John E. Searcy, III, appeals the District Court’s 1 dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Judge Charles E. Clawson, Jr., of the Chancery Court of Van Burén County, Arkansas, who presided over a quiet-title action involving property the Internal Revenue Service had seized from Searcy. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm. See Lemonds v. St. Louis County, 222 F.3d 488, 492 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting court reviews questions regarding subject matter jurisdiction de novo), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1183, 121 S.Ct. 1168, 148 L.Ed.2d 1026 (2001).

We agree with the District Court that Searcy’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 2 Searcy’s due process claims would have required the District Court to determine the propriety of Judge Clawson’s rulings on jurisdiction, evidentiary issues, and the merits of the quiet-title action. See Ballinger v. Culotta, 322 F.3d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting with the exception of habeas corpus petitions, lower federal • courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments; jurisdictional bar applies to straightforward appeals as well as to “indirect attempts by federal plaintiffs to undermine state court decisions”). Further, this court has previously rejected the void-judgment argument Searcy urges on appeal. See Snider v. City of Excelsior Springs, Mo., 154 F.3d 809, 812 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that under Rooker-Feldman rule, “no federal district court has jurisdic *908 tion to decide that the state court judgment was void”).

Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

A true copy.