U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 1993 Inmate's § 1983 claims that prison officers failed to process grievances and that a restitution order violated his Eighth Amendment rights were properly dismissed.

Inmate's § 1983 claims that prison officers failed to process grievances and that a restitution order violated his Eighth Amendment rights were properly dismissed.

Buckley v. Barlow
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · Decided July 8, 1993 · Arnold, Bowman, Magill
997 F.2d 494; 1993 WL 243413 (Federal Reporter, Second Series)

Outcome: Affirmed for defendants.

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Counsel

Appellant, pro se., William A Hill, Asst. Atty. Gen., Des Moines, IA, for appellees.

Buckley v. Barlow

What happened

The facts of the case, in plain language.

In November 1991, Buckley filed a complaint alleging that Richard Barlow refused to pick up his completed grievance forms and Christopher Meek condoned this by refusing to answer his letters or investigate his grievances.

A disciplinary committee ordered continued deduction of one-half of Buckley's $7.50 monthly 'idle pay' in restitution for damage to a mattress and thermostat.

Buckley claimed the restitution deductions deprived him of the ability to purchase personal hygiene items such as body lotions and hair grease, and postage for personal mail.

What the court decided

Eddie O. Buckley Jr., an Iowa inmate, appealed a magistrate judge's dismissal of two consolidated § 1983 complaints. In the first, filed November 1991, Buckley alleged that Richard Barlow refused to process grievance forms and Christopher Meek condoned this by refusing to answer his letters or investigate his grievances. In a second complaint filed February 1992, Buckley challenged continued deductions from his prison account pursuant to a disciplinary restitution order, claiming it constituted cruel and unusual punishment and deprived him of personal hygiene items and postage. He also claimed he was entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that no constitutional right exists regarding prison grievance procedures, that no Seventh Amendment jury trial right applies in prison disciplinary hearings, and that loss of access to optional personal items does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

  1. Prison grievance procedures confer only procedural rights and do not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest; an official's failure to process an inmate's grievances, without more, does not violate the Constitution and is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
  2. Inmates have no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in prison disciplinary proceedings. (*496)
  3. Deprivation of optional personal hygiene items such as body lotions and hair grease pursuant to a disciplinary restitution order does not deprive an inmate of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities and does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. (*496)

How the court reached its decision

The court's reasoning, step by step.

Whether an official's failure to process an inmate's completed prison grievance forms violates a constitutionally protected right actionable under § 1983. Barlow's refusal to pick up Buckley's completed grievance forms and Meek's refusal to answer Buckley's letters or investigate his grievances implicated only the procedural grievance mechanism; no substantive constitutional right was infringed, and state-mandated grievance procedures do not acquire a federal constitutional dimension merely because state law prescribes them. Defendants' failure to process any of Buckley's grievances, without more, is not actionable under § 1983, and the first complaint failed to state a claim.

Whether an inmate has a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in a prison disciplinary proceeding. Buckley's challenge to the disciplinary restitution order rested on a claimed right to a jury hearing; because the Seventh Amendment does not extend to prison disciplinary proceedings and Buckley asserted no state-created liberty interest in a jury trial in that context, the claim was legally insufficient. Buckley had no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in the prison disciplinary setting, and that aspect of his second complaint failed to state a claim.

Whether withholding optional personal hygiene items from an inmate pursuant to a disciplinary restitution order constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The items Buckley alleged he was unable to purchase—body lotions, hair grease, and postage for personal mail—are optional amenities rather than minimal civilized necessities; their unavailability may cause discomfort but does not rise to the level of conduct that is inhumane, base, or barbaric. Buckley's allegations that he was denied certain personal hygiene items were insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment cruel-and-unusual-punishment claim.

Key quotes from the opinion

Notable passages from the opinion, in the court's own words.

“To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”
Section 1983 pleading standard —
“Thus, defendants' failure to process any of Buckley's grievances, without more, is not actionable under section 1983.”
Prison grievance procedures do not create a constitutional right —
“discomfort does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment; conduct must be so inhumane, base or barbaric as to shock sensibilities”
Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment standard — *496

Cases the court relied on

Earlier decisions the court cited as authority for its ruling.

  • Flick v. Alba (932 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1991)) — Held that federal grievance regulations providing for an administrative remedy procedure do not create a liberty interest in access to that procedure, directly supporting dismissal of Buckley's grievance-processing claim.
  • West v. Atkins (487 U.S. 42 (1988)) — Supplies the foundational § 1983 pleading standard requiring allegation of a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.
  • Wolff v. McDonnell (418 U.S. 539 (1974)) — Supreme Court authority on procedural due process in prison disciplinary proceedings, cited for the proposition that no Seventh Amendment jury trial right exists in that setting.
  • Rhodes v. Chapman (452 U.S. 337 (1981)) — Establishes that the Eighth Amendment prohibits depriving inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities, providing the constitutional benchmark against which Buckley's deprivation claim was measured.
  • Porth v. Farrier (934 F.2d 154 (8th Cir. 1991)) — Articulates the Eighth Circuit standard that discomfort does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment and that the conduct must be so inhumane, base, or barbaric as to shock the sensibilities.

Cases that cite this one

446 later published cases cite this decision. The 24 that cite it most often are listed here.

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Full opinion

The complete text of the court's opinion as published.

Opinion of the Court

PER CURIAM.

Eddie 0. Buckley, Jr., an Iowa inmate, appeals the magistrate judge’s1 judgment in favor of defendants in two consolidated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions. We affirm.

In November 1991, Buckley filed a section 1983 complaint alleging that Richard Barlow refused to pick up his completed grievance forms, and Christopher Meek condoned Barlow’s actions by refusing to answer Buckley’s letters or investigate his grievances. In February 1992, Buckley filed a complaint against Debbie Nichols, records clerk, Don Mallinger, business accountant, and Crispus Nix, warden. He claimed that their continued deduction of one half of his $7.50 “idle pay” from his prison account pursuant to a disciplinary committee’s restitution order2 amounted to cruel and unusual punishment because it deprived him of the ability to purchase some personal hygiene items (e.g., body lotions and hair grease) and postage for personal mail. Buckley also claimed that the restitution order was unconstitutional because he had not been afforded a jury hearing as required by the Seventh Amendment.

“To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States....” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2255-56, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). While a violation of a state-created liberty interest can amount to a violation of the Constitution, not every violation of state law or state-mandated procedures is a violation of the Constitution. See, e.g., Meis v. Gunter, 906 F.2d 364, 369 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028, 111 S.Ct. 682, 112 L.Ed.2d 673 (1991). “‘The simple fact that state law prescribes certain procedures does not mean that the procedures thereby acquire a federal constitutional dimension.’” Vruno v. Schwarzwalder, 600 F.2d 124, 130-31 (8th Cir. 1979) (quoting Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 34 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077, 98 S.Ct. 1268, 55 L.Ed.2d 783 (1978)).

We conclude Buckley’s first complaint failed to state a claim because no constitutional right was violated by the defendants’ failure, if any, to process all of the grievances he submitted for consideration. Cf. Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (federal grievance regulations providing for administrative remedy procedure do not create liberty interest in access to that procedure) (citing with approval Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F.Supp. 8 (N.D.Ill. 1982)). “[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates. Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the fourteenth amendment.” Azeez, 568 F.Supp. at 10. Thus, defendants’ failure to process any of Buckley’s grievances, without more, is not actionable under section 1983.

Contrary to Buckley’s assertion in his second complaint, he had no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in a prison *496disciplinary setting. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978-83, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Buckley did not assert that he had state-created liberty interest in a jury trial in that context. We also conclude that Buckley’s allegations that he was denied certain personal hygiene items were insufficient to state a claim for cruel and unusual punishment. Cf. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (Eighth Amendment prohibits depriving inmates of “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities”); Porth v. Farrier, 934 F.2d 154, 157 (8th Cir. 1991) (discomfort does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment; conduct must be so inhumane, base or barbaric as to shock sensibilities); Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir. 1989) (inmates are entitled to reasonably adequate sanitation and personal hygiene).

Accordingly, we affirm.

. The Honorable Celeste F. Bremer, United States Magistrate Judge for the Southern District of Iowa, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

. Buckley was ordered to pay $297 for a mattress and thermostat he damaged while at Oak-dale Medical Security Facility.

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