In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
No. 24-2620
SOTIR LIBAROV,
                                                 Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                v.

U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
                                     Defendant-Appellee.
                    ____________________

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the
          Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
         No. 1:22-cv-06414 — Jeffrey I. Cummings, Judge.
                    ____________________

      ARGUED APRIL 10, 2025 — DECIDED MAY 27, 2025
                ____________________

   Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Sotir Libarov is a
Bulgarian citizen. His attempt to obtain lawful permanent
resident status was denied by United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) in June 2022. The following
month, Libarov submitted a request to United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA or the Act), 

,
seeking documents relating to himself. After making clear
2                                                 No. 24-2620

that he indeed intended to direct his FOIA request to ICE, not
USCIS, Libarov waited for a response. He had received none
by November 2022. He then filed this suit against both ICE
and USCIS seeking an order compelling disclosure of relevant
documents. He alleged that both agencies maintained
“standard operating procedures” of delaying document
disclosures in violation of FOIA and the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 

.
    In September 2023, ICE told Libarov that it had found six
pages of records responsive to his request and that it was
withholding all six pages as relevant to an ongoing law en-
forcement investigation. On cross-motions for summary judg-
ment, the district court concluded that Libarov could not seek
declaratory relief resulting solely from delayed FOIA disclo-
sure. The district court also concluded, though, that ICE
needed to disclose certain portions of the withheld document.
Finally, the court ruled that the FOIA statute provides an ad-
equate remedy for delayed disclosures, precluding Libarov’s
claim under the APA. Libarov has appealed, arguing (1) that
he should be able to receive a declaratory judgment that ICE
violated FOIA by failing to adhere to the Act’s timing provi-
sions, (2) that ICE must disclose all of the six-page document,
and (3) that FOIA does not foreclose his claim under the APA.
We agree with the district court on each issue and affirm its
judgment.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
    After entering the United States legally, Libarov married
Elizabeth Alonso Hernandez, a lawful permanent resident.
On March 15, 2016, Libarov applied to become a lawful
permanent resident based on that marriage. USCIS
interviewed Libarov and Hernandez separately in December
No. 24-2620                                                 3

2016. USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Libarov’s
application in March 2022, concluding that Libarov and
Hernandez had entered into a sham marriage for immigration
purposes. In the Notice, USCIS explained that Hernandez
said under oath that the marriage was arranged by an
acquaintance and that she “was offered $10,000 to enter a
fraudulent marriage” with Libarov. USCIS ultimately denied
Libarov’s application for permanent resident status on June
15, 2022. That denial included a more robust description of
USCIS’s interviews with Libarov and Hernandez.
    On July 22, 2022, Libarov, through counsel, submitted a
FOIA request to ICE seeking all “forms, statements, notes,
emails, text messages, investigative memoranda, electroni-
cally stored data, screenshots of DHS databases containing in-
formation and data, and all other documents and records per-
tinent to and/or relating in any way” to Libarov. ICE re-
sponded the same day, explaining that complete immigration
files (known as A-files) are maintained by USCIS, not ICE. ICE
accordingly routed Libarov’s FOIA request to USCIS. But Li-
barov did not want his A-file—he wanted any documents ICE
had on him and his application for legal permanent resident
status. He responded accordingly, asking that ICE “issue a
tracking number and process the request for the records of
ICE as requested.” ICE did not respond.
   Roughly four months later, in November 2022, Libarov
filed this lawsuit against both ICE and USCIS. The district
court later dismissed Libarov’s claims against USCIS. Libarov
has not appealed that dismissal.
    In September 2023, ICE sent Libarov a letter with a FOIA
tracking number and header titled “Interim Release.” It
explained it was withholding all the information Libarov
4                                                              No. 24-2620

sought under FOIA’s “7(A)” exemption for documents
related to ongoing law enforcement proceedings. See 

(b)(7)(A).
    The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
ICE’s motion included a declaration from ICE’s FOIA Direc-
tor, Fernando Pineiro, explaining ICE’s search procedures.
ICE also attached a Vaughn index explaining why ICE was
withholding the six-page document. 1
    The district court granted most of ICE’s motion,
explaining that an untimely response did not alone warrant
judgment in Libarov’s favor and that FOIA provided Libarov
with an adequate remedy, foreclosing his claim under the
APA. Libarov v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, No. 22 C
6414, 

, at *5, *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2024). The
court also granted summary judgment to ICE on some of its
withholdings but granted Libarov’s motion to a limited
extent, ordering ICE to disclose only portions of the report
comprising “basic personal information regarding Libarov
himself that Libarov is undoubtedly aware of already.” 

. Libarov has appealed on all three issues.
II. Analysis
    We address first Libarov’s argument that he is entitled to
a declaratory judgment that ICE violated FOIA because it
failed to issue a threshold “determination” on Libarov’s FOIA


    1 “A Vaughn index is a comprehensive listing of each withheld docu-

ment cross-referenced with the FOIA exemption that the Government as-
serts is applicable.” Solar Sources, Inc. v. United States, 

, 1036
n.3 (7th Cir. 1998), citing Vaughn v. Rosen, 

, 827–28 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (requiring a detailed index designating “which portions of the doc-
ument are disclosable and which are allegedly exempt”).
No. 24-2620                                                       5

request in the required statutory timeframe. We then review
the decision withholding the remaining information under
the law enforcement proceeding exemption before finally dis-
cussing whether Libarov has an independent cause of action
under the Administrative Procedure Act.
   A. Remedies for Slow FOIA Determinations
    The Freedom of Information Act was enacted to “ensure
an informed citizenry” and to “hold the governors accounta-
ble to the governed.” Vidal-Martinez v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 

, 747 (7th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks
omitted), quoting Nat’l Immigrant Just. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

 (7th Cir. 2020). FOIA provides that federal
agencies must make a wide array of government records
available to the public upon request. 

(a)(3)(A).
“FOIA records must be released ‘promptly.’” White v. U.S.
Dep't of Just., 

, 544 (7th Cir. 2021), quoting 

(a)(3)(A).
    Perhaps recognizing that unusual circumstances may
make it difficult for agencies to comply with bright-line rules
requiring disclosure under specific timelines, FOIA does not
require immediate disclosure upon receipt of a request. It re-
quires instead that an agency shall “determine within 20 days
… whether to comply with such request and shall immedi-
ately notify the person making such request” of its decision,
along with some additional information. 

(a)(6)(A)(i). The statute also provides for extensions of
this timeline in circumstances not present here. If an agency
does not comply with the “applicable time limit provisions,”
the FOIA requester “shall be deemed to have exhausted his
administrative remedies with respect to such request.”

(a)(6)(C)(i). “If the agency does not adhere to
6                                                     No. 24-2620

FOIA’s explicit timelines, the ‘penalty’ is that the agency can-
not rely on the administrative exhaustion requirement to keep
cases from getting into court.” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in
Washington v. Fed. Election Comm’n (“CREW I”), 

 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
    The district court concluded that FOIA does not authorize
relief resulting solely from an agency’s late production of re-
quested records. Libarov, 

, at *5, citing Walsh
v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 

 (7th Cir. 2005).
We review that decision, like any other summary judgment
decision, de novo. Ball v. Kotter, 

 (7th Cir.
2013).
    The undisputed facts show that ICE did not issue Libarov
a tracking number and that it missed by months the 20-day
statutory deadline to make a “determination” as required by

(a)(6)(A). But the undisputed facts also show
that ICE conducted an appropriate search for responsive doc-
uments and provided Libarov with information about the rea-
sons why it was withholding those documents. That occurred
in September 2023, roughly ten months after this lawsuit was
filed. Libarov still seeks a declaratory judgment to the effect
that ICE violated FOIA. Accordingly, the first question in this
appeal is whether Libarov may seek declaratory relief result-
ing solely from ICE’s failure to issue a determination in the
20-day window. Following our precedents and precedents
from other circuits, we conclude that—barring unusual cir-
cumstances—a plaintiff in Libarov’s situation may not obtain
declaratory relief.
   We have held at least twice that a suit filed to compel FOIA
production becomes moot once the government produces the
requested documents. See Cornucopia Institute v. U.S. Dep’t of
No. 24-2620                                                                   7

Agriculture, 

, 675–76 (7th Cir. 2009); Walsh, 400
F.3d at 536–37 (collecting cases). In Cornucopia Institute, the
plaintiff made the same argument that Libarov makes here:
that while injunctive relief obliging document disclosure
might have become moot by disclosure of the requested doc-
uments, “the district court remained free to issue a declara-
tory judgment that the USDA violated FOIA.” 560 F.3d at
675–76. We rejected this argument, citing the Supreme Court’s
explanation that the Declaratory Judgment Act did not “relax
Article III’s command that an actual case or controversy exist
before federal courts may adjudicate a question.” 

,
quoting MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 

(2007). Because the Cornucopia Institute plaintiff did not seek
“any response to its FOIA requests beyond what it already
ha[d] received,” the district court properly dismissed the case.

 2
   Walsh and Cornucopia Institute squarely resolve this issue.
As in both of those cases, the agency here has fulfilled the
FOIA request. Also as in both of those cases, Libarov does not


    2 On this point, we find further support in our case law and that of

several other circuits. See, e.g., In re Wade, 

 (7th Cir. 1992)
(“In FOIA cases, mootness occurs when requested documents have
already been produced.”); DeBold v. Stimson, 

 (7th Cir.
1984) (“Once the requested documents have been produced, the claim for
relief under FOIA becomes moot.”); see also Empower Oversight
Whistleblowers & Research v. Nat’l Institutes of Health, 

, 101 (4th
Cir. 2024) (agency’s delayed response “has already been redressed
through constructive administrative exhaustion. Indeed, Appellant
proceeded directly to court. … FOIA does not provide a separate cause of
action.”); Bayala v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Office of Gen. Couns., 

 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[O]nce all the documents are released to the
requesting party, there no longer is any case or controversy.”).
8                                                     No. 24-2620

contend that the document production was inadequate.
Accordingly, there is no “case or controversy” regarding the
adequacy of ICE’s production, and he may not seek a
declaratory judgment resulting solely from the delay. See
also, e.g., Perry v. Block, 

 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(“[H]owever fitful or delayed the release of information under
the FOIA may be, once all requested records are surrendered,
federal courts have no further statutory function to
perform.”).
    Libarov nonetheless makes three arguments worth ad-
dressing. He first contends that the statute requires a finding
of liability if the agency does not make a determination in the
required time because there has been a technical statutory vi-
olation. We disagree. The statute itself spells out what hap-
pens if the agency fails to issue a timely determination: the
requester “shall be deemed to have exhausted his administra-
tive remedies.” 

(a)(6)(C)(i). “This constructive
administrative exhaustion, and resulting ability to begin liti-
gation, is the exclusive remedy for the failure of an agency to
respond in a timely manner.” Empower Oversight Whistleblow-
ers & Research v. Nat’l Institutes of Health, 

, 100 (4th
Cir. 2024).
   Libarov’s next argument is that ICE, to this date, has not
made a required “determination” under the statute. He cites
the D.C. Circuit’s decision in CREW I for the principle that an
agency making a “determination” must “(i) gather and re-
view the documents; (ii) determine and communicate the
scope of the documents it intends to produce and withhold,
and the reasons for withholding any documents; and (iii) in-
form the requester that it can appeal whatever portion of the
‘determination’ is adverse.” 

. But CREW I
No. 24-2620                                                    9

actually explained that those three steps are required for an
agency to “trigger the administrative exhaustion require-
ment,” not that they are always required. 

 at 188–89. Even
Libarov’s authorities support the view that a plaintiff’s rem-
edy when an agency fails to issue a “determination” is the
right to go straight to federal court. See, e.g., Empower Over-
sight Whistleblowers, 122 F.4th at 100; Corbett v. Transportation
Sec. Admin., 

, 1025–26 (9th Cir. 2024) (“If the
agency does not timely respond, we deem the requester’s ob-
ligation to exhaust available administrative remedies con-
structively satisfied, and the requester may proceed directly
to court.”).
    While Libarov may be right that ICE never issued a formal
“determination” as contemplated by 

(a)(6)(A),
he received the relief allowed by the statute. The only addi-
tional relief available to Libarov after filing the lawsuit was
actual production of the documents. See 

(a)(4)(B) (“On complaint, the district court … has juris-
diction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records
and to order the production of any agency records improperly
withheld from the complainant.”). In other words, the pur-
pose of the initial determination is to notify a requester
whether he will receive the files. By now, Libarov has received
more than that. He has the actual documents, subject to the
exemptions discussed below.
    Libarov’s next statutory argument is that disallowing de-
claratory relief under FOIA after an agency produces docu-
ments renders superfluous 

(a)(6)(C)(i), which
permits district courts to “allow the agency additional time to
complete its review of the records” if the agency can show
that “exceptional circumstances exist and that the agency is
10                                                  No. 24-2620

exercising due diligence in responding to the request….”
Why, Libarov asks, would Congress have allowed an agency
to seek additional time to process requests if the agency could
simply delay production indefinitely once the lawsuit begins?
The answer is that, once in court, an agency faces the possibil-
ity of a court order obliging it to disclose documents immedi-
ately. The safety valve allows agencies to avoid those orders
in exceptional circumstances by requesting additional time to
respond. Both possibilities support FOIA’s purpose, which is
to ensure an informed citizenry, while protecting “certain in-
terests in privacy and confidentiality.” Solar Sources, Inc. v.
United States, 

 (7th Cir. 1998), citing NLRB.
v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 

 (1978). Here, ICE
did not contend that Libarov’s request posed an “exceptional
circumstance.” Instead, it responded to his request before the
dispositive motions deadline, thereby fulfilling, belatedly, its
duty to disclose documents.
    Libarov cites four cases in which other courts have issued
equitable relief to remedy undue agency delays in responding
to FOIA requests. All four involved facts substantially differ-
ent from this case. In three of them, plaintiffs submitted FOIA
requests that covered tens of thousands of pages of responsive
documents. See Seavey v. Dep’t of Just., 

,
243–44. (D.D.C. 2017); Clemente v. FBI, 

(D.D.C. 2014); Villanueva v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 19-23452-
CIV, 

, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2021). In Seavey,
Clemente, and Villanueva, the defendant agencies slowly pro-
cessed the documents, and the plaintiffs argued that the
courts should order them to expedite those reviews. All three
courts agreed to order such relief. Seavey, 

; Clemente, 

; Villanueva, 

, at *4. When those cases were decided, the defendant
No. 24-2620                                                    11

agencies had not yet provided the requested documents, and
the requesters had not received any indication from the agen-
cies whether to expect to receive the documents or which ex-
emptions would be applied.
    Here, on the other hand, ICE has conducted a sufficient
search for responsive documents and provided Libarov with
those documents (subject to the exemptions discussed below).
Seavey, Clemente, and Villanueva do not support Libarov’s po-
sition that an agency’s mere delay in making an initial deter-
mination warrants declaratory relief.
    The fourth case that Libarov cites is Payne Enterprises, Inc.
v. United States, 

 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Payne supports
the premise that some plaintiffs may be entitled to equitable
relief stemming from persistent and repeated delays in docu-
ment production, but not that Libarov is entitled to such re-
lief. In Payne, the plaintiff ran a business that relied on access-
ing information about government contracts through FOIA.
Payne’s document requests were repeatedly denied by the de-
fendant agency but later granted by an appeals board, which
instructed the agency to stop denying the plaintiff’s requests.
When the agency did not do so, Payne filed suit. 

 at 488–90.
After the district court dismissed his suit as moot, the D.C.
Circuit reversed. It explained that while document produc-
tion will moot an ordinary FOIA claim, consistent with our
explanation above, “this will not moot a claim that an agency
policy or practice will impair the party’s lawful access to infor-
mation in the future.” 

 (emphasis in original). The
court held that the district court’s refusal to grant equitable
relief was an abuse of discretion because agency officials had
consistently denied Payne’s document requests for over two
years, infringing his right to information. 

. Later D.C.
12                                                  No. 24-2620

Circuit decisions have reiterated that, to state such a “policy
or practice” claim, a plaintiff must “allege a pattern of pro-
longed delay amounting to a persistent failure to adhere to
FOIA’s requirements and that the pattern of delay will inter-
fere with its right under FOIA to promptly obtain non-exempt
records from the agency in the future.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 

 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
    In Walsh and Cornucopia Institute, we left open the possibil-
ity that plaintiffs may obtain declaratory or other equitable
relief from an agency’s persistent FOIA violations. We ex-
plained that the plaintiff in Walsh could not seek relief because
he had not shown more than a “faint possibility” that he
might make additional FOIA requests and again be forced to
wait too long to receive responses. Walsh, 

. And
in Cornucopia Institute we held that the case was moot in part
because the plaintiff did not “seek any response to its FOIA
requests beyond what it” had already received. 

.
    Like the plaintiffs in Walsh and Cornucopia Institute,
Libarov has not argued, let alone offered evidence, that he is
likely to make additional FOIA requests and be subject to
delayed responses. He also concedes that ICE’s search for
responsive documents here was adequate. These facts
distinguish Payne and put his case outside the “pattern and
practice” exception to Walsh and Cornucopia Institute. See also
Hajro v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 

(9th Cir. 2015) (noting that FOIA allows “pattern or practice”
claims but plaintiff had not alleged that delays would impair
his access to information in the future; remanding for fact-
finding on another plaintiff’s standing). Accordingly, Libarov
No. 24-2620                                                      13

is not entitled to a declaratory judgment against ICE for
delayed FOIA responses.
   B. The Exemption
    Libarov also appeals the district court’s decision not to re-
quire ICE to disclose the six-page document in its entirety.
“FOIA requires a federal agency upon request to disclose rec-
ords in its possession, subject to nine exemptions.” Enviro Tech
Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Env’tl Prot. Agency, 

 (7th Cir.
2004), citing 

(a), (b). Here, ICE invoked exemp-
tion 7(A), which exempts from production “records or infor-
mation compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such law enforcement rec-
ords or information ... could reasonably be expected to inter-
fere with enforcement proceedings.” 

(b)(7)(A).
To justify withholding, the government must show first that
the information was compiled for law enforcement purposes,
and that, “with respect to particular kinds of enforcement
proceedings, disclosure of particular kinds of investigatory
records while a case is pending would generally ‘interfere
with enforcement proceedings.’” Robbins Tire, 

,
quoting 

(b)(7)(A); see also Solar Sources, 

.
   The district court here viewed the document in camera and
concluded that ICE should disclose the portions of the report
containing “basic personal information regarding Libarov
himself that Libarov is undoubtedly aware of already.”
Libarov, 

, at *8. The court granted summary
judgment for ICE on its decision to withhold “the portions of
the Report which could reasonably be expected to interfere
with enforcement proceedings if disclosed.” 

. At oral
14                                                              No. 24-2620

argument, counsel for ICE represented that roughly five of the
six pages have been disclosed to Libarov.
    We employ an unusual standard of review in FOIA ex-
emption cases. We first determine de novo whether “the dis-
trict court had an adequate factual basis for its decisions,” ask-
ing whether the district court had enough information to
make a “legally sound decision about whether an exemption
applies.” Stevens v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 

 (7th
Cir. 2021). This step usually assesses the “specificity of the
agency’s affidavit, its Vaughn index, and whether the district
court conducted an in camera review of the contested materi-
als.” 

 If the district court had sufficient information to make
a “legally sound” decision about the exemption, we review its
conclusion for clear error because district courts are “best sit-
uated to conduct the comprehensive, record-by-record review
that FOIA withholdings may require.” 

 3


     3 Libarov argues in passing that the clear error standard is “at odds

with the settled view of other courts that an agency’s decision that infor-
mation is exempt from disclosure receives no deference, and all doubts
must be resolved in favor of disclosure.” Appellant’s Br. at 13, citing
Bloomberg, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 

(2d Cir. 2010); Epstein v. Resor, 

 (9th Cir. 1970). While we
have previously acknowledged “doubts” about “how the clear-error
standard pops up in an appeal from a summary-judgment ruling, given
how well established the de novo standard of review is in such cases,”
Vidal-Martinez v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 

, 747 n.3 (7th Cir.
2023) (internal quotation marks omitted), Libarov has not developed an
argument that would convince us to depart from circuit precedent here.
Also, Libarov misconstrues our standard of review. We agree that a dis-
trict court reviews “de novo all agency decisions applying an exemption.”
Ass’n of Retired R.R. Workers v. U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd., 

(D.C. Cir. 1987), citing 

(a)(4)(B). But that is not to say that we
must review de novo a district court’s decision applying an exemption.
No. 24-2620                                                  15

   At step one, the district court here had an “adequate fac-
tual basis … to make a legally sound decision about whether
an exemption applies.” 

 The court reviewed an affidavit
from ICE’s FOIA Director, Fernando Pineiro, which explained
that the document was created for law enforcement purposes
because it is ICE’s mission to investigate “individuals who
may be present in the United States illegally.” Pineiro also ex-
plained: “Release of the documents could potentially interfere
with an open and ongoing case and investigation being con-
ducted, as well as enforcement proceedings. Release of the
records would most certainly jeopardize an investigation that
has been ongoing for a long period of time.”
    ICE also provided a Vaughn index, which in a case involv-
ing just one document was not particularly helpful. It simply
designated all six pages as protected under exemption 7(A).
The affidavit was fairly conclusory too, so without more it
might have been difficult to affirm withholding the remaining
information. The Vaughn index and conclusory affidavit are
offset, though, by the fact that the district court conducted an
in camera review. See Vidal-Martinez, 84 F.4th at 748 (district
court had “more than an adequate factual basis” for evaluat-
ing agency withholdings when it conducted in camera review
of 51 documents; collecting cases supporting the principle).
We conclude that the district court had an adequate factual
basis to determine whether exemption 7(A) applied. See id.
    The court’s conclusion about exemption 7(A) was not
clearly erroneous. We conducted our own in camera review of
the document and see parts that could have been (1) compiled
for law enforcement purposes and (2) could reasonably be ex-
pected to “interfere with enforcement proceedings.” 

(b)(7)(A). ICE contends that release of this information
16                                                            No. 24-2620

could “jeopardize an investigation that has been ongoing for
a long period of time.” There is enough information in the re-
dacted part of the report for the district court to conclude that
disclosure could interfere with ongoing law enforcement pro-
ceedings. See, e.g., Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 239–42 (disclosure
of witness statements could lead to witness intimidation). The
district court did not clearly err when it concluded that dis-
closure of records like this one “would generally ‘interfere
with enforcement proceedings.’” 

. 4
    Libarov’s last argument is that the withheld pages cannot
“reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement pro-
ceedings,” 

(b)(7)(A), because he applied for law-
ful permanent resident status in 2016, nine years ago and well
outside the general five-year statute of limitations in 

. This does not persuade us to reverse the district court’s
7(A) decision. While Libarov’s own conduct itself may fall
outside the statute of limitations, those events may still be rel-
evant to an investigation of an ongoing or long-term scheme
or conspiracy to commit further violations. Cf. Solar Sources,


     4 Libarov submits that ICE cannot invoke exemption 7(A) because

USCIS already disclosed “a significant portion of its ‘investigation’ into
the Libarov marriage.” First, Libarov has not presented evidence on what
exactly USCIS disclosed while this litigation has been pending, making it
impossible to assess this argument. Insofar as Libarov is referring to the
information provided by USCIS in its initial denial of his application for
permanent resident status, the information contained in the redacted part
of the report is materially different, making this case unlike the cases cited
by Libarov. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 

 (D.D.C. 2009) (rejecting 7(A) argument
when agency did not explain “how its investigation will be impaired by
the release of information that the targets of the investigation already
possess” (emphasis in original)).
No. 24-2620                                                 17

 (“The fact that the Government has closed a
particular investigation does not make it any less likely that
disclosure in this case ‘could reasonably be expected to inter-
fere with enforcement proceedings.’” (quoting 

(b)(7)(A)). The district court’s summary judgment ruling
on the 7(A) withholding is affirmed.
   C. The Administrative Procedure Act
    Finally, Libarov seeks to revive his theory that he should
win relief under the APA because ICE maintains a policy of
unduly delaying its FOIA responses. His complaint alleges
that “since approximately 2010 DHS and ICE have taken the
position that 

(a)(6)(A)(i) does not impose an af-
firmative obligation or require the agency and its components
to make determinations on FOIA requests within the 20-busi-
ness day statutory timeframe.” He requested a court order de-
claring this “practice” unlawful.
    The APA states in relevant part: “Agency action made re-
viewable by statute and final agency action for which there is
no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial re-
view.” 

. The district court concluded that FOIA
itself provides an “adequate remedy” for Libarov, and that he
therefore could not maintain a cause of action under the APA.
Libarov, 

, at *8. Whether the FOIA statute
provides Libarov with an “adequate remedy” under the APA
is a question of law that we review de novo. Delgado v. Holder,

 (7th Cir. 2012).
   Here, again, Libarov’s argument is foreclosed by circuit
precedent. In Walsh, we held that “FOIA provides an adequate
remedy” for a plaintiff seeking disclosure of documents, be-
cause under either statute, the remedy sought is the same: “a
18                                                  No. 24-2620

court order requiring total compliance with [the plaintiff’s] re-
quest.” 

, citing Bowen v. Massachusetts, 

 (1988) (“Congress did not intend the general grant of
review in the APA to duplicate existing procedures for review
of agency action. … § 704 ‘does not provide additional judi-
cial remedies in situations where the Congress has provided
special and adequate review procedures.’”). Several other cir-
cuits have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Citizens for
Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Just. (“CREW II”),

 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“FOIA offers an ‘ade-
quate remedy’ within the meaning of section 704 such that
CREW’s APA claim is barred.”); Rimmer v. Holder, 

 (6th Cir. 2012) (“FOIA provided Rimmer with an ad-
equate remedy in court, and thus Rimmer’s APA claim is
barred by 

.”); Central Platte Natural Resources
Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 

 (8th Cir.
2011) (“FOIA specifically bars judicial review of an APA claim
where the claimant seeks ‘a court order’ to produce the same
documents under both FOIA and the APA.”).
    Libarov argues that his APA claim seeks “a declaration
and vacatur of certain final rules” as unlawful, not production
of any records. He appears to concede that FOIA provides an
adequate remedy for production of documents, but he
contends instead that the statute is insufficient to remedy an
agency’s systemic practice of delaying FOIA responses. We
disagree with this position, too. As we explained above, FOIA
does, in some circumstances, allow “policy or practice” suits
against a defendant agency. See Payne Enterprises, 837 F.2d at
494–95; Judicial Watch, Inc, 895 F.3d at 780–84; Walsh, 

; Cornucopia Institute, 

; see also CREW II,
846 F.3d at 1244–46 (explaining that FOIA allows district
courts to grant prospective injunctive relief, and that “FOIA
No. 24-2620                                                  19

offers CREW precisely the kind of ‘special and adequate
review procedure[ ]’ that Congress immunized from
‘duplic[ative]’ APA review” (quoting Bowen, 

)).
    Libarov’s last argument is that if he cannot seek equitable
relief for a delayed determination under FOIA, then FOIA
cannot serve as an “adequate remedy” foreclosing relief un-
der the APA. We see no Catch-22. “Importantly, the question
of whether a remedy is ‘adequate’ under § 704 is distinct from
the question of whether that remedy presents the plaintiff
with a viable path to relief.” Rollerson v. Brazos River Harbor
Navigation Dist., 

 (5th Cir. 2021); CREW II, 

 (“[O]ur determination that FOIA is the proper
vehicle for CREW’s claim is entirely distinct from the question
whether CREW is entitled to relief.”). Libarov is not entitled
to further relief under FOIA in this case, but that does not
mean that the FOIA statute is not an adequate remedy for
plaintiffs in FOIA cases generally.
   The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.