Marc Moore, a former police officer with the city of Sedalia, Missouri appeals the district court’s 1 grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants in this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm.

Moore was employed as a police officer with the city of Sedalia, Missouri from March 28, 1994 until February 1999, at which time he was discharged for cause. During his tenure with the police department Moore served on the executive board *524 of the Mid-Missouri Fraternal Order of Police (FOP). While serving on the board Moore assisted in the preparation of a letter accusing Sadalia’s Police Chief, Theodore Litschauer, of incompetence, and a lack of honesty and integrity. Moore showed the letter to various members of the FOP, including some who were employed as officers in the Sedalia Police Department. Moore then sent the letter to Irl Tessendorf, Sedalia’s City Administrator.

City officials investigated Moore’s allegations and determined they were false and unsupported by any credible evidence. Moore was suspended pending an informal disciplinary hearing. At the informal hearing, officials concluded that Moore’s conduct in circulating the letter was sufficient cause for dismissal. Moore appealed the decision to the Police Personnel Board claiming the letter constituted protected speech under the First Amendment. The Board upheld his termination.

Moore filed this action under § 1983, alleging violation of his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. Moore named as defendants the city of Sedalia, various members of city government, including the City Administrator, Chief of Police, and Mayor, as well as the members of the Police Personnel Board. The defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that Moore’s claims were barred by claim preclusion, issue preclusion, and qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment on the basis of claim preclusion and issue preclusion.

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the same standards as the district court. Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir. 1997). We will affirm the grant of summary judgment if the record “show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When considering the facts, and the inferences to be drawn from them, we do so in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Dulany, 132 F.3d at 1237.

On appeal, Moore challenges only the district court’s dismissal of his freedom of association claim. 2 Moore claims he was terminated because of his membership with the FOP. Our review of the record, however, fails to disclose any evidence supporting Moore’s freedom of association claim. Rather, the record demonstrates that Moore was terminated as a result of the false and unsupported allegations made against Chief Litschauer. We, therefore, affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment. 3