In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
No. 23-2789
STEVEN LINDSEY,
                                             Petitioner-Appellant,
                                v.

RON NEAL,
                                             Respondent-Appellee.
                    ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
         Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.
     No. 3:23-cv-740-TLS-APR — Theresa L. Springmann, Judge.
                    ____________________

      ARGUED APRIL 08, 2025 — DECIDED MAY 30, 2025
                ____________________

   Before HAMILTON, LEE, and MALDONADO, Circuit Judges.
    MALDONADO, Circuit Judge. In 2019, Steven Lindsey
sought postconviction relief in an Indiana trial court, chal-
lenging his murder conviction. For the past six years, that pe-
tition has languished in the state court. The delay stems from
the state court’s inaction and the prosecution’s ineffective-
ness. In 2022, Lindsey turned to federal court for relief under

. His federal habeas petition acknowledged
that he had not fully exhausted Indiana’s state remedies;
2                                                    No. 23-2789

however, he argued that those remedies were “ineffective,”
allowing him to proceed under the exception to the exhaus-
tion requirement in § 2254(b)(1). We agree. We therefore va-
cate the district court’s judgment dismissing Lindsey’s peti-
tion and remand for further proceedings.
                                  I
    In 2016, an Indiana jury convicted Lindsey of murdering
his wife, Melinda Lindsey. The conviction came after two
failed attempts. The first trial, in September 2015, ended in a
mistrial when evidence emerged implicating an alternative
suspect, prompting a pause to investigate the lead. Six weeks
later, the State tried again. That second trial also resulted in a
mistrial, this time because the jury could not reach a unani-
mous verdict. Finally, in February 2016, the State brought
Lindsey to trial a third time. That proceeding concluded in a
guilty verdict. The trial court sentenced Lindsey to fifty-five
years in prison.
    Lindsey appealed, raising numerous constitutional, proce-
dural, and evidentiary challenges. The Court of Appeals of
Indiana denied his appeal in an unpublished memorandum
decision. Lindsey v. State, 

 (Table), 

 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). The Indiana Supreme Court de-
clined to take his subsequent appeal.
    That brings us to Lindsey’s state postconviction proceed-
ings, the matter before us. He filed a pro se postconviction pe-
tition in state court on February 13, 2019. That was over six
years ago. The case has virtually stalled during that time, with
the state court taking little action. Below we describe the liti-
gation of the last six years.
No. 23-2789                                                     3

   On April 30, 2019, the State, without seeking any extension
from the state court, filed its answer to Lindsey’s petition—
more than a month late. See IND. POST-CONVICTION R. 1(4)(a).
Two weeks after its late filing, the State asked the court to ap-
point a special prosecutor. The court complied, but the first
appointee stepped aside after one month, forcing the court to
appoint a new prosecutor in August.
    Lindsey, meanwhile, tried to move his case forward. In
August 2019, he filed several motions, including one to set a
hearing. After three months of silence, he filed another mo-
tion in November requesting a status update. The court has
yet to acknowledge or rule on any of these motions.
   The case then sat idle for over a year. In December 2020,
nearly two years after Lindsey filed his petition, the state
court, acting on its own, appointed Lindsey a public defender.
At first glance, the move might have seemed like progress.
But Lindsey indicated in his petition that he wished to repre-
sent himself. That misunderstanding cost another three
months, as the public defender moved to withdraw and the
court eventually granted the request. Even then, Lindsey’s
earlier motions remained unaddressed.
    After the case stalled again for another year, Lindsey
moved to amend his petition in December 2021. One month
later, he filed a motion for discovery. In response, the special
prosecutor withdrew from the case. The court appointed a
third special prosecutor in May 2022.
    To the State’s credit, the third special prosecutor got off to
a better start. That prosecutor promptly requested (and re-
ceived) an extension to respond to Lindsey’s amended peti-
tion and discovery motion. By July 2022, the State filed an
4                                                   No. 23-2789

answer and responded to Lindsey’s motion for discovery; by
August, the State served discovery requests. Lindsey timely
responded the next month, answering interrogatories and ob-
jecting to certain requests, which the State never moved to
compel. Then the state case went silent again. So, in August
2023, Lindsey turned to federal court and filed a pro se habeas
petition in the Northern District of Indiana.
   Like his state appeals, Lindsey’s habeas petition raises a
range of constitutional claims: some alleging ineffective assis-
tance of counsel by trial and appellate counsel, others charg-
ing prosecutorial misconduct, and still others asserting due
process violations. All underpin his central claim that he is
actually innocent.
   Lindsey concedes that he has not exhausted state court
remedies for all the claims he brings in his habeas petition, as

(b)(1)(A) ordinarily requires. He argues, how-
ever, that the State blocked his path. He therefore invokes
§ 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii), which excuses exhaustion when “circum-
stances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the
rights of the applicant.” Specifically, he maintains that inordi-
nate delay in his state postconviction proceedings should ex-
cuse the exhaustion requirement relating to those claims.
    The district court disagreed. It dismissed Lindsey’s peti-
tion at the screening stage, see Rule 4 of the Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases, finding that any delays in the state court
were reasonable and declining to reach the merits. In so rul-
ing, the district court mistakenly stated that Lindsey was ap-
pointed counsel within a year of filing his state postconviction
petition (the docket shows the appointment in fact occurred
nearly two years after Lindsey’s initial filing) and concluded
that the appointment of counsel rendered Lindsey’s earlier
No. 23-2789                                                     5

motions moot. The district court acknowledged the lack of
progress since September 2022 but found that Lindsey’s legal
inexperience, not the State, caused the delay.
    The district court denied Lindsey a certificate of appeala-
bility, but he proceeded with an appeal. On review, this Court
granted him a certificate and allowed his appeal to proceed,
finding that reasonable jurists could debate whether Lind-
sey’s petition fell within the inordinate-delay exception. Lind-
sey then requested appellate counsel, and we appointed him
a lawyer. We now squarely address whether Lindsey is ex-
cused from § 2254’s exhaustion requirement.
                                 II
    In appeals of petitions for habeas relief, we review the dis-
trict court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings
for clear error. Arnold v. Richardson, 

 (7th Cir.
2021).
    Federal habeas relief is unavailable unless the petitioner
first gives state courts a full opportunity to resolve his consti-
tutional claims. Shinn v. Ramirez, 

 (2022) (cit-
ing § 2254(b)(1)(A)). To meet this requirement, the petitioner
must pursue “one complete round of the State's established
appellate review process.” O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 

 (1999). This “rule of comity” eases federal-state “friction”
by giving state courts the first chance to correct any constitu-
tional violations before a federal district court intervenes. 

    That rule has exceptions, though. “The petitioner need not
exhaust if there is ‘an absence of available State corrective pro-
cess’ or ‘circumstances exist that render such process ineffec-
tive to protect the rights of the applicant.’” Carter v. Buesgen,

 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting §§ 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)–
6                                                    No. 23-2789

(ii)). Our longstanding precedent establishes that inordinate
delay can render a state-law remedy ineffective or unavaila-
ble. Evans v. Wills, 

 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing
Carter, 10 F.4th at 723–24, and Lane v. Richards, 

,
364–65 (7th Cir. 1992)). To invoke this exception to the exhaus-
tion rule, a petitioner must demonstrate both that the delay is
“inordinate” and that it is “attributable to the state.” 

    Lindsey easily establishes the first step of inordinate de-
lay. More than six years have passed since he filed his state
postconviction petition without a meaningful step forward.
Our Court has found far shorter delays intolerable: a four-
year delay was “extreme and tragic” in Carter, 

;
a three-and-a-half-year delay was “inordinate” in Lowe v.
Duckworth, 

 (7th Cir. 1981); and even a seven-
teen-month lapse sufficed in Dozie v. Cady, 

(7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), where the petitioner’s court-ap-
pointed counsel failed to file an opening brief in that time. The
state court has yet to rule on Lindsey’s 2019 motions. Indeed,
there was a nearly three-year period from June 2022 to May
2025 during which the state court took no action—a delay
that, standing alone, is troubling. See Evans, 

(concluding that a three-year delay within longer delay was
itself inordinate). The question, then, boils down to whether
the delay is “meaningfully attributable to the state.” 

    To answer that, we evaluate the actions of the state court
and prosecution and determine whether they are responsible
for “significant portions of the total delay.” 

. The law
does not demand perfection from the State, just steady move-
ment that shows its judicial processes are effectively “pro-
tect[ing] the rights of the applicant.” § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii).
No. 23-2789                                                    7

Unfortunately, the Indiana trial court and the attorneys for
the State have failed to live up to this basic standard here.
    Start with the state court. Since the case’s inception, the
court has not held any hearings, has not issued any status up-
dates, and has not acknowledged or ruled on any of Lindsey’s
motions. That pattern of inaction is unacceptable. So too is the
court’s selective attention to the parties’ filings. The state
court has ruled on each of the prosecution’s motions within
two weeks yet has ignored every motion Lindsey filed pro se.
We recognize the administrative burdens that can come with
pro se litigation. Courts, however, are not two-tiered. A mo-
tion drafted in a prison cell deserves no less judicial attention
than one typed in a government office. See Huber v. Anderson,

 (7th Cir. 2018) (Prisoners have “an inde-
pendent constitutional right to meaningful access to the
courts.”).
    The prosecution’s performance fares no better. It missed
the deadline to answer Lindsey’s petition by more than a
month without seeking the court’s permission or forgiveness
for the late filing. After filing its late response, it asked the
court to appoint a special prosecutor, triggering a series of ap-
pointments and withdrawals that delayed meaningful review
of the case for months. Even the third special prosecutor, who
started off diligently, eventually lapsed into a years-long si-
lence. Each of these false starts lies with the State, not with
any delay or obstruction by Lindsey.
   Now contrast that with Lindsey’s performance. From the
outset, he took active steps to advance his case: filing multiple
motions, requesting a hearing, and later seeking to amend his
petition and conduct discovery. When the court fell silent for
months, Lindsey followed up with a motion for a status
8                                                  No. 23-2789

update. His diligence continued during discovery. After the
State submitted its requests, Lindsey timely responded, an-
swering interrogatories and objecting where he deemed ap-
propriate. He met each obligation without delay, all while
navigating the process pro se from prison. In short, while the
State stumbled or stood still, Lindsey took action.
     Notwithstanding this record, the State tries to shift the
blame to Lindsey. Its core claim is that Lindsey bore a duty to
prosecute his case, see Caruthers v. State, 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2016), and failed to meet it. But the record
shows that he met any burden. Lindsey filed repeated mo-
tions, and the court ignored each one. He has also actively and
timely participated in discovery, including answering and ob-
jecting to certain production requests. Absent informal reso-
lution of any discovery disputes between the parties, the State
could have moved to compel responses. See IND. TRIAL R. 26.
Yet the State abandoned the effort entirely and now insists
Lindsey should have done more. What more, it does not say.
The law does not require Lindsey to take on the futile task of
filing motion after motion into a judicial void.
    The State also argues that the state court’s failure to rule
on Lindsey’s pending motions should not count against it,
since those motions predated his appointment of counsel.
That position is unreasonable. True, Indiana courts recognize
that represented litigants speak “to the court through coun-
sel.” Underwood v. State, 

 (Ind. 2000). But
Lindsey’s postconviction petition expressly declined the ap-
pointment of counsel, rendering the court’s appointment an
oversight. Moreover, the assigned public defender never par-
ticipated in the case. And the state court neither struck nor
ruled on Lindsey’s motions. A court does not tacitly nullify a
No. 23-2789                                                     9

pro se litigant’s motions by appointing unwanted counsel.
The State’s attempt to shift blame to Lindsey ignores that the
confusion originated from the court’s own error.
    Even if Lindsey bore some responsibility for discrete peri-
ods of delay—and we are not saying he did—the broader
timeline overwhelmingly points to the State. We underscored
this point in Evans, where we explained that the §
2254(b)(1)(B) analysis eschews “divvy[ing] up the proceed-
ings into bits and pieces, and then measur[ing] who—[the pe-
titioner] or the state—is responsible for a greater amount [of
the delay].” Evans, 

. Instead, it turns on whether
the State's process proved ineffective. The pattern of delay
and inaction Lindsey experienced meets that standard. Six
years at a standstill “should have sounded an alarm bell” in
Indiana’s judicial apparatus. Carter, 

. Yet rather
than accept responsibility, the State appears more interested
in shifting blame.
    Recent actions by the State prove the point. In a Rule 28(j)
letter filed on May 19, the State informed the Court that it has
moved to dismiss Lindsey’s postconviction petition in state
court for failure to prosecute. That motion—filed one month
after our Court held oral argument and while the federal ap-
peal was pending—accused Lindsey of “abandon[ing]” the
state court proceedings in favor of the federal habeas relief. A
hearing on the motion is now set for June 17, which would be
the first hearing the state court has held since the postconvic-
tion petition was filed in 2019. In line with its prior conduct,
the State remains intent on dodging review rather than con-
fronting the merits of Lindsey’s petition. Its refusal to take any
responsibility for delaying the case serves as yet another
10                                                 No. 23-2789

illustration of the State’s unwillingness to give Lindsey a fair
shake.
    Unable to pin the delay on Lindsey, the State also attempts
to shift blame to other causes. It suggests, for example, that
the complexity and length of the case explains the delay. This
might be a complex case, but that does not excuse failing to
hold a single hearing in six years. The State also invokes the
COVID-19 pandemic. Here too, it offers no concrete explana-
tion for how the pandemic affected this case, aside from gen-
eral references to delays in 2020. Lindsey filed his petition
nine months before the pandemic began, and it has now been
several years since the courts returned to normal operations.
Simply put, the pandemic cannot explain six years of stasis.
                                III
   In sum, we find that Indiana’s postconviction remedies
proved to be ineffective for Lindsey and thus that he is ex-
cused from § 2254’s exhaustion requirement. Accordingly, we
VACATE the judgment and REMAND to the district court to
review the merits of Lindsey’s § 2254 petition.