In 2006, Clifton Brown was indicted on charges of possessing with intent to distribute marijuana, more than five grams of cocaine base, and cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). After the District Court 1 denied Brown’s motion to suppress evidence, Brown pleaded guilty to all counts. The District Court initially sentenced him to 130 months in prison: an aggregate of 70 months for the drug offenses and a consecutive 60-month term for the firearm offense. On Brown’s 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion to reduce sentence, the court amended its judgment to reduce the aggregate sentence for the drug offenses to 60 months in prison, for a total prison term of 120 months, the statutory minimum. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)®, (D)(ii); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(B)(iii). Brown appeals. His counsel has moved to withdraw and filed a *923 brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), arguing that the District Court erred in denying the suppression motion and that the sentence imposed was unreasonable.

We reject these arguments. First, by pleading guilty, Brown waived the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. See United States v. Arrellano, 213 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that a defendant who pleads guilty waives all suppression issues not expressly reserved by a conditional plea). Second, the District Court’s imposition of the statutory minimum sentence was not unreasonable. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Having reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm the judgment of the District Court.