[UNPUBLISHED]

Former federal inmate Cesar Cordoba sued the United States Bureau of Prisons and various prison officials, asserting under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) *934 that he was injured as a result of defendants’ negligent failure to train him to use certain machinery safely during his UNI-COR employment. Cordoba also asserted a retaliation claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). The district court 1 dismissed Cordoba’s Bivens claim after he failed to provide proof of exhaustion. The magistrate judge 2 dismissed without prejudice Cordoba’s FTCA claim upon finding that his sole remedy against the government was a claim under the Federal Prison Industries’ Inmate Accident Compensation (IAC) system. See 18 U.S.C. § 4126; 28 C.F.R. §§ 301.101-.319. Cordoba appeals both rulings.

Following careful review of the record and Cordoba’s arguments on appeal, we believe that Cordoba’s claims were properly dismissed. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (exhaustion); 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (inmate compensation for injuries); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 532, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (prisoner cannot bring Bivens action involving prison conditions before exhausting available administrative remedies); United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149, 151-54, 87 S.Ct. 382, 17 L.Ed.2d 258 (1966) (§ 4126 is exclusive remedy for federal inmates’ work-related injuries, and FTCA actions which seek recovery for such injuries are barred). In particular, the district court was not bound by an Institution Safety Committee’s finding — which, as Cordoba was advised, was subject to review by an IAC Committee upon his filing of an IAC claim — that his injury was not work-related; the record does not indicate Cordoba pursued an available remedy by filing an IAC claim; and Cordoba did not allege retaliation, or even facts from which a retaliation claim could be inferred, in his prison grievances.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.