After revoking her supervised release, the district court 1 sentenced Brenda Louise Niehaus to 7 days in prison and 1 year of supervised release with a special condition requiring her to reside in a residential re-entry center for up to 120 days. On appeal, Niehaus argues that her confinement in a residential re-entry center is unreasonable, and that her revocation sentence is greater than necessary to meet the statutory goals of sentencing.

Niehaus’s challenge to this condition of her sentence is moot because she has been released from the residential re-entry center. Cf. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 5-7, 18, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (habeas challenge to parole revocation became moot upon expiration of sentence). After careful review, we conclude that her revocation sentence, which is within statutory limits, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583, is not unreasonable, see United States v. Tyson, 413 F.3d 824, 825-26 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (court reviews revocation sentences under “unreasonableness” standard announced in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258-63, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005)); see also United States v. Long Soldier, 431 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 2005) (reasonableness of sentence is reviewed for abuse of discretion, which occurs if court fails to consider relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives significant weight to improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only appropriate factors but commits clear error of judgment in weighing factors).

Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm.