In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096
REPUBLIC TECHNOLOGIES (NA), LLC and
REPUBLIC TOBACCO, L.P.
                       Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross-Appellees,

                                 v.

BBK TOBACCO & FOODS, LLP,
                       Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.
                    ____________________

        Appeals from the United States District Court for the
           Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
          No. 1:16-cv-03401 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.
                    ____________________

   ARGUED SEPTEMBER 12, 2024 — DECIDED APRIL 25, 2025
                ____________________

   Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
   HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Republic Technologies
and defendant BBK Tobacco (known as “HBI”) compete in the
market for organic hemp rolling papers for cigarettes,
regardless of the type of dried leaves burned in them. Plaintiff
Republic manufactures and markets a brand of rolling papers
known as “OCB,” while defendant HBI markets papers
manufactured by others, including an in-house brand known
2                                       Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096

as “RAW.” Republic sued HBI in 2016 seeking a declaration
that the trade dress for Republic’s OCB papers did not
infringe HBI’s trade dress for its RAW papers. Republic later
amended its complaint to accuse HBI of false advertising in
violation of state and federal law. HBI counterclaimed,
asserting as relevant to this appeal that OCB’s trade dress
actually did infringe HBI’s trade dress for RAW papers. The
case was tried to a jury in 2021, resulting in a mixed verdict
on the infringement claims. The district court later entered a
permanent injunction against some of HBI’s advertising
practices.
    Both sides have appealed, raising just a few discrete
issues. Republic argues that the district court’s response to a
jury question failed to clarify properly that HBI could be liable
under the federal Lanham Act if its advertising misled
commercial middlemen (rather than individual smokers).
Republic also argues that the jury’s finding that its OCB trade
dress infringed RAW’s trade dress was unsupported by the
evidence. On cross-appeal, HBI contends that the district
court’s injunction is unduly vague and improperly applies
nationwide. We affirm the judgment of the district court in all
respects.
I. Background
    A. Factual Background
    Republic owns and operates facilities where it manufac-
tures OCB papers, which it sells to wholesale distributors and
large retailers. It began selling organic hemp rolling papers in
Europe in 2010 and started its United States operation in 2014.
As part of its initial U.S. sales strategy, Republic sold a 24-
Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096                                       3

pack of OCB organic hemp rolling papers for a discounted
price of 99 cents.
    HBI has been selling RAW rolling papers in the United
States since 2009. Unlike Republic, it does not manufacture its
own “paper booklets.” HBI acquires the RAW-branded
booklets from an entity called Iberpapel, located in Spain.
Iberpapel, in turn, obtains rolls of paper—which it packages
into booklets—from paper mills. HBI sells the booklets to “a
wide variety of customers ranging from small mom and pops,
like smoke shops, convenience stores, grocery stores, liquor
stores, all the way up through small distributors, regional
distributors, and large chains like Sam’s Club or Costco.”
   HBI’s marketing strategy included a series of claims that
Republic says are false:
      —RAW papers are made from organic hemp
      —RAW papers are the “world’s first” or
       “world’s only” organic hemp rolling papers
      —RAW papers are made using wind power
      —RAW papers are made from “unrefined”
       natural hemp
      —RAW papers are made using “Natural Hemp
       Gum”
      —RAW papers are made in Alcoy, Spain
      —A portion of profits from RAW products goes
       to the “RAW Foundation,” which uses those
       funds to save lives worldwide
      —HBI’s owner, Josh Kesselman, invented
       rolling paper “cones.”
4                                      Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096

See also dkt. 925 at 3–4 (permanent injunction ordering HBI
to refrain from making many of these statements). These
statements served as the basis for Republic’s false advertising
claims under state and federal law.
    B. Procedural Background
    In February 2016, HBI’s counsel sent Republic a letter
asking Republic to change OCB’s trade dress to eliminate “the
substantial similarity between the package designs and any
consumer confusion over whether the OCB Organic Hemp
rolling papers originate [from], or are otherwise associated
with, the RAW® Organic Hemp rolling papers sold by” HBI.
The next month, in March 2016, Republic filed this lawsuit in
the Northern District of Illinois seeking a declaration that its
trade dress—principally its package design—did not infringe
HBI’s trade dress. Republic later amended its complaint to
allege unfair competition and deceptive advertising under the
federal Lanham Act, 

(a), Illinois common law,
and the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(“IUDTPA”), 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 510/2 (2024). HBI
counterclaimed, asserting trade dress infringement and
copyright infringement.
   At trial the court gave an agreed jury instruction on
Republic’s Lanham Act false advertising claim. It explained
that, for the jury to find HBI engaged in false advertising, it
had to find that HBI made a misleading statement that
“conveys a false impression and actually misleads a
consumer” and that the “deception was likely to influence the
purchasing decisions of consumers.”
   On the second day of jury deliberations, the court received
several questions from the jury. One asked: “Is there a
Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096                                       5

definition of ‘consumer’? Is that only the End User of the
product or including anyone who purchases the product?”
The parties disagreed on how to respond. The court held an
off-the-record conversation on the question and upon return
stated its view that “the answers are contained in the
instructions.” Republic objected, arguing that when there is
“a clear answer, as a matter of law, … we ought to give it to
the jury.” The court noted the objection and nonetheless sent
a note to the jury stating: “As to your questions, I can only
advise you (at this time) to refer to and review all the
instructions … including the cautionary instructions.”
    The jury returned a verdict against Republic on its federal
Lanham Act false advertising claims but for Republic on its
common law and IUDTPA claims. The verdict form required
specific findings on which statements by HBI constituted false
advertising only if the jury found for Republic on the Lanham
Act claim. Because it did not, the parties were left with a
verdict form assigning liability to HBI under Illinois law but
without findings as to which statements or categories of
statements constituted “unfair trade practices.”
    Republic filed a motion seeking a permanent injunction
based on the jury’s having found HBI liable under the
IUDTPA. HBI opposed the motion but told the court that it
found the trial to be “something of a ‘wake up call’ about the
importance” of carefully confining its advertising to
statements “that either clearly constitute permissible
salesmanship (e.g. ‘great tasting’) or for which the company
maintains tangible, objective verification.” Republic later
submitted a draft injunction that included a slightly modified
version of HBI’s statement, requiring HBI’s advertisements to
“either clearly constitute permissible opinion … or be factual
6                                       Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096

statements for which HBI maintains tangible, objective,
verification.” HBI objected, but the district court included that
term in the permanent injunction.
    The jury also found that Republic’s trade dress for its 99-
cent OCB papers infringed HBI’s trade dress for its RAW
papers. Republic moved for judgment as a matter of law
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), arguing that the
different large capital letters on the OCB and RAW packages
required a finding of non-infringement. It also filed a Rule 59
motion for a new trial on its false advertising claim, arguing
that the court did not clear up the jury’s “consumer”
confusion with “concrete accuracy.” Dkt. 937 at 6, quoting
United States v. Durham, 

 (7th Cir. 2011). The
district court denied both motions.
II. Discussion
    We first address Republic’s request for a new trial on the
jury’s question about a “consumer,” then Republic’s motion
for judgment as a matter of law on HBI’s trade dress claim,
and finally HBI’s challenge to the terms and geographic scope
of the permanent injunction.
    A. The Jury’s Question
    Republic argues that the district court should have
granted its motion for a new trial because the court
erroneously referred the jury back to the initial instructions
instead of clarifying who could be a “consumer” under the
false advertising instruction. We find that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in responding to the jury’s
question or in denying Republic’s motion for a new trial.
   A trial judge tries to give a jury instructions on the law that
applies to the issues the jury must decide, striking a balance
Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096                                          7

between giving the jury all it needs but without unnecessary
detail. From the trial judge’s point of view, it’s helpful if the
parties agree to all or nearly all of the instructions, as in this
case. Despite those efforts, juries sometimes ask the judge
during deliberations for further explanations.
    That happened here. The parties agreed that the jury
should be instructed in accordance with Seventh Circuit
Pattern Instruction 13.3.1 on the elements of the Lanham Act
claim. The key portion of that instruction read this way:
       For Republic to succeed on its claim of false ad-
       vertising, Republic must prove five things by a
       preponderance of the evidence:
       1. HBI made a false or misleading statement of
       fact in a commercial advertisement about the
       nature; quality; characteristic; or geographic
       origin of its own product or Republic’s product.
       A statement is misleading if it conveys a false
       impression and actually misleads a consumer. A
       statement can be misleading even if it is literally
       true or ambiguous.
       2. The statement actually deceived or had the
       tendency to deceive a substantial segment of
       HBI’s audience.
       3. The deception was likely to influence the
       purchasing decisions of consumers.…
Dkt. 801 at 3 (emphasis added).
   During deliberations, the jury sent the court a note asking
whether “consumer” could be “only the End User of the
product or including anyone who purchases the product?”
8                                               Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096

After consulting with counsel, the court responded that the
jury should “refer to and review all the instructions including
the cautionary instructions.” Republic objected to the court’s
decision not to issue a supplemental instruction that would
have made more explicit that Republic could prove its claim
by showing that commercial middlemen, as distinct from end
users, could be or were deceived.
    We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s
response to a jury question. United States v. Funds in the
Amount of One Hundred Thousand & One Hundred Twenty
Dollars ($100,120.00) (“Funds”), 

 (7th Cir.
2018). Our review focuses on “whether the response: (1) fairly
and adequately addressed the issues; (2) correctly stated the
law; and (3) answered the jury’s question specifically.” Stevens
v. Interactive Financial Advisors, Inc., 

 (7th Cir.
2016). And while we have said that “the [district] court has an
obligation to dispel any confusion quickly and with concrete
accuracy,” United States v. Sims, 

 (7th Cir.
2003), it is also true that “a judge need not deliver instructions
describing all valid legal principles.” Gehring v. Case Corp., 

 (7th Cir. 1994). Further, we will reverse “only if
the response resulted in prejudice.” Funds, 

. 1
    It is rare for us to vacate a judgment based on a district
court’s decision not to issue a clarifying response when the
initial instruction was a correct statement of law. See, e.g.,
Knowlton v. City of Wauwatosa, 

 (7th Cir. 2024)

    1 We also review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s denial

of Republic’s Rule 59 motion for a new trial. O’Donnell v. Caine Weiner Co.,

 (7th Cir. 2019). Because the district court did not abuse
its discretion in responding to the jury’s question, it also did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.
Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096                                                      9

(decision to refer jury back to original, correct instruction was
not an abuse of discretion; standard “does not require the
‘best’ answer”); Durham, 

 (“a judge does not err
by instructing the jury to re-read the instructions in response
to a question, so long as the original jury charge clearly and
correctly states the applicable law.”). Such caution on the part
of a trial judge is understandable. An incorrect response could
prejudice either party and jeopardize the eventual verdict. “As
long as the original instructions accurately and
understandably state the law, referring a jury back to those
instructions can be the most prudent course…. Deviating
from these instructions creates the needless risk of reversible
error.” Emerson v. Shaw, 

, 685–86 (7th Cir. 2009)
(affirming denial of habeas relief). 2
    The district judge here had to choose between referring the
jury back to an agreed instruction on the elements of the
Lanham Act claim or issuing a disputed answer resolving
whether Lanham Act liability can be based on a misleading
statement to an intermediate purchaser. See Republic
Technologies (NA), LLC v. BBK Tobacco & Foods, LLP (“New Trial
Order”), No. 16-CV-3401, 

, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 22, 2023) (“This Court decided not to provide a
supplemental instruction because the parties disagreed on the

    2 Republic cites United States v. Fisher, 

, 447–49 (6th Cir.

2011), for the premise that a court can abuse its discretion by failing to
clarify an important legal issue not covered by the initial jury instructions.
We agree with the general premise, but the Fisher opinion also recognized
that jury questions can pose nuanced problems that district courts have
considerable discretion in solving. In the end, Fisher affirmed a district
court’s decision not to answer a question that was “not relevant to the
crimes charged.” 

. Fisher does not show that the court abused its
discretion in this case.
10                                      Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096

correct answer to the question….”). This juxtaposition—and
the absence of a clear answer in the statute or in our case
law—persuades us that the district court’s decision to refer
the jury back to the original instructions was not an abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Mealy, 

 (7th
Cir. 1988) (“If the original jury charge clearly and correctly
states the applicable law, the judge may properly answer the
jury’s question by instructing the jury to reread the
instructions.”). In this case, the court heard both sides,
weighed the choices, and stuck with the original instruction
that both sides had approved. That was not an abuse of
discretion. See Knowlton, 

 (not abuse of
discretion to refer jury back to original instruction when
question involved clarification of agreed initial instruction).
    Republic also argues that the district court applied the
wrong legal standard when assessing whether Republic was
prejudiced by the district court’s response. According to
Republic, the district court required it to show that a properly
instructed jury “must have” found in its favor when it should
have needed to show only that a properly instructed jury
“might well have” found in its favor.
   The district court did not apply an incorrect legal
standard. It used the phrase “must have” only to explain
Republic’s argument: “Republic reasons that the jury must
have inferred that ‘consumers’ means ‘end users.’” New Trial
Order, 

, at *5. This is a fair characterization of
Republic’s position both in the district court and on appeal.
For example, in its opening brief on appeal, Republic argues:
“the very fact that the jury asked the question—whether a
‘consumer’ is ‘only the End User of the product or including
anyone who purchases the product?’—indicates that at least
Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096                                          11

some of the jurors viewed the question as potentially
dispositive.”
    The district court cited Cook v. IPC Int’l Corp., 

 (7th Cir. 2012), for the point that Republic now argues it
overlooked: that a party is prejudiced by an instructional
error when “a properly instructed jury might well have found
in the plaintiff’s favor.” New Trial Order, 

, at
*4, quoting Cook, 

. This is an accurate statement
of the law, though we do not mean to imply that the standard
for prejudice is a precise one. See Boyd v. Illinois State Police,

 (7th Cir. 2004) (erroneous supplemental jury
instruction would require new trial only if “jury was likely to
be confused or misled”); see also, e.g., Jimenez v. City of
Chicago, 

 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming where
district court refused narrower jury instruction requested by
defense: “Even if we believe that the jury was confused or
misled, we would need to find that the defendants were
prejudiced before ordering a new trial.”).
   Like the district court, we are not persuaded that a
different response to the jury question “might well have” or
was “reasonably likely” to have caused the jury to return a
verdict for Republic. This is so for two reasons.
    First, the closest thing to an answer to the jury’s question
in the original instructions resolved the issue in Republic’s
favor. The second bullet point of the Lanham Act
instructions—sandwiched between the two provisions
referring to “consumers”—required the jury to find that the
statement “actually deceived or had the tendency to deceive
a substantial segment of HBI’s audience.” Dkt. 801 at 3
(emphasis added). By referring the jury to the initial
instructions, the court referred it to this instruction—which
12                                            Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096

implies that the relevant purchasing public is “HBI’s
audience,” whoever that may be. See Knowlton, 

 (district court did not abuse discretion by referring jury to
original instruction containing broad language bearing on
jury’s question); Durham, 

 (telling jury to re-
read instructions was not abuse of discretion when
instructions addressed jury’s question).
    Second, even if the jury believed that only “end users”
could be “consumers,” Republic presented evidence at trial
that HBI’s statements misled that group. For example, the jury
heard testimony from Republic executive Seth Gold that
HBI’s claim to sell the world’s first and only organic hemp
rolling papers could influence “a very large number of …
potential purchasers.” Gold’s testimony focused on the public
appeal of organic products to ultimate purchasers. Gold also
testified to the likely effect on end users of HBI’s statements
about “natural gum,” “Alcoy, Spain,” wind power, and
charitable donations. He told the jury that resellers also care
about these statements because they know that consumers
make purchasing decisions based on such factors. 3
    Republic presented evidence at trial regarding the
possibility of HBI’s statements misleading both end users and
intermediaries. It now seeks a new trial because the district
court did not point the jury in a particular direction. The
district court’s decision not to do so was not an abuse of

     3 As the district court noted, the jury may have decided not to credit

this evidence on whether anyone, whether an end user or distributor, was
misled by the deceptive advertising. New Trial Order, 

, at
*6. The point is that Republic’s trial evidence was not focused enough on
demonstrating confusion among middlemen for us to conclude that it was
prejudiced by the district court’s response.
Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096                                                    13

discretion. See EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 

 (7th
Cir. 2016) (affirming denial of motion for new trial and
finding no prejudice from supposedly confusing jury
instructions when appellant had ability to make argument to
the jury).
    B. Trade Dress Infringement
    Republic next argues that the district court erred by
denying its Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on
HBI’s trade dress claim. The Lanham Act, 

(a),
protects against infringement of a product’s trade dress,
which is “a product design that is so distinctive it identifies
the product’s source.” Bodum USA, Inc. v. A Top New Casting
Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 2019). Trade dress can include
the product’s “size, shape, color, graphics, packaging, and
label.” Abbott Laboratories v. Mead Johnson & Co., 

(7th Cir. 1992), quoting Vaughan Manufacturing Co. v. Brikam
Int’l, Inc., 

, 348 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987). “A party may
obtain relief under 

(a) for trade dress
infringement if it can prove (1) its trade dress is protectible;
and (2) its trade dress was infringed.” Badger Meter, Inc. v.
Grinnell Corp., 

 (7th Cir. 1994).
   HBI’s trade dress was protectible.4 The disputed question
on appeal is whether a reasonable jury could find that


    4 Republic’s reply brief asserts in a footnote that HBI’s claim relies on

elements of trade dress that are either functional or generic and are
therefore not protectible. If Republic meant to offer this point as a reason
to reverse, it should have been part of its opening brief on appeal. Its
silence in the opening brief waived the argument. See Bernard v. Sessions,

 (7th Cir. 2018). In any event, even where functional or
generic elements of trade dress are not protectible individually, they can
be elements of a holistic trade dress that is protectible. See Computer Care
14                                                Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096

Republic’s OCB trade dress infringed HBI’s RAW trade dress.
That requires us to assess whether HBI can show that “the
similarity of [OCB’s] trade dress to that of [RAW] is such as to
create a likelihood of confusion on the part of consumers as to
the source of the goods.” 

 The district court concluded that
the jury finding of likely confusion was supported by
sufficient evidence. We review the court’s decision de novo,
taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
Bodum USA, 

, but there must be more than “a
mere scintilla of evidence” to support the verdict. May v.
Chrysler Group, LLC, 

 (7th Cir. 2013), quoting
Hossack v. Floor Covering Assocs. of Joliet, Inc., 

(7th Cir. 2007).
   Republic sold two OCB products relevant to this appeal, a
promotional 99-cent 24-pack with red lettering, and a full-
priced 36-pack with brown lettering:




  99-cent OCB promotional packaging with red lettering.
  Dkt. 954-8.




v. Service Systems Enterprises, Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 1992)
(“Where the plaintiff’s overall trade dress is distinctive, the fact that it uses
descriptive (or generic) elements does not render it nonprotectable.”).
Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096                                        15




  Full-priced OCB 36-pack with brown lettering. Dkt. 954-
  16.


   HBI’s RAW packaging also had bright red lettering:




 RAW packaging. Dkt. 955-6.

    The jury found that Republic’s OCB 99-cent red packaging
infringed the RAW trade dress but that its full-priced brown
packaging did not. Republic now argues that no reasonable
person “could possibly confuse Republic’s OCB rolling
papers for HBI’s RAW papers given the prominent display of
the brand names in ‘great big letters’ in the center of the
package ….” Republic Br. at 35. We see the point, but on this
record, at least, the different letters and names are a factor for
the jury to weigh, not a feature that defeats the claim as a
matter of law.
   Republic’s “great big letters” argument goes to the weight,
not the sufficiency, of the evidence of similarity. See Badger
16                                      Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096

Meter, 13 F.3d at 1152–53 (affirming denial of Rule 50 motion
and noting similar arguments went to weight, not
sufficiency). Assessing the likelihood of confusion between
two trade dresses involves consideration of seven factors:
“(1) the similarity between the marks; (2) the similarity of the
products; (3) the area and manner of concurrent use; (4) the
degree of care consumers are likely to use; (5) the strength of
plaintiff’s mark; (6) actual consumer confusion; and (7) the
defendant’s intent to ‘palm off’ its product as that of another.”
Uncommon, LLC v. Spigen, Inc., 

 (7th Cir.
2019), quoting Sorensen v. WD-40 Co., 

 (7th
Cir. 2015). “No one factor is dispositive.” 

 While Republic
challenges only “similarity between the marks,” in
considering the challenge to the verdict, we must take all of
them into account.
    HBI presented substantial evidence on five of the six other
“likelihood of confusion” factors. The underlying products
are very similar, even according to Republic’s advertising
materials, and have an overlapping manner of use. The jury
also heard expert testimony that “some consumers are likely
to make quick decisions, without paying much attention
when choosing cigarette rolling papers.” Some evidence
tended to show actual customer confusion, including
statements from HBI executives that customers and retailers
wondered about the relationship between OCB and RAW.
The jury also received competing expert surveys regarding
consumer confusion. We reiterate here that the Lanham Act
“requires the plaintiff to show ‘a likelihood of confusion,’ a
question of fact in which ‘actual confusion’ is but a single
nondispositive part.” NBA Properties, Inc. v. HANWJH, 

, 626 n.18 (7th Cir. 2022), quoting Board of Supervisors
for Louisiana State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel
Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096                                        17

Co., 

 (5th Cir. 2008). Finally, HBI presented
testimony indicating that a Republic employee conducted
market research on the HBI product and proposed that
Republic use a similar color scheme in releasing its own
product in Europe—allowing a reasonable jury to infer that
Republic intended to “palm off” its product as at least related
to HBI’s. All of this evidence, while contested, was available
for the jury to weigh in its holistic assessment of likelihood of
confusion. See Junkert v. Massey, 

 (7th Cir.
2010) (when reviewing Rule 50 motion, we take evidence in
light most favorable to jury’s verdict).
    The jury’s finding of likely confusion was not “irrational.”
Bodum USA, 

. The jury had the opportunity to
view side-by-side comparisons of the trade dresses and saw
pictures of the products next to each other on store shelves (as




RAW and OCB products side-by-side in a smoke shop.
18                                       Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096

displayed in the photograph). It also heard extensive
testimony comparing features of the trade dresses other than
the block letters. Both had a brown button on the side,
distressed fonts, textured backgrounds, green accents, large
red fonts, and three-letter labels. Notably, the jury found that
Republic’s OCB red 99-cent packaging infringed on RAW’s
trade dress while its brown full-priced packaging design did
not. This contrast suggests the jury considered carefully
whether each specific package design was likely to confuse—
and found that only the 99-cent packaging was, probably
because of the comparable red lettering. Republic asks us to
reweigh the evidence, which of course is not our role on
appeal. Crompton v. BNSF Railway Co., 

, 295–96
(7th Cir. 2014) (we “will overturn a jury verdict ‘only when
there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the
conclusion reached.’” (quoting Lavender v. Kurn, 

 (1946)).
    To be sure, the different product names were a factor
weighing against a finding of infringement. The distinct
product names factor strongly into the “similarity between
the marks” analysis, and they make this case a relatively close
one, even with our deferential review under Rule 50. But the
different names do not require judgment of non-infringement
as a matter of law. That was implicit in the Supreme Court’s
decision in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 

(1992), and explicit in the Fifth Circuit’s decision that was
affirmed. Both courts affirmed a jury verdict on trade dress
infringement notwithstanding that one party’s restaurants
were named “Two Pesos” and the other party’s were called
“Taco Cabana” and “TaCasita.” See Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v.
Two Pesos, Inc., 

 (5th Cir. 1991). In Two Pesos,
the brothers who owned the plaintiff restaurants divided the
Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096                                         19

restaurants between themselves just days before filing suit
against the allegedly infringing Two Pesos restaurant chain.
One brother kept the “Taco Cabana” name while the other
adopted “TaCasita”—but both kept the original trade dress.
The defendant, Two Pesos, argued that it could not be
“accountable for confusion in a market already subject to the
confusion perpetuated by Taco Cabana and TaCasita.” 

. While the Supreme Court did not address this
argument, the Fifth Circuit rejected it, explaining that “a
consumer who assumes some affiliation between Taco
Cabana and TaCasita assumes correctly…. An equivalent
assumption about Two Pesos, however, is incorrect, and
properly indicative of the market confusion for which the
Lanham Act provides redress.” 

   The Fifth Circuit’s discussion helps show why the
different brand names in this case do not require us to set
aside the jury’s verdict. Products may share an affiliation—
reflected by similar trade dress—despite different names.
Evidence in this record suggests that some rolling paper
consumers thought that might be true of OCB and RAW: the
jury heard testimony from HBI representatives that retailers
asked whether OCB was a RAW product. See, e.g., dkt. 854 at
1946; dkt. 989-1 at 10–11. As in Two Pesos, this evidence is
“properly indicative of the market confusion for which the
Lanham Act provides redress.” 

; see also
Computer Care v. Service Systems Enterprises, Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming finding on likelihood of
confusion between two software companies despite different
names: “Finally, it seems quite likely that the similarity of the
parties’ trade dress could lead dealers to believe that the two
companies are associated in some way.”).
20                                      Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096

    Republic relies on the Second Circuit’s decision in Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc. for its argument that the
distinct names require judgment as a matter of law. 

 (2d Cir. 1992). There, the Second Circuit concluded that
while one company’s “Tylenol PM” packaging shared many
elements similar to “Excedrin PM,” including color scheme
and font, the “prominence of the trade names on the two
packages weighs heavily against a finding of consumer
confusion resulting from the overall look of the packaging.”

 at 1045–46. Accordingly, it ruled that there was “no
likelihood of confusion between these two products” and
reversed the district court’s preliminary injunction. 

.
    We agree with the Second Circuit’s general point that the
“presence and prominence of markings tending to dispel
confusion as to the origin, sponsorship or approval of the
goods in question is highly relevant to an inquiry concerning
the similarity of the two dresses,” 

, but it does not
persuade us to set aside this jury’s verdict. Notably, the
Second Circuit in Bristol-Myers Squibb reviewed a district
court’s findings of fact on a preliminary injunction. While it
vacated the injunction, it did not go so far as to dismiss the
action, acknowledging that the plaintiff could “present
evidence at trial—numerous instances of actual confusion
between the two products by actual customers for example—
that might lead to a change in the ultimate conclusion
regarding the likelihood of consumer confusion.” 

.
   Here, we have a jury verdict on likelihood of confusion.
Our review is therefore more deferential both because the
verdict represents a final (not preliminary) finding of fact and
because we reverse jury verdicts only “when there is a
complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion
Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096                                                  21

reached.” Lavender, 

. As explained above,
evidence in the record supports this jury verdict. See Syndicate
Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 

 (7th Cir.
1999) (“There are, of course, situations where distinct labeling
or packaging of products will not prevent confusion.”).
    While it might be a slight overstatement to say that “the
question of likelihood of confusion is all fact and no law,”
Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 

 (7th
Cir. 1985), the point is close to the truth. See also Uncommon,

 (likelihood of confusion is a question of fact).
This properly instructed jury found that Republic’s trade
dress created a likelihood of confusion. Sufficient evidence
supports that finding, so we affirm the district court’s denial
of Republic’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.
    C. The Permanent Injunction
    That brings us to HBI’s cross-appeal, which contends the
district court’s injunction is improperly vague and overbroad.
HBI also argues that the injunction’s nationwide scope is
incongruous with its source—Illinois law—so that the
injunction should be limited to “conduct occurring primarily
and substantially within the State of Illinois.” “[W]e review
the district court’s decision to grant a permanent injunction
for an abuse of discretion, though we conduct an independent
review of any underlying legal determinations.” GEFT
Outdoor, LLC v. Monroe County, 

 (7th Cir.
2023). We affirm the district court’s permanent injunction. 5


    5 HBI also asserts in passing that the injunction is “improperly unlim-

ited in time.” That argument is underdeveloped and therefore forfeited.
See Jones v. Clark, 

 (7th Cir. 2011) (underdeveloped argu-
ments can be considered either waived or forfeited). That forfeiture would
22                                              Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096

         1. Specificity of the Injunction’s Terms
   The injunction requires that all HBI advertising or
promotional statements “shall either clearly constitute
permissible opinion (e.g., that something is ‘great tasting’) or
be factual statements for which HBI maintains tangible,
objective, verification.” HBI argues that this provision is
unduly vague and overbroad. 6
    A district court’s discretion in crafting an injunction is
governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d). In relevant
part, Rule 65(d)(1) requires an order granting any injunction
to “state its terms specifically” and to “describe in reasonable
detail … the act or acts restrained or required.” We have
emphasized that district courts may craft injunctions that are
“broad enough to be effective, and the appropriate scope of
the injunction is left to the district court’s sound discretion.”
Russian Media Group, LLC v. Cable America, Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming preliminary injunction).
Discretion is especially important when an enjoined party’s
“proclivity for unlawful conduct has been shown.” 

quoting McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 

(1949); see also Lineback v. Spurlino Materials, LLC, 546 F.3d


not, however, prevent the district court from revisiting the issue in the fu-
ture.
     6 The injunction also said that HBI “agreed” to the verification
requirement, a point that HBI disputes on appeal. HBI’s possible consent
is beside the point. The district court entered the injunction to vindicate
Republic’s rights under unfair competition law, not because HBI agreed
to each term. In fact, the court specifically rejected HBI’s request to delete
the verification requirement. Republic Technologies (NA), LLC v. BBK
Tobacco & Foods, LLP, No. 16-cv-03401, 

, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 6, 2022).
Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096                                      23

491, 505–06 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming injunction with
prohibition broader than employer’s proven violations
because employer had maintained strategy of obstruction).
Ordinarily the district court is “in the best position to weigh
these interests.” H-D Michigan, LLC v. Hellenic Duty Free Shops
S.A., 

 (7th Cir. 2012).
    HBI argues that the injunction is unduly vague because it
is unclear when a statement “clearly constitute[s] permitted
opinion,” or when a statement is factual and requires
“tangible, objective, verification.” This argument reflects
HBI’s dissatisfaction with the lack of sharp contours in false
advertising law. We have explained that a “prohibition on
implied falsehoods makes the use of somewhat inexact
language unavoidable.” Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 2018); see also Scandia Down, 

 (“When the difficulty stems from the inability of
words to describe the variousness of experience, the court
may prefer brief imprecise standards to prolix imprecise
standards.”). In Eli Lilly, for instance, we affirmed a
preliminary injunction against a dairy company’s misleading
portrayal of a drug product. The injunction prohibited the
dairy company from using one particular advertisement but
also barred it from making “substantially similar”
advertisements. 

. The dairy company appealed,
arguing (as HBI does here) that the language was vague and
overbroad. We affirmed because the injunction “essentially
prohibits [the company] from portraying [the drug] as
something it’s not. That’s sufficiently definite ….” 

.
   We reach the same conclusion here. Courts regularly
differentiate between statements of opinion and fact when
assessing false advertising claims, as well as claims in other
24                                      Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096

areas of the law. Likewise, businesses must ordinarily ensure
that their advertisements are factually accurate. See, e.g.,
Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 

 (7th
Cir. 2007) (holding false statements of material fact are
prohibited by Lanham Act, and assuming without deciding
that same is true under IUDTPA); Tri-Plex Tech. Services, Ltd.
v. Jon-Don, LLC, 

, ¶ 16, 

, 460
(IUDTPA prohibits conduct that creates a “likelihood of
confusion or misunderstanding”), citing 815 Ill. Comp. Stat.
510/2(a)(12). This injunction is “sufficiently definite” because
it reflects that legal reality. It simply adds some
requirements—like maintaining factual verification—to
ensure that HBI complies with the law.
   The injunction in this case does not order HBI to obey “an
abstract conclusion of law [rather than] an operative
command capable of ‘enforcement.’” See Int’l Longshoremen's
Ass’n, Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass’n, 

 (1967). The facts of International Longshoremen make the
point. In that case, a district court ordered the petitioners to
“comply with and abide by” an arbitral award determining
that the respondent’s reading of a contract was correct. When
the petitioners asked the court what the order meant, the
court responded: “That you will have to determine, what it
means.” 

. Understandably, the Supreme Court ruled
that this explanation did not satisfy Rule 65(d) because it “did
not state in ‘specific terms’ the acts that it required or
prohibited.” 

 (cleaned up), quoting Rule 65(d) (1966).
    HBI has substantially more guidance here. The injunction
prohibits it from making nine categories of statements and, to
safeguard against future violations, requires HBI to take
concrete steps to assure the court of the factual veracity of
Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096                                        25

additional factual representations. As Rule 65(d) requires, this
injunction “describe[s] in reasonable detail … the act or acts
restrained or required.”
    One more point. HBI says it fears it might be haled into
court to face contempt proceedings on the basis of “harmless
and immaterial statements,” such as that rolling paper is
brown, or that rolling papers were used in Catalonia in the
1600s. While HBI is right that the law does not typically
mandate affirmative verification of factual statements, “[a]
federal court has broad power to restrain acts … whose
commission in the future unless enjoined, may fairly be
anticipated from the defendant’s conduct in the past.” NLRB
v. Express Publishing Co., 

 (1941).
     Here, the district court found it was appropriate to require
HBI to maintain verification for its future factual
advertisements given HBI’s proven tendency to make
unsupported claims in advertising. The court concluded that
Republic was likely to suffer future harm without an
injunction because “HBI’s untruthful or at least misleading
statements are likely to cause consumers to choose HBI’s
products over Republic’s products on the basis of those
statements….” Republic Technologies (NA), LLC v. BBK Tobacco
& Foods, LLP, No. 16-cv-03401, 

, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 6, 2022). The court also noted in a related discussion
about other terms that the injunction needed to be broad in
order to be effective. 

 (“This would cause the
injunction to be too narrow to be effective.”). The court
explained that “HBI has also shown a proclivity to attempt to
evade court orders,” and it cited precedents from the Supreme
Court and this court affirming broadly worded injunctions
26                                      Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096

against parties who “demonstrated a tendency to evade or
violate court orders.” 

 at *5–6.
    By mandating that HBI verify the accuracy of its factual
statements—or otherwise use opinions—the district court
crafted a remedy that it reasonably believed would deter
future violations that it could “fairly” anticipate from HBI’s
conduct. See Express Publishing, 

; SEC v. Advance
Growth Capital Corp., 

 (7th Cir. 1972) (reversing
denial of injunction under Investment Company Act: “The
purpose of injunctive relief is, after all, not to punish but to
deter future violations, thus insuring general compliance with
the broad remedial design of the legislation.” (citing Hecht Co.
v. Bowles, 

 (1944)). Accordingly, the court did
not abuse its discretion in framing the injunction. See H-D
Michigan, 

 (“the injunction must also be broad
enough to be effective.”); Dexia Crédit Local v. Rogan, 

 (7th Cir. 2010) (district court properly issued broad
injunction: “When the district court fashioned the broad
injunction, it noted the elaborate steps [defendant] had taken
to evade creditors.”).
       2. Nationwide Scope
    HBI’s last argument is that the district court’s injunction
should be limited to “conduct occurring primarily and
substantially within the State of Illinois.” HBI contends that,
because Illinois law serves as the basis for the injunction, it is
improper to hold HBI to that standard nationwide. On the
facts of this case, at least, we disagree and affirm the
nationwide scope of the permanent injunction, subject of
Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096                                                       27

course to the district court’s continuing jurisdiction and
power to modify the injunction. 7
     First, it is well established that a district court “exercising
its equity powers may command persons properly before it to
cease or perform acts outside its territorial jurisdiction.” Steele
v. Bulova Watch Co., 

 (1952); see also Zayn
Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 

,
2104 (2017) (“If an individual defendant is found to have a
duty to act or refrain from acting in a certain way, and the
court has jurisdiction over that defendant, that duty need not
be geographically limited.”). The important limiting principle
is generally that “injunctive relief should be no more
burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide
complete relief to the plaintiffs.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 

 (1979); accord, City of Chicago v. Barr, 

,
920–21 (7th Cir. 2020) (“It is widely accepted—even by self-
professed opponents of universal injunctions—that a court
may impose the equitable relief necessary to render complete
relief to the plaintiff ….” (citing Yamasaki, 

)).




    7 HBI objected to the nationwide scope of the injunction in its initial

briefing in the district court, and the district court did not resolve the issue.
This apparent oversight does not prevent us from considering the
question (notwithstanding that the parties expressly preserved for appeal
only “disputed issues arising from prior Court orders.”). See United States
v. Grandberry, 

, 980 n.10 (9th Cir. 2013) (parties disputed issue
but district court did not address it in final order: “Whether that was due
to an oversight or a conclusion that the issue was not properly raised, we
do not know. … We therefore choose to decide the question—which was
fully briefed before us—rather than declaring it forfeited.”).
28                                           Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096

    HBI argues that the nationwide scope of the injunction
violates principles of comity and due process. 8 Its primary
authority for this assertion is Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,

 (1985), where the Supreme Court assessed
whether leaseholders from all 50 states could sue a Delaware
corporation under Kansas law in Kansas state court for
delayed royalty payments. The Court first explained: “There
can be no injury in applying Kansas law if it is not in conflict
with that of any other jurisdiction connected to this suit.” 

. It then noted there were several potential conflicts in
that case, including that interest rates in other states were
lower than the Kansas rate, which dramatically increased the
defendant’s potential liability. 

 at 817–18. The Court
ultimately remanded the case for the Supreme Court of
Kansas to determine whether Kansas law conflicted “in any
material way with any other law which could apply.” 

.
    Phillips Petroleum illustrates why, on the record before us,
at least, we do not perceive a comity or due process problem
here. As HBI notes, several states—including Arizona, where
HBI is headquartered—have not adopted the Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act and have differences in their
consumer protection laws. But HBI does not argue that any
state permits false or misleading statements of fact in
advertising. See, e.g., 

(A) (2025)
(unlawful practice to use a “false pretense, false promise, [or]
misrepresentation … in connection with the sale or
advertisement of any merchandise”); National Consumer

     8 HBI presents these as separate arguments, but they are essentially

the same. Both turn on whether the injunction denies HBI the benefit of
non-Illinois law. We address them together.
Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096                                                   29

Law Center, Consumer Protection in the States 9 (2018) (every
state has some version of an unfair and deceptive trade
practices statute), available at https://www.nclc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2022/09/UDAP_rpt.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/2BBD-JPZJ ].
    Unlike the situation before the Supreme Court in Phillips
Petroleum, HBI has not shown that Illinois unfair competition
law differs from the law of other states in a way that is
“material” to the injunction. See 

. 9 Regardless
of any injunction, HBI should expect to have a legal obligation
not to make false or deceptive statements in advertising in all
50 states. See 

 (“When considering fairness in this
context, an important element is the expectation of the
parties.”). Given the jury’s finding that HBI either
misrepresented certain goods or engaged in other conduct
that similarly created a likelihood of confusion or
misunderstanding, we see no reason to oblige Republic to file
separate suits in all 50 states to vindicate its rights to be free
from unfair trade practices—rights that come from well-
established and relatively uniform principles of state law. Cf.
Curry v. Revolution Laboratories, LLC, 

 (7th
Cir. 2024) (considering nationwide conduct when assessing
an Illinois punitive damages award and stating: “Curry did
not need to file separate suits in all 50 states to vindicate his
Lanham Act rights.”). 10


    9 The injunction has some other provisions that are not relevant to this

appeal. HBI’s briefs make clear that it is primarily concerned with the
nationwide effect of the verification requirement.
    10 The jury’s finding that the conduct underlying the injunction

occurred “primarily and substantially in Illinois” is not to the contrary.
The location of the harm for which the defendant is found liable does not
30                                             Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096

    The district court will continue to exercise jurisdiction
over the injunction in this case. It should continue to ensure
that the injunction is “no more burdensome to the defendant
than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.”
Yamasaki, 

; see also United States v. Fisher, 

 (7th Cir. 1988) (“when a court issues an
injunction, it automatically retains jurisdiction to enforce it.”).
On the facts of this case, “complete relief” to Republic—
which, as far as we can tell, competes with HBI in all 50
states—can include remedial measures like this injunction
that apply nationwide. See Siddique, supra, 117 Colum. L.
Rev. at 2116 (discussing challenges with nationwide
injunctions based on state laws and stating: “The touchstone
of complete relief is properly defining the geographic scope
of an injury and then remedying that precise harm.”).
    However, if HBI engages in advertising activities
unrelated to the facts at issue in this case—or that have no
connection to Illinois—it may seek “clarification or
modification” of the injunction from the district court to
ensure that its activities do not run afoul of the injunction. See
H-D Michigan, 

 (explaining that a party “may
seek” “clarification or modification” of an injunction “from
the district court in the first instance”); accord, Carson v. Here's
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 

 (6th Cir. 1987)


alone limit a court’s power to remedy that harm. See Hart v. Sansom, 

 (1884) (“equity acts in personam”); Leman v. Krentler-Arnold
Hinge Last Co., 

 (1932) (Massachusetts district court issued
injunction prohibiting company from selling hinged shoe lasts but
company continued selling them in other states; Supreme Court explained
that “decree was binding upon the respondent, not simply within the
District of Massachusetts, but throughout the United States”).
Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096                                        31

(affirming nationwide injunction based on state “right of
publicity” law despite ambiguous legal status of such law
elsewhere: “If the defendant should hereafter decide that it
wants to use the phrase in a state (other than Michigan) where
it believes such use would be legal but for the injunction, it
will be free to seek a modification of the injunction from the
district court at that time.”). The district court will be best
situated to determine whether “complete relief” requires
applying the injunction to those not-yet-defined contexts,
including possible advertising with no connection to Illinois
or situations where the enjoined conduct might be legal in
another state. See, e.g., United States v. AMC Entertainment,
Inc., 

 (9th Cir. 2008) (collecting similar cases
and limiting geographic scope of injunction when injunction
required conduct that Fifth Circuit had “judicially
repudiated”).
    The injunction here is appropriately tailored to “provide
complete relief” to Republic, see Yamasaki, 

, and
the district court did not abuse its discretion or make a legal
error by allowing the injunction to take effect nationwide.
Factual differences relating to future HBI advertising
campaigns may require a different conclusion, though, and
the district court will be free to consider those issues they
arise.
   The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
32                                     Nos. 23-2973 & 23-3096

   SCUDDER, Circuit Judge, concurring. The court’s opinion is
very well done, and I join it in full. I write separately to un-
derscore my understanding that HBI engages in nationwide
advertising, meaning that any application of the district
court’s injunction always and necessarily will apply to pro-
motional activities within Illinois. The court’s opinion takes
care to recognize that the legal analysis of the injunction’s
scope could be different if that fact changes.