In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
No. 24-2400
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                v.

ROGER D. SNAKE,
                                             Defendant-Appellant.
                    ____________________

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the
                    Western District of Wisconsin.
       No. 3:22-cr-00019-wmc-1 — William M. Conley, Judge.
                    ____________________

       ARGUED APRIL 23, 2025 — DECIDED JUNE 9, 2025
                ____________________

   Before HAMILTON, KIRSCH, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit
Judges.
    HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Roger
Snake pleaded guilty in federal court in 2011 to two counts of
abusive sexual contact with minors. He completed his prison
sentence in 2020 and began serving a lifetime term of super-
vised release. Snake repeatedly violated several conditions of
his release, including unapproved and unsupervised contact
with minors in his home. The district court revoked his
2                                                    No. 24-2400

supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months in prison,
well above the top of the range recommended in the policy
statement in the Sentencing Guidelines. On appeal, Snake ar-
gues that the district court failed to explain adequately its rea-
sons for imposing a sentence above that range.
    Given our highly deferential review of sentences for vio-
lating a term of supervised release, and looking at the entire
record, we affirm. We can understand why the court decided
to go well above the policy statement’s advisory range. But
given the substance of the arguments here, we again encour-
age sentencing judges to ask the parties, before concluding a
sentencing hearing, if they believe the court has sufficiently
explained its decision so that arguable problems can be ad-
dressed on the spot rather than on appeal. See, e.g., United
States v. Donelli, 

, 940–41 (7th Cir. 2014), citing
United States v. Garcia-Segura, 

 (7th Cir. 2013).
I. Factual and Procedural Background
    Snake is an elder member of the Ho-Chunk tribe. In 2011,
he pleaded guilty to two counts of abusive sexual contact of
children under the age of 12 in the Northern Cheyenne Indian
Reservation in Montana. See 

(a), 2244(a)(5).
He was sentenced to a prison term and a lifetime of super-
vised release. Upon release from prison in 2020, he relocated
with court permission from Montana to the Western District
of Wisconsin where he began his supervised release.
    Snake’s supervised release conditions required that he not
be in the company of any minors or go to any places “primar-
ily used” by minors without permission from his probation
officer. He also could not leave the judicial district without
permission from the court or his probation officer.
No. 24-2400                                                    3

    In October 2023, the probation office notified the district
court in Wisconsin that Snake had violated several conditions
of supervision. He had traveled outside the judicial district
without permission on several occasions, including trips to
New Mexico, Nebraska, and Minnesota. He also had had mul-
tiple contacts with minors without permission, such as when
he attended at least eight tribal events where minors were pre-
sent and gave a ride to a woman and her minor children. The
district court did not take formal action at that time but held
an off-the-record teleconference in which it reminded Snake
that he could not go to any events where minors would be
present without permission and supervision and that his ac-
tions needed to show that he understood the terms of his su-
pervised release.
    A few months after that conference, in June 2024, the pro-
bation office petitioned the district court to issue a summons
to Snake based on new alleged violations of the conditions of
supervision. The petition noted Snake’s admissions to his pro-
bation officer that he had two contacts with minors without
permission: He attended a Christmas brunch where minors
were present, and he drove his minor grandson to school.
   Most troubling, the officer had made an unscheduled
home visit. He found Snake with three minors (two girls and
one boy ranging in age from thirteen to fifteen) with no other
adults present. The officer ordered Snake to have the children
picked up by their father, who was “surprised” when told by
Snake that he could not have unsupervised contact with mi-
nors. The district court issued a summons to Snake and sched-
uled a hearing on the charged violations.
    Before the hearing, Snake’s lawyer wrote a letter to the dis-
trict court saying that Snake would “stipulate to the
4                                                 No. 24-2400

violations.” His lawyer asked the court to impose a home-de-
tention term of three to nine months. Although Snake may
have “failed to prioritize the Court’s conditions over his com-
munity obligations,” Snake’s lawyer wrote, home detention
would punish him appropriately without removing him com-
pletely from his tribe’s community. Snake’s lawyer added
that because Snake was an elder within the tribe, his “congre-
gation and clan rely on him for spiritual leadership.”
    At the hearing, Snake admitted the violations. The district
court reiterated that Snake had violated his conditions of su-
pervision, including what the court called “[p]erhaps the
most egregious violation”—when Snake was found in his
home by the probation officer alone with three young teenag-
ers. The court added that “[t]his contact was made worse” by
the fact that the children’s father apparently had not been in-
formed about Snake’s conviction.
    The court turned to the policy statement in the Sentencing
Guidelines for supervised release violations. The court calcu-
lated an advisory range of three to nine months in prison
based on a criminal history category of I and Grade C viola-
tions. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4. The court rejected Snake’s argu-
ment that his elder leadership role in his tribe was a reason
not to incarcerate him. The judge pointed out that Snake had
used his elder status to engage in contact with minors in a
manner “disturbingly similar” to the conduct for which he
had previously been convicted: sexual abuse of young girls.
The court asked: “Why would I consider his standing in the
tribe where he presents a real risk of being a predator to the
children in the tribe?”
  In response to Snake’s argument that home confinement
would be an appropriate sanction given his role as tribe elder,
No. 24-2400                                                     5

the court reiterated that Snake had committed “more egre-
gious violations” within the tribe after being explicitly
warned against violating his conditions of supervision. The
court thus had “even greater concern” about Snake present-
ing himself as an elder leader because he had repeatedly re-
fused to comply with restrictions on contact with the children
of the tribe. The court found it “stunning” and a “complete
disconnect” for counsel to argue that Snake’s status as an el-
der would justify home detention when he “was found in his
home with two minor females in close age to those he had
abused for over a year.”
    Snake then testified. He described the incident at home
with minor children as “unintentional,” but he admitted that
the probation officer’s angry reaction resonated with him.
When pressed by the court, he said he understood that his
continued violations made it difficult to accept that he knew
he could not have unchaperoned contact with minors and that
his “actions” and not his words had to be considered. Going
forward, he said, he would give priority to his legal obliga-
tions over requests from tribal members. But the court ex-
pressed concern that Snake’s status as an elder continued to
“be a cover”—that “the respect owed to elders … makes [him]
seem less of a risk” to children in the tribe than he truly is. It
defied belief, the court added, that—after repeated warn-
ings—Snake was “sitting here again” or that he could have
allowed himself to be alone with minor children in his home.
   The court ultimately revoked Snake’s supervised release
and sentenced him to 24 months in prison—the statutory
maximum—followed by a lifetime of supervised release. The
court then said in a written order that a sentence above the
policy-statement range was “reasonable and no greater than
6                                                  No. 24-2400

necessary to achieve the statutory purposes of sentencing
upon revocation given the egregiousness of [Snake’s]
violations.” This sentence, said the court, aimed to hold Snake
“accountable for his violations, protect the community and
specifically minors, and promote specific and general
deterrence.”
    The court did not ask the parties whether it had suffi-
ciently explained its sentence or whether further elaboration
of its reasons was necessary.
II. Analysis
    Snake argues that the district court made a procedural
error by failing to justify a sentence above the top of the
policy-statement range. In his view, the court explained why
it ordered prison rather than home detention but not why a
sentence well above the policy-statement range was
warranted.
    In reviewing whether the district court sufficiently ex-
plained its sentence for a supervised release violation, we ex-
amine whether the record reflects that the district court con-
sidered both the guideline policy statements for violations of
supervised release and the sentencing factors set forth in 

(a), as applied to revocations of supervised re-
lease under 

(e). See United States v. Boulting-
house, 

 (7th Cir. 2015). “A departure from
the Guidelines, especially a significant one, must be carefully
explained.” United States v. Snyder, 

 (7th Cir.
2011).
    If this were a sentencing for an original offense rather than
for supervised release violations, the district court’s explana-
tion for an above-range sentence might not be deemed
No. 24-2400                                                    7

enough. Our decision in United States v. Lockwood, 

(7th Cir. 2015), is illustrative in that regard. In Lockwood, we
concluded that the district court’s explanation for an original
sentence well above the guideline range filled only one page
of the sentencing transcript, did not refer to 

,
failed to explain how the court balanced those factors, and
made no reference to the advisory guideline range at all. 

. These shortcomings underscored the flaw in the court’s
explanation: it failed to address “why that particular defend-
ant requires a more severe punishment than most defend-
ants.” 

   Snake points out here that, similarly, the district court did
not refer explicitly to § 3553 (as applied to revocations of su-
pervised release under § 3583(e)), nor did it detail how it bal-
anced the relevant factors under § 3553. And although the
court, in pronouncing the sentence, said that a 24-month sen-
tence—above the policy-statement range—was “reasonable
and no greater than necessary to achieve the statutory pur-
poses of sentencing upon revocation,” it did not explain spe-
cifically why a departure from the policy-statement range was
warranted.
    But we give greater deference to a sentencing court
revoking supervised release than we do to a court imposing a
sentence for an original offense. Even before the decision
twenty years ago in Booker v. United States, 

 (2005),
sentencing courts had “more than usual flexibility” applying
the Sentencing Commission’s recommended policy
statements in the revocation context. Childs, 39 F.4th at 945;
United States v. Salinas, 

, 588–89 (7th Cir. 2004)
(before Booker, “the recommended range informs rather than
cabins the exercise of the judge’s discretion”). We have said
8                                                     No. 24-2400

that appellate review of a sentence revoking supervised
release is akin to the “narrowest judicial review of judgments”
known. United States v. Robertson, 

 (7th Cir.
2011). Moreover, in evaluating the procedural reasonableness
of a sentence after the revocation of supervised release, we
review “the record as a whole” and not just the court’s
pronouncement of the sentence. United States v. Martin, 

 (7th Cir. 2024). Still, as we said more recently, a
judge revoking supervised release must “say something that
enables the appellate court to infer that [she] considered both
sources of guidance,” the policy statement and the statutory
factors. United States v. Childs, 

 (7th Cir. 2022),
quoting Robertson, 

.
    When viewed through that highly deferential lens, the
court adequately explained its sentence so that appellate re-
view can be meaningful. The court correctly calculated, with-
out objection, the policy-statement range based on Snake’s
criminal history category (I) and offense level (Grade C).
See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4. The court’s language also tracked the
language of the relevant statutory factors under § 3553(a) and
§ 3583(e), though without citing the statutes expressly.
    The lack of specific statutory references does not trouble
us. Those factors are the weekly if not daily fare of sentencing
judges. We are confident this veteran district judge can recite
them by heart. He alluded here to the nature and
circumstances of Snake’s offenses and violations (he had been
convicted of abusing minor females for over a year, and on
supervised release had violated conditions designed to
protect children from similar abuse); his history and
characteristics (repeated violations, including the “egregious”
incident when he was discovered at home with minors, and
No. 24-2400                                                    9

his status as one of the “most dangerous sex offenders to
children”—offenders “intelligent enough to hide their
predatory actions, who come up with excuses for their
actions, while they’re grooming children for additional sex
offenses”); and the need for deterrence (to protect the
community, “specifically minors”). It is also obvious that the
court found Snake’s violations especially egregious because
he committed them after the judge’s clear warnings in the
earlier conference to address earlier violations without formal
sanctions. Those are all sound and sufficient reasons for the
above-range sentence here.
    Citing our decision in United States v. Snyder, 

 (7th Cir. 2011), Snake argues that the district court failed
to consider whether his sentence would create unwarranted
sentencing disparities among defendants. In Snyder, we found
that the district court failed to explain adequately its revoca-
tion sentence above the policy-statement range because it did
not refer to the recommended range at all. Snyder distin-
guishes itself. We noted there that if the court had correctly
calculated and carefully reviewed the policy-statement range,
“we would be more confident that it also considered the need
to avoid unwarranted disparities.” 

 citing Gall v. United
States, 

 (2007). Unlike in Snyder, the district
court here explicitly calculated the policy-statement range
and made clear, both orally during the hearing and in its writ-
ten order, that an above-range sentence was needed, particu-
larly in light of the “egregiousness” of the violations.
   Snake also argues that much of the district court’s discus-
sion at sentencing pertained to the choice between prison and
home detention and not the length of his prison sentence. As
noted, though, “we look to the whole transcript to consider
10                                                    No. 24-2400

whether the district court applied the § 3553(a) factors appro-
priately.” United States v. Swank, 

 (7th Cir.
2022). The court’s comments here about Snake’s offense con-
duct, history, and personal characteristics also pertain to the
relevant sentencing factors under § 3553(a).
   A final note: we again encourage district courts at sentenc-
ing, after they have pronounced a sentence and stated their
reasons, to ask the parties whether they require any further
elaboration of the reasons for the sentence. This step allows
for correction of a potential procedural error on the spot,
which “is preferable to correction after appellate review, a
year or more of delay, and a new hearing after remand.”
United States v. Donelli, 

 (7th Cir. 2014), citing
United States v. Garcia-Segura, 

 (7th Cir. 2013),
and United States v. Cunningham, 

 (7th Cir.
2005).
                                                     AFFIRMED.