In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 22-2011
CHRISTINE SWIECICHOWSKI,
                                                 Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                 v.

LELAND DUDEK,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
                                                Defendant-Appellee.
                     ____________________

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the
                    Eastern District of Wisconsin.
       No. 2:21-cv-00249 — Stephen C. Dries, Magistrate Judge.
                     ____________________

     ARGUED APRIL 12, 2023 — DECIDED MARCH 31, 2025
                 ____________________

   Before SCUDDER, KIRSCH, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
   LEE, Circuit Judge. Christine Swiecichowski challenges the
denial of her claim for disability insurance benefits. On ap-
peal, her arguments focus on the administrative law judge’s
(“ALJ”) evaluation of her fibromyalgia. We appreciate the
ALJ’s detailed review and discussion of the record. Fibrom-
yalgia, however, has unique properties, and it is unclear from
the record whether the ALJ performed the analysis required
2                                                 No. 22-2011

by the Social Security Administration’s fibromyalgia guid-
ance. We therefore vacate the judgment and remand for fur-
ther proceedings.
                                I.
A. Medical History
    Swiecichowski worked in a warehouse for over thirty
years from 1987 until 2018. That year, she quit her job due to
increasing symptoms and pain from her fibromyalgia, depres-
sion, issues with her right arm and wrist, and spinal disor-
ders. Because Swiecichowski’s appeal focuses on her fibrom-
yalgia and fibromyalgic pain, we consider the medical records
related to that issue.
   In July 2018, Swiecichowski had two appointments with
her primary care provider, Dr. Manisha Chaturvedi, during
which she complained of chronic back and arm pain. Dr. Cha-
turvedi wrote a note for Swiecichowski to take two weeks off
work because she was “unable to perform any [work] duties”
and referred her to a pain management specialist. In late July
2018, Swiecichowski began seeing Dr. Hind Gautam, a pain
management doctor, for treatment for her pain.
    In early August 2018, Swiecichowski saw another doctor,
Dr. Sany Khabbaz, for her chronic pain. This appears to be the
first time that Swiecichowski was diagnosed with fibromyal-
gia. We surmise this from the doctor’s note indicating that
even though various medical tests, including electromyogra-
phy (“EMG”) and magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”), were
unable to identify the cause of Swiecichowski’s pain, she still
reported “significant pain throughout,” was “sensitive” to the
touch, and had “multiple areas of trigger points.” This last
statement is illuminating because the “trigger-point
No. 22-2011                                                              3

assessment” is the only recognized test for diagnosing fibrom-
yalgia. 1 Indeed, a couple of weeks later, Dr. Chaturvedi dis-
cussed the fibromyalgia diagnosis with Swiecichowski during
her visit.
    From September 2018 to May 2019, Swiecichowski visited
Dr. Gautam regularly and received several prescriptions, in-
jections, and referrals for physical therapy. But none of the
treatments were effective, and she continued to experience se-
vere pain.
    In June 2019, Swiecichowski met with Karen Burr, a nurse
practitioner, to evaluate her fibromyalgia. Nurse Burr admin-
istered the trigger-point test and noted that twelve out of the
eighteen trigger points indicated positive for fibromyalgia.
After this, Swiecichowski had a few more appointments with
Dr. Chaturvedi and other physicians, but none related specif-
ically to fibromyalgia.
B. Administrative Proceedings
    In October 2018, Swiecichowski applied for disability ben-
efits, alleging that she was disabled beginning on October 16,
2018. 2 In her application and at a hearing before the ALJ,
Swiecichowski described how her impairments limited her
ability to work. According to Swiecichowski, she had quit her
warehouse job in July 2018 because of debilitating pain, and


    1 The test involves pressing down on eighteen fixed locations on the
body. Generally, if the patient flinches at eleven or more locations, she is
deemed to have fibromyalgia. See Vanprooyen v. Berryhill, 

(7th Cir. 2017); Sarchet v. Chater, 

 (7th Cir. 1996).
    2 Swiecichowski originally had alleged that her onset date was July
17, 2018, but later amended it.
4                                                  No. 22-2011

she did not try to find a less physically demanding job, in
large part because she could not sit or stand for long periods
of time. Swiecichowski also attested that she could not lift or
bend and that she needed to change positions throughout the
day.
    As for her ability to perform daily activities,
Swiecichowski explained that she could perform chores on
“good days” but needed “to take breaks” and “go sit down
for a while.” And she often depended on her partner or other
family members to complete the chores. Swiecichowski noted
too that she was able to feed and sometimes play with her
dogs, but her wife was their primary caretaker. Furthermore,
Swiecichowski stated, she was limited to cooking only simple
meals (such as sandwiches, microwave dinners, or cereal),
and she went shopping weekly but the duration of the trip
would “depend[] on how [she was] feeling.” Swiecichowski
was able to drive but only drove to doctor’s appointments or
to visit her family, who lived five minutes away. Finally,
Swiecichowski testified that she tried to go outside the house
at least once per week, but this “depend[ed] on [her] pain
level.”
    In June 2020, the ALJ denied Swiecichowski’s application
for disability benefits. The ALJ followed the agency’s pre-
scribed five-step process for determining whether a claimant
is disabled: (1) whether she is employed; (2) whether she has
a severe medically determinable impairment; (3) whether her
impairment is one that the agency considers automatically
disabling; (4) if not, whether she can perform her past relevant
work; and (5) whether she is capable of performing any work
in the national economy. See 

(a)(4); Kastner
v. Astrue, 

 (7th Cir. 2012).
No. 22-2011                                                   5

    Between steps three and four, the ALJ determined
Swiecichowski’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which
is defined as “the most physical and mental work the claimant
can do on a sustained basis despite her limitations.” Mandrell
v. Kijakazi, 

, 516 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing 

(a)). The ALJ used this RFC in the evaluation of
steps four and five as prescribed. See 

(a)(4)(iv), (v).
    As relevant here, the ALJ determined that Swiecichowski
had multiple severe impairments—fibromyalgia, disorders of
the spine, disorders of the right arm and wrist, and major de-
pressive disorder. But, the ALJ concluded, none of these im-
pairments were automatically disabling, either alone or in
combination. Moreover, the ALJ found that Swiecichowski’s
“allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations are not
fully consistent with the totality of the evidence.”
    In arriving at this conclusion, the ALJ discounted
Swiecichowski’s subjective complaints about her pain symp-
toms on several grounds. First, the ALJ pointed to the EMGs
and MRIs of Swiecichowski’s spine and right arm, which only
showed “relatively mild” problems. The ALJ also cited the
“mixed”       clinical   findings,    which     indicated    that
Swiecichowski experienced “severe pain at times but not con-
sistently” and that she “frequently” showed “no acute dis-
tress, 5/5 strength in the upper and lower extremities, … intact
[sensation] bilaterally to all modalities including pinprick,
light touch, temperature and vibration, normal deep tendon
reflexes, and normal gait.” Also significant to the ALJ was
Swiecichowski’s admission of “being capable of preparing
meals, performing housework, cleaning, doing dishes,
6                                                           No. 22-2011

watching television, caring for pets, driving, and shopping
despite her symptoms.”
    The ALJ also examined the medical opinion evidence
about Swiecichowski’s physical abilities, including opinions
offered by two state agency consultants and two of
Swiecichowski’s providers. The former opined that
Swiecichowski was able to perform light work, and the ALJ
agreed (although he added a limitation related to use of her
right upper extremity).3 By contrast, the ALJ found the opin-
ions of Swiecichowski’s providers attesting to her more lim-
ited capabilities to have little support in the record.
    As for Swiecichowski’s RFC, the ALJ concluded that she
could perform light work with additional restrictions for sim-
ple and repetitive work due to her depression and limitations
on handling and fingering with her right arm. Although
Swiecichowski could not perform her past work as a ware-
house worker or forklift operator, the ALJ continued, she
could still perform other jobs in the national economy. As a
result, the ALJ determined that Swiecichowski was not disa-
bled.
    The Appeals Council denied Swiecichowski’s request for
review, making the ALJ’s opinion the final and appealable de-
cision by the Commissioner of Social Security. 20 C.F.R.


    3 Light work “involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with
frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds” and “re-
quires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most
of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls.”

(b). The only more limited form of work is sedentary
work, which involves “lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time” and re-
quires walking or standing only “occasionally.” 

 § 404.1567(a).
No. 22-2011                                                               7

§§ 404.955, 404.981. Swiecichowski then sought review in the
district court, and the court affirmed the agency’s decision. See
Swiecichowski v. Kijakazi, No. 21-CV-249, 

(E.D. Wis. May 27, 2022).
                                    II.
    When a social security decision is appealed, “[w]e review
the ALJ’s ‘not disabled’ decision directly, without deferring to
the district court’s assessment.” Jeske v. Saul, 

, 587
(7th Cir. 2020). We will uphold the ALJ’s decision so long as it
is supported by substantial evidence, does not contain any le-
gal errors, and “build[s] an accurate and logical bridge” from
the evidence to its conclusion. 

 (citations omitted). “Sub-
stantial evidence” is a low threshold requiring only such evi-
dence as “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to sup-
port a conclusion.” Gedatus v. Saul, 

, 900 (7th Cir.
2021) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 

 (1971)).
    On appeal, Swiecichowski focuses on the ALJ’s RFC deter-
mination. 4 She argues that, in crafting her RFC, the ALJ made
several errors, including: (1) failing to assess her fibromyalgia
in accordance with relevant agency guidance; (2) failing to ac-
count for the combined impact of her fibromyalgia and other


    4 In the district court, Swiecichowski also argued that the ALJ had
failed to follow certain agency regulations at step three of the sequential
process. But Swiecichowski’s opening brief contains only a single sen-
tence, unsupported by any relevant authority, about this issue. Puffer v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 

 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[E]ven arguments that
have been raised may still be waived on appeal if they are underdevel-
oped, conclusory, or unsupported by law.”). And, although
Swiecichowski expands on this argument in her reply brief, arguments
raised for the first time in reply are waived. See Mendez v. Perla Dental,

, 423–24 (7th Cir. 2011).
8                                                    No. 22-2011

physical impairments; (3) improperly assessing the opinions
of the state agency physicians; and (4) improperly assessing
the opinion of Nurse Burr. The Commissioner contends that
all but the first argument are waived because Swiecichowski
failed to raise them in the district court. We agree.
    Even in social security cases, wherein we review the ALJ’s
underlying decision directly, a claimant opposing the deci-
sion must present whatever objections she may have to the
district court or risk waiver on appeal. See Jeske, 955 F.3d at
597. Largely conceding the point, Swiecichowski argues that
she at least has preserved her objection to the ALJ’s treatment
of Nurse Burr. And, in support, Swiecichowski cites to por-
tions of the district court’s opinion that mention Nurse Burr’s
medical evaluation. But, given Swiecichowski’s failure to pre-
sent this argument to the district court herself and the result-
ing inability of the Commissioner to respond, the district
court’s statements are insufficient to preserve the argument
on appeal. Thus, we focus on the lone remaining issue—
whether the ALJ’s evaluation of Swiecichowski’s fibromyal-
gia comports with agency guidance.
A. The Agency’s Fibromyalgia Guidance
    Fibromyalgia is a “chronic health condition that causes
pain all over the body and other symptoms.” Kennedy v. Lilly
Extended Disability Plan, 

 (7th Cir. 2017) (ci-
tation omitted). These symptoms include severe fatigue, sleep
problems, and problems with memory or thinking clearly. 

Fibromyalgia is notoriously difficult to assess because “its
symptoms are entirely subjective.” Sarchet v. Chater, 

 (7th Cir. 1996). Further complicating the matter, the
severity of fibromyalgia pain “cannot be measured with ob-
jective tests aside from a trigger-point assessment.” Gerstner
No. 22-2011                                                               9

v. Berryhill, 

 (7th Cir. 2018); accord Vanprooyen
v. Berryhill, 

 (7th Cir. 2017).
    Given the difficulty of evaluating fibromyalgia, the Social
Security Administration has issued guidance specific to this
ailment: Social Security Ruling SSR 12-2p, 

(July 25, 2012). See Wilder v. Kijakazi, 

, 653 (7th Cir.
2022) (“Social Security Rulings lack the force and effect of law,
but they are binding on ALJs.”).
    In relevant part, SSR 12-2p addresses how a claimant can
establish fibromyalgia as a “medically determinable impair-
ment,” which is step two of the five-step sequential process
described above. 

, at *1. To satisfy this step,
the claimant must point to a diagnosis of fibromyalgia and
provide evidence of certain diagnostic criteria. 

 at *2–3; see
Revels v. Berryhill, 

, 656–57 (9th Cir. 2017) (describ-
ing the diagnostic criteria). Here, the ALJ found that
Swiecichowski’s fibromyalgia was a severe medically deter-
minable impairment. The only question was whether her fi-
bromyalgia was sufficiently severe to be disabling. Fortu-
nately, SSR 12-2p provides guidance on this question as well.
   To determine the limitations associated with fibromyalgia,
SSR 12-2p instructs ALJs to follow the normal two-step pro-
cess for determining the claimant’s RFC, which is found in
SSR 16-3p, 

-03 (Oct. 25, 2017). 5 See SSR 12-
2p, 

, at *5. First, the ALJ considers whether


    5 SSR 12-2p actually instructs ALJs to follow the agency’s prior guid-
ance on evaluating symptoms (called “SSR 96-7p”). But where, as here, the
ALJ’s ruling was issued on or after March 28, 2016, SSR 16-3p controls. See
Burmester v. Berryhill, 

, 510 n.1 (7th Cir. 2019); SSR 16-3p, 82
Fed. Reg. at 49462–63.
10                                                   No. 22-2011

the underlying impairment “could reasonably be expected”
to produce the claimant’s alleged symptoms, including disa-
bling pain. SSR 16-3p, 82 Fed. Reg. at 49463. Second, the ALJ
evaluates “the intensity and persistence of those symptoms”
to determine whether the claimant’s ability to work is limited.
Id. at 49464. In doing so, the ALJ must consider the objective
medical evidence; the individual’s subjective statements; in-
formation provided by medical sources; and the claimant’s
level of pain, medication, treatment, and daily activities. Id. at
49464–66; see also 

(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3).
    SSR 12-2p also provides guidance on how to incorporate
fibromyalgia into the RFC determination. One such guidance
states that the agency will “consider a longitudinal record
whenever possible because the symptoms of [fibromyalgia]
can wax and wane so that a person may have ‘bad days and
good days.’” SSR 12-2p, 

, at *6. Additionally,
the ALJ must be mindful that pain, fatigue, and other symp-
toms associated with fibromyalgia may result in limitations
that should be incorporated into the RFC. 

B. The ALJ’s Subjective Symptoms Analysis
    When examining the clinical findings, the ALJ observed
that Swiecichowski’s physical exams, though “mixed,” “fre-
quently” showed “no acute distress”; normal strength, re-
flexes, and gait; and “intact” sensation. Swiecichowski con-
tends that these observations violate SSR 12-2p because the
guidance does not expressly list physical symptoms as factors
relevant to whether fibromyalgia is a medically determinable
impairment. See SSR 12-2p, 

. But her argu-
ment misunderstands how SSR 12-2p operates here.
No. 22-2011                                                   11

    Swiecichowski is correct that the factors SSR 12-2p lays out
to determine whether a person has a medically determinable
impairment of fibromyalgia describe the 11-point assessment
and focus on manifestations of pain. 

 at **2–3. But SSR 12-
2P makes clear that, when assessing a claimant’s residual
functional capacity, the ALJ may consider “all relevant evi-
dence in the case record.” 

. This makes sense because,
unlike some other pain-causing disorders, fibromyalgia re-
sults in few physical manifestations. See Revels, 

(explaining that fibromyalgia patients have normal muscle
strength, sensory functions, reflexes, and joints); cf. Sarchet,

 (“Since swelling of the joints is not a symptom
of fibromyalgia, its absence is no more indicative that the pa-
tient’s fibromyalgia is not disabling than the absence of head-
ache is an indication that a patient’s prostate cancer is not ad-
vanced.”).
    This does not mean, however, that clinical evidence is ir-
relevant in fibromyalgia cases. Once the claimant has estab-
lished that her fibromyalgia is a medically determinable im-
pairment, the ALJ still needs to resolve whether the severity
of the resulting symptoms limits the claimant’s ability to
work; this is the heart of the RFC analysis. And physical ex-
aminations can help answer this question by revealing the
claimant’s ability to walk, move, and generally function.
    Furthermore, as we have noted, in evaluating the impact
of fibromyalgia as part of the RFC assessment, the ALJ must
“consider a longitudinal record whenever possible because
symptoms of FM [fibromyalgia] can wax and wane so that a
person may have ‘good days and bad days.’” SSR 12-2p, 

, at *6 (emphasis added). And, although the rule
does not define the term, “longitudinal” commonly means
12                                                No. 22-2011

“involving the repeated observation or examination of a set of
subjects over time with respect to one or more study varia-
bles.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 734 (11th ed.
2020).
    Here, the ALJ did not acknowledge the need to conduct a
longitudinal review of Swiecichowski’s pain symptoms. It is
true that the ALJ found that Swiecichowski’s clinical findings
“frequently” indicated no “acute distress,” strength in ex-
tremities, and other signs of normal function. But, when dis-
cussing the impacts of Swiecichowski’s pain, the ALJ refer-
enced only five medical visits that occurred on July 20, 2018;
August 8, 2018; June 10, 2019; January 18, 2020; and April 6,
2020. And, from this, he concluded that “clinical findings have
been mixed, indicating severe pain at times but not consist-
ently.”
    But recall that manifestations of pain from fibromyalgia
can “wax and wane” (in other words, be inconsistent). And
the record indicates thirty additional medical visits between
September 18, 2017, and April 19, 2020, during which
Swiecichowski complained of limiting pain. For example, on
July 2, 2018, she complained of chronic back pain and pain in
her right elbow and hand during her visit with Dr. Chatur-
vedi. On August 17, 2018, she told an orthopedic physician
that she had pain throughout her right arm. On August 20,
2018, she informed Dr. Chaturvedi that she suffered from
multiple joint pain and chronic back pain, and they discussed
her fibromyalgia diagnosis. On October 11, 2018, she again re-
ported experiencing aches and pain. On November 30, 2018,
a physical exam indicated chronic bilateral low back pain as
well as “tenderness all over the body.” On January 21, 2019,
Swiecichowski reported to Dr. Gautam that she was suffering
No. 22-2011                                                              13

from arm, back, hip, leg and neck pain. On March 11, 2019,
she presented with pain in her back, right elbow, neck, and
both legs. On September 20, 2019, an occupational therapist
observed “symptoms consistent with fibromyalgia” and that
she was struggling to sit, stand, or walk for extended periods
on account of pain. On February 11, 2020, Swiecichowski re-
ported to a physical therapist that she had ongoing neck pain.
     To be clear, we are not saying that an ALJ must discuss
every medical visit or piece of medical evidence when as-
sessing the impact of fibromyalgic pain on a claimant’s func-
tional capacity. But, given the unique nature of fibromyalgia
and the large number of medical visits here, it is not clear from
this record whether the ALJ evaluated the medical reports of
Swiecichowski’s pain holistically over time, keeping in mind
that the symptoms of fibromyalgia may manifest in an incon-
sistent fashion. As SSR 12-2p recognizes, such a longitudinal
review is critical to forming the “logical bridge” between the
medical records and the ALJ’s conclusions regarding the im-
pact of Swiecichowski’s fibromyalgia on her functional capac-
ity. 6
    Finally, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s decision
is supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ cited the
“conservative treatment” received by Swiecichowski. In some


    6 The ALJ’s reliance on “frequent” reports of “no acute distress” does

little to satisfy this requirement. The record shows that the term “no acute
distress” did not necessarily indicate the absence of fibromyalgic pain.
Take, for example, the ALJ’s citation to Swiecichowski’s August 8, 2018,
visit with Dr. Khabbaz. After noting that Swiecichowski was in “no acute
distress,” Dr. Khabbaz observed that Swiecichowski had “multiple areas
of trigger points” and “significant pain throughout…. Whenever she is
touched [s]he [is] sensitive.”
14                                                   No. 22-2011

cases, allegations of disabling pain can be discounted when a
claimant’s treatment consists only of injections and basic pain
management. See, e.g., Prill v. Kijakazi, 

, 749 (7th
Cir. 2022) (upholding the ALJ’s reliance on the claimant’s
“conservative” treatment of “injections, orthotics, and physi-
cal therapy” to support the not disabled decision). But see
Thomas v. Colvin, 

 (7th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the
ALJ’s reliance on “minimal treatment” for pain stemming
from sciatica nerve pain, because “the treatment records are
replete with notes that the pain medication was not helping”
and “sciatica is not always susceptible to more severe treat-
ments”). Here, however, the ALJ simply noted
Swiecichowski’s “conservative” treatment, seemingly as an
afterthought, without providing further discussion or citation
to the record. Such a cursory statement is insufficient to rem-
edy the decision’s shortcomings.
                               III.
    We appreciate the ALJ’s thorough analysis of the medical
records in this complicated case. The unique nature of fibrom-
yalgia, however, requires a more holistic longitudinal review
to evaluate the severity of a claimant’s fibromyalgic pain and
its impact on her ability to work. For the foregoing reasons,
we VACATE the judgment affirming the denial of benefits
and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
No. 22-2011                                                    15

    KIRSCH, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I agree with the major-
ity’s characterization of the relevant legal framework as well
as its observation that the ALJ could have explained some of
his reasoning more thoroughly. But I am not persuaded this
is enough to overcome the deference we owe an ALJ’s benefits
determination. When reviewing an ALJ’s finding for substan-
tial evidence, our role is “extremely limited.” Elder v. Astrue,

 (7th Cir. 2008). We may not “reweigh evi-
dence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or
substitute our own judgment for that of the Commissioner.”
Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 

 (7th Cir. 2003)
(quotation omitted). Though not a rubber stamp, substantial
evidence is “not a high threshold,” Prill v. Kijakazi, 

, 746 (7th Cir. 2022), and “we will reverse only if the record
compels a contrary result,” Deborah M. v. Saul, 

,
788 (7th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted).
    To be sure, the ALJ never directly acknowledged the im-
portance of conducting a longitudinal review in fibromyalgia
cases, but I am not convinced that he, in fact, failed to holisti-
cally consider evidence of how Swiecichowski’s symptoms
presented over time. Noting that medical exam results have
“frequently” indicated that Swiecichowski is in “no acute dis-
tress” and possesses normal strength, sensation, reflexes, and
gait, the ALJ ultimately characterized the “clinical findings”
as “mixed, indicating severe pain at times but not consist-
ently.” The majority faults the ALJ for drawing this conclu-
sion based on only five medical exams and suggests he gave
insufficient attention to Swiecichowski’s many complaints of
pain. But it seems natural to me that a discussion of “clinical
findings” will focus on the parts of the record that contain ob-
jective medical assessments rather than those documenting
Swiecichowski’s self-reported symptoms.
16                                                    No. 22-2011

    Of course, the ALJ cannot ignore the longitudinal evidence
with respect to Swiecichowski’s subjective reports of pain. But
I don’t think he did. Citing a number of different medical vis-
its spanning multiple years in the record, the ALJ acknowl-
edged that Swiecichowski has complained of “neck and back
pain,” “right elbow and hand pain,” “right elbow pain which
radiates down on her forearm,” “decreased grip strength and
tremors,” and general “body pain,” and that she presented at
a physical exam with “exquisite tenderness all over the back.”
The majority criticizes the ALJ’s failure to mention additional
medical visits during which Swiecichowski made similar
complaints of limiting pain. But nearly half of the visits the
majority discusses took place before October 16, 2018—the
amended onset date of Swiecichowski’s disability. While the
ALJ was entitled to (and did) consider medical evidence be-
fore the date of onset, see Groves v. Apfel, 

 (7th
Cir. 1998), I am hesitant to find fault with his decision to not
cite even more of the pre-onset record. More broadly, I worry
that the majority’s standard for longitudinal analysis is overly
demanding and implies the existence of some threshold
amount of medical evidence that ALJs must consider without
specifying where that line is.
    The ALJ’s ultimate determination that Swiecichowski was
capable of restricted light work was further supported by
medical opinions from two state agency consultants, and the
ALJ explained why he found these opinions more persuasive
than those of Swiecichowski’s providers. And, notably, the
ALJ’s evaluation of all the record evidence led him to con-
clude that Swiecichowski’s residual functional capacity was
actually more limited than the state agency consultants as-
sessed it to be. Whether we would have weighed the evidence
in the record differently or reached a different conclusion than
No. 22-2011                                                   17

the ALJ is irrelevant; when reviewing for substantial evi-
dence, we ask only whether the ALJ’s conclusion was sup-
ported by “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate.” Martin v. Kijakazi, 

, 729
(7th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted). In this case, I cannot say
the ALJ wholly failed to consider the longitudinal record with
respect to Swiecichowski’s symptoms, nor that his decision
lacked a “logical bridge between the evidence and the result.”
Beardsley v. Colvin, 

 (7th Cir. 2014). The ALJ’s
explanation of his reasoning was certainly not perfect—but it
need not be under our highly deferential standard of review.
I respectfully dissent.