Douglas K. Skokos (Skokos) appeals the district court’s 1 order denying his motion *766 for a preliminary injunction. Upon careful review, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Skokos’s motion based on his failure to meet the factors set out in Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). See Bandog, Inc. v. Jack’s Tire & Oil, Inc., 190 F.3d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (standard of review). We reject Skokos’s arguments: (1) it was not improper for the court to consider the applicability of Younger 2 abstention in assessing Skokos’s likelihood of success on the merits under Dataphase, cf. Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 113 (court’s approach to issue of success on merits must be flexible enough to encompass particular circumstances of each case), (2) the district court did not err in abstaining, although the pending state action was filed eleven days after the federal ease was filed, cf. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975) (Younger applies when state criminal proceedings are initiated against federal plaintiffs after federal complaint is filed, but before substantial proceedings on the merits have taken place in federal court), and (3) the district court did not improperly refuse to consider relevant evidence or make unsupported factual findings, see Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 819 (1st Cir. 1988) (evidentiary hearing is not needed in cases depending solely on legal issues).

Accordingly, we affirm.