Myron Hubbard appeals the district court’s 1 order dismissing his amended pro se complaint against his former employer the Missouri Department of Mental Health (MDMH), and the St. Louis Psychiatric Rehabilitation Center (Center), the MDMH facility where Hubbard had worked as a registered nurse. Hubbard asserted various civil claims, including that defendants denied him leave he was entitled to under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Upon careful review, see Butler v. Bank of Am., N.A., 690 F.3d 959, 961 (8th Cir. 2012) (de novo review of dismissal for failure to state claim), we conclude dismissal was appropriate: defendants were immune from suit for alleged violations of the FMLA’s self-care provision, see Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1327, 1338, 182 L.Ed.2d 296 (2012); Hubbard did not show he had exhausted administrative remedies before bringing his Title VII claim, see Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 850-51 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (Title VII exhaustion requirements); and the Eleventh Amendment barred Hubbard’s other claims against defendants, see Murphy v. State of Ark., 127 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 1997). We further conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hubbard leave to amend and add an additional party, given the many opportunities Hubbard had to amend his complaint over the 18-month course of this litigation. See Moses.com Sec., Inc. v. Comprehensive Software Sys., Inc., 406 F.3d 1052, 1065-66 (8th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.