In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________

No. 23-1659
JAMES NAPIER,
                                                 Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                v.

ORCHARD SCHOOL FOUNDATION,
                                                Defendant-Appellee.
                    ____________________

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the
        Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
         No. 1:19-cv-03556 — Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.
                    ____________________

    ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2024 — DECIDED MAY 16, 2025
                ____________________

   Before EASTERBROOK, KIRSCH, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges.
    KOLAR, Circuit Judge. James “Jamie” Napier was the Direc-
tor of the Middle School at the Orchard School. In 2018, Or-
chard hired Dr. Sherri Helvie as Head of School. About eight
months later, on Helvie’s orders, Orchard declined to renew
Napier’s contract for the following school year. In response,
Napier filed an employment discrimination suit against Or-
chard, alleging that he was terminated because of his sex.
2                                                         No. 23-1659

Napier also reapplied for his position, and after Orchard re-
jected him, he added a retaliation claim to this litigation.
   The district court granted summary judgment for Orchard
on both claims. We affirm.
                           I. Background
    The Orchard School is a private school in Indianapolis that
is divided into an Early Childhood and Elementary School
and a Middle School. Orchard hired Jamie Napier as the Di-
rector of the Middle School in 2016.1 Napier is a man, and at
that time, so were the other three members of Orchard’s sen-
ior leadership: Head of School Tom Rosenbluth, Assistant
Head of School Nick Eble, and the Director of the Early Child-
hood and Elementary School, Hal Schwartz.
    In 2017, Orchard informed Rosenbluth that they would
not renew his employment contract, and Orchard began
searching for a new Head of School. During the process, a
consultant hired by Orchard fielded concerns from members
of Orchard’s Board that a male Head of School would encoun-
ter difficulty in the job. The consultant noted that the existing
leadership team had a “frat boy” perception among Orchard’s
predominantly female faculty. Indeed, when Napier was
hired the preceding year, there were “strong feelings” about
not hiring him because he was “simply one more white male.”
Race and sex were undoubtedly at issue in the Head of School
search, yet they were not a “determining factor” in whether
an applicant was selected.
   In the end, Orchard chose Dr. Sherri Helvie, a woman.
Helvie had previously served as Assistant Head of School for

    1 Napier previously taught at Orchard from 1996 to 2003.
No. 23-1659                                                  3

a private school in California, and she held a B.A. in English
with a minor in Women’s Studies, an M.A. in English with
emphases in Women’s Literature and Critical Theory, and a
Ph.D. in Literature with notation in Women’s Studies.
    Helvie became Head of School in July 2018, and she im-
mediately made changes. According to Orchard, Helvie in-
herited the organizational structure developed by her prede-
cessor, which included two leadership teams, the Senior Ad-
ministrative Team and Academic Leadership Team. Helvie,
however, removed Napier and Schwartz from the Senior Ad-
ministrative Team and replaced them with two new members,
Jennifer Bostrom, the Director of Institutional Advancement,
and Courtney Williams, the Chief Financial Officer. Following
the change, the Senior Administrative Team was Helvie, Eble,
Bostrom, and Williams, whereas the Academic Leadership
Team was Helvie, Eble, Napier, and Schwartz. Although his
compensation and daily job duties stayed the same, Napier
perceived the shift as a demotion because it meant he was less
involved with Orchard’s high-level strategy. Also, Helvie told
Napier to report to her through Eble, and Napier felt that hav-
ing Eble as a go-between hampered his ability to build a rela-
tionship with Helvie.
    The first incident between Helvie and Napier was in Octo-
ber 2018, when an English teacher announced that she in-
tended to retire. Napier was interested in replacing her with
a specific teacher employed by another school, and he raised
this candidate with Helvie, who said that she wanted to talk
to the teacher’s head of school. Napier then told the director
of human resources that Orchard should post an opening
online to accumulate a broader set of applications. After the
opening was posted, Helvie was displeased and instructed
4                                                  No. 23-1659

Eble to take it down. Napier testified that he was never in-
structed not to post an opening online, and that he did not see
the issue with collecting a pile of applications.
    A second, bigger problem arose in the winter. Helvie be-
gan considering whether to eliminate the Middle School Co-
ordinator and Elementary School Coordinator positions,
which were held (respectively) by Angela Brothers and
Gretchen Bricker. Orchard was under a budget crunch, and
Helvie was concerned that the coordinator roles were vaguely
defined, so she requested that Napier and Schwartz put to-
gether updated job descriptions to help her decide if the posi-
tions should be retained.
    The parties dispute whether Helvie specifically ordered
Napier not to tell Brothers that he was revising her job de-
scription, but it was unquestionably a delicate subject. Ac-
cording to Orchard, Helvie directed Napier and Schwartz to
keep the development of the new job descriptions confidential
to leadership. In an affidavit, Schwartz agreed that Helvie in-
structed him to keep the task confidential. At his deposition,
Napier testified that Helvie did not provide an explicit confi-
dentiality instruction (which he also stated in his affidavit), or
say that the topic was “of uber secrecy,” but he acknowledged
that Helvie would usually end leadership meetings by re-
minding everyone that “what’s been talked about in here
should stay in here.”
   Around February 2019, Brothers became worried about
her job and asked Napier whether her position was in jeop-
ardy. Napier testified he “did not lie terribly well,” and “[a]ll
[he] could say was if and maybe possibly,” and told Brothers
that “we’re putting together your job description.” Brothers
No. 23-1659                                                  5

asked Napier if he would care if she reached out to Helvie,
and he said he would not.
    Shortly afterward, Napier brought Helvie a list of priori-
ties for the Middle School Coordinator position and said that
Brothers had helped him make the list. Helvie responded that
she was surprised that Napier had breached her administra-
tive confidence. Helvie added that Brothers had made an ap-
pointment with her and that she now was sure it was about
Orchard’s review of Brothers’s position.
    At the meeting with Brothers, Helvie admitted that she
was taking a close look at the school’s administrative posi-
tions, which included the possibility of eliminating the Mid-
dle School Coordinator position. This upset Brothers, and ru-
mors spread that she was seen in tears after the meeting.
Around the same time, Bricker became aware that her Ele-
mentary School Coordinator position was at risk and raised
the topic with Schwartz.
    A couple days later, on February 22, 2019, Helvie emailed
the co-chairs of Orchard’s Board to inform them that she
planned to meet with Napier to address “his decision to
breach the confidentiality of our Academic Leadership Team
conversations,” and to tell him that he had subjected Brothers
to incredible stress and failed in his duties as supervisor and
Middle School Director. Helvie wrote that Napier had “egre-
giously compromised [her] trust in him” and that Napier ap-
peared to have activated a gossip network. Helvie said she
was deciding what to do next.
   On March 6, Helvie met with Napier and informed him
that his contract would not be renewed for the following
6                                                           No. 23-1659

school year. 2 Napier testified that Helvie told him: “I’ve lost
confidence in you because you have disclosed to Angie Broth-
ers about her job, which has caused her undue stress, and that
has also bled over to Gretchen Bricker.”
   That same day, Helvie offered Brothers the position of Act-
ing Middle School Director for the following school year,
which she accepted. Before accepting, Brothers sought advice
from Napier, who encouraged her to take the job because he
did not “want this scandal to become a ... fulcrum for which
the school dissolved itself.” Nonetheless, Napier testified that
he believed Brothers was not qualified for the position.
    Napier informed Eble and Schwartz that he was being ter-
minated. Eble was surprised and said he was not involved in
the decision, while Schwartz appeared relieved, which Napier
attributed to Schwartz fearing that he was at risk of termina-
tion instead.
    On March 7, Napier attempted to give Helvie a letter that
asked her, among other things, to provide a written explana-
tion of his termination and to rehire him. Helvie declined to
take the letter from Napier, so Napier handed it to the director
of human resources, who “made it clear to [Napier] that Dr.
Helvie was driving the decision to dismiss [him] without con-
sidering any other options.” Napier never received a written
termination notice.
    The next day, March 8, Helvie sent an email to the Orchard
community announcing Napier’s departure. Napier had de-
clined Helvie’s request to assist with the email and asked

    2 Napier continued to serve as Director for the remainder of the school

year. The parties refer to Helvie’s decision not to renew his contract as a
“termination,” so we follow their lead.
No. 23-1659                                                    7

Helvie not to send it at all. The email praised Napier for his
contributions to Orchard and did not provide a reason why
he would not be returning.
    In addition to terminating Napier, Helvie eliminated the
Middle School and Elementary School Coordinator positions,
as foreshadowed by the review of the job descriptions. Alt-
hough that change did not affect Brothers, who had been pro-
moted, it meant that Bricker would have to return to a teach-
ing position. Bricker complained about Orchard on Facebook,
and Helvie made her remove the post, but allowed Bricker to
keep her teaching role if she wished.
    In mid-March, Napier sent a letter to the acting chair of
Orchard’s Board detailing the issues he had with Helvie and
contending that he should not have been terminated. After
learning of Napier’s termination, several Orchard faculty
members and parents sent him statements of support, and
some contacted the Board to express concern and disagree-
ment. At a meeting with parents, Helvie refused to say why
Napier was not coming back the following school year, but
said that she “[did] not want a single person leaving this room
thinking disparaging things about Jamie Napier.” A later sur-
vey of Orchard parents found that many were upset that
Helvie terminated Napier, with responses deeming it a “ter-
rible decision” and several parents suggesting that Helvie
should be fired instead.
    The Board did not investigate Napier’s termination after
his letter to the acting chair, and in June 2019, Napier sent the
Board a letter again criticizing his termination. He raised the
prospect that his dismissal was based on sex, alleging that
Eble had been repeatedly heard saying that there were “too
many tall white males in charge” at Orchard. Napier
8                                                   No. 23-1659

indicated that he was on the verge of pursuing litigation and
asked for a meeting. The Board declined to meet with Napier.
    On August 21, 2019, Napier filed his initial complaint in
this case, alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.
    In November 2019, Orchard posted an opening for the
Middle School Director position, and Napier applied. Eble
oversaw the search and selection process, and although he did
not know exactly why Helvie had not renewed Napier’s con-
tract, Helvie had told him that her professional relationship
with Napier would not be conducive to Orchard’s future. Or-
chard rejected Napier’s application and hired Brothers to oc-
cupy the role permanently. In response to the rejection, Na-
pier supplemented his discrimination lawsuit with a retalia-
tion claim.
    After discovery, Orchard moved for summary judgment,
arguing that Napier had not presented sufficient evidence for
a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Orchard discrimi-
nated against him based on his sex. Orchard likewise argued
that there was insufficient evidence to support Napier’s retal-
iation claim.
    The district court granted Orchard’s motion. The district
court concluded that Napier had not presented a prima facie
case of discrimination. It emphasized that Napier did not of-
fer evidence to dispute that he breached Helvie’s trust and
confidence through his disclosures to Brothers. The district
court thus held that “no genuine issue of material fact exists
regarding whether Napier’s sex was the reason for and the
cause of his termination of employment.” Similarly, the dis-
trict court held that Napier had not raised a triable retaliation
claim because the record showed no connection between
No. 23-1659                                                        9

Napier’s protected activity and his rejected application. Na-
pier now appeals.
                           II. Analysis
    We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. Reives v. Illinois State Police, 

 (7th Cir.
2022). We construe the record in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, Napier, and draw all reasonable infer-
ences in his favor. 

 Summary judgment is appropriate “if
the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any ma-
terial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
   Napier has two closely related claims, both of which rest
on the proposition that Orchard’s explanation for rejecting an
employment relationship with him was dishonest. We take
each in turn, holding that neither claim survives summary
judgment.
             A. Napier’s Discrimination Claim Fails.
    Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful
for employers to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any in-
dividual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1). As
relevant here, Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination be-
cause of sex “protects men as well as women.” Oncale v. Sun-
downer Offshore Servs., Inc., 

 (1998).
       1. Ortiz and McDonnell Douglas Align.
   To assess Napier’s claim, we look at the direct and indirect
evidence together as a whole and determine whether it would
10                                                            No. 23-1659

permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that his sex caused
his termination. Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 

,
764–65 (7th Cir. 2016). In light of Ortiz, Napier argues that the
district court erred by adhering to the burden-shifting frame-
work set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

 (1973). 3 He is wrong for two reasons.
    First, “McDonnell Douglas is entirely consistent with our
holding in Ortiz, and it ‘remains an efficient way to organize,
present, and assess evidence in discrimination cases.’” Reives,

 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Johnson v.
Advoc. Health & Hosps. Corp., 

 (7th Cir. 2018)).
“As long as the court considers the evidence as a whole, it may
also use the McDonnell Douglas framework as a supplemental
tool.” Tyburski v. City of Chicago, 

 (7th Cir.
2020). We do caution that McDonnell Douglas may have lim-
ited value as a heuristic when a plaintiff has not taken that
approach to presenting his case. See, e.g., Wince v. CBRE, Inc.,

, 1040–41 (7th Cir. 2023) (advising that Ortiz and
McDonnell Douglas are both ways in which a plaintiff may
have “gathered the evidence, organized it, and explained how


     3 Under McDonnell Douglas, a Title VII plaintiff generally must first

establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that (1) he is a
member of a protected class, (2) he was meeting the employer’s legitimate
expectations, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) simi-
larly situated employees who were not members of his protected class
were treated more favorably. Reives, 

. Once a plaintiff meets
that burden, “the burden shift[s] to the defendant to ‘articulate a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, at
which point the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to submit evidence that
the employer’s explanation is pretextual.’” Simpson v. Franciscan All., Inc.,

 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Andrews v. CBOCS W., Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 2014)).
No. 23-1659                                                     11

and why a trier of fact could conclude that it added up to ...
discrimination.”).
    Second, Napier’s argument is perplexing because after de-
termining that Napier’s claim failed a McDonnell Douglas
analysis, the district court went on to conclude that the claim
failed under an Ortiz assessment of the evidence, too. See
Reives, 

 (“Regardless of the approach we use,
however, Reives’s discrimination claim cannot survive sum-
mary judgment.”); see also Igasaki v. Illinois Dep't of Fin. & Pro.
Regul., 

, 958 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Igasaki failed to as-
sert a prima facie case for race and sex discrimination under
the McDonnell Douglas framework. Igasaki’s case also falls
short under Ortiz.”).
    In short, “[a]lthough there are many tests and rubrics for
viewing discrimination claims ... they are all merely conven-
ient ways to organize our thoughts” as we decide whether a
reasonable factfinder could conclude that a plaintiff’s pro-
tected characteristic caused an adverse employment action.
Brooks v. Avancez, 

 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Ortiz,

).
    Here, because Orchard argues it terminated Napier based
on his performance, the McDonnell Douglas and Ortiz frame-
works come together. “We may skip the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie analysis if the employer raises the employee's per-
formance as the reason for the adverse employment deci-
sion.” Vichio v. US Foods, Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 2023)
(citing Bragg v. Munster Med. Rsch. Found. Inc., 

,
12                                                               No. 23-1659

271 (7th Cir. 2023)). “[I]ssues of satisfactory performance and
pretext overlap,” so we proceed directly to pretext.4 Id.
         2. The Record Lacks Evidence That Helvie’s Reason
            For Terminating Napier Was Pretextual.
     Pretext is “[a] lie, specifically a phony reason for some ac-
tion,” not “just faulty reasoning or mistaken judgment on the
part of the employer....” Barnes v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of
Ill., 

, 389–90 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Argyropoulos
v. City of Alton, 

 (7th Cir. 2008)). At the same
time, “[p]retext does not require that plausible facts presented
by the defendant not be true, only that they not be the reason
for the employment decision.” Hasham v. California State Bd. of
Equalization, 

 (7th Cir. 2000). Said differ-
ently, when there is sufficient evidence that an employment
action was discriminatory, an employer cannot sanitize the
decision by pointing to a legitimate problem with an em-
ployee’s performance.
  Orchard’s performance-based justification for terminating
Napier is straightforward: Napier breached Helvie’s trust.

     4 Currently, when we evaluate a male plaintiff’s “reverse discrimina-

tion” claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must
first establish “background circumstances” that demonstrate that a partic-
ular employer has reason or inclination to discriminate invidiously
against men or evidence that “there is something ‘fishy’ about the facts at
hand.” Henry v. Jones, 

 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Phelan v.
City of Chicago, 

, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2003)). The Supreme Court
will soon decide whether this “background circumstances” requirement
is consistent with the text of Title VII. See Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs.,

 (2024). That pending decision does not bear upon on the
analysis in this case. We bypass the initial stages of McDonnell Douglas,
and our pretext inquiry does not hold Napier to a greater burden because
he is a man.
No. 23-1659                                                          13

True, Napier’s relationship with Helvie was just one facet of
his job, and Orchard does not contend that Napier was other-
wise deficient in the role. But given Orchard’s leadership
structure, Helvie’s confidence in Napier was central to his
performance.
   Relatedly, the evidence shows that Helvie alone made the
decision to terminate Napier, with little to no input from
members of the Board, Eble, or anyone else. 5 That means
events predating Helvie’s time with Orchard—such as dis-
content about the dynamics of the then-all-male leadership—
are a red herring.
   With that observation, this appeal boils down to whether
there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to de-
cide that Helvie’s justification for terminating Napier was
pretext for sex discrimination. Despite Napier’s arguments to
the contrary, that evidence is absent.
    We see no indication that Helvie’s reason for terminating
Napier was dishonest. Napier disputes that Helvie specifi-
cally instructed him not to tell Brothers about the review of
her job description, so on this posture, we accept that Helvie
did not. Still, Napier conceded that even if Helvie never ex-
pressly told him to keep that project a secret, Helvie often
ended leadership meetings with a reminder to keep things
confidential. At the least, Napier should have known that it
was a sensitive topic. Telling Brothers that she might be on the
chopping block—before Helvie had made a decision—


    5 Helvie may have emailed the co-chairs of the Board with her con-

cerns regarding Napier, but the record lacks information about their re-
sponse, or for that matter, any evidence suggesting they had exerted in-
fluence over the decision.
14                                                       No. 23-1659

predictably introduced turmoil into the workplace. Plus, Na-
pier had already created friction with Helvie on a previous
occasion by authorizing a job posting.6 It is easy to see why
Helvie would have felt that Napier was undermining her
leadership, and further, why she would have found that to be
an intolerable dynamic between the Head of School and the
Middle School Director.
   To put it colloquially, Helvie’s story checks out. She raised
concerns about Napier’s breach of confidentiality to the
Board’s co-chairs immediately after it happened. She gave
that same reason to Napier himself when she terminated him.
Nowhere in the record does Helvie waver on why she did not
renew Napier’s contract. She could not trust him.
   Even if we were to assume Helvie used Napier’s disclo-
sures as a convenient excuse for something she wanted to do
regardless, Napier’s claim is not necessarily on stronger foot-
ing. “[A] showing of pretext alone is not enough; the plaintiff
must also show that the explanations are a pretext for the pro-
hibited animus.” Hitchcock v. Angel Corps., Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 2013).
    None of Napier’s attempts at demonstrating that Helvie
held his sex against him are persuasive. Take, for instance,
Helvie replacing Napier and Schwartz on the Senior Admin-
istrative Team with two women (Bostrom and Williams) who
indeed held prominent administrative roles. It is hard to see a
nefarious motive behind this reorganization, which provided
Napier and Schwartz with less insight into Orchard’s

     6 Napier disputes that Helvie adequately communicated that he

should not post the opening, but he admits that she was unhappy and had
the posting taken down.
No. 23-1659                                                 15

direction but did not alter their pay or day-to-day work. After
all, Napier and Schwartz remained on the Academic Leader-
ship Team, which handled the issues affecting Orchard’s two
constituent schools.
    Other supposed slights, such as Helvie denying Napier’s
request that Orchard not send out an email announcing his
departure, or Helvie refusing to inform faculty and parents
specifically why Napier was leaving the school, also bear no
apparent relation to Napier’s sex. And, although Napier high-
lights that Helvie made him report to Eble, and declined to
meet with Napier individually, Napier admitted in his depo-
sition that he was not certain that Helvie did so because he
was a man. Napier speculated that gender may have played
an indirect role, because Helvie only wanted to meet with
people who she was comfortable with, and she was more
comfortable with “non-threatening” and “subservient” men,
labels that apparently did not fit him.
    Napier’s main proof for why Eble fell into those catego-
ries, but he did not, is that Eble declined to speak up when
Helvie brought him a birthday cake containing nuts, in viola-
tion of Eble’s efforts to protect Orchard students with nut al-
lergies. Napier also observed that he is much taller than
Helvie, which parents would sometimes awkwardly bring up
during meetings. Neither Eble’s timidity nor Helvie’s annoy-
ance at comments about height are sufficient to demonstrate
that she was inclined to discriminate against Napier because
he is a man.
   At core, Napier’s theory is that Helvie targeted him be-
cause he was one man too many at Orchard, but we lack evi-
dence Helvie held that view of Orchard’s leadership. Yes, Eble
and others may have complained about Orchard having a
16                                                           No. 23-1659

surplus of men in charge, but Napier did not recall those state-
ments persisting after Helvie started. Certainly, and crucially,
there is no record of Helvie making similar remarks. With no
evidence that Helvie was even aware of what others had said
about Orchard’s ratio of men to women, Napier’s contention
that Helvie agreed with those comments is entirely specula-
tive.
   Finally, Napier’s brief invites us to infer that Helvie was
biased against men because of her educational background in
women’s studies. 7 We decline to make such a leap based on
nothing in this record other than Helvie’s choice of study and
the degrees she received fifteen to twenty-five years prior to
the events in this case.
           3. Napier’s Other Purported Evidence Of Pretext, In-
              cluding Comparator Evidence, Does Not Save His
              Claim.
    Another way that Napier tries to show pretext is by iden-
tifying five similarly-situated female employees that Orchard
allegedly treated better than him: Bostrom, Williams, Broth-
ers, Bricker, and even Helvie herself. We consider this evi-
dence not to evaluate whether Napier made a prima facie case
under McDonnell Douglas, but rather because “comparator ev-
idence and selective enforcement of an employer’s rules” are
relevant to a pretext analysis. Khowaja v. Sessions, 

 (7th Cir. 2018); see also Coleman v. Donahoe, 

, 857–58 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he similarly-situated inquiry
and the pretext inquiry are not hermetically sealed off from
one another.”). When using comparators to demonstrate

       7 We attribute this argument to an advocacy choice by Napier’s coun-

sel.
No. 23-1659                                                        17

pretext, a plaintiff must usually “show that the comparators
(1) ‘dealt with the same supervisor,’ (2) ‘were subject to the
same standards,’ and (3) ‘engaged in similar conduct without
such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would dis-
tinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them.’”
Coleman, 

 (quoting Gates v. Caterpillar, Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 2008)). “Similarly situated employees
must be directly comparable to the plaintiff in all material re-
spects.” 

 (cleaned up).
    All the purported comparators fail that test. Bostrom and
Williams are virtually absent from the events in this case; at
most, they were women placed on the Senior Administrative
Team instead of Napier. Brothers, unlike Napier, did not vio-
late Helvie’s confidentiality expectations. Bricker somewhat
resembles Napier in that she angered Helvie by disclosing her
demotion on Facebook, but she held a lower-ranked position
than Napier even before she was demoted to classroom
teacher, making it difficult to compare Napier’s termination
with Bricker retaining the option to stay on after her Facebook
post. Lastly, Helvie was Napier’s supervisor and the one who
terminated him, so she cannot be “similarly situated” to Na-
pier. See Ellis v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 

 (7th
Cir. 2008).
    There is a bit more to say about Brothers. Napier contends
that it is possible to infer sex discrimination because Brothers
was unqualified to replace him as Director of the Middle
School. Not so. Helvie offered Brothers the job as Acting Di-
rector on the same afternoon, but she terminated Napier be-
cause she no longer trusted him, not because she wanted to
put Brothers in the role. With Napier gone, promoting Broth-
ers was a way for Helvie to reduce the fallout from
18                                                             No. 23-1659

eliminating Brothers’s counselor position. Brothers had over
two decades of experience with Orchard, and while Napier
now argues she was unfit for the position, at the time he en-
couraged Brothers to take the job to prevent Orchard from be-
coming unglued. Thus, Helvie’s apparent “two birds with one
stone” approach to hiring Brothers does not help Napier’s
claim.
    That is also how we view the events following Napier’s
termination. Orchard never sent a written statement explain-
ing the decision, but Helvie’s verbal explanations were clear
and consistent. Additionally, while the Board deferred to
Helvie’s judgment as Head of School and did not inde-
pendently investigate or reconsider Napier’s termination,
“merely pointing to an employer’s shoddy investigatory ef-
forts” is insufficient “to establish pretext.” Humphries v.
CBOCS W., Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 2007), aff'd, 

 (2008). To be sure, an investigation “may have some bear-
ing on the truthfulness of [an employer’s] proffered reasons
for terminating [an employee],” 

 but here our doubt is not
great enough for Orchard’s deficiencies to move the needle. 8
  Ultimately, the evidence shows that Helvie terminated
Napier, who was popular in the Orchard community, because


     8 We note that Napier’s initial letter to the acting chair of the Board on

March 15, 2019 was silent on sex discrimination, and he seemingly did not
raise the subject until a follow-up communication in June 2019. A Title VII
plaintiff need not immediately cry discrimination in response to an ad-
verse employment action, but in this factual pattern, the absence of an in-
vestigation would be more troubling if Napier had promptly accused Or-
chard of terminating him based on sex. Similarly, while it would raise eye-
brows if Orchard failed to abide by its policy requiring an investigation,
Napier does not point to any such policy.
No. 23-1659                                                   19

he breached her trust. “Whether this was wise is, again, not a
question of pretext, which looks only to veracity.” Barnes, 

. We are strictly in the business of reviewing
whether there is evidence that Orchard’s employment deci-
sion was discriminatory. See Joll v. Valparaiso Community Sch.,

 (7th Cir. 2020) (“We have said time and again
(in more than one hundred reported opinions, by our count)
that we are not a super-personnel department that will sub-
stitute our criteria for an employer’s for hiring, promoting, or
disciplining employees.”). At the end of that review, our con-
clusion is that no reasonable factfinder could find that Napier
lost his job based on his sex.
           B. Napier’s Retaliation Claim Also Fails.
    To survive summary judgment on his retaliation claim,
Napier must show that (1) he engaged in an activity protected
by the statute; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action;
and (3) there was a but-for causal link between the protected
activity and the adverse action. Vesey v. Envoy Air, Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 2021); Gracia v. SigmaTron International,
Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing University of
Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 

(2013)). Orchard agrees that Napier’s complaint was pro-
tected activity and that the decision not to rehire him was an
adverse action, so we look at the third element only.
   Orchard says it rejected Napier based on his “past poor
performance,” but Napier argues that cannot be true because
Eble made the rejection decision, and Eble did not specifically
know why Napier was terminated. Although it is true that
Eble did not know exactly why Helvie terminated Napier, he
was aware that they had a fractured relationship, and he ac-
curately inferred that Napier breached Helvie’s trust. The
20                                                 No. 23-1659

record evidence indicates that Eble sincerely believed that Or-
chard terminated Napier for cause and would have had little
reason to rehire him less than a year later. No reasonable fact-
finder could determine that Napier’s litigation, rather than
the events that led to his termination, was the “but-for” cause
of Orchard’s decision not to rehire him.
                       III. Conclusion
     We AFFIRM the district court judgment.