In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
No. 23-1207
DAVID C.L. WALTON,
                                              Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                v.

ASHLEY NEHLS,
                                              Defendant-Appellee.
                    ____________________
           Appeal from the United States District Court for
                  the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
       No. 1:22-cv-00007-WCG — William C. Griesbach, Judge.
                    ____________________

     ARGUED OCTOBER 21, 2024 — DECIDED MAY 2, 2025
                  ____________________
   Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
    SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents an issue of
first impression for our court: whether, as a matter of Eighth
Amendment law, a prisoner can consent to sexual activity
with a prison official. David Walton, a Wisconsin prisoner, in-
voked 

 and sued Ashley Nehls, a prison nurse,
alleging that she violated his Eighth Amendment rights by en-
gaging in a sexual relationship with him. But Walton also tes-
tified in his deposition that the relationship was consensual.
Reyling on that testimony, the district court entered summary
2                                                 No. 23-1207

judgment for Nehls, reasoning that a consensual sexual rela-
tionship cannot constitute a cruel or unusual punishment un-
der the Eighth Amendment.
    On appeal Walton urges us to join the Sixth and Ninth Cir-
cuits and adopt a legal presumption that any sexual activity
between a prisoner and prison official is nonconsensual and,
by extension, violates the Constitution unless the prison offi-
cial can show an absence of coercion. That position has much
to say for itself, given the power and control prison officials
have over inmates and considering today’s standards of de-
cency, as all 50 states have made a prison official’s sexual con-
duct with a prisoner a crime. But even if we applied the pre-
sumption, the evidence in the record establishes that the al-
leged sexual relationship between Walton and Nehls lacked
any coercive factors. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s
entry of summary judgment for Nehls, saving for another day
the question whether to adopt a presumption of nonconsent.
                               I
    Walton alleges that he began a romantic and sexual rela-
tionship with Nehls in June 2021. He has always described the
relationship as “consensual.” Within three months, however,
other officials at the prison learned of the relationship and im-
mediately transferred Walton to a new institution. Walton, no
longer in contact with Nehls, then brought the § 1983 action
against her in federal court in Wisconsin.
    Walton’s lawsuit requires us to determine whether a rela-
tionship that he considered consensual nonetheless deprived
him of his Eighth Amendment rights. That is no easy task, for
neither Supreme Court precedent nor our own case law
squarely answers the question, and the circuits that have
No. 23-1207                                                    3

weighed in have taken differing approaches. We think the
Sixth and Ninth Circuit’s approach—presuming nonconsent
and shifting the burden of establishing consent onto the de-
fendant—very well could be the best answer. But we ulti-
mately need not decide whether to adopt such an approach to
resolve Walton’s appeal.
                               A
    A prison official’s conduct does not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment,
the Supreme Court has explained, unless “two requirements
are met.” Farmer v. Brennan, 

 (1994). First, the
conduct “must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” 

 (quot-
ing Wilson v. Seiter, 

 (1991)). Conduct is suffi-
ciently serious—or objectively harmful—if it is “incompatible
with the evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
gress of a maturing society” or “involve[es] the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain.” Hudson v. McMillian, 

 (1992) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 

, 102–03
(1976)). Second, the “prison official must have a ‘sufficiently
culpable state of mind.’” Farmer, 

 (quoting Wil-
son, 

). The official must act with “‘deliberate in-
difference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm” of which they
are “subjectively aware.” Id. at 828.
    We first had occasion to apply those principles to allega-
tions of prison sexual abuse in Washington v. Hively, 

 (7th Cir. 2012). James Washington, a Wisconsin pretrial
detainee, claimed that a guard had violated his Eighth
Amendment rights by “gratuitously fondling” his genitals
when conducting a pat down and strip search. 

. We
recognize, of course, that today we would analyze Washing-
ton’s claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
4                                                     No. 23-1207

Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment. See Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 

, 400 (2015). But the distinction is of
no moment for present purposes, since the Fourteenth
Amendment similarly protects pretrial detainees from “abu-
sive conditions.” Miranda v. County of Lake, 

(7th Cir. 2018).
    In Hively, the district court had entered summary judg-
ment against Washington on the ground that he had “pre-
sented evidence of only de minimis injury.” 

.
But we reversed, explaining that “[s]exual offenses forcible or
not are unlikely to cause so little harm as to be adjudged de
minimis.” 

. Put differently, unwanted sexual contact,
regardless of whether it involves force, is objectively harmful
under the Eighth Amendment in light of the “significant dis-
tress and often lasting psychological harm” that it tends to
cause. 

    We also took care in Hively to emphasize the importance
of the subjective intent inquiry. See 

 at 643–44. We acknowl-
edged that objectively harmful sexual conduct will not give
rise to an Eighth Amendment violation when the defendant
lacks the requisite subjective intent. See 

 If, for instance, the
defendant “had no intention of humiliating” the prisoner or
“deriving sexual pleasure,” but “was merely overzealous in
conducting the pat down and strip search,” there would be
“no deliberate violation of a constitutional right and so no ba-
sis for the suit.” 

. Still, we recognized that subjective
intent, “unless admitted, has to be inferred rather than ob-
served.” 

 And we concluded that a reasonable jury could
infer the guard’s requisite intent based on the prisoner’s alle-
gation that “he complained vociferously … to no avail.” 

 at
No. 23-1207                                                    5

644. After all, such conduct, “if correctly described,” could not
“be thought a proper incident of a pat down or search.” 

    More recently, in J.K.J. v. Polk County, we upheld a jury’s
award of damages against a prison guard who repeatedly sex-
ually assaulted two prisoners. See 

, 376 (7th Cir.
2020) (en banc). We explained that, based on the evidence at
trial, it “was more than reasonable for the jury to conclude”
that the guard “acted with deliberate indifference to an exces-
sive risk” to the health and safety of the two prisoners. 

 We
also rejected the guard’s contention that the trial court “erred
in not giving a special instruction on his consent defense.” 

No such instruction was necessary, we reasoned, because had
“the jury bought” the guard’s story that the prisoners “were
willing participants (and, for that matter, even capable of be-
ing willing participants under the circumstances),” it would
not have found that the guard “acted with deliberate indiffer-
ence to their safety and well-being.” 

    Hively and J.K.J. supply a few takeaways. For one, it is of
no legal moment that Walton did not allege that Nehls used
force against him. Force or no force, unwanted sexual contact
between a prison official and prisoner is objectively harmful
under the Eighth Amendment. Nehls’s subjective intent,
though, remains relevant. As in any other Eighth Amendment
sexual abuse case, Walton (the prisoner) must establish that
Nehls (the prison official) acted with deliberate indifference
to an excessive risk of harm to his safety or well-being.
   Yet we have not encountered the particulars of the sce-
nario before us here. Unlike the inmates in Hively and J.K.J.,
Walton admits that he consented to a sexual relationship with
Nehls. But given the inherent coerciveness present in a prison
environment, Walton’s argument goes, the relationship was
6                                                 No. 23-1207

nevertheless legally nonconsensual. It is on those allegations
that we must decide whether a reasonable jury could con-
clude that Nehls’s conduct was objectively harmful and that
she acted with deliberate indifference to an excessive risk to
Walton’s well-being.
                              B
    Other circuits have faced similar factual allegations in
Eighth Amendment cases, but they have not reached a uni-
form conclusion. In Wood v. Beauclair, a district court entered
summary judgment against a prisoner on the basis that the
prisoner’s “romantic relationship” with a prison guard “was
consensual.” 

 (9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth
Circuit reversed, emphasizing “[t]he power dynamics be-
tween prisoners and guards” and questioning whether “sex-
ual relationships in prison” are “truly the product of free
choice.” 

. At the same time, the court expressed
“concern[] about the implications of removing consent as a
defense for Eighth Amendment claims,” ultimately deciding
that “the better approach” was “a rule that explicitly recog-
nize[d] the coercive nature of sexual relations in the prison
environment.” 

 at 1048–49.
    Aligned with that principle, the Ninth Circuit adopted the
following framework for Eighth Amendment sexual abuse
cases:
      [W]hen a prisoner alleges sexual abuse by a
      prison guard, we believe the prisoner is entitled
      to a presumption that the conduct was not con-
      sensual. The state then may rebut this presump-
      tion by showing that the conduct involved no
      coercive factors. We need not attempt to
No. 23-1207                                                     7

       exhaustively describe every factor which could
       be fairly characterized as coercive. Of course,
       explicit assertions or manifestations of non-con-
       sent indicate coercion, but so too may favors,
       privileges, or any type of exchange for sex. Un-
       less the state carries its burden, the prisoner is
       deemed to have established the fact of non-con-
       sent.

.
    The Sixth Circuit has since followed suit, adopting whole-
sale the Ninth Circuit’s presumption in a sexual abuse case—
albeit one concerning the alleged deprivation of a pretrial de-
tainee’s Fourteenth (as opposed to Eighth) Amendment
rights. See Hale v. Boyle County, 

, 852, 854 (6th Cir.
2021).
    The Eighth and Tenth Circuits have charted a different
course, though, declining to adopt a presumption and leaving
prisoners with the burden of establishing nonconsent. “To
state a plausible constitutional claim” in the Eighth Circuit, “a
prisoner who recounts sexual contact that is outwardly con-
sensual must allege at least some manifestation of resistance
by the prisoner or some act of coercion by the corrections of-
ficial.” Richardson v. Duncan, 

, 1030 (8th Cir.
2024). The Tenth Circuit has echoed the Eighth Circuit, stating
that “in this circuit, the burden remains on the plaintiff—not
the defendant—to establish that sexual conduct is nonconsen-
sual.” Works v. Byers, 

, 1162 (10th Cir. 2025).
                                C
  In time, the Supreme Court is sure to resolve the split.
And, while this case does not compel us to choose a side, we
8                                                      No. 23-1207

do see many reasons for why a presumption of nonconsent
may prove to be the right answer to a difficult question.
    Supreme Court precedent is clear that bedrock Eighth
Amendment principles require us to assess a prison official’s
conduct against “the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.” Hudson, 

(quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 

 (1981)). Recall
that conduct is objectively harmful (and therefore may give
rise to an Eighth Amendment violation) when it is “incompat-
ible” with such standards. 

 at 10 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at
102–03). “[R]eview under those evolving standards,” the Su-
preme Court has explained, “should be informed by ‘objec-
tive factors to the maximum possible extent.’” Atkins v. Vir-
ginia, 

 (2002) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan,

 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment)). And the “clearest and most re-
liable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legis-
lation enacted by the country’s legislatures.” Id. at 312 (quot-
ing Penry v. Lynaugh, 

 (1989)).
    It is telling, then, that the legislatures in all 50 states (plus
the District of Columbia) have made it a crime for prison offi-
cials to engage in sexual activity with prisoners—regardless
of consent. The Appendix to this opinion lists each state’s stat-
ute. Federal law similarly makes it a criminal offense for a fed-
eral law enforcement officer to “knowingly engag[e] in a sex-
ual act” with a prisoner, regardless of consent. 

(b); see also United States v. Martinez, 

, 166
(2d Cir. 2023) (explaining that 

(b) “prohibits
sexual acts between an inmate and a guard regardless of the
inmate’s consent to such acts”). So the takeaway is clear: our
country’s legislatures have determined that sexual activity
No. 23-1207                                                    9

between prisoners and prison officials is a crime, intolerable
conduct in a civilized society.
    The aligned judgment of elected officials at the state and
national level is consistent with Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence recognizing the inherently vulnerable position of pris-
oners, especially in relation to prison officials. The prison en-
vironment, the Supreme Court has underscored, “strip[s]”
prisoners “of virtually every means of self-protection and
foreclose[s] their access to outside aid.” Farmer, 

. We recognized that same reality in J.K.J., explaining that
prisoners depend on prison officials “for nearly everything in
their lives—their safety as well as their access to food, medical
care, recreation, and even contact with family members.” 960
F.3d at 381.
    But these observations invite yet another question: why
not conclude that, as a matter of Eighth Amendment law, a
prisoner can never consent to a sexual relationship with a
prison official? After all, at first glance, such a per se rule
would comport with both the judgment of our country’s leg-
islatures and Eighth Amendment case law recognizing the in-
herent vulnerability of prisoners.
    We are mindful, however, that the Supreme Court has in-
structed courts to “proceed cautiously in making an Eighth
Amendment judgment.” Rhodes, 

. Any determi-
nation that certain conduct constitutes a per se violation of the
Eighth Amendment “cannot be reversed short of a constitu-
tional amendment.” Gregg v. Georgia, 

 (1976).
A per se nonconsent rule would run counter to the Supreme
Court’s instruction by broadly and indeed categorically ex-
panding Eighth Amendment liability in one fell swoop—
10                                                   No. 23-1207

without regard to the unique factual circumstances that could
arise in future cases.
    Determining the scope of a constitutional right, moreover,
can be an endeavor ill-suited to an overly formalistic or cate-
gorical approach. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 

(1991) (rejecting a “per se rule” in a Fourth Amendment case
and explaining that “in order to determine whether a partic-
ular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all
the circumstances”). That observation rings particularly true
when it comes to the Eighth Amendment, which “draw[s] its
meaning from … evolving standards of decency” and, as a re-
sult, “admits of few absolute limitations.” Hudson, 503 at 8 (al-
teration in original) (quoting Rhodes, 

). Put dif-
ferently, because evolving standards of decency define the
Eighth Amendment’s scope, Eighth Amendment cases re-
quire a flexible approach that is not often compatible with per
se, broadly applicable rules.
    A burden-shifting presumption may well align better with
the sort of flexible approach that constitutional law requires.
Indeed, the Supreme Court frequently applies such presump-
tions when fleshing out the scope of constitutional rights. In
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, for example, the
Court explained that the Second Amendment “presumptively
protects” the individual right to bear arms. 

, 24
(2022). For that reason, if a government regulation bars or oth-
erwise limits that right, the government bears the burden of
“justify[ing] its regulation by demonstrating that it is con-
sistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regu-
lation.” 

  And in the Fourth Amendment context, the Supreme
Court has long held that “[w]arrantless searches are
No. 23-1207                                                      11

presumptively unreasonable.” United States v. Karo, 

 (1984). Under that presumption, the government
bears the burden of showing that a warrantless search was
nevertheless constitutional. See Chimel v. California, 

 (1969).
    Even the tiers of scrutiny, ubiquitous in First and Four-
teenth Amendment jurisprudence, operate as burden-shifting
presumptions. Under the First Amendment, content-based
laws are “presumptively unconstitutional.” Reed v. Town of
Gilbert, 

, 163 (2015). For any content-based re-
striction or regulation, then, the government bears the burden
of establishing that it is “narrowly tailored to serve compel-
ling state interests.” 

 Racial classifications are likewise “pre-
sumptively invalid” under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause. Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 

 (1979). It is therefore the government that bears the bur-
den of establishing the legitimacy of any such classifications.
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 

 (2007).
    The prevalence of burden-shifting presumptions in these
contexts is perhaps unsurprising. It reflects the reality that the
Constitution’s provision of individual rights can be broad and
that giving content to those rights is not always a straightfor-
ward exercise. But knowing that the Constitution protects
“the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,” to be free
from “unreasonable searches and seizures,” to enjoy “the
freedom of speech,” or take comfort in “the equal protection
of the laws” is one thing. U.S. Const. amends. I, II, IV, XIV.
Knowing exactly when official action infringes on any of
those individual rights is another. The latter requires evaluat-
ing both the official action as well as the nature of the alleged
12                                                   No. 23-1207

infringement on the individual. Under such an evaluation, the
government’s justification (or historical basis) for a particular
action is of course relevant. But the law will often place a
thumb on the scale in favor of the individual—especially
when the official action “appears on its face within a specific
prohibition of the law.” United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 

, 152 n.4 (1938); see also District of Columbia v. Heller,

, 628 n.27 (2008) (citing Carolene Products and ex-
plaining that something more than rational basis review must
“be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may reg-
ulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech,
the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel,
or the right to keep and bear arms”).
   In the Eighth Amendment context, a presumption of non-
consent may fit comfortably within the line of constitutional
cases applying burden-shifting frameworks. Our own case
law establishes that a prison official who engages in a noncon-
sensual sexual relationship with a prisoner runs afoul of the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. See J.K.J., 960 F.3d at 376. Presuming that any such
sexual relationship is nonconsensual, then, would be tanta-
mount to presuming that a prison official has violated the
Eighth Amendment—a presumption that aligns with both the
judgment of our nation’s legislatures and the inherently coer-
cive prison environment.
    Yet before we can adopt a presumption of nonconsent,
several difficult questions need answering. Start with deter-
mining what conduct triggers the presumption. We have ob-
served that sexual conduct need not involve the use of force
to be objectively harmful. See Washington, 

. But
how, exactly, should we define sexual conduct? Some conduct
No. 23-1207                                                   13

is obviously sexual in nature, but what about a kiss or touch
of the thigh? Alternatively, what about nonphysical conduct,
such as indecent exposure or verbal harassment? Relatedly,
should the presumption apply to all prison officials? Or
should we limit it to only those officials capable of affecting
or influencing a prisoner’s conditions of confinement? And if
we do so limit the presumption, how do we determine
whether an official satisfies that standard?
   Given the difficulty of those questions (and the no doubt
many others that will arise), we are hesitant to adopt a pre-
sumption of nonconsent, especially once we return to the facts
before us.
                               II
    Even if we applied a presumption of nonconsent, Nehls
would be able to overcome it based on the facts in the record.
In the end, then, this case does not present the best vehicle for
working out the dimensions of a presumption framework for
future Eighth Amendment prison sexual abuse cases.
                               A
   Walton alleges that, over the course of three months or so
beginning in June 2021, he and Nehls were in a romantic and
sexual relationship. For her part, Nehls denies that she was
ever romantically or sexually involved with Walton. But be-
cause this appeal comes to us from the district court’s entry of
summary judgment in Nehls’s favor, we recount the facts in
the light most favorable to Walton. See Hackett v. City of South
Bend, 

, 506 (7th Cir. 2020).
    The relationship began in June 2021, when Walton visited
the prison’s health services unit to receive prescription medi-
cation from Nehls. While giving Walton the medication,
14                                                No. 23-1207

Nehls touched his arm. In response, Walton joked, “You touch
me like that, I might touch you.” Nehls replied, “All right,”
and grabbed Walton’s shirt. Walton and Nehls then kissed
each other.
   Walton continued to visit Nehls at the health services unit,
where the two would kiss “almost every single day.” Walton
sometimes initiated the kissing. Walton also says Nehls
touched his penis over his clothing at times and “allow[ed]”
him to touch her chest and buttocks over her clothing. Walton
compared their interactions to “two high school kids making
out.”
   Throughout the course of their relationship, Nehls pro-
vided Walton with illegal contraband, including chips, candy,
chewing gum, a cell phone, and an unprescribed antidepres-
sant. Nehls never asked Walton for anything in return.
   Walton described the relationship as “consensual,” and
explained that “outside of the prison,” he would consider
Nehls his “girlfriend.” He did not report the relationship be-
cause he “enjoyed it,” wanted it to continue, and did not want
himself or Nehls “to get into trouble.”
    Despite his wishes, the relationship did not continue. Wal-
ton last visited Nehls on August 30, 2021. On that day, Walton
and Nehls began kissing in a private room within the health
services unit. Nehls then closed the door and touched Wal-
ton’s penis underneath his clothing with her bare hand—an
interaction that Walton described as “consensual.” At one
point, Walton joked about letting a correctional officer “catch”
them. Nehls responded by threatening to sound an alarm that
would warn correctional officers of an ongoing assault. Wal-
ton then reached out toward Nehls, who stepped back and
No. 23-1207                                                   15

then fell to the floor. As Walton bent down over Nehls, several
correctional officers entered the private room and discovered
them.
   Prison officials transferred Walton to another institution
the next day. Since his transfer, he has had no contact with
Nehls. In his complaint, he alleged that his relationship with
Nehls triggered post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety at-
tacks, and self-harm.
                               B
    Against those facts, the district court did not err in enter-
ing summary judgment for Nehls. Walton implores us to re-
verse the district court on the ground that it should have ap-
plied the Ninth Circuit’s presumption of nonconsent. But
even if the district court had done so, summary judgment
would have been proper. Nehls would be able to meet the
burden of showing that the relationship was consensual. Wal-
ton has never deviated from describing their encounters as
“consensual” and even acknowledged initiating some of the
sexual conduct. He also stated that he “enjoyed” the relation-
ship and wanted it to continue.
   To be sure, Nehls provided Walton with contraband—
conduct that under many circumstances can be coercive. See
Wood, 

 (identifying “favors, privileges, or any
type of exchange for sex” as indicators of coercion). But Wal-
ton explained that Nehls did not expect anything in return.
And nowhere has he suggested that Nehls provided the con-
traband in exchange for sexual contact.
   Having taken a close look at the evidentiary record, we see
nothing that would allow a jury to find that Nehls coerced
Walton into a sexual relationship. The closest evidence of
16                                                  No. 23-1207

coercion is a declaration Walton submitted to the district
court, stating that, at one point in July 2021, Nehls “got upset”
with him and “fals[e]ly” had him “placed on temporary lock[]
down.” Walton also attached an incident report that Nehls
filled out, accusing him of making inappropriate comments
about “a female staff member.” But Walton did not submit
any evidence connecting the incident report to a theory of co-
ercion. He did not, for instance, allege that he continued with
the relationship out of fear that Nehls would submit another
report or otherwise get him in trouble. To the contrary, he
continued to describe their later interactions as consensual.
    Absent evidence of coercion, we are left with Walton’s
clear, consistent, and unqualified statements that his relation-
ship with Nehls was consensual. Those statements would be
sufficient to overcome any presumption that the relationship
was nonconsensual. We can therefore save the broad legal
question for another day.
                        *       *      *
    We recognize the fundamental power imbalance between
prison officials and prisoners and the inherently vulnerable
position of prisoners. But deplorable as Nehls’s alleged con-
duct may be, we cannot on this record say that she knew of
and was deliberately indifferent to an excessive risk that her
conduct would seriously harm Walton. In the final analysis,
then, we cannot say that Nehls’s conduct constitutes an
Eighth Amendment violation. So with this closing observa-
tion we AFFIRM the district court’s entry of summary judg-
ment for Nehls.
No. 23-1207                                                   17

                          Appendix
    In 26 states plus the District of Columbia, statutes make it
a criminal offense for prison officials to engage in sexual ac-
tivity with prisoners and explicitly state that consent is not an
affirmative defense:
             State                    Relevant Statute
 Alabama                       

 Arkansas                      

 California                    

 Delaware                      Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 780A
 District of Columbia          

,
                               -3017(a)
 Florida                       

(3)(b)
 Georgia                       

 Illinois                      720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-9.2
 Indiana                       

-10
 Kansas                        

 Kentucky                      

(3)(f),
                               .120(1)(c)
 Massachusetts                 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 268,
                               § 21A
 Minnesota                     

,
                               subd. 24(2)(viii), 609.345
 Mississippi                   

 Missouri                      

 Montana                       

 Nebraska                      

-
                               322.01
18                                                   No. 23-1207

 New Hampshire                  

-
                                A:2, -A:4
 New York                       

(3)(e)–(f)
 North Carolina                 

-
                                27.31
 Oregon                         

, .454
 Pennsylvania                   18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
                                § 3124.2
 South Carolina                 

 Utah                           

,
                                -412.2
 Washington                     Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
                                §§ 9A.44.160, .170
 West Virginia                  

-8B-2,
                                -10
 Wisconsin                      

(2)(h), (4)
 Wyoming                        

-
                                303(a)(vii), -307(b)

    The remaining 24 states make it essentially a strict liability
offense for prison officials to engage in sexual activity with
prisoners, omitting consent as an available affirmative de-
fense.
             State                     Relevant Statute
 Alaska                         

(a)(1),
                                .432
 Arizona                        

-
                                1407, -1419
No. 23-1207                                   19

Colorado       

-
               701
Connecticut    Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 53a-
               65(3), 54a-73a(a)(1)(E)
Hawaii         

-
               732
Idaho          

Iowa           

Louisiana      

Maine          Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A,
               § 255-A(1)(I) to -A(1)(J)
Maryland       

(b)
Michigan       

.520c(1)(i)
Nevada         

New Jersey     N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-2(c)(2)
New Mexico     

-
               11(E)(2)
North Dakota   

-
               20-06, -07
Ohio           

(A)(6)
Oklahoma       

(A)(7)
Rhode Island   R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-25-24
South Dakota   S.D. Codified Laws §§ 22-22-
               7.6, 24-1-26.1
Tennessee      

Texas          

Vermont        

(a)(1)
20                            No. 23-1207

Virginia   

,
           -67.4