[UNPUBLISHED]

Stephen Griffin’s attorneys, David Nixon and Theresa Pockrus (“Griffin’s Counsel”), appeal from the district court’s 1 order affirming the bankruptcy court’s 2 imposition of $1,100 in sanctions against them under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011. 3 The bankruptcy court imposed the sanctions because Griffin’s Counsel had filed, in Griffin’s name, counterclaims for which standing to sue rested solely with the bankruptcy estate’s trustee.

We review the bankruptcy court’s imposition of sanctions for an abuse of discretion. In re Coones Ranch, Inc., 7 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 1993). The bankruptcy estate included Griffin’s counterclaims. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1); Whetzal v. Alderson, 32 F.3d 1302, 1303 (8th Cir. 1994). The bankruptcy trustee had the capacity to sue and be sued with respect to the estate’s property. 11 U.S.C. § 323. Griffin’s Counsel failed to establish any exception to the general rule that “a debtor may not prosecute on his own a cause of action belonging to the estate unless that cause of action has been abandoned by the trustee.” Vreugdenhil v. Hoekstra, 773 F.2d 213, 215 (8th Cir. 1985); cf. Wissman v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Bank, 942 F.2d 867, 869-71 (4th Cir. 1991) (where cause of action was exempt *469 under bankruptcy laws and therefore not property of bankruptcy estate, debtor had standing to bring cause of action in own name without trustee’s formal abandonment of claim). We conclude that the bankruptcy court’s imposition of sanctions was not an abuse of discretion. See Cooter & Gell v. Harbmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990) (trial court is best situated to determine when sanctions are warranted; deference to determination of courts on front lines of litigation enhances courts’ ability to control litigants).

Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.