Arkansas inmate Carl Davis, Jr., appeals the district court’s 1 preservice dismissal with prejudice of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to state a claim. Upon de novo review, see Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), we affirm.

We agree with the district court that Davis’s alleged due process violations resulting from a disciplinary hearing and conviction were cured by its reversal. See Wycoff v. Nichols, 94 F.3d 1187, 1189 (8th Cir. 1996) (reversal of disciplinary case against prisoner constituted due process prisoner received and it cured alleged due process violation). We also find no merit to Davis’s claim that he was denied due *637 process by not being restored to his prior classification status, and enduring the resulting more restrictive living conditions, as the conditions did not amount to an “atypical and significant” hardship. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (confinement in segregation does not implicate Due Process Clause unless confinement imposes atypical and significant hardship on inmate in relation to ordinary prison life); Glick v. Walker, 834 F.2d 709, 711 (8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (failure of prison official to properly classify inmate does not amount to constitutional violation). Finally, as to Davis’s allegation that his conviction resulted in a loss of good-time credit, Davis must seek relief in a habeas proceeding. See Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2002) (§ 1983 claim for damages from prison discipline that resulted in loss of good-time credits does not arise until inmate has challenged discipline through habeas proceeding); see also Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007) (rule set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994)-that person challenging loss of sentence-reduction credits must do so through habeas action-applies even if habeas remedy is no longer available to plaintiff).

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.