David O. Colbenson appeals the district court’s 2 order affirming the denial of disability insurance benefits (DIB). Upon de novo review of the record, see Van Vickie v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 825, 828 & n. 2 (8th Cir. 2008), and careful consideration of Col-benson’s arguments for reversal, we find no basis for overturning the administrative law judge’s (ALJ’s) determination that Colbenson was not disabled from his alleged onset date of January 1, 2008, until his date last insured (DLI) of March 31, 2003, see Dipple v. Astrue, 601 F.3d 833, 834 (8th Cir. 2010) (DIB claimant must prove he was disabled before DLI). Specifically, we defer to the ALJ’s credibility determination, because it was supported by several valid reasons. See Renstrom v. Astrue, 680 F.3d 1057, 1067 (8th Cir. 2012); see also Medhaug v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 805, 813 (8th Cir. 2009) (impairment controlled by treatment or medication is not considered disabling). Further, we find that the disability determination by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is not relevant, because the VA’s favorable decision was not rendered until after the ALJ’s decision and was not effective until well after Colbenson’s DLI. Finally, we conclude that the ALJ’s determination as to Colbenson’s residual functional capacity (RFC) is supported by substantial evidence. See Perks v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1086, 1092 (8th Cir. 2012) (RFC determination); Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 930-31 (8th Cir. 2010) (global assessment of functioning score may be of considerable help in formulating RFC, but is not essential to RFC’s accuracy); Leckenby v. Astrue, 487 F.3d 626, 632 (8th Cir. 2007) (treating physician’s opinion is entitled to great weight but does not automatically control; where limitations listed on form were never mentioned in treatment records or supported by objective testing or reasoning, ALJ’s decision to discount them should be upheld). The judgment of the district court is affirmed.