Anthony Alardin appeals from the order of the District Court 1 denying his motion for a certifícate setting aside his 1983 criminal conviction under the Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA), 18 U.S.C. § 5021 (1982) (repealed 1984). We grant Alardin’s motion to file a supplemental brief. After carefully considering the parties’ arguments and reviewing the record, we conclude that the District Court properly denied Alardin’s motion because he did not receive an early unconditional discharge from his original term of probation or from his subsequent two-year probation-revocation sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 5021(a) (requiring the issuance of a certificate setting aside a FYCA conviction upon the Parole Commission’s unconditional discharge of the committed youth offender before the expiration “of the maximum sentence imposed upon him” (emphasis added)); id. § 5021(b) (requiring the issuance of a certificate setting aside a FYCA conviction when a youth offender has been placed on probation and the court grants him an unconditional discharge from probation before “the expiration of the maximum period of probation theretofore fixed by the court ” (emphasis added)); Tuten v. United States, 460 U.S. 660, 666, 103 S.Ct. 1412, 75 L.Ed.2d 359 (1983) (noting that the set-aside provision in § 5021(b) applies only to youth offenders discharged before their original proba *502 tionary terms have expired). Accordingly, we affirm the District Court.