Mark Alan Hall appeals from the order of the District Court 1 order upholding the denial of disability insurance benefits. Upon de novo review, we conclude that the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See Partee v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 860, 868 (8th Cir. 2011) (standard of review). Specifically, we conclude that the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference, see Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 935 (8th *610 Cir. 2008) (noting that this Court defers to the ALJ’s credibility determination if the ALJ explicitly discredits the claimant’s testimony and gives good reasons for doing so); that the ALJ was not required to develop the record further on Hall’s depression, see Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 926-27 (8th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the ALJ is required to order medical examinations only if the medical records before him do not provide sufficient evidence to determine whether the claimant is disabled); Dunahoo v. Apfel, 241 F.3d 1033, 1039 (8th Cir. 2001) (observing that a failure to “allege depression on [an] application for disability benefits is significant, even if the evidence of depression was later developed”); that Hall failed to meet his burden of establishing that his depression or fibromyalgia were severe impairments, see Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707-08 (8th Cir. 2007) (“An impairment is not severe if it amounts only to a slight abnormality that would not significantly limit the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.”); and that the ALJ’s determination as to Hall’s physical residual functional capacity (RFC) is supported by substantial evidence, see Jones v. Astrue, 619 F.3d 963, 971 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting that the ALJ is responsible for determining RFC based on all relevant evidence and that the determination must be supported by some medical evidence). The District Court is affirmed, and we deny Hall’s motion to supplement the record.