In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
No. 25-3050
MARGARITO CASTAÑON-NAVA, et al.,
                                                Plaintiffs-Appellees,
                                v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al.,
                                  Defendants-Appellants.
                    ____________________

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the
          Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
         No. 1:18-cv-3757 — Jeffrey I. Cummings, Judge.
                    ____________________

  ARGUED DECEMBER 2, 2025 — DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2025
               ____________________

   Before KIRSCH, LEE, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    LEE, Circuit Judge. In 2022, the Department of Homeland
Security and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“Defendants”) entered into a Consent Decree with Plaintiffs
negotiated over the course of two different administrations.
In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs’ principal claim was that Defend-
ants’ practice of warrantlessly arresting individuals—absent
probable cause that the subjects were likely to escape before
warrants could be obtained—violated 

(a)(2),
2                                                            No. 25-3050

which governs immigration arrests effectuated without a
warrant. And so, in the Consent Decree, Defendants agreed to
issue a “Broadcast Statement of Policy” affirming “the under-
lying laws and policies applicable to all arrests effected under

(a)(2),” provide relevant training, and docu-
ment compliance. Dkt. 155-1 at 5, 6, 17. 1
    In exchange, Defendants obtained a dismissal with preju-
dice and release of all related claims, “avoid[ing] the substan-
tial expense, inconvenience, and distraction of further pro-
tracted litigation … and finally put[ting] to rest and termi-
nat[ing]” the action. 

. Defendants do not challenge the
validity of the original Consent Decree or the authority of the
district court to enter it.
    Instead, Defendants seek a stay pending appeal of two re-
cent district court orders issued on October 7 and November
13, 2025. First, they challenge the district court’s October 7 or-
der extending the term of the Consent Decree by 118 days af-
ter finding that Defendants had failed to substantially comply
with the Consent Decree. Second, Defendants seek to stay the
district court’s November 13 order requiring the release of 13
individuals, whom both parties agree were arrested in viola-
tion of § 1357(a)(2), as well as approximately 442 individuals
who (in the district court’s words) “it stands to reason” were
“potentially” arrested in violation of § 1357(a)(2).
    For the reasons explained below, Defendants’ request for
a stay pending appeal of these rulings is granted in part and
denied in part. The request for a stay of the October 7




    1 “Dkt.” refers to the docket number in the district court record.
No. 25-3050                                                     3

extension order is denied. The request for a stay of the No-
vember 13 order is granted under the terms described below.
                                I
A. The Consent Decree
    In 2018, Plaintiffs filed this class action against the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (“DHS”), Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement (“ICE”), and various federal officials, alleg-
ing that they were arresting noncitizens without a warrant in
violation of 

(a)(2). This provision provides, in
relevant part:
   Any officer or employee of the Service authorized un-
   der regulations prescribed by the Attorney General
   shall have power without warrant … to arrest any alien
   in the United States, if he has reason to believe that the
   alien so arrested is in the United States in violation of
   [any law or regulation made in pursuance of law reg-
   ulating the admission, exclusion, expulsion, or re-
   moval of aliens] and is likely to escape before a warrant
   can be obtained for his arrest ….
   After several years of discovery and motion practice, the
parties negotiated a settlement and signed the Consent Decree
on November 29, 2021. On February 8, 2022, the district court
granted final approval of the agreement, entered the Consent
Decree, and certified the following class pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e): “All current and future persons
arrested without a warrant for a civil violation of U.S. immi-
gration laws within the area of responsibility of the ICE Chi-
cago Field Office.” Dkt. 158 at 4.
   As part of the Consent Decree, Defendants agreed to issue
a “Broadcast Statement of Policy” to all ICE officers affirming
4                                                            No. 25-3050

ICE’s obligations under § 1357(a)(2). Dkt. 155-1 at 6–7, 17–19.
Defendants additionally agreed to adopt or amend current
training materials to ensure compliance with § 1357(a)(2) and
maintain records documenting warrantless arrests. Id. at 7–8.
    The Consent Decree also laid out how the parties would
address any future claims that Defendants had violated the
terms of the Consent Decree. For example, in those instances
where Plaintiffs believe that Defendants have arrested and de-
tained an individual in violation of the agreement, they can
raise the issue with Defendants and file a motion to enforce if
the parties are unable to agree upon a resolution. Id. at 10–11.
Furthermore, if Plaintiffs come to believe that Defendants
have repeatedly and materially violated the Consent Decree,
they can file a motion, after conferring with Defendants, and
seek appropriate equitable relief from the court. Id. at 11. 2
   Under its terms, the Consent Decree was scheduled to ex-
pire on May 12, 2025, three years after its effective date. How-
ever, the parties agreed that it would only terminate on that
date “absent a pending motion to enforce its terms.” Id. at 5.




    2 Release as a remedy for class members comports with the remedy
provided when someone is arrested in violation of federal law. See Arias
v. Rogers, 

 (7th Cir. 1982) (“If the petitioners had been
arrested illegally by [immigration] officers and carted off to jail and the
[agency] had made no move to begin deportation proceedings, the peti-
tioners would have been entitled to obtain their freedom through a habeas
corpus proceeding because their detention would have violated the
Fourth Amendment, which forbids ‘unreasonable ... seizures,’ including
arrests, of persons whether or not they are citizens; and the immigration
laws, specifically 

(a)(2).”).
No. 25-3050                                                  5

B. The October 7 Order
    On March 13, 2025, a few months before the scheduled ter-
mination date, Plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce, asserting
that ICE had arrested 26 individuals in violation of
§ 1357(a)(2) and the Consent Decree. Dkt. 164.
   On April 14, 2025, Plaintiffs also filed a motion to modify
the final approval order enforcing the terms of the Consent
Decree under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). Dkt.
177. In it, Plaintiffs requested that the court extend the Con-
sent Decree by an additional three years in light of, in their
view, Defendants’ repeated material noncompliance. In re-
sponse, Defendants argued that they had not violated the
Consent Decree and that Plaintiffs had not satisfied Rule
60(b)(5)’s requirements to seek a modification of the Consent
Decree. Dkt. 184.
   While both motions were pending, a senior DHS official
sent an email on June 11, 2025, unilaterally declaring that
ICE’s obligations under the Consent Decree were terminated:
   Despite a pending motion to enforce the settlement
   agreement and motion to extend the settlement agree-
   ment, it remains terminated. Accordingly, I hereby re-
   scind the May 27, 2022, Castañon-Nava Settlement Ob-
   ligation statement of policy.
Dkt. 193 at 1.
    On October 7, 2025, the district court granted the enforce-
ment motion in part, finding that 22 of the 26 individuals
identified in the enforcement motion were arrested in viola-
tion of the Consent Decree. Noting that the 22 individuals had
already been released, the only relief that remained were fees
6                                                   No. 25-3050

and compliance certificates. Defendants do not challenge that
ruling here.
    In the same order, the district court also granted Plaintiffs’
Rule 60(b)(5) request to modify the Consent Decree by extend-
ing it, although only in part. The district court agreed with
Plaintiffs and found, after reviewing the factual record, that
Defendants had failed to substantially comply with the Con-
sent Decree. But it denied Plaintiffs’ request to extend the
Consent Decree by three years, concluding that an extension
of 118 days was more appropriate. This, the court reasoned,
was equal to the number of days between June 11, 2025—the
date that Defendants announced they would stop abiding by
the Consent Decree—and October 7, 2025, the date of the or-
der’s issuance. Thus, it ordered that the Consent Decree re-
main in effect until February 2, 2026.
C. The November 13 Order
    On October 20, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Place-
ment of Potential Class Members on Alternatives to Detention
(“ATD motion”). Dkt. 219. The ATD motion was filed in re-
sponse to Defendants’ request for a two-month extension to
produce certain documents Plaintiffs had requested regard-
ing the arrest of numerous individuals whom Plaintiffs be-
lieved had been arrested in violation of the Consent Decree.
Given the delay, Plaintiffs asked the court to order Defend-
ants to place “each potential class member” arrested prior to
October 7, 2025, on ankle monitors or other alternatives to de-
tention. Dkt. 219-9 at 1. Defendants argued that release of
these “potential” class members contravened the Consent De-
cree, which permitted release only when Plaintiffs could es-
tablish that the arrest in question violated the Consent Decree
and § 1357(a)(2). Dkt. 227.
No. 25-3050                                                             7

    On November 7, 2025, the parties filed a joint status report,
which identified 46 arrests that the parties agreed violated the
Consent Decree. (By the time of the report, only 15 remained
in custody). 3 At a hearing on November 12, 2025, the parties
indicated that two additional individuals were no longer in
detention and confirmed that there were 13 class members
who had been arrested in violation of the Consent Decree and
who remained in ICE detention. Defendants nevertheless op-
posed their release, asserting for the first time in this litigation
that the 13 individuals, who were arrested without a warrant
of any kind, were being detained pursuant to ICE’s authority
under 

(b)(2)(A). 4
    On November 13, 2025, the district court ordered the re-
lease of the 13 individuals. It also granted Plaintiffs’ broader
request to release 615 individuals who potentially fell into the
class, noting that “given the number of instances where the
parties have agreed that the rights of the class members were
violated, it stands to reason that a significant number of addi-
tional violations will be uncovered as plaintiffs receive and
analyze the arrest records of the remaining arrestees.” Dkt.


    3 Based upon the parties’ submissions, 28 of the 46 were removed
from the United States, either voluntarily or involuntarily. Three have
been released on bond.
    4 That provision provides:

    Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who
    is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer
    determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and be-
    yond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained
    for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.

(b)(2)(A).
8                                                     No. 25-3050

247 at 4. The district court ordered Defendants to release on
bond, or other alternatives to detention, the 615 “potential
class members,” who are still detained and who do not pose
a high risk of danger to the public. According to the parties,
that number now stands at approximately 442.
                                II
   Before the court is Defendants’ Emergency Motion to Stay
the October 7 and the November 13 orders. Granting such a
stay is “extraordinary relief.” See Somerville Pub. Schs. v.
McMahon, 

, 68 (1st Cir. 2025); Plaquemines Par. v.
Chevron USA, Inc., 

, 373 (5th Cir. 2023); United
States v. Mitchell, 

 (9th Cir. 2020); Citizens for
Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2018). And the standard for obtaining
that relief is “demanding.” Camelot Banquet Rooms, Inc., v. U.S.
Small Bus. Admin., 

 (7th Cir. 2021); see
Plaquemines, 84 F.4th at 373 (noting that the movant must meet
a “heavy burden”).
    When assessing a motion for a stay pending appeal, we
consider: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong
showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether
the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3)
whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other
parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public
interest lies.” Nken v. Holder, 

 (2009) (quoting
Hilton v. Braunskill, 

 (1987)). The first two fac-
tors “are the most critical.” Id. at 434. We will discuss each in
turn.
No. 25-3050                                                              9

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
    1. The October 7 Order
    Defendants first seek a stay of the district court’s October
7 order modifying the Consent Decree to extend its term until
February 2, 2026. 5 In Defendants’ view, this relief violates

(f)(1), which provides:
    Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the
    identity of the party or parties bringing the action, no
    court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have juris-
    diction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation
    of the provisions of part IV of this subchapter [8 U.S.C.
    §§ 1221–1232], as amended by the Illegal Immigration
    Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
    other than with respect to the application of such pro-
    visions to an individual alien against whom proceed-
    ings under such part have been initiated.

    Section 1252(f)(1)’s injunction bar is implicated here, De-
fendants argue, because the court’s order restrains their abil-
ity to arrest and detain individuals under 

 and
1226. Defendants’ invocation of § 1252(f)(1), however, runs
into two significant hurdles at this stage in the litigation.
        a. Waiver
   First, by entering into the Consent Decree in their quest to
dismiss the underlying action with prejudice, Defendants


    5 In their papers, Defendants do not challenge the district court’s Oc-
tober 7 ruling on the enforcement motion. This makes sense because, at
the time of the ruling, the individuals in question had already been re-
leased.
10                                                            No. 25-3050

likely waived their § 1252(f)(1) argument about warrantless
arrests. Indeed, well before Defendants agreed to be bound by
the Consent Decree, they had raised this exact argument be-
fore the district court on at least two separate occasions. See
Dkt. 27 at 13–14 (opposition to class certification); Dkt. 66-1 at
14–15 n.5 (motion to dismiss). But Defendants later aban-
doned this argument to obtain the benefits of settlement. 6 This
is a textbook example of an “intentional relinquishment of a
known right.” Miller v. Willow Creek Homes, Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 2001); see United States v. Armour & Co., 

 (1971) (“Consent decrees are entered into by parties
to a case after careful negotiation has produced agreement on
their precise terms.”).
    Defendants resist this conclusion, contending that
§ 1252(f)(1) is jurisdictional and, therefore, unwaivable. The
Supreme Court, however, has held that, despite its verbiage,
§ 1252(f)(1) does not limit a federal court’s subject matter ju-
risdiction. Biden v. Texas, 

, 797–801 (2022). Rather,
§ 1252(f)(1) only constrains the ability of a federal court (other
than the Supreme Court) to grant injunctive relief on a class-
wide basis. Id. at 801. And, while it is true that the Supreme
Court in Biden declined to decide whether § 1252(f)(1) is wai-
vable, id. at 801 n.4, there is ample reason to believe that it is,
given that similar rules limiting the power of the federal


     6 Notably, Defendants also failed to raise this § 1252(f)(1) argument in
their opposition to Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b)(5) motion to modify, thereby
waiving it a second time. See Wheeler v. Hronopoulos, 

(7th Cir. 2018) (“Failing to bring an argument to the district court means
that you waive that argument on appeal.”) (citing United Cent. Bank v. Dav-
enport Est. LLC, 

 (7th Cir. 2016), and Puffer v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 

 (7th Cir. 2012)).
No. 25-3050                                                              11

courts are waivable. See, e.g., Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,

 (1999) (personal jurisdiction is waivable);
Hoffman v. Blaski, 

 (1960) (“[V]enue, like juris-
diction over the person, may be waived.”); Pusey & Jones Co.
v. Hanssen, 

 (1923) (objection to equitable ju-
risdiction is waivable); Sossamon v. Texas, 

(2011) (state sovereign immunity is waivable). Thus, we be-
lieve that it will be difficult for Defendants to overcome Plain-
tiffs’ argument that Defendants waived their § 1252(f)(1) ob-
jection when it comes to warrantless arrests, both by entering
into the Consent Decree and later failing to raise it in their op-
position to Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b)(5) motion to modify. 7
    Our colleague cautions against the use of waiver against
governmental entities and believes that, before we hold De-
fendants to the commitments outlined in the Consent Decree,
which was negotiated and signed during two prior admin-
istrations (although we note that one was President Trump’s
first term), we must consider whether doing so would be pru-
dent given the concerns over democratic disempowerment
expressed in Horne v. Flores, 

, 447–50 (2009), and
Evans v. City of Chicago, 

, 478–79 (7th Cir. 1993)
(plurality opinion). Is it wise, our colleague asks, to use con-
sent decrees to hold one administration to the commitments
(and waivers) of another?




    7 By contrast, we believe as a preliminary matter that it is less likely
that, by entering into a consent decree requiring compliance with
§ 1357(a)(2) for warrantless arrests, Defendants also waived a § 1252(f)(1)
challenge as to the manner in which it effectuates arrests pursuant to I-200
warrants issued under § 1226(a).
12                                                    No. 25-3050

    This concern is not an unreasonable one. Although the op-
posite proposition, that is, holding that a consent decree or
settlement agreement to which a governmental entity is a
party can never bind future administrations, raises its own
thorny problems. Of course, as our colleague alluded to at
oral argument, one can imagine a scenario where one elected
official might seek to connive with like-minds to embed a con-
troversial policy within a consent decree in order to bind fu-
ture ones. See also Horne, 

 (making the same ob-
servation). Luckily, hypotheticals of that sort are subject to the
reality that federal judges, obligated “to say what the law is,”
do not merely rubber stamp consent decrees. Marbury v. Mad-
ison, 

 (1803); cf. Horne, 

(“It goes without saying that federal courts must vigilantly
enforce federal law and must not hesitate in awarding neces-
sary relief.”). Nevertheless, Defendants have not raised the ar-
guments our colleague has proffered here. And “[i]n our ad-
versarial system of adjudication, we follow the principle of
party presentation,” where the parties “‘frame the issues for
decision,’ while the court serves as ‘neutral arbiter of matters
the parties present.’” Clark v. Sweeney, 607 U.S. ----, No. 25-52,

, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 24, 2025) (per curiam) (first
quoting United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 

(2020); and then quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 

 (2008)). Put another way, it is difficult to conclude
that Defendants are likely succeed on an argument they did
not raise either before us or even before the district court be-
low.
    In any event, Horne and Evans recognize at least two mech-
anisms to prevent such abuse, both of which apply here. The
first is the availability of Rule 60(b)(5), which allows a party
to seek modification of a consent decree when “applying it
No. 25-3050                                                   13

prospectively is no longer equitable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5);
see Horne, 

. Defendants did not take that ap-
proach. Contra 

 at 439–40, 452–56 (discussing the govern-
ment’s Rule 60(b)(5) motion to modify a consent decree be-
cause changed circumstances rendered enforcement of the
decree no longer equitable). The second is ensuring that any
enforcement of a consent decree is grounded “on the existence
of a substantial claim under federal law.” Evans, 

; see Horne, 

. Here, Plaintiffs have made that
showing under § 1357(a)(2), the statute at the heart of the Con-
sent Decree. And Defendants do not challenge the validity of
the Consent Decree or the authority of the district court to en-
ter it.
       b. The extension order does not violate § 1252(f)(1).
    But, even assuming § 1252(f)(1) is not waived here, De-
fendants are not likely to succeed on their argument that the
district court’s modification of the Consent Decree is invalid
under § 1252(f)(1). Recall that this provision only applies to
injunctive relief that “enjoin[s] or restrain[s] the operation of

 through 1232.” The Consent Decree, on the
other hand, is focused squarely on Defendants’ compliance
with § 1357(a)(2).
     Defendants disagree, arguing that extending the Consent
Decree will impede ICE’s operation under § 1226 by limiting
its ability to arrest individuals pursuant to field-issued I-200
warrants (which, in their view, are proper under § 1226 and
its implementing regulations). But, based on this preliminary
record, we read the Consent Decree to cover only those indi-
viduals whose arrests are effectuated in the absence of any
warrant (I-200 or otherwise).
14                                                           No. 25-3050

    It is possible that the extension of the Consent Decree
could result in ICE choosing to rely more on field-issued I-200
warrants (as it appears to have done), thereby indirectly influ-
encing the way the agency employs § 1226, but such collateral
effects do not run afoul of § 1252(f)(1). See Garland v. Aleman
Gonzalez, 

, 553 n.4 (2022) (remarking that a case
“stands at most for the unresponsive proposition that a court
may enjoin the unlawful operation of a provision that is not
specified in § 1252(f)(1) even if that injunction has some collat-
eral effect on the operation of a covered provision”) (emphasis
in original); Texas v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 

,
209–11 (5th Cir. 2024); Al Otro Lado v. Exec. Off. for Immigr.
Rev., 

 (9th Cir. 2025), cert. granted on other
grounds sub nom. Noem v. Al Otro Lado, No. 25-5, 

 (U.S. Nov. 17, 2025); Gonzalez v. U.S. Immigr. & Cus-
toms Enf’t, 

, 812–15 (9th Cir. 2020). 8
    On the other hand, we believe that Defendants are likely
to succeed on their argument that the district court ran afoul
of § 1252(f)(1) when it rejected ICE’s use of field-issued I-200


     8 Defendants cite to N.S. v. Dixon, 

, 288–89 (D.C. Cir.
2025), but that case is distinguishable. There, the district court had held
that the U.S. Marshals lacked authority to make civil immigration arrests.
It then permanently enjoined the Marshals “from arresting and detaining
criminal defendants in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia for
suspected civil immigration violations.” 

. The D.C. Circuit agreed
that the Marshals lacked the authority to arrest but reversed the injunc-
tion, reasoning that “[a]n injunction that restrains the Government from
carrying out an arrest and detention of a criminal defendant pursuant to
an I-200 form clearly affects provisions to which § 1252(f)(1) applies.” Id.
at 289. Unlike N.S. which involved I-200 warrants made pursuant to
§ 1226, a covered provision, the Consent Decree only addresses warrant-
less arrests made pursuant to § 1357(a)(2).
No. 25-3050                                                               15

warrants and re-classified the arrests made pursuant to these
warrants as warrantless ones. As we have explained, we do
not read the Consent Decree to reach arrests effectuated pur-
suant to a warrant, and the Supreme Court held in Aleman
Gonzalez that § 1252(f)(1) bars an inferior court from class-
wide injunctive relief that would interfere with ICE’s opera-
tion of § 1226, even if the court believes the government’s ap-
plication of the provision is unlawful. 596 U.S. at 550–51.
     Here, the district court found that ICE had implemented a
policy of issuing defective I-200 warrants in the field for the
express purpose of avoiding its obligation under § 1357(a)(2)
and the Consent Decree. 9 But, even so, § 1252(f)(1) prohibits
it from remedying such conduct with class-wide injunctive re-
lief. In short, the Consent Decree permissibly provides class-
wide injunctive relief as to warrantless arrests under
§ 1357(a)(2); however, it cannot provide such relief to those
arrested with warrants issued under § 1226, even defective
ones. 10




    9 This factual finding is supported by the record and is not clearly er-
roneous. The district court referenced, among other things, an ICE Acad-
emy training presentation which stated, “Officers may also carry a blank
form I-200 for the arrest of each collateral so that an individual flight risk
analysis is not needed.” Dkt. 185-2 at 4.
    10 Of course, an individual arrested pursuant to a field-issued I-200
warrant can challenge the validity of the warrant in federal court on an
individual basis (for example, in a habeas proceeding), but he cannot do
so in this class action.
16                                                    No. 25-3050

       c. The district court did not abuse its discretion.
    Despite its discussion of I-200 warrants, the district court
likely did not err when it granted Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b)(5) mo-
tion to modify the Consent Decree by extending it, at least as
to warrantless arrests.
    A party may move to modify a consent decree under Rule
60(b)(5). To succeed, the movant, as relevant here, bears the
burden to establish the defendant has failed to substantially
comply with the terms of the decree. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk
Cnty. Jail, 

 (1992); see also Kelly v. Wengler, 

 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Under well established law,
substantial violation of a court order constitutes a significant
change in factual circumstances.”). If the movant makes that
showing, we consider “whether the proposed modification is
suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.” Rufo, 

. We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a
Rule 60(b)(5) motion for abuse of discretion. Shakman v. Clerk
of Cook Cnty., 

 (7th Cir. 2021).
    Here, even putting its rejection of the I-200 warrants to the
side, the district court cited multiple instances where Defend-
ants had failed to comply with the Consent Decree while mak-
ing warrantless arrests (that is, arrests without a warrant of
any kind, defective or otherwise). It also relied on the unilat-
eral proclamation by a DHS senior official on June 11, 2025
that DHS would no longer comply with the Consent Decree.
Accordingly, we cannot say that the district court abused its
discretion when finding that Defendants’ substantial non-
compliance with the Consent Decree constituted a significant
change in circumstances that warranted a modification of the
Consent Decree under Rule 60(b)(5). See Siddiqui v. Nat’l Ass’n
of Broad. Emps. & Technicians, 

 (7th Cir. 2025) (“A
No. 25-3050                                                               17

district court abuses its discretion ‘if it reaches an erroneous
conclusion of law ... or reaches a conclusion that no evidence
in the record supports as rational.’”) (quoting In re Stericycle
Sec. Litig., 

, 559 (7th Cir. 2022)); United States v.
Carlberg, 

 (7th Cir. 2024) (“We will find an
abuse of discretion if there is no evidence in the record on
which the district court could have rationally based its deci-
sion.”) (citation omitted).
    Furthermore, the court’s modification was reasonable and
narrowly tailored to the violation. Indeed, the district court
rejected Plaintiffs’ request for a three-year extension and in-
stead extended the Consent Decree by only 118 days, the pe-
riod between June 11, 2025 (the date of the DHS email) and
October 7, 2025 (the date of the order’s issuance). 11
    For these reasons, even assuming they had not waived
their § 1252(f)(1) objection as to warrantless arrests, Defend-
ants have not met their burden on this record to show a like-
lihood of success as to their argument that the 118-day exten-
sion of the Consent Decree was an abuse of discretion.
    2. The November 13 Order
    In its November 13 order, the district court mandated the
release of 13 individuals whom the parties agreed were ar-
rested in violation of the Consent Decree. It also granted
Plaintiffs’ ATD motion and ordered the release of over 600
“potential class members” so long as Defendants had not

    11 Our colleague faults the district court for not taking “a more careful

approach” to consider the concerns regarding “democratic governance”
raised in Horne and Evans, but we do not see how the district court could
have abused its discretion by failing to address an argument Defendants
failed to raise in the first place. See Wheeler, 

.
18                                                         No. 25-3050

designated them to be high public-safety risks. At oral argu-
ment, counsel estimated that approximately half of the re-
maining 442 were arrested pursuant to field-issued I-200 war-
rants, while the other half were arrested without any war-
rant. 12
    In their motion to stay, Defendants contend that the re-
lease orders are barred by § 1252(f)(1). As to those arrested
with I-200 warrants, Defendants argue that the order imper-
missibly infringes upon their operations under § 1226 in con-
travention of § 1252(f)(1) and Aleman Gonzalez. We believe
that Defendants have demonstrated a likelihood of success on
this argument for the reasons already explained.
     As for those who were arrested without any warrant what-
soever, Defendants insist that the release orders still contra-
vene § 1252(f)(1) because Defendants are detaining those in-
dividuals pursuant to their mandatory detention authority
authorized by § 1225(b)(2)(A). See 

(b)(2)(A)
(“Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien
who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigra-
tion officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien
shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this
title.”).
   As an initial matter, there is a strong argument that De-
fendants waived this argument as well when they decided to
enter into the Consent Decree (albeit Defendants did raise it



     12 We cannot tell from the present record whether the 13 individuals
identified in the November 13 order were arrested pursuant to an I-200
warrant or subjected to warrantless arrests.
No. 25-3050                                                    19

prior to the November 13 order). But the argument is likely to
fail on the merits too.
    The question is whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) covers any noncit-
izen who is unlawfully already in the United States as well as
those who present themselves at its borders. For their part,
Plaintiffs highlight a host of cases where courts have held that
ICE’s authority to detain a noncitizen discovered within the
country derives from § 1226(a) and not from § 1225(b). See

(a) (“On a warrant issued by the Attorney Gen-
eral, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a deci-
sion on whether the alien is to be removed from the United
States.”); see , e.g., Corona Diaz v. Olson, No. 25-CV-12141, 

 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2025); Hasan v. Crawford, No.
1:25-CV-1408 (LMB/IDD), 

 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19,
2025); Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 

 (S.D.N.Y.
2025). Based upon the text and structure of the two provi-
sions, we believe that Plaintiffs have the better argument on
the current record.
    That’s because § 1225(a)(1) defines an “applicant for ad-
mission” as “an alien present in the United States who has not
been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 

(a)(1). And while a noncitizen arrested in the Midwest
might qualify as “an alien present in the United States who
had not been admitted,” § 1225(a)(1), the mandatory deten-
tion provision upon which Defendants rely, limits its scope to
an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission,”
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Put another way, “U.S. immigration law au-
thorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admis-
sion into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also au-
thorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the
country pending the outcome of removal proceedings under
20                                                    No. 25-3050

§§ 1226(a) and (c).” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 

(2018) (emphasis added). Accordingly, given the factual rec-
ord before us, we conclude that Defendants are not likely to
succeed on the merits of their argument that those individu-
als, whom ICE arrested in Chicago without a warrant, are
subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
    Defendants disagree. In their view, an “applicant for ad-
mission” is synonymous with a person “seeking admission”
because, as they put it, one cannot apply for something with-
out also seeking it. And, admittedly, this argument has some
superficial appeal. After all, a person does not apply for some-
thing they are not seeking. Moreover, § 1225(a)(3), which De-
fendants point to, refers to noncitizens “who are applicants
for admission or otherwise seeking admission,” 

(a)(3) (emphasis added), suggesting that “applicants for
admission” are those “seeking admission.” But it is Con-
gress’s prerogative to define a term however it wishes, and it
has chosen to limit the definition of an “applicant for admis-
sion” to “an alien present in the United States who has not
been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 

(a)(1). It could easily have included noncitizens who are
“seeking admission” within the definition but elected not to
do so.
    What is more, Defendants’ construction would render
§ 1225(b)(2)(A)’s use of the phrase “seeking admission” su-
perfluous, violating one of the cardinal rules of statutory con-
struction. See United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res.,
Inc., 

, 432 (2023) (“[E]very clause and word of a
statute should have meaning.”). Indeed, as the Supreme
Court reminds us, if an interpretation of one provision
“would render another provision superfluous, courts
No. 25-3050                                                              21

presume that interpretation is incorrect.” Bilski v. Kappos, 

, 607–08 (2010). And this presumption is “strongest
when an interpretation would render superfluous another
part of the same statutory scheme,” as would be the case here.
Marx v. Gen. Rev. Corp., 

 (2013).
    Furthermore, the difference in treatment between a noncit-
izen at the border and one already in the United States fits
within the broader context of our immigration law. Indeed,
“[t]he distinction between an alien who has effected an entry
into the United States and one who has never entered runs
throughout immigration law.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 

 (2001); Leng May Ma v. Barber, 

 (1958).
(“[O]ur immigration laws have long made a distinction be-
tween those aliens who have come to our shores seeking ad-
mission ... and those who are within the United States after an
entry, irrespective of its legality.”). 13
   Thus, we conclude on this preliminary record that Defend-
ants are not likely to succeed on the merits of their argument
that those individuals, whom ICE arrested without a warrant,




    13 It also does not escape our notice that Defendants’ recent reliance

on § 1225(b)(2)(A) to detain noncitizens discovered within the United
States upends decades of practice. “Before July 8, 2025, DHS’s long-stand-
ing interpretation had been that § 1226(a) applied to those who have
crossed the border between ports of entry and are shortly thereafter ap-
prehended.” Hasan, 

, at *9 (citation modified). Manda-
tory detention of all persons illegally in the United States only became of-
ficial DHS policy when Acting Director of ICE Todd M. Lyons issued an
internal memorandum on July 8, 2025 explaining that the agency “revis-
ited its legal position” on the applicability of §§ 1225(b) and 1226(a). Id.
(citation omitted).
22                                                            No. 25-3050

are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). 14
Moreover, their release under the terms of the Consent Decree
would not violate § 1252(f)(1) because their arrests were not
based on I-200 warrants (defective or not) and the effects on
§ 1226 are collateral at best for the reasons we have explained.
As a result, the release orders as to these detainees are not
barred by § 1252(f)(1). But this does not end our analysis.
    Even though we conclude as a preliminary matter that
§ 1252(f)(1) poses no obstacle to the release of those detainees
who faced warrantless arrests, we believe that Defendants
have a strong argument that the district court lacked the au-
thority to order the release of the 442 “potential” class mem-
bers under the terms of the Consent Decree. In Section IV(E)
of the Consent Decree, the parties agreed that a detained class
member would be released from ICE custody “upon a deter-
mination by the parties or the Court … that [the] Class Mem-
ber was so arrested contrary to the terms of the Agreement.”
Dkt. 155-1 at 9. Here, no such determination has been made


     14 To the extent that Defendants believe they can trigger § 1252(f)(1)

merely by invoking § 1225(b) at the eleventh hour, even if it is wholly in-
applicable to the cirumstances at hand, they are mistaken. See Texas, 123
F.4th at 210 (noting that, despite DHS’s contention that a wire barrier
would impede its ability to detain noncitizens pursuant to its authority
under §§ 1225 and 1226, the federal agency defendants were not “the ulti-
mate judges of whether § 1252(f)(1)’s bar applies”). Defendants do not
point us to anything in the factual record to support their contention that
the individuals in question were in fact arrested and detained pursuant to
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). And Defendants cannot insulate themselves from judicial
review regarding the applicability of § 1252(f)(1) simply by pointing to a
covered statute and claiming that it applies without any factual support.
Id. at 210–11 (rejecting DHS’s reliance on § 1252(f)(1) when the factual rec-
ord did not support it).
No. 25-3050                                                 23

for the approximately 442 “potential class members” who
were the subject of the November 13 order.
    Nor do we think the discretion the court retained under
Section V(B)(2) to “provide any equitable remedies not other-
wise specified in this Agreement” would override the specific
remedy the parties agreed to in Section IV(E). Thus, even as
to those individuals who were arrested without a warrant, we
believe that Defendants have a strong argument that the “po-
tential class members” cannot be released absent individual
determinations as required under Section IV(E).
    To sum up, we conclude that Defendants have not estab-
lished a likelihood of success on the merits as to their argu-
ment that the district court’s October 7 order extending the
term of the Consent Decree until February 2, 2026 violated
§ 1252(f)(1). However, Defendants have demonstrated that
they are likely to succeed on their argument that the Novem-
ber 13 order requiring the release of individuals, who were
arrested pursuant to I-200 warrants, contravened
§ 1252(f)(1)’s class-wide injunction bar. As for those individ-
uals who were arrested without a warrant, we believe that De-
fendants are not likely to succeed on their argument that these
individuals are subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(A)(2), but Defendants are likely to successfully ar-
gue that the district court exceeded its authority when order-
ing their release before making an individualized determina-
tion that they were arrested in violation of the Consent Decree
as required by Section IV(E).
B. Irreparable Harm
   Turning first to the October 7 modification order, Defend-
ants do not persuasively explain how they would suffer
24                                                  No. 25-3050

irreparable harm from having to comply with a consent de-
cree to which they knowingly and willingly agreed, particu-
larly when the district court found that Defendants had re-
peatedly violated it and limited the extension to cover only
those days after Defendants’ unilateral declaration of non-
compliance. Notably, Defendants did not file their own Rule
60(b)(5) motion asking the court to modify or terminate the
Consent Decree, contra Horne, 557 U.S. at 439–40, 452–56, nor
do they dispute its validity and enforceability. It is difficult to
see, then, how extending it by a time equal to Defendants’ pe-
riod of substantial noncompliance could constitute irrepara-
ble harm.
    Defendants protest, contending that “[w]henever the Gov-
ernment is enjoined by a court order, it suffers irreparable
sovereign harm.” Defs.’ Stay Motion at 19 (citing Trump v.
CASA, Inc., 

, 860–61 (2025)). This statement not
only overstates the holding in CASA, but CASA itself is dis-
tinguishable on numerous grounds. First, of course, Defend-
ants here voluntarily undertook the obligations set forth in
the Consent Decree; CASA involved nothing of the sort. Sec-
ond, CASA involved a universal injunction that prevented the
government from enforcing its policies against nonparties;
this case involves a Rule 23 class action. See CASA, 

 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (recognizing that CASA does
not foreclose plaintiffs from seeking injunctive relief via Rule
23 class actions). Third, the Supreme Court in CASA premised
its irreparable harm analysis on its determination that the
government was likely to prevail on its argument that the Ju-
diciary Act barred universal injunctions. See 

 (“The
question before us is whether the Government is likely to suf-
fer irreparable harm from the District Courts’ entry of injunc-
tions that likely exceed the authority conferred by the
No. 25-3050                                                   25

Judiciary Act.”). By contrast, Defendants’ argument that the
October 7 modification order contravenes § 1252(f)(1) is not
likely to succeed. Finally, in CASA, the Supreme Court refer-
enced Chief Justice Roberts’s statement in Maryland v. King
that “any time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating
statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a
form of irreparable injury.” 

 (2012) (Rob-
erts, C. J., in chambers) (citation modified). But, here, the Con-
sent Decree requires—rather than enjoins—Defendants’ com-
pliance with a federal statute, § 1357(a)(2).
    That said, we agree that Defendants will suffer irreparable
harm if the district court’s November 13 order requiring the
release of individuals who were arrested pursuant to field-is-
sued I-200 warrants is not stayed. Section 1252(f)(1) proscribes
inferior federal courts from issuing class-wide injunctive re-
lief that would impede the agency’s enforcement operations
pursuant to its authority under § 1226. In this instance, the Su-
preme Court’s citation in CASA to Maryland v. King is apt. See
Noem v. Vazquez Perdomo, No. 25A169, 

, at *3
(U.S. Sept. 8, 2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (noting, “any
time that the Government is enjoined by a court from effectu-
ating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suf-
fers from a form of irreparable injury.”) (quoting CASA, 

) (citation modified)).
    Similarly, we believe that Defendants will suffer irrepara-
ble harm if the district court’s November 13 order mandating
the release of individuals, who were arrested without a war-
rant, prior to individual violation determinations is not
stayed. After all, this is not the bargain Defendants agreed to,
and the Consent Decree carefully maps out what the district
judge can or cannot order, balancing Defendants’
26                                                    No. 25-3050

immigration enforcement responsibilities, Defendants’ obli-
gations to comply with § 1357(a), and the need to maintain
public safety.
C. Remaining Factors
    Turning to the remaining Nken factors, we conclude that
staying the October 7 order’s extension of the Consent Decree
will substantially injure individuals who have been or will be
subjected to warrantless arrests without probable cause in vi-
olation of § 1357(a)(2) during the extended period of the Con-
sent Decree—the very harm it is intended to prevent. See Pres-
ton v. Thompson, 

, 303 n.3 (7th Cir. 1978) (ongoing
violation of individual rights “constitutes proof of an irrepa-
rable harm”).
    Lastly, the public interest factor is neutral. On the one
hand, “control over matters of immigration is a sovereign pre-
rogative, largely within the control of the executive and the
legislature.” Landon v. Plasencia, 

 (1982). On the
other, “there is a substantial public interest ‘in having govern-
mental agencies abide by the federal laws that govern their
existence and operations.’” League of Women Voters of the U.S.
v. Newby, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Washington
v. Reno, 

 (6th Cir. 1994)); see also Preston, 589
F.2d at 303 n.3 (remedy for ongoing violations of individual
rights “certainly would serve the public interest”).
                                III
    As we have noted, due to the nascent nature of this appeal,
our conclusions today are preliminary and based on the lim-
ited record available to us. We have every confidence that the
parties will present more fulsome arguments and a more
comprehensive record when we address the appeal on the
No. 25-3050                                                             27

merits. That said, for the reasons explained above, Defend-
ants’ request to stay the October 7 order granting Plaintiffs’
Rule 60(b)(5) motion to modify the Consent Decree is
DENIED. Turning to the 13 class members and approximately
442 “potential class members” who are the subject of the No-
vember 13 order, as to those individuals who were arrested
pursuant to an I-200 warrant, Defendants’ request to stay the
November 13 order pending appeal is GRANTED. As to those
individuals, who were arrested absent a warrant, Defendants’
motion to stay the November 13 order is GRANTED pending
individual violation determinations pursuant to Section IV(E)
of the Consent Decree. 15
   During oral argument, Defendants requested that the
court stay this order for 14 days to permit Defendants to seek
emergency relief from the Supreme Court, if necessary. That
request is GRANTED.
   An expedited briefing schedule and oral argument date
will be set by separate order.




    15 Again, it is unclear whether the 13 individuals discussed in the No-
vember 13 order were arrested with or without warrants. The district court
is in a much better position to make this assessment. Accordingly, we
leave this, as well as any further individual proceedings under Section
IV(E) of the Consent Decree, to the district court.
28                                                   No. 25-3050

    KIRSCH, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Through a consent de-
cree, one branch of the federal government (the executive)
handed over to another (the judiciary) the power to enforce
compliance with part of the nation’s immigration laws. Judi-
cial enforcement of such an agreement requires flexibility. See
Horne v. Flores, 

, 447–50 (2009). When asked to
bind current elected officeholders to the policy preferences of
their predecessors, judges must allow maximum room for
democratic governance. Evans v. City of Chicago, 

 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (plurality opinion). Ambiguities
in these agreements should be read in this light, and courts
should “hesitate to assume that by signing a consent decree
the government knowingly bartered away important public
interests merely to avoid the expense of a trial.” All. to End
Repression v. City of Chicago, 

 (7th Cir.
1984) (en banc). The majority and the district court ignore
these concerns in favor of the policy preferences of the last
administration. In doing so, the district court also provided
class-based injunctive relief in violation of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA). Because both of the district court’s
orders should be stayed in their entirety, I dissent.
                                I
                                A
    The consent decree centers on just one part of the federal
immigration laws: plaintiffs gave up their litigation in ex-
change for the government’s promise to follow 

(a)(2). That provision says that a warrantless arrest of
an alien must be based on facts showing that the alien is in
violation of immigration laws and is likely to escape before a
warrant can be obtained. When plaintiffs moved to enforce
and modify the agreement based on alleged violations, the
No. 25-3050                                                   29

government claimed that Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment (ICE) had held up its end of the bargain. The district
court disagreed, but not based on § 1357(a)(2). Rather, the dis-
trict court found that ICE was using entirely different statutes
(

 and 1226) to circumvent the agreement. To
give effect to what it perceived to be plaintiffs’ and the prior
administration’s intent when they entered into the agreement,
the district court extended the consent decree’s expiration
date and ordered the release of hundreds of detained aliens.
As an added kicker, the district court gave the released de-
tainees a 24-hour reprieve from further arrest.
    To understand where the district court went wrong, start
with the October 7 order. Based on a set of recent ICE arrests
in the Chicago area, plaintiffs moved to enforce and modify
the consent decree. While the parties agreed that some of
ICE’s arrests fell under § 1357, the government argued that
others weren’t warrantless arrests at all because its agents had
issued field warrants (referred to as I-200s) on the spot, and
made those arrests on authority from a different statute—8
U.S.C. § 1226. The court concluded that the I-200 arrests were
unlawful and in violation of the agreement. Put another way:
to give force to an agreement about one part of the immigra-
tion laws (§ 1357), the district court decided the legality of an
ICE practice involving another provision (§ 1226). Based in
part on the violations of § 1226 as the district court saw them,
it extended the decree by almost four months, barring the
government from using its authority under § 1226 to make I-
200 warrant-based arrests.
    Something similar happened a month later. In the Novem-
ber 13 order, the district court considered plaintiffs’ request to
release potential class members as a remedy for the
30                                                   No. 25-3050

government’s violations of the consent decree. The agreement
said that class members arrested in violation of the decree and
not subject to mandatory detention—as relevant here, defined
by 

(b)(2)(A)—should be released. The govern-
ment argued that, under a new interpretation of § 1225, many
of the arrestees at issue were subject to mandatory detention
and could not be released. The district court rejected the gov-
ernment’s interpretation. Without conducting individualized
determinations as to whether the detainees were in the class
or if their arrests violated the agreement, the district court or-
dered the release of hundreds of people—including those the
government believes § 1225 requires it to detain.
    Were this consent decree between two private parties, the
choice to interpret and enforce the agreement in this way
might have been appropriate. But this consent decree isn’t be-
tween two private parties. Temporary officeholders of the ex-
ecutive branch—not the United States itself—entered into the
agreement. See Evans v. City of Chicago, 

 (7th
Cir. 1993) (en banc) (plurality opinion). Enforcing the prom-
ises of those elected officials requires an awareness that
“[t]oday’s lawmakers have just as much power to set public
policy as did their predecessors,” and that “democracy does
not permit public officials to bind the polity forever.” 

“Recognition of the uniqueness of [institutional reform litiga-
tion] must inform [the] decision whether to grant or deny” a
motion to modify a consent decree involving a branch of gov-
ernment. Shakman v. City of Chicago, 

 (7th Cir.
2005) (emphasis added). And when elected officials make
promises about executive power, a court interpreting and en-
forcing such promises should do so with “due regard for the
separation of powers, the flexibility of equity, the ambiguity
of the decree … the sensitivity and importance of the subject
No. 25-3050                                                    31

matter, and the limitations of judicial competence.” All. to End
Repression v. City of Chicago, 

 (7th Cir. 1984)
(en banc).
    The majority contends that the government never raised
these concerns, and so we ought to turn a blind eye to them
now. Ante at 12 (citing Clark v. Sweeney, 607 U.S. ----, No. 25-
52, 

, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 24, 2025)). Yet while the
government may not have used the words “separation of
powers” or cited our precedent in this area, it adequately
raised these issues. The government noted that the agreement
was entered by a previous administration, and that “[t]he dis-
trict court’s orders interfere with the Executive’s immigration
enforcement operations.” What’s more, the “party presenta-
tion principle is supple, not ironclad.” United States v.
Sineneng-Smith, 

 (2020). And we retain “the
independent power to identify and apply the proper con-
struction of governing law.” Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc.,

 (1991). The government raised this argument
in general terms, and—given its significance—we should con-
front the constitutional dimensions of this case.
   Plaintiffs settled in exchange for a promise that the gov-
ernment would conduct warrantless arrests in compliance
with § 1357—not follow their preferred interpretation of other
parts of the immigration laws. Put differently, government
compliance with § 1357 is the only “substantial claim under
federal law” that supports the continued existence of this de-
cree. Evans, 

 (plurality opinion) (“[E]ntry and
continued enforcement of a consent decree regulating the op-
eration of a governmental body depend on the existence of a
substantial claim under federal law.”).
32                                                  No. 25-3050

     Relying on equitable discretion, the district court went
way beyond § 1357. Its orders mean that the government’s
consent in 2022 tied ICE’s hands not merely as to § 1357, but
also as to other parts of the immigration laws: §§ 1225 and
1226. The orders require the government to comply with the
previous administration’s views of mandatory detention un-
der § 1225, and bar ICE from using warrants in a way the gov-
ernment believes is lawful under § 1226. We need not decide
if the district court was right about the meaning of these stat-
utes. But it was wrong about how much flexibility the execu-
tive branch is due when it gives up enforcement authority to
the judiciary. The district court should have taken a more
careful approach. See All. to End Repression, 742 F.2d at 1013–
20 (narrowly interpreting a consent decree to avoid “a prem-
ature confrontation between the judicial and executive
branches”); Evans, 10 F.3d at 477–80 (plurality opinion). Be-
cause these orders went beyond what was reasonable and
necessary to implement § 1357, the government is likely to
succeed on the merits by establishing that district court
abused its discretion in modifying the consent decree.
                               B
    That another federal law blocks courts from granting the
relief at issue underscores the district court’s errors. The
INA—8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1)—strips courts of “jurisdiction or
authority” to grant class-based relief that enjoins or restrains
the operation of §§ 1225 and 1226. An order enjoins or re-
strains the operation of a law when it requires federal officials
to take actions that (in the government’s view) are not re-
quired, or to refrain from actions that (again, in the govern-
ment’s view) are allowed. Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 

 (2022). Crucially, § 1252(f)(1)’s injunction bar applies
No. 25-3050                                                 33

to class-based relief regardless of whether a court is right
about the meaning of the underlying provisions. See id. at
552–53. Put another way, the government is allowed to be
wrong about what §§ 1225 and 1226 require and authorize,
and a court is not allowed to block the government from en-
forcing its preferred interpretation of those laws unless the
court does so on an individual basis. Id. The district court’s
orders in this case violate the INA’s injunction bar—they re-
quire ICE to refrain from executing warrant arrests and de-
taining aliens in ways that the government believes to be per-
missible under §§ 1226 and 1225.
     The majority wrongly asserts that the government is
barred from raising § 1252(f)(1) as applied to the motion to
modify the decree and the meaning of mandatory detention
in the agreement because it didn’t raise the issue in 2022 or
oppose the motion to modify. Ante at 9–11 & n.6, 18–19. That
cannot be right. Entering a consent decree three years ago is
not a waiver of a § 1252(f)(1) objection to unforeseen injunc-
tions that target provisions outside the four corners of the
consent decree. And even if the government forfeited this ar-
gument as to the October 7 order, see id. at 10 n.6, we should
still reach it because (as discussed above) it is “founded on
concerns broader than those of the parties.” Wood v. Milyard,

 (2012) (citation modified); United States v.
Ford, 

 (7th Cir. 2012) (same).
    The majority ties itself into knots attempting to explain
why § 1252(f)(1) doesn’t bar the district court’s orders. Ac-
knowledging that the October 7 order runs afoul of
§ 1252(f)(1) by declaring the illegality of ICE’s I-200 warrant
procedure, the majority nonetheless finds that the order
should stand because the warrant-based arrests weren’t the
34                                                  No. 25-3050

court’s only reason for extending the consent decree. Ante at
16–17. But it’s not clear that the district court would have ex-
tended the decree absent the violations it found based on I-
200 arrests. And while the majority attempts to bar the district
court from providing injunctive relief enjoining § 1226 going
forward, id. at 14–15, the surer course (especially in light of
the separation of powers concerns discussed above) is to
simply grant the stay. Part of the district court’s rationale for
extending the decree was faulty: it enjoined the government
from conducting warrant-based arrests in a way the govern-
ment believes to be lawful. That’s impermissible relief under
§ 1252(f)(1), and it means the modification of the decree in the
October 7 order was an abuse of discretion.
    The majority’s approach to the November 13 order is even
more problematic. The majority says that to decide if
§ 1252(f)(1)’s injunction bar applies, we must first decide if the
district court was right or wrong about its interpretation of
§ 1225. Concluding that the district court was right, the ma-
jority holds that the release of class members arrested under
§ 1357 may go forward. Ante at 19–22.
    This sort of analysis—a court can enjoin the government
on a class-wide basis so long as the government has the law
wrong—has been squarely foreclosed by the Supreme Court.
See Aleman Gonzalez, 596 U.S. at 552–54. The majority seems
to suggest that, if the government is wrong enough about the
law, a class-wide injunction is permissible under § 1252(f)(1).
Ante at 19–22 & n.14. But such a rule has no grounding in the
law. That the government’s interpretation of § 1225 may be
incorrect (we need not decide), does not authorize the court
to go around § 1252(f)(1) and issue class-based relief. See Ale-
man Gonzalez, 596 U.S. at 552–54. I agree with the majority
No. 25-3050                                                   35

(based on a straight-forward application of the agreement’s
remedial provision) that the district court lacked authority to
order the blanket release of potential class members. But it is
also the case that § 1252(f)(1) barred the November 13 order,
even as to those arrested under § 1357 and regardless of
whether the district court was right about the meaning of
mandatory detention in § 1225. The district court issued class-
wide injunctive relief enjoining § 1225. That’s a violation of
§ 1252(f)(1).
                               II
    As discussed above, the government is likely to succeed
on the merits of its appeal for two reasons: first, because the
district court failed to consider the unique nature of this liti-
gation in modifying and enforcing the decree; second, be-
cause the orders run afoul of the INA’s injunction bar. The
remaining factors for a stay are also met. See Nken v. Holder,

 (2009).
    The government faces irreparable harm. See Trump v.
CASA, Inc., 

, 860–61 (2025); Noem v. Vasquez Per-
domo, No. 25A169, 

, at *3 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2025)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“Any time that the Government
is enjoined by a court from effectuating statues enacted by
representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable
injury.”) (citation modified). The majority argues that the gov-
ernment suffers no harm from being forced to comply with a
consent decree that it voluntarily entered. Ante at 24–25. But
the consent decree addressed § 1357. The government never
agreed to follow a particular interpretation of §§ 1225 or 1226,
and that’s the harm in this case. These orders bar the govern-
ment from enforcing those laws as the government believes it
should. The fact that the government suffers that harm in the
36                                                No. 25-3050

context of a consent decree does not matter. This case is like
CASA because the government seeks to enforce its view of the
law and has been barred from doing so by a district judge. See

. The balance of equities does not counsel
against awarding the government interim relief given the
overbreadth of the orders at issue. The motion for a stay pend-
ing appeal should be granted.