with HEA 1420.
And, they continue, the Commission has no authority over
MISO. While these observations may be accurate, they are in-
complete and do not resolve the standing question before us.
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                              37

    Whether LSP has Article III standing does not turn on
whether the Commissioners have authority to assign trans-
mission projects or direct MISO, a non-party, to do anything.
All the ink the majority spills over MISO’s role in the assign-
ment process is neither here nor there—non-responsive, in
my respectful view, to the central issue: whether the Commis-
sion itself has the power to prevent an incumbent from con-
structing, owning, operating, or maintaining an electric trans-
mission facility in the State of Indiana. Indiana law tells us it
does. By its terms, § 8-1-2-115 grants the Commission general
enforcement authority over all laws relating to public utilities.
And we should take the Indiana General Assembly at its
word—rather than acquiesce in the agency’s understanding
of its own statutory authority.
    The panel opinion portrays this theory of standing as
“novel.” Op. at 3. But there is nothing novel about discerning
the scope of an agency’s administrative authority by inter-
preting the plain language of the statute defining its powers
of enforcement. Nor is there any meaningful difference be-
tween my analysis and the district court’s. As applied here,
the Indiana legislature gave the Commission authority to en-
force the statute that causes LSP’s alleged harm.
   The majority’s error stems from reading Indiana law with
too narrow a focus, looking only to the immediate provision
containing the right of first refusal and, as a consequence,
leading the panel to conclude the requirement that incum-
bents provide the Commission with notice of their intent to
exercise the right is “all HEA 1420 has to say about the IURC.”
Op. at 14–15. But § 8-1-38-9, which houses the right of first re-
fusal, is one provision within the broader Indiana Utility
Code—a complex regulatory scheme made up of over 70
38                             Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

chapters and more than 1,000 separate sections. And I see no
indication that the Indiana General Assembly sought to erect
an interior firewall around HEA 1420, neither separating it
from the rest of the Code nor stripping the Commission of its
“broad authority over public utilities.” Op. at 20.
   The majority reaches the opposite conclusion by analyzing
whether HEA 1420 is “severable from the other provisions of
Indiana law dealing with utility regulation.” Op. at 19. But the
severability analysis it employs is not one the law knows or
recognizes.
    The Supreme Court has described severability as a ques-
tion of the proper remedy for constitutional violations. See,
e.g., Seila L. LLC v. CFPB, 

, 232 (2020); NFIB v. Sebe-
lius, 

, 585–88 (2012); United States v. Booker, 

 (2005). Severability doctrine comes into play
only after a court has decided the constitutional merits. But, in
resolving this appeal on standing grounds, the majority never
reaches the merits of LSP’s constitutional challenge to HEA
1420. So it is not at all clear why the majority reaches for the
severability doctrine to answer a threshold question of Arti-
cle III standing.
    The clear design of the majority’s severability analysis is
to isolate HEA 1420 from the rest of the Indiana Utility Code
and avoid the Indiana General Assembly’s delegation of gen-
eral enforcement authority to the Commission. But whether
the right of first refusal is indeed severable in no way answers
or even informs the Article III standing inquiry: whether the
Commissioners can redress LSP’s alleged injury. Nor does
any canon of construction I know of consider a statute’s “rel-
ative brevity and recent enactment,” Op. at 20, to conclude, in
categorical terms, that the rest of the statutory scheme is
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                                39

extraneous and, by extension here, irrelevant to a proper Ar-
ticle III standing analysis.
    HEA 1420 does not speak to the Commissioners’ power to
enforce the right of first refusal. Contra Jackson, 595 U.S. at 35–
36, 43–44 (citing 

(a))
(concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the Attorney
General of Texas where the state statute expressly divested
state officials of enforcement authority). So resolving what
authority these named defendants have under Indiana law re-
quires looking outside the four corners of the provision
providing the right of first refusal.
    All I am saying is we must read HEA 1420 in “context”
and “with a view to [its] place in the overall statutory
scheme.” West Virginia v. EPA, 

, 721 (2022) (cita-
tion omitted). Against this backdrop, the grant of general en-
forcement authority belies the majority’s claim that the Com-
mission—the state regulatory body tasked with overseeing
public utilities—is merely a maildrop, functioning “only as a
notice repository, not as an enforcer of the rights of first re-
fusal.” Op. at 14. The plain language of § 8-1-2-115 compels a
clear conclusion: the Commission can redress the harm im-
posed by an unconstitutional statute that it has the power to
enforce.
    The majority doubles down on its error by the way it ana-
lyzes the harm HEA 1420 inflicts upon LSP. The panel opinion
narrowly focuses on MISO’s “assignment” of a transmission
project to an incumbent and disregards the steps in the pro-
cess that will follow. Whatever it means to be assigned a pro-
ject, this is only the first step of a years-long venture that will
culminate in an incumbent constructing and operating new
transmission lines in Indiana. But LSP does not merely want
40                             Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

to be awarded a project: the company wants to reap the finan-
cial benefit of that project through construction and, ulti-
mately, operation of the transmission line within the State.
    The district court’s preliminary injunction properly ac-
counts for this. By its terms, its scope extends beyond the act
of assigning a transmission project to an incumbent—prohib-
iting the Commissioners instead from more generally “en-
forcing the rights of first refusal” under Indiana law. And re-
member that the General Assembly defined the scope of that
right to “construct, own, operate, and maintain” certain elec-
tric transmission facilities, 

(a), not merely
to be assigned such a project.
    Consider for a moment what the majority opinion does
not say. Nowhere does the panel conclude that LSP lacks Ar-
ticle III standing to seek a permanent injunction. In fact the
majority takes pains to disavow that conclusion and contends
the question remains open. See Op. at 29–31. But ask yourself
what could possibly happen on remand that would allow LSP
to seek permanent injunctive relief where it lacked standing
to seek preliminary injunctive relief. The clear answer is, in a
word, nothing.
     The dormant Commerce Clause claim, the named defend-
ants, and the Commission’s authority are not subject to
change based on any fact-finding that may occur in the dis-
trict court. To the contrary, the facts critical to the Article III
standing question here all remain the same whether we con-
sider LSP’s request for a preliminary or permanent injunction.
If, as the majority urges, this case really does begin and end
with MISO’s exclusive authority to assign new transmission
projects, how could LSP have standing to seek permanent
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                               41

injunctive relief on the very same basis against the very same
defendants?
    Any approach that depends on how MISO, a non-party,
would respond to a permanent injunction would run head-
long into a basic tenet of standing doctrine: a plaintiff cannot
rely on a judgment’s domino effect on a non-party to establish
redressability. To the contrary, “it is a bedrock principle a fed-
eral court cannot redress ‘injury that results from the inde-
pendent action of some third party not before the court.’”
Murthy, 

 (citation omitted).
    Nor can a federal court declare a statute unconstitutional
in the abstract—Article III always demands a proper defend-
ant capable of redressing the alleged injury. See California v.
Texas, 

, 672 (2021) (explaining that “[r]emedies”
traditionally “operate with respect to specific parties” (cita-
tion omitted)); see also William Baude & Samuel L. Bray,
Proper Parties, Proper Relief, 

, 158, 177–79
(2023).
    Nothing about how MISO would react to a final judgment
expands the enforcement authority of the Commissioners—
the only named defendants in this action. See Haaland v. Brack-
een, 

, 292–93 (2023) (concluding that plaintiffs
lacked Article III standing to enjoin enforcement of a federal
law where third parties, not the named defendants, “carry out
the court-ordered placements” giving rise to plaintiffs’ al-
leged injury). And nothing about the nature of the relief
sought gives the Commission a role in redressing LSP’s in-
jury, transforming them into proper defendants. So regardless
of any subsequent “developments before FERC or decisions
by MISO,” Op. at 30, the standing inquiry would remain the
same on remand.
42                            Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

    I see only two options: either the Commissioners’ enforce-
ment authority is sufficient to allow LSP to seek both prelim-
inary and permanent injunctive relief or its authority is insuf-
ficient as to both. If, as the majority would have it, the Com-
mission lacks authority to enforce the statute that causes the
alleged harm, the proper resolution should be to remand this
case to the district court with instructions to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. But the panel opinion leaves
open the possibility of a different outcome in connection with
a permanent injunction on remand because it is unwilling to
say that LSP’s claim is not justiciable. In this respect, the ma-
jority’s conclusion is at odds with itself.
    Recognize too the incoherence of the Commissioners’ po-
sition. In advancing the contention that federal law has au-
thorized any violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, the
Commissioners emphasize that the Federal Power Act pre-
serves state authority over utility regulation—including in
the siting and construction of electric transmission lines. But
in their same breath, when it comes to Article III standing, the
Commissioners insist the Commission itself is powerless to
regulate utility companies operating in Indiana—through, for
example, their authority over powerline siting and construc-
tion. Try as they might, the Commissioners cannot have it
both ways.
    Walking even further out on a legal limb, the Commission-
ers tell us that no arm of Indiana can be sued on a claim that
HEA 1420 violates the dormant Commerce Clause. They ef-
fectively say that LSP’s claim is non-justiciable. With all re-
spect, that position is way off the mark. Foremost, the Com-
missioners’ position flies in the face of the Ex parte Young doc-
trine and cannot be correct—particularly not where, as here,
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                             43

Indiana law plainly tells us which state officials enforce the
statute and plaintiffs have named those precise officials as de-
fendants. The Supreme Court has recognized the dormant
Commerce Clause confers a right actionable under § 1983. See
Dennis v. Higgins, 

 (1991).
    On this point, the majority’s opinion struggles. The major-
ity suggests that LSP might cure any defect with respect to
Article III’s redressability requirement by adding MISO to its
lawsuit, faulting the plaintiffs’ “tactical choice” not to name
MISO as a defendant. Op. at 16. Perhaps that is the skeleton
key “development” the majority envisions upon remand. But
this solution begs a question: what claim could LSP bring? No
one has suggested that MISO—a non-profit, private entity—
is a proper § 1983 defendant. So what cause of action would
allow a plaintiff to sue MISO as a non-state actor for a viola-
tion of the dormant Commerce Clause? The majority opinion
offers no answer. And I have been unable to come up with
one.
                             ***
    No doubt the standing question immerses us in the con-
sideration of complicated facts and an equally complicated
regulatory scheme. But nothing about that twofold complex-
ity changes what Article III requires to show a redressable in-
jury caused by a state statute. The majority has allowed litiga-
tion complexity to overwhelm and cloud a clear takeaway
from the authority the Indiana General Assembly gave the
State’s Utility Regulatory Commission. In the final analysis
for me, the named defendants—charged as they are by State
law with enforcing Indiana’s public utility laws—are posi-
tioned to give effect to a judicial order enjoining enforcement
of HEA 1420’s right of first refusal based on a judicial
44                             Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

determination that the provision likely violates the dormant
Commerce Clause.
                                 II
     That brings us to the merits. Recall that these appeals come
to us following the district court’s grant of a motion for a pre-
liminary injunction. The standard for receiving such relief is
clear. “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must es-
tablish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he
is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of prelimi-
nary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and
[4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 

.
    LSP has satisfied the requirements. HEA 1420 facially dis-
criminates against interstate commerce by imposing differen-
tial treatment on companies’ ability to compete for new con-
struction projects in Indiana based on their preexisting own-
ership of transmission facilities in the State. The statute fails
to satisfy strict scrutiny and nothing in the Federal Power Act
reflects that Congress authorized this dormant Commerce
Clause violation with a clear statement. I also see no abuse of
discretion in the district court’s weighing of the equitable con-
siderations.
                                 A
    The Constitution extends to Congress the power to “regu-
late Commerce … among the several States.” U.S. Const.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3. But the Supreme Court has long interpreted
the Commerce Clause to also contain a “dormant” or “nega-
tive” component, which prohibits states and municipalities
from “erecting barriers to the free flow of interstate com-
merce.” Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 

, 440
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                                 45

(1978). This restraint on state action applies even when Con-
gress has “failed to legislate on the subject.” Okla. Tax Comm’n
v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 

 (1995).
    “To determine whether a law violates this so-called
‘dormant’ aspect of the Commerce Clause,” the first question
is whether the challenged measure “discriminates on its face
against interstate commerce.” United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v.
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 

(2007). “Discrimination” in this context “means differential
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that
benefits the former and burdens the latter.” Or. Waste Sys., Inc.
v. Dep’t of Env't Quality of State of Or., 

 (1994). A
state law discriminating in this way is “subject to a ‘virtually
per se rule of invalidity,’ which can only be overcome by a
showing that the State has no other means to advance a legit-
imate local purpose.” United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 338–39 (quot-
ing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 

 (1978)).
                                 B
    These principles find straightforward application to HEA
1420. The statute provides a benefit—a right of first refusal—
only to companies who already own transmission facilities in
Indiana. And it does so to the exclusion of all potential out-of-
state competitors, who must wait for an incumbent to decline
a new project before having a chance to enter the bidding mix.
HEA 1420 disfavors—discriminates against—companies
wanting to construct transmission lines in Indiana but cur-
rently lacking a presence there.
   The differential treatment is express on the statute’s face.
HEA 1420 defines “incumbent” as a “public utility that owns,
operates, and maintains an electric transmission facility in
46                            Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

whole or in part in Indiana.” 

 (emphasis
added). An “in-state presence requirement” of this type runs
contrary to the principle that states “cannot require an out-of-
state firm ‘to become a resident in order to compete on equal
terms.’” Granholm v. Heald, 

 (2005) (quoting
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 

(1963)). This suffices to establish facial discrimination.
    The Commissioners urge that HEA 1420 draws a neutral
distinction between incumbents—electric transmission own-
ers whose existing facilities will connect to the approved new
project—and all other entities, regardless of whether they are
in-state or out-of-state. Regulating based on incumbency sta-
tus, they argue, does not discriminate according to a com-
pany’s presence in Indiana because a company that is an in-
cumbent as to some projects (those that connect to their facil-
ities) will not be an incumbent as to other projects (those that
do not).
    But that position falters on another well-established prin-
ciple: a state law is “no less discriminatory” because in-state
businesses “are also covered by the prohibition.” C&A Car-
bone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 

 (1994); see
also Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 

, 354 n.4
(1951). HEA 1420, like the ordinance in Carbone, provides a
preference to “favored operator[s]” in Indiana—the incum-
bents—and deprives out-of-state entities the opportunity to
compete for transmission projects on the same terms. 511 U.S.
at 391. It makes no difference, then, that when the Indiana
statute confers a right of first refusal on an in-state incumbent,
it disadvantages both out-of-state entities and in-state non-in-
cumbents alike. That Indiana has also frozen out these in-state
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                              47

would-be-competitors is irrelevant to the facial discrimina-
tion analysis.
    The Fifth Circuit charted this same course of reasoning in
NextEra Energy Capital Holdings, Inc. v. Lake, 

 (5th
Cir. 2022). The court held that a Texas law providing a right
of first refusal to incumbent transmission owners facially dis-
criminated against interstate commerce. “Limiting competi-
tion based on the existence or extent of a business’s local foot-
hold,” the court explained, “is the protectionism that the
Commerce Clause guards against.” 

. And while the
Fifth Circuit confronted a different statutory scheme, the prin-
ciples guiding its reasoning apply with full force to HEA 1420.
    The Eighth Circuit’s contrary analysis in LSP Transmission
Holdings, LLC v. Sieben, 

 (8th Cir. 2020), which
found       a     Minnesota       right-of-first-refusal   law
non-discriminatory, comes up short, in my respectful view. A
focus on where the companies who benefit from a protection-
ist measure are “based” does not resolve the question of
whether the law discriminates against interstate commerce.
No matter if a company is incorporated or headquartered in
the state, a statute providing a legal benefit predicated on a
company’s physical presence there triggers scrutiny under
the dormant Commerce Clause. See Lake, 48 F.4th at 323–24
(collecting cases).
                               C
    The conclusion that HEA 1420 discriminates against inter-
state commerce brings us to the question of tailoring. Where
a statute discriminates against nonresident economic actors
or out-of-state goods, the law can be sustained only if the state
shows it has “no other means to advance a legitimate local
48                            Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

purpose.” United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 338–39. The Supreme
Court has told us that this standard imposes an “extremely
difficult burden” and requires the “strictest scrutiny.” Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 

,
581–82 (1997) (citation omitted).
    The Commissioners say that HEA 1420 protects the safety
of Indiana residents and promotes the reliability and stability
of its electric grid. But review of the statutory scheme con-
firms the right of first refusal is not necessary for the State to
achieve this goal.
    HEA 1420 does not compel incumbents to accept a new
business opportunity and construct transmission projects that
connect to their existing facilities. Rather it confers a right of
first refusal—it offers them first choice to accept such projects.
The State might reasonably prefer incumbents to undertake
projects which connect to their existing lines. But if this was
truly necessary for safety and reliability of the electric grid,
Indiana would not open the project to competitive bidding.
What is more, regardless of which company is awarded a pro-
ject, they will be subject to extensive federal and state regula-
tion in the construction and operation of the transmission line.
   I would hold that HEA 1420 violates the dormant dimen-
sion of the Commerce Clause.
                                D
    The Commissioners press two additional arguments that
warrant response. Each attempts to remove HEA 1420 from
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny altogether—even if the
statute facially discriminates against out-of-state power sup-
pliers and Indiana has other means to advance its interest. But
both contentions fall flat.
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                              49

                               1
   The Commissioners first contend that the Supreme
Court’s decision in General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 

(1997), forecloses LSP’s challenge. Not so in my view.
    Tracy is difficult to distill into a simple description. The
case involved an Ohio law which provided a tax exemption
to local distributors of natural gas but not to out-of-state bulk
gas sellers. See 

 at 281–83. This tax exemption operated in
two different retail markets. The local distributors sold natu-
ral gas to residential and small-business customers in a “cap-
tive” monopoly market, where gas was “bundled” with pro-
tections mandated by state regulators and the distributors
served all customers at restricted rates. See 

 at 296–99, 303–
04. But the exemption also applied to sales these local distrib-
utors made in the separate, competitive market for large in-
dustrial customers—where they competed against out-of-
state companies, who sold “unbundled” gas and whose sales
were not tax exempt. See 

 at 282–83, 297–98, 302. General
Motors, which bought natural gas from the out-of-state
sellers, appealed Ohio’s application of the tax to its purchases,
alleging that the differential tax treatment violated the Com-
merce Clause. See 

.
   In upholding the challenged Ohio statute, the Supreme
Court focused on the purposes of the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine. Where companies provide different prod-
ucts in different markets and would continue to do so even if
the alleged discriminatory burden on interstate commerce
were removed, the Court explained, “eliminating the … reg-
ulatory differential would not serve the dormant Commerce
Clause’s fundamental objective of preserving a national mar-
ket for competition undisturbed by preferential advantages
50                            Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

conferred by a State upon its residents or resident competi-
tors.” 

.
    Because the local, captive market was a regulated monop-
oly, “competition would not be served by eliminating any tax
differential as between sellers, and the dormant Commerce
Clause ha[d] no job to do.” 

. But eliminating this dis-
parity between the companies in the noncaptive market, on
the other hand, might intensify competition. See 

 The case
thus turned on whether to “accord controlling significance to
the noncaptive market in which they compete, or to the non-
competitive, captive market in which the local utilities alone
operate[.]” 

 at 303–04.
    Tracy chose to give “greater weight to the captive market”
and the local distribution companies’ “singular role in serving
[that market].” 

. Invalidating the tax exemption, the
Supreme Court determined, could “imperil” the distributors’
ability to serve the captive market by reducing their competi-
tive advantage. 

 at 304–07. So the Court rejected the
dormant Commerce Clause challenge and let the Ohio statute
stand.
    The Commissioners see incumbents under HEA 1420 as
situated like the local distributors in Tracy and, from that ob-
servation, argue that Indiana state law should be permitted to
treat these companies differently than non-incumbents. In-
cumbents own the existing facilities that will be upgraded or
to which new transmission lines will connect and so, the ar-
gument goes, are in a materially different position to under-
take construction than a new operator. Further, they urge,
many Indiana incumbents are vertically integrated utilities
(meaning they generate, transmit, and distribute electricity)
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                               51

and serve captive retail customers, just like the Tracy local dis-
tributors.
    In insisting on a side-by-side comparison with Tracy, the
Commissioners overlook a crucial fact supporting the Court’s
decision there that is not present here. The natural gas com-
panies primarily operated in two different markets (one cap-
tive, one competitive) and the challenged law regulated both.
See Camps Newfound, 

 n.16 (observing that Tracy
“premised its holding that the statute at issue was not facially
discriminatory on the view that sellers of ‘bundled’ and ‘un-
bundled’ natural gas were principally competing in different
markets”).
    HEA 1420, by contrast, governs only a single competitive
market: the market to construct transmission lines that con-
nect to the interstate power grid, where vertically integrated
utilities compete alongside independent transmission opera-
tors. “In the market for transmission of electricity,” the Fifth
Circuit recognized, “vertically integrated utilities and trans-
mission-only companies compete and offer the same services:
building, operating, and owning transmission lines.” Lake, 48
F.4th at 319 (interpreting and applying Tracy). HEA 1420’s
right of first refusal stifles competition in this market. Indeed,
the reason that several incumbent power suppliers intervened
in this litigation to defend the Indiana law is to avoid having
to compete for these projects through competitive bidding.
   HEA 1420 does not regulate a “noncompetitive, captive
market in which the local utilities alone operate[.]” Tracy, 519
U.S. at 303–04. And Tracy cannot be read to remove from
Commerce Clause scrutiny laws regulating a single market
where vertically integrated utilities undoubtedly compete
alongside other transmission-only operators. See Energy
52                             Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

Mich., Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 

, 492–97
(6th Cir. 2025) (explaining that Tracy should be limited “to its
unique factual setting”).
    It is easy to get lost in the weeds of Tracy, but do not let all
of this detail create confusion. The clearest principle to be de-
rived from the case is that the ordinary rules of dormant Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence can sometimes give way when
their application would not serve the doctrine’s core aim: pro-
tecting competition in interstate markets. Because HEA 1420
undermines this objective, I have little trouble concluding that
Tracy does not save it.
                                 2
   The Commissioners’ final effort to save HEA 1420 comes
with the contention that Congress in the Federal Power Act
authorized states to enact right of first refusal laws like this
one. Here, too, I disagree. Having reviewed the Federal Power
Act, I do not see anywhere where Congress supplied the nec-
essary clear statement to immunize a dormant Commerce
Clause violation.
    “[F]or a state regulation to be removed from the reach of
the dormant Commerce Clause,” the Supreme Court has em-
phasized, “congressional intent must be unmistakably clear.”
S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 

 (1984).
“The requirement that Congress affirmatively contemplate
otherwise invalid state legislation is mandated by the policies
underlying dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,” 

 at 91–92,
and a state has the “burden of demonstrating a clear and un-
ambiguous intent on behalf of Congress to permit the discrim-
ination against interstate commerce,” Wyoming v. Oklahoma,

 (1992). By contrast, the mere “fact that the
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                              53

state policy … appears to be consistent with federal policy—
or even that state policy furthers the goals we might believe
that Congress had in mind—is an insufficient indicium of
congressional intent.” S.-Cent. Timber Dev., 

.
    The Federal Power Act contains no unambiguous state-
ment of congressional intent to authorize state rights of first
refusal. The Commissioners rely on the so-called savings
clause of the Act, which reserves for the states authority over
“facilities used for the generation of electric energy,” “facili-
ties used in local distribution or only for the transmission of
electric energy in intrastate commerce,” and “facilities for the
transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the trans-
mitter.” 

(b)(1). Our court has interpreted this
language to retain state authority over “the location and con-
struction of electrical transmission lines.” Ill. Com. Comm’n v.
FERC, 

 (7th Cir. 2013). But Congress giving
states authority over siting and construction is a far cry from
Congress empowering states to discriminate in favor of in-
state interests with respect to interstate transmission lines.
    If the lack of a clear statement alone was not enough, the
Supreme Court has twice rejected that the Federal Power
Act’s savings clause constitutes “an affirmative grant of
power to the states to burden interstate commerce ‘in a man-
ner which would otherwise not be permissible.’” New England
Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 

 (1982) (citation
omitted). In New England Power the Court held that the Fed-
eral Power Act did not permit a state to restrict the interstate
transmission of hydroelectric power, despite the savings
clause’s additional assurance that the Act would not deprive
a state “of its lawful authority now exercised over the expor-
tation of hydroelectric energy which is transmitted across a
54                            Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

State line.” 

(b)(1). Notwithstanding this lan-
guage, the Court explained that “[n]othing in the legislative
history or language of the statute evinces a congressional in-
tent to alter the limits of state power otherwise imposed by
the Commerce Clause.” New England Power, 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). And
that case presented a stronger basis for congressional author-
ization than rights of first refusal, as the Federal Power Act’s
savings clause does specifically speak to state authority over
hydroelectric energy.
    The Supreme Court returned to the Power Act a decade
later and reached the same conclusion. The savings clause, the
Court reaffirmed, “simply saves from pre-emption under
Part II of the Federal Power Act such state authority as was
otherwise ‘lawful.’” Wyoming, 

 (quoting New
England Power, 

) (declining to find congres-
sional approval of state law reserving a segment of the Okla-
homa coal power market for Oklahoma-mined coal). Leaving
nothing to doubt, the Court underscored that its decisions
“have uniformly subjected Commerce Clause cases implicat-
ing the Federal Power Act to scrutiny on the merits.” 

   Against the backdrop of Supreme Court precedent requir-
ing a clear statement and explicitly rejecting that the savings
clause contains such a statement, I see no indication—and
definitely no clear statement—that Congress authorized the
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause perpetrated by
HEA 1420.
                              III
   In addition to likelihood of success on the merits, a party
seeking a preliminary injunction must show that it “is likely
Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024                                  55

to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,
that the balance of the equities tips in [its] favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.” Higher Soc’y of Ind. v.
Tippecanoe County, 

 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Winter, 

). The district court was right to conclude
that each of these factors weighs in LSP’s favor.
    “The existence of a continuing constitutional violation,”
we have emphasized, “constitutes proof of an irreparable
harm, and its remedy certainly would serve the public inter-
est.” Preston v. Thompson, 

, 303 n.3 (7th Cir. 1978).
And LSP further faces irreparable harm based on its showing
that, absent an injunction, it will be deprived of the equal op-
portunity to compete for billions of dollars in Indiana trans-
mission projects—which HEA 1420 sets aside for incumbents.
    On the other side of the scale, the Commissioners contend
that a preliminary injunction threatens the safety, stability,
and reliability of the transmission grid in Indiana. But this
concern rings hollow. The transmission projects implicated by
HEA 1420 are all future projects—scheduled for completion
years down the road. If an incumbent were to decline to exer-
cise their right of first refusal, as the statute permits, that alone
would initiate a lengthy competitive bidding process for the
project. A preliminary injunction does not imminently
threaten any Indiana residents losing power or hamper the
ability of current operators to respond to service disruptions.
So I fail to see irreparable harm in requiring incumbents to
compete for these planned projects in the first instance.
    The Commissioners have not shown that the district court
clearly erred in its evaluation of the other preliminary injunc-
tion factors.
56                          Nos. 24-3248, 24-3249, & 25-1024

                            ***
   For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would affirm
the district court’s entry of a preliminary injunction.