In the
    United States Court of Appeals
                For the Seventh Circuit
                   ____________________

No. 24-1799
LANITA DOTSON,
                                               Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                v.

JAMES FAULKNER,
                                              Defendant-Appellee.
                   ____________________

           Appeal from the United States District Court
               for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
           No. 20-cv-1767-bhl — Brett H. Ludwig, Judge.
                   ____________________

       ARGUED MAY 13, 2025 — DECIDED MAY 29, 2025
                ____________________

   Before EASTERBROOK, BRENNAN, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. While confined at Ellsworth
Correctional Institution in Wisconsin, Lanita Dotson was
abused by guard James Faulkner. He forced her to perform
fellatio two or three times and once choked her into uncon-
sciousness. Faulkner has been convicted of sexual assault and
sentenced to 14 years’ custody, at least 6½ of which must be
served in prison. State v. Faulkner, 

(Sept. 7, 2022).
2                                                 No. 24-1799

    In this suit under 

 Dotson sought damages
from Faulkner, Sarah Cooper (the warden), Kalen Ruck (the
deputy warden), and Amy Finke (a captain of guards). The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Cooper,
Ruck, and Finke, ruling that none of them knew or had reason
to suspect that Faulkner posed a danger to prisoners. 

 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 24, 2023). Dotson’s ap-
pellate brief does not mention Cooper, Ruck, or Finke, so she
has abandoned her claims against them, and we have re-
moved them from the caption.
    Faulkner did not answer the complaint. The district court
entered a default and held a hearing to determine damages.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)(B). Dotson contended that the as-
saults reduced her expected income and would require long-
term medical expenses. She sought damages to cover these
losses, plus pain and suffering; she also requested punitive
damages. The district judge awarded $1 million for pain and
suffering plus $3 million in punitive damages but found the
proof of other loss insufficient. 

(E.D. Wis. Feb. 27, 2024). Although represented by counsel
(Joseph W. Seifert of Milwaukee), Dotson did not introduce
any evidence about her anticipated future income—either
how much she would have expected to make in the absence
of Faulkner’s crimes, or how they affected her earning capac-
ity. Counsel did proffer an expert report estimating the ex-
penses that Dotson would incur for mental-health care, but
the expert did not testify and the report was not authenti-
cated. Nor did the report reduce future outlays to present
value. The district judge generously gave Seifert 14 days after
the hearing to fix those problems.
No. 24-1799                                                    3

    Instead of having the expert authenticate her report
through an affidavit or a declaration under 

,
Seifert drafted, and the expert signed, a document that did not
satisfy either option. It was not sworn before a notary, and it
did not meet the statute, which requires language in substan-
tially this form: “I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under
penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of
America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on
(date).” The document that Seifert drafted for the expert says
that it is “under penalty of perjury” but does not declare that
the report’s substance “is true and correct”. The judge could
not fathom why Seifert failed to copy the statutory words or
use a notary. The judge concluded that the document did not
comply substantially with §1746.
    As for the present-value calculation: Seifert did this him-
self rather than obtaining the expert’s views. He added an an-
nual cost increase of 4.3% while selecting a discount rate of
3%. The result nearly doubled the expert’s cost estimate. He
did not justify projecting annual cost increases (something the
expert had not done) when all the district judge held the rec-
ord open for was discounting to present value. Nor did Seifert
explain how he could be a witness in Dotson’s case, or what
expertise he had to project medical cost increases or deter-
mine appropriate discount rates.
    The district judge threw out the additional evidence, ob-
serving that Seifert had “failed to comply with basic law on
damages and the rules of evidence.” 

 at *7. The judge added: “Counsel’s submission shows a
wholesale lack of care for compliance with” §1746. Id. at *8
n.2. This left Dotson with a $4 million award.
4                                                    No. 24-1799

    Dotson’s appellate brief contests these rulings, but the dis-
trict judge did not abuse his discretion or make a legal error.
The brief’s main argument is that the district court erred by
not finding that Faulkner committed his wrongs in the course
of his employment. The goal could be a judgment against the
employer under principles of respondeat superior or a state law
providing indemnification for some adverse judgments. Nei-
ther option has good prospects. Monell v. New York City De-
partment of Social Services, 

 (1978), holds that §1983
does not authorize vicarious liability, and as a matter of Wis-
consin’s law it is Faulkner who possesses any entitlement to
indemnification, given that his employer was the state itself.

(1)(a). See Carlson v. Pepin County, 

 (Wis. App. 1992) (§895.46 “does not permit a tort
victim to sue the state directly”). More: Faulkner’s employer,
Wisconsin’s Department of Corrections, is not a “person” un-
der §1983 to begin with. Will v. Michigan Department of State
Police, 

 (1989).
     But the district court did not consider any of these poten-
tial obstacles, because the complaint did not name Faulkner’s
employer as a party. The result, the judge patiently explained,
is that scope of employment “is not before the Court. … Plain-
tiff never sued Faulkner’s employer, so this issue was never
litigated.” 

 at *14–15. Wisconsin is
entitled to contest any assertion that Faulkner’s criminal acts
were within the scope of his employment, but the posture of
this litigation has denied it that opportunity. Any declaration
about its obligations, in a proceeding to which it is not a party
(and so cannot be bound), would be an advisory opinion.
About all of this Seifert’s brief on appeal says … not one word.
No. 24-1799                                                      5

    Lawyers who ignore the ground on which a district court
acts doom their clients’ chances. You cannot persuade a court
of appeals that a district judge erred if you fail to engage with
the judge’s reasons. At oral argument Dotson’s lawyer stated
that he believes that naming the employer as a party is unnec-
essary under Wisconsin’s law and asked for a chance to file a
supplemental brief to address the subject. That request is de-
nied. Even the reply brief would have been too late. Argu-
ments omitted from an opening appellate brief are forfeited,
if not waived. Protect Our Parks v. Buttigieg, 

(7th Cir. 2024); Hackett v. South Bend, 

 (7th Cir.
2020); Cole v. CIR, 

, 772–73 (7th Cir. 2011); Practi-
tioner’s Handbook for Appeals to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit 161 (2020 ed.). We entertain supple-
mental briefs on questions that appellate judges introduce
into a case or issues that arise after the opening brief was filed.
But when the district court decides a case on a particular
ground, that subject must be addressed in the appellant’s
opening brief, if appellant wants it reviewed.
    Seifert’s work in this litigation falls far short of profes-
sional standards. Yet he went on the offensive in his appellate
brief. While ignoring the ground on which his client lost the
scope-of-employment issue, Seifert asserted that “[t]he [dis-
trict] Judge’s unfounded accusations of Attorney Seifert of
ethical violations and attempts to deceive the lower court
were slanderous and improper and should be stricken from
the Record.” Seifert does not explain just how we are to
“strike” language from the district judge’s opinions, which
are available to the public via the PACER system as well as
Westlaw and Lexis. Are we also supposed to enjoin newspa-
pers from publishing judicial language?
6                                                     No. 24-1799

    The All Writs Act, 

(a), permits a court to
“issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respec-
tive jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles
of law.” We doubt that a Writ of Erasure is “agreeable to the
usages and principles of law.” Certainly it lacks provenance.
Seifert’s brief does not cite authority for the relief he seeks; it
simply assumes that courts of appeals can blot unwelcome
language from district courts’ opinions. That is not within our
remit.
                                                        AFFIRMED