Former federal inmate Michael Antonel-li brought suit for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against officials at the Federal Correctional Complex in Arkansas. He alleged that defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances, and violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights, as well as his right to due process. The district court 1 *904 dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim. Anto-nelli appeals. After careful de novo review, see Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), we affirm.

First, we conclude that Antonelli failed to state a retaliation claim because he either failed to allege which defendants were involved in or affected by his grievances, see Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim where inmate failed to allege sufficient facts from which retaliatory animus could be inferred); see also Gordon v. Hansen, 168 F.3d 1109,1113 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (§ 1983 and Bivens suits involve same analysis), or failed to allege particular actions by specific defendants that would have chilled a person of ordinary firmness from filing grievances, see Lewis v. Jacks, 486 F.3d 1025, 1028 (8th Cir. 2007).

We also conclude that dismissal was proper as to each of the remaining Bivens claims because Antonelli either did not allege facts rising to the level of a constitutional violation, or did not allege facts indicating any defendant’s personal involvement in the claimed violation. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 475-76, 483-84, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (confinement in segregation does not implicate Due Process Clause unless confinement imposes atypical and significant hardship on inmate in relation to ordinary prison life); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (requirements for Eighth Amendment claim against prison official); Bandy-Bey v. Crist, 578 F.3d 763, 767 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (requirements for establishing violation of substantive due process rights); Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2006) (for prisoner claiming denial of access to courts, notice pleading requires specific allegations as to prejudice suffered because of defendants’ alleged conduct); Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985) (where plaintiff did not allege defendant was personally involved in or had direct responsibility for incidents that injured him, his claims against that defendant were not cognizable under § 1983).

Finally, we conclude that Antonelli failed to state a claim under the FTCA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), (c) (FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity shall not apply to any claim based on federal agent’s exercise or performance of discretionary function, or to any claim arising in respect of detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by law enforcement officer); § 1346(b)(2) (requiring person convicted of felony who is incarcerated while serving sentence to show physical injury before bringing civil action against United States for mental or emotional injury).

Accordingly, we affirm.