In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
No. 24-1604
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
                                               Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                v.

ILLINOIS MINE SUBSIDENCE INSURANCE FUND,
                                      Defendant-Appellee.
                    ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
                      Central District of Illinois.
      No. 3:20-cv-03281-SEM-KLM — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.
                    ____________________

     ARGUED NOVEMBER 6, 2024 — DECIDED JUNE 2, 2025
                ____________________

   Before BRENNAN, KOLAR, and MALDONADO, Circuit Judges.
    BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Illinois is one of the largest coal-
producing states in the nation. Mining coal creates gaps
underground which may collapse, even many years later. A
collapse that causes sinking or movement of the ground sur-
face is called mine subsidence.
   In 1978, Illinois enacted the Mine Subsidence Act, 215 ILCS
5/803.1, to require companies that write insurance in the state
2                                                   No. 24-1604

to offer coverage for mine subsidence. The Act also created
the Illinois Mine Subsidence Insurance Fund as a reinsurer for
primary insurers that offer mine subsidence coverage. The
Fund has the power to sue on behalf of claimants.
    As a corporate successor to a dissolved coal mining com-
pany, Union Pacific Railroad Company periodically received
subsidence claims from the Fund. After years of litigation, Un-
ion Pacific sued the Fund for declaratory and injunctive relief,
seeking to preclude future cases. The Fund moved to dismiss.
The district court allowed the complaint seeking injunctive re-
lief to proceed on certain theories but not others.
    Union Pacific brought this interlocutory appeal asking us
to reverse the partial dismissal. Instead, we conclude we lack
appellate jurisdiction.
                        I. Background
    The Superior Coal Company, originally a subsidiary of
Chicago and North Western Railway Company (later called
the “Chicago Railway Company”), operated four coal mines
in Macoupin County, Illinois between 1904 and 1953.
Superior Coal used the common room-and-pillar method for
mining, which involves driving a shaft into the earth to create
passageways for the movement of coal and personnel. Once
the coal was removed, the empty area was called a “room.”
Superior Coal used the remaining coal and rock to create “pil-
lars” to sustain the room and the ground surface above the
mine. See Wilms v. Jess, 

 (1880). Even though the
pillars Superior Coal built were intended to provide structure
and support in perpetuity, they began to deteriorate, causing
the ground surface above the mine to subside.
No. 24-1604                                                      3

    Superior Coal dissolved in 1957. In 1995, Union Pacific
merged with Chicago Railway Company and assumed its lia-
bilities. But whether either company is responsible for the ac-
tions of Superior Coal remains in dispute.
    As mine subsidence claims from property owners and
their insurers accumulated, that dispute about responsibility
came to the fore. The Fund reimbursed subsidence claims un-
der the reinsurance policy. Then, subrogated to the rights of
its claimants, the Fund sought to recover its reinsurance pay-
ments from Union Pacific. For nearly three decades, the Fund
and Union Pacific have litigated the actions of Superior Coal.
    Some of those cases were resolved. Between 1996 and
2008, Union Pacific settled approximately 21 mine subsidence
claims amounting to less than $1 million. To date, the Fund
has brought three lawsuits against Union Pacific. Given the
type of relief Union Pacific seeks in this case—to preclude fu-
ture cases—the past litigation between the parties must be
considered.
   A. Prior Litigation
    In 2009, after a school in Gillespie, Illinois suffered mine
subsidence damage, the Fund submitted a multi-million-dol-
lar claim to Union Pacific. Believing it was not liable as a mat-
ter of law, Union Pacific refused to settle. The Fund and the
Gillespie School District then sued in Macoupin County Cir-
cuit Court, which first dismissed the action. Plaintiffs ap-
pealed, the appeals court reversed the dismissal in part, and,
on remand, the court entered summary judgment for the
plaintiffs. Gillespie Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 7 v. Union Pac. R.R.
Co., 

, ¶¶ 5–6 (discussing procedural
history in state trial court).
4                                                     No. 24-1604

    On appeal, neither party disputed that Union Pacific as-
sumed the liabilities of Chicago Railway Company after their
merger. Gillespie, 

, ¶ 4. At issue was
whether Chicago Railway Company assumed Superior Coal’s
liabilities or directly participated in its business operations. Id.
Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued that Superior Coal was an
instrumentality or alter ego of Chicago Railway Company. Id.
    The Illinois Appellate Court held that Chicago Railway
Company, and thus Union Pacific, assumed only liabilities ex-
isting at the time of Superior Coal’s dissolution in 1957, and
not unknown, contingent liabilities for mine subsidence. Id.
¶ 109. It also held that there was insufficient evidence to caus-
ally connect Chicago Railway Company’s decisions with
damage to the Gillespie school. Id. ¶ 118. On the question of
alter ego, the court reversed and remanded for resolution of a
factual dispute about whether Superior Coal was a “mere in-
strumentality” of Chicago Railway Company. Id. ¶¶ 173–74.
The parties settled the case before proceeding on remand.
    Beginning in 2011, the Fund tendered dozens more mine
subsidence claims to Union Pacific, totaling several million
dollars. In 2017, the Fund sued Union Pacific in federal court
seeking reimbursement for mine subsidence claims it paid out
to two homeowners in Macoupin County. Ill. Mine Subsidence
Ins. Fund v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 17-cv-3199, 

, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2019) (“the 2019 Opinion”).
The Fund again alleged the alter ego theory, and in the alter-
native, it argued that Chicago Railway Company assumed all
of Superior Coal’s liabilities because the dissolution consti-
tuted a de facto merger of the two companies. Id. at *3. While
the case was pending, Union Pacific agreed to toll the statute
of limitations on 25 of the tendered subsidence claims.
No. 24-1604                                                                5

    In the 2019 Opinion, the district court rejected both theo-
ries. It ruled that the Fund had failed to prove the alter ego or
de facto merger theories so as to justify piercing the corporate
veil. Id. at *26–27. The Fund filed a notice of appeal to this
court but then voluntarily dismissed it. Ill. Mine Subsidence
Ins. Fund v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 19-2965, 

(7th Cir. Jan. 6, 2020). With all litigation resolved, Union Pa-
cific declined to enter any more tolling agreements.
    Less than a year later, the Fund filed another complaint in
the Macoupin County Circuit Court (Case No. 2020 LM 63)
(“Hill Complaint”), reasserting some of the same theories for
Union Pacific’s liability that had been rejected in Gillespie and
the 2019 Opinion. The Fund contended that Union Pacific had
assumed Superior Coal’s liabilities, acted as its alter ego, and
for the first time proposed that Union Pacific is a successor to
Superior Coal’s liabilities as a “related entity.” Union Pacific
removed the case to district court, asserting jurisdiction under

 because the parties were diverse and the
amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. But because the
amount in controversy in Hill is just over $45,000, the district
court remanded the case to state court.
    B. This Dispute
    With Hill pending again in state court, Union Pacific filed
this action in federal court. 1 It sought a declaration that the



    1 The district court had diversity jurisdiction here under 

(a). Union Pacific is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal
place of business in Nebraska. The Fund is incorporated and has its prin-
cipal place of business in Illinois. Union Pacific alleges that the amount in
controversy, considering approximately 20 mine subsidence claims ten-
dered by the Fund since August 2019 and all future subsidence claims,
6                                                           No. 24-1604

Fund was barred by both issue and claim preclusion from re-
litigating theories decided in Gillespie and the 2019 Opinion.
Union Pacific also sought a declaration that the Fund was the
real party in interest in all current and future cases, as well as
an injunction barring the Fund from filing any future subsid-
ence claim deemed precluded.
    The Fund moved to dismiss, denying it was the real party
in interest in the mine subsidence claims it tendered to Union
Pacific. Per the Fund, for each reimbursement of a mine sub-
sidence claim, it was subrogated to the claimant’s rights. It
thus exercised a new assignment of rights with each succes-
sive subsidence claim. The Fund could not be barred, it
argued, from exercising the rights of a claimant who could in-
dependently sue. Perry v. Globe Auto Recycling, Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Since [the subrogor] had the right to
bring his own claim, that is what he conveyed to [the subro-
gee] in the assignment.”).
    The magistrate judge ruled for Union Pacific. 2 Relying on
the Supreme Court’s discussion of exceptions to nonparty
preclusion in Taylor v. Sturgell, 

 (2008), the magis-
trate judge concluded that Union Pacific had sufficiently al-
leged that the Fund was barred from relitigating the theories
decided in Gillespie and the 2019 Opinion. On review, the dis-
trict judge agreed in part. Union Pacific was allowed to seek

amounts to tens of millions of dollars, far exceeding the $75,000 statutory
minimum.
    2 The parties did not consent to the magistrate judge hearing the case

and issuing a final judgment under 

(c)(1). A district judge
may adopt the magistrate’s recommendations or reject them and decide
the matter de novo. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). This case was reviewed and
decided by the district judge.
No. 24-1604                                                            7

declaratory and injunctive relief as to the subsidence claims
the Fund acquired before the Gillespie case and the 2019 Opin-
ion. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Ill. Mine Subsidence Ins. Fund, No.
20-cv-03281, 

, at *6 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2022).
But the district judge ruled that the reasoning in Perry called
for dismissing the complaint as to any subsidence claims the
Fund might acquire after Gillespie and the 2019 Opinion. 

    Union Pacific amended its complaint a second time to no
avail. 3 In Count I, it sought a declaration that the subsidence
claims acquired by the Fund before the Gillespie case and the
2019 Opinion were barred by issue and claim preclusion. It
added a request for the court to clarify when a subsidence
claim may be deemed “acquired” by the Fund. In Count II,
Union Pacific sought a declaration that future subsidence
claims the Fund acquired would be barred by issue preclusion
and nonparty issue preclusion, the latter a theory the Fund
had not raised before. And in Count III, Union Pacific asked
for injunctive relief for the theories outlined in Counts I and
II.
    On the Fund’s renewed motion to dismiss, the district
court reiterated its holding from 2022. It allowed Count I to
proceed. But the court again denied Union Pacific’s request
for future injunctive relief. It said Count II “appears as an at-
tempt to ask the Court to reconsider” its opinion from 2022.
Without a proper motion to reconsider, the court declined to
do so and dismissed Count II. As to Count III, the court

    3 Union Pacific amended its complaint twice. The first amendment oc-

curred as a matter of course before the magistrate judge issued its first
report and recommendation. Union Pacific amended its complaint a sec-
ond time after the district judge issued its first order. That Second
Amended Complaint is the operative complaint for this appeal.
8                                                               No. 24-1604

declined to dismiss the portion of injunctive relief related to
Count I but dismissed those parts related to Count II. Union
Pacific filed an interlocutory appeal, asserting this court has
jurisdiction under 

(a)(1) and seeking review
of the dismissal of its request for declaratory and injunctive
relief in Count II and relevant portions of Count III. 4
                      II. Appellate Jurisdiction
   Prior to considering the merits of any appeal, we must ad-
dress the question of appellate jurisdiction. Upchurch v.
O’Brien, 

 (7th Cir. 2024). That jurisdiction fre-
quently arises under 

, which authorizes re-
view of the “final decisions” of a district court. Shakman v.
Clerk of Cook Cnty., 

 (7th Cir. 2021). But an
exception in 

(a)(1) provides jurisdiction to ad-
judicate orders from the district court “granting, continuing,


    4 After its notice of appeal, Union Pacific asked the district court to

enter final judgment on its dismissal of Count II and corresponding por-
tions of Count III (the two counts in this appeal) under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b). It also asked the district court to certify two issues
to our court under 

(b). Union Pacific raises both issues in
its principal brief to us.
    The district court declined to enter final judgment under Rule 54(b).
Even though the contentions in Count I and Count II are “separable,”
“[g]ranting certification here would run counter to the conservation of ju-
dicial resources.” The court also declined to certify issues for appeal under
§ 1292(b) because Union Pacific failed to satisfy the first of five require-
ments set out in our caselaw. See Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill.,

 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[1] there must be a question of law, [2] it
must be controlling, [3] it must be contestable, and [4] its resolution must
promise to speed up the litigation. There is also a nonstatutory require-
ment: [5] the petition must be filed in the district court within a reasonable
time after the order sought to be appealed.”).
No. 24-1604                                                      9

modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions,” even before a
final judgment has issued. See, e.g., DM Trans, LLC v. Scott, 

, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2022) (holding that the court has
jurisdiction to adjudicate an appeal from a district court’s or-
der “refusing” to issue a preliminary injunction).
    Section 1292(a)(1) is a limited exception to the final judg-
ment rule. 

; Albert v. Trans Union Corp., 

 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e approach the § 1292(a)(1) exception
‘somewhat gingerly lest a floodgate be opened’ that would
deluge the appellate courts with piecemeal litigation.” (quot-
ing Gardner v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 

, 481–82
(1978))). Interlocutory appeals are thus granted sparingly so
as not to “invite[] piecemeal appeals.” Chi. Joe’s Tea Room, LLC
v. Village of Broadview, 

 (7th Cir. 2018); Jamie
S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 

 (7th Cir. 2012).
   Before addressing whether jurisdiction exists over this ap-
peal, we note two items.
    First, the district court dismissed Count II and correspond-
ing parts of Count III. Count I, and corresponding parts of
Count III, remain pending in that court. Even though that rul-
ing is not a formal or explicit refusal of injunctive relief, Union
Pacific may in principle still invoke jurisdiction under
§ 1292(a)(1) because the portion of Count III the court dis-
missed contained a request for an injunction. Allico Nat’l Corp.
v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 

 (7th Cir. 1968) (appeal under § 1292(a)(1) permitted from
an order dismissing a count of the complaint seeking injunc-
tive relief).
   Second, § 1292(a)(1) “ordinarily” permits the immediate
appeal of grants or refusals of preliminary injunctions. Ty, Inc.
10                                                    No. 24-1604

v. Publications Intern., Ltd., 

 (7th Cir. 2002).
Here, Union Pacific did not request a preliminary injunction
for the district court to deny. Indeed, it does not specify
whether it seeks a preliminary or a permanent injunction. The
Second Amended Complaint seeks injunctive relief in gen-
eral, and earlier versions of the complaint do not specify the
type of injunction Union Pacific seeks either. Considering the
nature of the relief sought—to enjoin the Fund from suing
based on theories adjudicated in Gillespie and the 2019 Opin-
ion—we can presume Union Pacific requests permanent in-
junctive relief. But ultimately the type of injunction sought is
not material for deciding jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1). Parks
v. Pavkovic, 

 (7th Cir. 1985).
    We return then to the question of whether jurisdiction ex-
ists over this interlocutory appeal of the district court’s refusal
of a permanent injunction. Key to that inquiry is how the dis-
trict court ruled on the injunctive relief Union Pacific requests.
That ruling can be viewed in two ways, the first advocated by
the Fund, the second by Union Pacific.
    The first asks, did the district court narrow the scope of the
injunction? This court has recognized that appellate jurisdic-
tion exists when the district court’s order definitively de-
nies—but not when it merely narrows—an injunction.
    “[W]hen a denial of an injunction is sufficiently ‘definitive’
to allow interlocutory appeal” is a “subtle and complicated”
question. Elliott v. Hinds, 

 (7th Cir. 1986). In
Elliott, the district court found as a matter of law that perma-
nent injunctive relief could not be granted, a determination
that would not be reconsidered because it is not fact-bound.

 at 300–01. The court stayed proceedings pending appellate
resolution. 

. The finality on the question of injunctive
No. 24-1604                                                   11

relief in the district court meant appellate jurisdiction was
present.
    Then, in Holmes v. Fisher, 

 (7th Cir. 1988),
a district court denied a request for an injunction on standing
grounds but allowed a request for damages to remain unre-
solved. Concluding that Holmes “suffered total defeat on his
request for an injunction,” 

, this court held “that an
order denying injunctive relief is immediately appealable
even though a request for damages remains pending,” 

.
     Fifteen years later, our precedent in Albert v. Trans Union
Corporation examined this rule to account for when the injunc-
tive relief denied was substantially different from the relief
still pending in the district court. 

. A second
inquiry now asks, did the district court refuse an injunction
“of an entirely different nature” than that still pending in the
district court? 

 This may occur when a case involves multi-
ple injunctions, only some of which the district court’s order
dismissed. There, the district court’s denial of equitable relief
cannot be a narrowing because an injunction “relating to dis-
tinct subject matter or seeking completely different injunctive
relief” remains in the district court. 

    For this second question, the court in Albert placed cases
on a continuum between those guaranteed appellate jurisdic-
tion—because the district court’s order entirely denied equi-
table relief—and those that did not involve dismissal of any
injunctive relief. 

 A case in which the injunctive relief de-
nied by the district court was different from the injunctive re-
lief pending in that court could be appealed under
§ 1292(a)(1). Id.
12                                                    No. 24-1604

   The Fund argues that the district court’s order narrowed
the injunctive relief still pending before it, so there is no ap-
pellate jurisdiction. Union Pacific counters that the order dis-
missed a substantially different type of injunctive relief than
what remains pending, so appellate jurisdiction exists. We
consider each possibility as to how the district court ruled on
the injunctive relief Union Pacific seeks.
     A. Narrowing Injunctive Relief
    A district court’s order on permanent injunctive relief “re-
sult[s] in conclusive findings as to the defendants’ actual lia-
bility.” Lacy v. Cook County, 

 (7th Cir. 2018). It
follows that grants of permanent injunctions are always ap-
pealable. Parks, 

; Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works,

 (1897) (establishing this interpretation of
§ 1292(a)(1)). “[D]efinitive” refusals to grant permanent in-
junctions are also appealable. Elliott, 

. “[I]f the
further proceedings in the trial court are quite unlikely to
make the appeal moot or even affect the issues on appeal,
there is no reason to delay the appeal while they are resolved;
and the delay may be a source of cost.” Parks, 753 F.2d at 1401–
02.
    But refusals of permanent injunctions that are not “suffi-
ciently ‘definitive’” may not be appealed under § 1292(a)(1).
Elliott, 

. For example, if a district court denies a
motion for summary judgment, but the plaintiff may still pre-
vail on the injunction at the conclusion of trial, then the order
is not appealable. Parks, 

.
   Union Pacific argues that the district court’s order “denied
almost all” injunctive relief. The only subsidence claims re-
maining before the district court are those the Fund tendered
No. 24-1604                                                    13

before the Gillespie case and the 2019 Opinion. But because the
statute of limitations has run on nearly all those subsidence
claims, Union Pacific contends, the only case that would be
implicated if it prevails in district court is Hill, which remains
pending in state court. Thus, injunctive relief in district court
would impact only one case with just over $45,000 in dispute.
In contrast, this appeal involves all subsidence claims the
fund acquired as of Gillespie and the 2019 Opinion.
    The Fund counters that we lack appellate jurisdiction be-
cause Union Pacific continues to pursue injunctive relief in
the district court that implicates circumstances “well beyond
the Hill case.” To the Fund, even if issue preclusion applies
only to Hill and any other subsidence claim acquired before
Gillespie and the 2019 Opinion, claim preclusion as pleaded in
Count I is not limited to that time frame.
    Both parties misapprehend our caselaw’s requirement as
to whether a district court’s refusal of a permanent injunction
is “sufficiently ‘definitive.’” See Elliott, 

. The
question does not turn on the number and/or the monetary
value of cases that would be implicated by the district court’s
ultimate resolution of this action. Rather, it turns on the na-
ture of injunctive relief before the district court.
    In the original and First Amended Complaint, Union Pa-
cific pleaded collateral estoppel (or issue preclusion) in Count
I, res judicata (or claim preclusion) in Count II, a declaration
that the Fund is the real party in interest in Count III, and in-
junctive relief based on issue and claim preclusion in Count
IV. In 2022, the district court allowed Union Pacific to seek re-
lief based on the theories of issue and claim preclusion only
as to the subsidence claims the Fund acquired before the Gil-
lespie case and the 2019 Opinion, but not as to unknown,
14                                                    No. 24-1604

contingent subsidence claims. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 

, at *6–8. So, the district court narrowed Union Pacific’s
request for a permanent injunction.
     Union Pacific filed a Second Amended Complaint, plead-
ing the theories the district court allowed in 2022 in Count I
and the theories the court rejected in Count II. In Count III,
Union Pacific asked for an injunction against future litigation
precluded by Counts I and II. In 2024, the district court re-
buked Union Pacific for amending Count II into what “ap-
pears as an attempt to ask the Court to reconsider” its opinion
from 2022. The district court then reiterated its earlier decision
and dismissed Count II and corresponding portions of Count
III. This is no more than a repetition of the district court’s ear-
lier decision to narrow the permanent injunction.
    A request for a permanent injunction therefore remains
pending in the district court in Count I and corresponding
portions of Count III. This means the district court’s dismissal
of Count II and corresponding portions of Count III does not
end Union Pacific’s plea for relief. It may still secure the re-
maining permanent injunction at the conclusion of trial. Such
a victory would allow Union Pacific to defend against the
Fund’s contentions under the doctrines of issue and claim
preclusion, a nontrivial power. See generally Creation Supply,
Inc. v. Selective Ins., 

, 763–65 (7th Cir. 2022) (de-
scribing the effect of issue and claim preclusion under Illinois
law); Daza v. Indiana, 

, 683–84 (7th Cir. 2021) (same
under federal law).
   Even if Union Pacific does not prevail on the pending
Count I and corresponding portions of Count III at trial, the
resolution of those counts is likely to affect Count II and cor-
responding portions of Count III on appeal. The relief sought
No. 24-1604                                                     15

on appeal and remaining in the district court involves similar
theories of issue preclusion. The district court’s resolution of
the permanent injunction will thus affect this court’s ap-
proach to those theories.
    When proceedings in the district court are likely to affect
the issues on appeal, our caselaw advises against concluding
that jurisdiction exists for an interlocutory appeal. See Parks,
753 F.2d at 1401–02. We decline to step in front of the district
court on the resolution of these theories before it has had the
opportunity to fully and finally resolve them. See Motorola
Sols., Inc. v. Hytera Commc’ns Corp., 

 (7th Cir.
2024) (“We are ‘a court of review,’ not ‘one of first view.’”
(quoting Arreola-Castillo v. United States, 

 (7th
Cir. 2018))). Because resolution of the counts pending in the
district court is likely to affect the counts on appeal, we lack
appellate jurisdiction.
   The district court has yet to make a final determination on
Union Pacific’s requested permanent injunction. That court’s
refusal of the permanent injunction pleaded in Count II and
corresponding portion of Count III is a narrowing, rather than
a “sufficiently ‘definitive’” denial to allow interlocutory ap-
peal. Elliott, 

.
   B. Refusing Different Injunctive Relief
    Union Pacific offers a different analysis. It contends we
should follow the reasoning in Albert for circumstances where
a plaintiff “sought multiple injunctions and the district court
denied some of them while leaving others pending.” 

. The Albert test requires an inquiry into whether the
relief sought on interlocutory appeal is “substantial and sim-
ilar” to the relief still available in the district court. 

 This
16                                                    No. 24-1604

interpretation of the district court’s order changes the analy-
sis, but not the result.
    Reviewing this court’s caselaw, Albert said interlocutory
appeals “represent a continuum.” 

 At one end are cases
where a district court’s order results in “a conclusive denial
of all equitable relief.” Holmes, 

. This court has
jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal of those cases under
§ 1292(a)(1). Id. (jurisdiction exists “even though a request for
damages lives on”). See also Chi. Joe’s Tea Room, 

(interlocutory appeal reviewable when the district court
“stripped the case of its equitable component”); DM Trans, 

 (same). At the other end are cases in which this
court lacks jurisdiction because the district court’s order did
not involve a denial of injunctive relief. Albert, 

.
    Difficult cases arise in the middle of the continuum where
plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, only part of which the district
court denies. 

 An interlocutory appeal from a partial refusal
of injunctive relief requires an inquiry into whether that relief
is “substantial and similar” to the relief still available in the
district court. 

 If the injunctive relief refused by the district
court is “of an entirely different nature—relating to distinct
subject matter or seeking completely different injunctive re-
lief” than that remaining before the district court, then juris-
diction could be appropriate. 

 In sum, whether jurisdiction
exists on an interlocutory appeal depends on the type of in-
junctive relief remaining in the district court.
   Union Pacific argues that the injunctive relief the district
court’s order refused is different from the injunctive relief still
pending in the district court. In support, it first contends that
the resolution of Count I would not impact the legal issues in
Count II. Union Pacific second frames the contentions in
No. 24-1604                                                    17

Counts I and II as temporally distinct. Given these two con-
siderations, it submits, the injunctive relief on appeal differs
enough from the injunctive relief pending in the district court
such that our court has jurisdiction under Albert’s test. The
Fund counters that the injunctive relief in the district court is
“the same or similar” to what the district court’s order re-
fused, so jurisdiction is lacking.
   The parties agree, and we decided above, that a request for
an injunction remains pending in the district court. The in-
quiry turns next to whether the injunctive relief denied is
“substantial and similar” to the request for injunctive relief
pending in the district court. Albert, 

.
     First, as to “substantial,” if Union Pacific should ultimately
succeed in the district court, it will have the considerable
power to bar litigation from the Fund based on issue and
claim preclusion. Union Pacific will be able to irrevocably dis-
pose of all subsidence claims the Fund acquired before the
judgments in Gillespie and the 2019 Opinion. This ability to
preclude future litigation is a substantial form of relief. See,
e.g., Brown v. Felsen, 

 (1979) (“Because [claim
preclusion] may govern grounds and defenses not previously
litigated, … it blockades unexplored paths that may lead to
truth. … It therefore is to be invoked only after careful in-
quiry.”).
    We note again that the parties’ dispute about the number
and value of the cases that would be implicated by the district
court’s resolution of this action misses the mark. We have not
been presented, nor have we located, any authority that sets a
quantum for the injunctive relief necessary to establish appel-
late jurisdiction. Thus, even if Union Pacific is correct that
only the Hill case would be implicated if the district court
18                                                   No. 24-1604

grants injunctive relief in Count I, this would not justify find-
ing appellate jurisdiction for Count II.
    Second, the inquiry asks whether the injunctive relief re-
maining in the district court is “similar” to the relief sought
on appeal. In Samayoa ex rel. Samayoa v. Chicago Board of Edu-
cation, this court ruled that there was no jurisdiction for an in-
terlocutory appeal when the count remaining in the district
court “involves the same factual situation, alleges constitu-
tional violations, and seeks essentially the same remedy” as
the count on appeal. 

 (7th Cir. 1986). As in
Samayoa, identical facts and broad overlap in the theories
pleaded in Counts I and II advise against finding appellate
jurisdiction. Both the facts and theories of relief should be
similar to satisfy this inquiry.
    The underlying facts presented in the Second Amended
Complaint are identical for both counts. Further, no new facts,
documents, or witnesses are discoverable as of the time this
information was first compiled for the 2017 case. Ill. Mine Sub-
sidence Ins. Fund, 

, at *3 (“The relevant events
occurred between 1902 and 1957. By 2017, the individuals
with personal knowledge of the relevant events were all de-
ceased.”).
    The theories contained in Counts I and II also overlap. In
both counts Union Pacific asks for the same kind of injunctive
relief: a declaration that the Fund is precluded from bringing
further suits against it. In Count I, Union Pacific seeks to en-
join the Fund based on issue and claim preclusion. Count II
presents the same theory of issue preclusion as well as the re-
lated theory of nonparty issue preclusion, which concerns
No. 24-1604                                                              19

whether a nonparty can be bound by a final judgment in a
previous action. 5
   The district court disagreed, concluding that the theories
in Counts I and II are different. Yet that conclusion was
reached without reasoning. Still, Union Pacific picks up that
conclusion and contends that resolution of Count I would not
impact the legal issues contained in Count II.
    We see little difference in the legal theories. Nonparty
issue preclusion is just a variation on the theory of issue pre-
clusion. In “‘limited circumstances,’ nonparties may be ade-
quately represented in litigation and bound by a judgment.”
Oneida Nation v. Village of Hobart, 

 (7th Cir.
2020) (quoting Richards v. Jefferson County, 

(1996)). The Supreme Court has described six such circum-
stances, including when a nonparty controlled the prior liti-
gation or privity existed with a party to the prior litigation.
Taylor, 553 U.S. at 893–95. Nonparty issue preclusion can be
viewed as issue preclusion with the additional element of
control or privity.
   Variation in the legal theory asserted in support of the
same kind of remedy does not render those varied theories
dissimilar. See Samayoa, 783 F.2d at 102–04; Albert, 

. In Samayoa, the plaintiffs alleged the Chicago Board of
Education discriminated against them because of their race
when it denied them admission to a school administering a

    5 In Count II of the Second Amended Complaint, and at Oral
Argument at 1:09–1:25, Union Pacific has confirmed that it has abandoned
questions of claim preclusion and limited this interlocutory appeal to issue
preclusion and nonparty issue preclusion.
20                                                   No. 24-1604

desegregation plan. 

. Their complaint charged
the Board and other defendants with violating: (1) the First,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments for which they sought to
enjoin the desegregation plan; (2) Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964; and (3) the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses for which they sought the same injunctive relief. 

at 102–03. The district court dismissed the first and second
counts but allowed the third count to go forward. 

.
This court refused to hear the appeal. Even though the injunc-
tive relief sought in count one was dismissed, count three,
“which remains for trial, involves the same factual situation,
alleges constitutional violations, and seeks essentially the
same remedy.” 

.
    Similarly, in Albert, the plaintiff sought to appeal the dis-
trict court’s denial of injunctive relief under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 

. 

 Even though
relief under the FCRA was denied, this court said “substantial
and similar” injunctive relief was still available in the district
court. 

 It denied jurisdiction because plaintiff’s request to
enjoin the defendants from violating the California Business
& Professions Code §§ 17203 and 17204, as well as under the
laws of other states, was still pending before the district court.
Albert, 

. Each of the theories for relief were
premised on the same underlying facts. 

 “[T]he district
court’s order ruling that injunctive relief is not available un-
der the FCRA did not truly deny an injunction but rather ‘nar-
rowed the grounds of dispute.’” 

 at 740 (citing Holmes, 

). In other words, the similarity in theories and facts
rendered the district court’s action a narrowing of, rather than
a refusal of, a different type of injunction.
No. 24-1604                                                    21

    As in Samayoa and Albert, here the nature of the injunctive
relief remaining in the district court precludes appellate juris-
diction. Even though Count II was dismissed, Count I remains
for trial, involves the same facts, alleges violations under sim-
ilar legal theories, and seeks essentially the same remedy. See
Samayoa, 

. The slight variation in legal theory
between issue preclusion and nonparty issue preclusion, dis-
tinguished only by the addition of a privity requirement in
the latter doctrine, does not change the essential similarity of
Counts I and II.
    Union Pacific next argues that what distinguishes the in-
junctive relief on appeal and that pending in the district court
is the universe of cases that would be implicated. It contends
that a temporal distinction between the subsidence claims
covered by Counts I and II renders them fundamentally dis-
tinct. To Union Pacific, the relief in the district court is retro-
spective, covering already-accrued suits, while the relief
sought on appeal is prospective, asking for relief from future
contingent suits.
    Our court advised in Albert that appellate jurisdiction may
exist if the remaining injunctive relief in the district court is
“of an entirely different nature,” meaning that it relates to dif-
ferent subject matter or seeks different injunctive relief. 

. But that theoretical scenario is not present here. In
both Counts I and II, Union Pacific seeks injunctive relief un-
der similar theories. Further, the temporal difference between
the two counts is a function of Union Pacific’s artificial con-
struction of its pleadings in the Second Amended Complaint.
The timing of when a subsidence claim arises does not trans-
form the doctrine of preclusion or the nature of injunctive re-
lief into something else.
22                                                    No. 24-1604

    Application of the Albert standard to the interlocutory
appeal sought in this case shows “substantial and similar” in-
junctive relief remains in the district court. 

. The
district court’s order thus is not appealable.
                         *      *       *
    Whether the district court’s order narrowed injunctive re-
lief, or refused different injunctive relief, we do not have ap-
pellate jurisdiction. This result is consistent with our
caselaw’s recognition that § 1292(a)(1) provides a limited ex-
ception. DM Trans, 

. Per Chicago Joe’s Tea Room,
allowing interlocutory appeals from a refusal of a permanent
injunction “invites piecemeal appeals.” 

. There,
this court expressed a desire to revisit this approach in a fu-
ture case. 

 at 812 n.1. This is not that case, but the same con-
cerns apply here.
                        III. Conclusion
    A district court’s order refusing an injunction does not cre-
ate appellate jurisdiction when that order was not “suffi-
ciently definitive.” The result is the same under the Albert test
when “substantial and similar” injunctive relief remains
pending in the district court. Under either approach, appel-
late jurisdiction is lacking here. For these reasons, this appeal
is DISMISSED.