In the

    United States Court of Appeals
               For the Seventh Circuit
                  ____________________

Nos. 24-1739, 24-1740, 24-1741 & 24-1742
CENTRAL STATES, SOUTHEAST AND SOUTHWEST AREAS PENSION
FUND and CHARLES A. WHOBREY,
                                    Plaintiffs-Appellants,

                             v.

EVENT MEDIA INC., d/b/a COMPLETE CREWING,
                                       Defendant-Appellee.
                  ____________________

EVENT MEDIA INC., d/b/a COMPLETE CREWING,
                                        Plaintiff-Appellee,

                             v.

CENTRAL STATES, SOUTHEAST AND SOUTHWEST AREAS PENSION
FUND,
                                   Defendant-Appellant.
                  ____________________
2                       Nos. 24-1739, 24-1740, 24-1741 & 24-1742

PACK EXPO SERVICES, LLC,
                                                    Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                  v.

CENTRAL STATES, SOUTHEAST AND SOUTHWEST AREAS PENSION
FUND,
                                   Defendant-Appellant.
                      ____________________

CENTRAL STATES, SOUTHEAST AND SOUTHWEST AREAS PENSION
FUND and CHARLES A. WHOBREY,
                                    Plaintiffs-Appellants,

                                  v.

PACK EXPO SERVICES, LLC,
                                                  Defendant-Appellee.
                      ____________________

         Appeals from the United States District Court for the
             Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
     Nos. 1:22-cv-6133, 1:22-cv-6143, 1:22-cv-6471 & 1:22-cv-6553 —
                        Edmond E. Chang, Judge.
                      ____________________

    ARGUED DECEMBER 10, 2024 — DECIDED APRIL 24, 2025
                ____________________

    Before KIRSCH, LEE, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges.
    KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. This case presents a narrow question
of statutory interpretation concerning multiemployer pension
plans. Event Media Inc. and Pack Expo Services, LLC, were
contributing employers to the Central States, Southeast and
Nos. 24-1739, 24-1740, 24-1741 & 24-1742                         3

Southwest Areas Pension Fund. They withdrew from the
Fund and incurred withdrawal liability obligations. The em-
ployers and Fund disagree over how to calculate those obli-
gations, a dispute that requires us to interpret 

(g)(3). In a well-reasoned opinion, the district court held
that the employers’ post-2014 contribution rate increases
should be excluded from the calculation. We affirm.
                                 I
                                A
    Although our interpretive question is narrow, it involves
a complex web of pension plan statutes. Congress enacted the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),

 et seq., “to ensure that employees and their
beneficiaries would not be deprived of anticipated retirement
benefits by the termination of pension plans before sufficient
funds have been accumulated in them.” Concrete Pipe & Prods.
of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 

 (1993) (cleaned up). To that end, ERISA provides that
any employer who withdraws from an insolvent pension plan
during the five years prior to insolvency is “liable for a fair
share of the plan’s underfunding.” Milwaukee Brewery Work-
ers’ Pension Plan v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 

(1995). But this provision had an unintended consequence. It
“encouraged an employer to withdraw from a financially
shaky plan and risk paying its share if the plan later became
insolvent, rather than to remain and (if others withdrew) risk
having to bear alone the entire cost of keeping the shaky plan
afloat.” 

 at 416–17. “Consequently, a plan’s financial trou-
bles could trigger a stampede for the exit doors, thereby en-
suring the plan’s demise.” 

.
4                    Nos. 24-1739, 24-1740, 24-1741 & 24-1742

    To fix this problem, Congress passed the Multiemployer
Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381–
1461, which requires “employers who withdraw from under-
funded multiemployer pension plans to pay withdrawal lia-
bility.” Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Tr. Fund v.
Ferbar Corp. of Cal., Inc., 

 (1997) (quotation
omitted). An employer’s withdrawal liability “roughly
matches [its] proportionate share of the plan’s unfunded
vested benefits.” 

 (quotation omitted). Withdrawing em-
ployers may make their withdrawal liability payments in ei-
ther one lump sum or periodic installments, 

, and in-
stallments are calculated using the employer’s “highest con-
tribution rate” during the ten years before withdrawal, 

(c)(1)(C)(i)(II).
    Congress later passed the Pension Protection Act of 2006,
which requires underfunded multiemployer pension plans to
take certain remedial measures. Pub. L. No. 109–280, 

. Now, pension plans in “endangered status” must adopt
“funding improvement plan[s],” and pension plans in “criti-
cal status” or “critical and declining status” must adopt “re-
habilitation plan[s].” 

(a). Both measures re-
quire the pension plan to propose changes—reduce future
benefit accruals, increase contributions, or both—that would
enable the plan to recover from its underfunded status. 

§ 1085(c)(1)(B)(i) & (e)(1)(B).
    But the Pension Protection Act’s requirements created an-
other unintended consequence. Although Congress intended
an employer’s withdrawal liability and its share of a pension
plan’s unfunded vested benefits to rise and fall together (that
is, an employer pays more to withdraw if it has more un-
funded vested benefits in the plan), see Bay Area Laundry, 522
Nos. 24-1739, 24-1740, 24-1741 & 24-1742                       5

U.S. at 196; Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 

 (1984), the opposite now occurred. An em-
ployer’s withdrawal liability increased as its share of un-
funded vested benefits decreased (that is, it paid more to
withdraw despite having fewer unfunded vested benefits in
the plan). See Methods for Computing Withdrawal Liability,
Multiemployer Pension Reform Act of 2014, 

,
1264 (Jan. 8, 2021). This happened because an employer’s pe-
riodic withdrawal liability payments are calculated using its
highest contribution rate in the past ten years, 

(c)(1)(C)(i)(II), and a funding improvement plan or re-
habilitation plan often requires employers to increase their
contribution rates, see 

 § 1085(c)(1)(B)(i) & (e)(1)(B). Thus,
as an employer’s contribution rate increased to reduce un-
funded vested benefits, the penalty for withdrawing also in-
creased.
    To address this issue, Congress adopted the Multiem-
ployer Pension Reform Act of 2014, which excludes certain
post-2014 increases in an employer’s contribution rate from
the calculation of its periodic withdrawal liability payments.

Div. O, § 109, 

, 2789–92 (cod-
ified at 

, 

); see also Methods for
Computing Withdrawal Liability, 86 Fed. Reg. at 1264. Specif-
ically, § 1085(g)(3) outlines the “[c]ontribution increases re-
quired by funding improvement or rehabilitation plan[s]”
that are disregarded in withdrawal liability determinations:
       (A) In general
       Any increase in the contribution rate … that is
       required or made in order to enable the plan to
       meet the requirement of the funding improve-
       ment plan or rehabilitation plan shall be
6                    Nos. 24-1739, 24-1740, 24-1741 & 24-1742

       disregarded in determining … the highest con-
       tribution rate ….
Id. § 1085(g)(3)(A). And any increase in the contribution rate
is deemed required to meet the funding improvement or re-
habilitation plan with two exceptions:
       (B) Special rules
       For purposes of this paragraph, any increase in
       the contribution rate … shall be deemed to be
       required or made in order to enable the plan to
       meet the requirement of the funding improve-
       ment plan or rehabilitation plan except for [1]
       increases in contribution requirements due to
       increased levels of work, employment, or peri-
       ods for which compensation is provided or [2]
       additional contributions are used to provide an
       increase in benefits, including an increase in fu-
       ture benefit accruals, permitted by subsection
       (d)(1)(B) or (f)(1)(B).
Id. § 1085(g)(3)(B). This appeal concerns the second exception
and the meaning of “permitted by subsection … (f)(1)(B).”
                               B
    Event Media Inc. and Pack Expo Services, LLC, (collec-
tively, the Employers) were contributing employers to the
Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund.
In 2008, the Fund’s actuary certified that the Fund was in crit-
ical status, which required it to adopt a rehabilitation plan.
See 

(a)(2) & (b)(2). When the Fund’s actuary
certified in 2019 that the Fund was in critical and declining
status and projected it would become insolvent by 2025, the
Nos. 24-1739, 24-1740, 24-1741 & 24-1742                      7

Employers withdrew from the Fund and incurred with-
drawal liability obligations.
    The parties dispute how much the Employers must pay in
periodic installments. In 2014, each Employer’s contribution
rate was $328, and it increased every year until reaching $424
in 2019, the year the Employers withdrew from the Fund.
When calculating the Employers’ withdrawal liability pay-
ments, the Fund used the higher 2019 rate because that was
the “highest contribution rate” in the past ten years. See 

§ 1399(c)(1)(C)(i)(II). The Employers argue the Fund should
have used the lower 2014 rate because § 1085(g)(3) excludes
from the calculation all post-2014 contribution rate increases
that are required by a rehabilitation plan. This dispute pre-
sents a question of first impression for the courts of appeals.
We conclude that the Fund should have used the 2014 rate.
                               II
    Despite ERISA’s labyrinthian structure, this exercise in
statutory interpretation is straightforward. When determin-
ing the highest contribution rate a pension plan should use to
calculate an employer’s periodic withdrawal liability pay-
ments, § 1085(g)(3)(A) disregards any post-2014 contribution
rate increase that is required to meet a funding improvement
plan or rehabilitation plan. And all contribution rate increases
are deemed “required” unless either of two exceptions ap-
plies. 

(g)(3)(B). Neither does in this case, so
the Employers’ post-2014 contribution rate increases are dis-
regarded from their withdrawal liability payment calcula-
tions.
   The first exception is “for increases in contribution re-
quirements due to increased levels of work, employment, or
8                     Nos. 24-1739, 24-1740, 24-1741 & 24-1742

periods for which compensation is provided.” 

 The parties
agree this exception doesn’t apply. The second is for “addi-
tional contributions … used to provide an increase in benefits,
including an increase in future benefit accruals, permitted by
subsection (d)(1)(B) or (f)(1)(B).” 

 The parties likewise agree
that § 1085(d)(1)(B) doesn’t apply (nor could it, because it’s for
funding improvement plans, and the Fund adopted a rehabil-
itation plan). The Fund instead focuses on § 1085(f)(1)(b) and
argues that the post-2014 contribution rate increases were
used to provide an increase in benefits permitted by
§ 1085(f)(1)(B). We disagree.
    Section 1085(f)(1)(B) permits amendments to a pension
plan that increase benefits, but only where “the plan actuary
certifies that such increase is paid for out of additional contri-
butions not contemplated by the rehabilitation plan.” The
parties agree there was no amendment, and the Fund points
us to no actuarial certification, so § 1085(f)(1)(B) doesn’t apply
either. Because the post-2014 contribution rate increases were
not “permitted by subsection … (f)(1)(B),” the Fund must dis-
regard them in calculating the Employers’ withdrawal liabil-
ity payments. 

(g)(3)(B).
    The Fund contends that “permitted by subsection …
(f)(1)(B)” really means not prohibited by subsection (f)(1)(B).
Because § 1085(f)(1)(B) only deals with amendments to a pen-
sion plan made after the adoption of a rehabilitation plan, the
Fund believes that increases in the contribution rate predating
the rehabilitation plan do not require a plan amendment and
are thus not prohibited by § 1085(f)(1)(B). The Fund says this
includes the contribution rate increases at issue here because
they were included in the Fund’s pension plan documents
that predate the rehabilitation plan. But the Fund’s argument
Nos. 24-1739, 24-1740, 24-1741 & 24-1742                      9

does not convince us. If Congress meant not prohibited, it
could have used those words. And although the Fund argues
permitted can be construed passively to mean not prohibited,
see Legal Maxims, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024)
(“Everything that the law does not forbid is permitted.”), we
believe the better construction of the statutory language re-
quires more affirmative permission. What § 1085(f)(1)(B) af-
firmatively permits is post-rehabilitation plan amendments to
the pension plan, accompanied by actuarial certification. Be-
cause the post-2014 contribution rate increases were not in-
cluded as an amendment to the rehabilitation plan and were
not accompanied by actuarial certification, they were not
“permitted by subsection … (f)(1)(B).”
    More broadly, the Fund construes § 1085(g)(3) to in-
clude—not disregard—all contribution rate increases in with-
drawal liability payment calculations unless those increases
reduce unfunded vested benefits or were made via an amend-
ment but unaccompanied by an actuarial certification. It ar-
gues that § 1085(g)(3)(B) simply lays out some examples of
contribution rate increases to be included in calculating an
employer’s withdrawal liability, rather than establishing the
only exceptions to the general prohibition against including
contribution rate increases. The Fund justifies this interpreta-
tion by arguing § 1085(g)(3) has a specific and limited pur-
pose: to avoid an undesirable outcome where an employer re-
duces a pension plan’s unfunded vested benefits—thereby
improving the health of the pension plan and furthering the
rehabilitation plan’s requirements—but at the same time
counterproductively increases its withdrawal liability.
   But the Fund ignores the language of the statute. Section
1085(g)(3) excludes contribution rate increases “[i]n general,”
10                   Nos. 24-1739, 24-1740, 24-1741 & 24-1742

unless some limited, “[s]pecial” exception applies. It provides
that any contribution rate increase required to meet the reha-
bilitation plan shall be disregarded in calculating the highest
contribution rate, id. § 1085(g)(3)(A), and it deems all contri-
bution rate increases to be required to meet the rehabilitation
plan unless, as relevant here, the rate increase is permitted by
§ 1085(f)(1)(B), id. § 1085(g)(3)(B). The Fund makes a reasona-
ble argument about § 1085(g)(3)’s purpose, but ERISA is “an
enormously complex and detailed statute that resolved innu-
merable disputes between powerful competing interests.”
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 

 (1993). Balancing
those competing interests is Congress’s job, which it has re-
peatedly performed by revising the statutory scheme for mul-
tiemployer pension plans. Our job is to interpret the text Con-
gress provides. We decline the Fund’s invitation to stray be-
yond that text and balance the interests ourselves.
                                                     AFFIRMED