Jamie Charles directly appeals after he pled guilty to possession of a machine gun in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, and the district court 1 — upon granting the government’s motion for a downward de *660 parture-sentenced him below the statutory minimum. Charles’s counsel has moved to withdraw, and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), alluding to the fact that Charles at sentencing expressed confusion about the offense to which he had pled guilty, and suggesting that Charles is dissatisfied with his sentence, but asserting no grounds for reversal. Charles has filed a supplemental brief, challenging the factual basis for his plea.

Upon careful review, we note that Charles specifically confirmed at the plea hearing that he understood he was pleading guilty to possession of a machine gun in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, and thus we conclude that he knowingly pled guilty to that offense. Cf United States v. Todd, 521 F.3d 891, 895 (8th Cir. 2008) (defendant properly advised of nature of charge to which he pled guilty where prosecutor recited elements of offense at plea hearing). We further conclude that there is no merit to his challenges concerning the factual basis for his plea. See O’Leary v. United States, 856 F.2d 1142, 1143 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (in pleading guilty, defendant admits all factual allegations made in indictment). Finally, having reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we find no non-frivolous issues.

Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm.