In a prior opinion in this matter, we reversed the district court’s application of the obstruction of justice sentencing enhancement to defendant Hugo Galaviz. See United States v. Galaviz, 687 F.3d 1042, 1043 (8th Cir. 2012). We concluded that the obstruction of justice enhancement did not apply because Galaviz had already pleaded guilty, and although the record established that he had conspired to kill a confidential informant while in prison, nothing in the record suggested that Galaviz intended to kill the informant for the purposes of impeding the progress of the case against Galaviz. Id. We thus remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 1044. On remand, the district court 1 resentenced Galaviz, removing the enhancement, but the court refused to grant Galaviz an acceptance of responsibility reduction, given his role in the murder conspiracy.

In the present appeal, Galaviz argues that the district court exceeded the scope of remand by failing to apply the acceptance of responsibility reduction at resen-tencing. 2 According to Galaviz, because the district court’s sole basis for denying the reduction at original sentencing was *684 based upon application of the obstruction of justice enhancement, once we reversed the court’s application of the enhancement, the district court did not have remand authority “to construe the conduct supporting the erroneous application of the obstruction of justice enhancement in such a manner as to now deny acceptance of responsibility.” We think the opposite is true. In the past, we have explicitly directed a district court to reconsider the acceptance of responsibility adjustment after we reversed its obstruction of justice determination. United States v. Peters, 394 F.3d 1103, 1108 (8th Cir. 2005). Here, although our prior opinion did not explicitly direct the district court to reconsider its previous acceptance of responsibility determination, we conclude this was necessarily within the district court’s remand authority given the close interaction between the Guidelines at issue. 3 See United States v. Castellanos, 608 F.3d 1010, 1017 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[Ljower courts are free to decide new issues left open on remand.”). And, too, contrary to Galaviz’s contention, our prior opinion only determined the peripherally related obstruction of justice enhancement issue and said nothing about an acceptance of responsibility reduction, much less inferentially resolved it in his favor. Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err in considering and denying Galaviz an acceptance of responsibility reduction at resentencing.

We affirm.